Chapter 52 8. The Soviet Central Military Region stipulates to save people's resources

On June 26, 1946, after the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek had completed preparations for launching a full-scale civil war, he tore up all the armistice agreements and aggressively invaded our Central Plains Liberated Area, and immediately attacked our Shandong, Jiangsu and Anhui, Shanxi, Hebei, Luyu, Jinchaji, and Jinsui. The Liberated Areas such as Liberated Areas, Northeast China, etc. launched a large-scale offensive, and the focus of the attack was on the East China Liberated Areas. Since then, civil wars of unprecedented scale have begun. On July 20, 1946, the Party Central Committee issued the instruction "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by Self-Defense War", clearly stating: We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek.The whole party should have full confidence in this.It also stipulates military, political, and economic principles and policies.In the military, we must persist in the implementation of mobile warfare, with the main goal of annihilating the vital forces of the Kuomintang army, rather than the active defense strategy with the main goal of conserving or seizing places; politically, we must establish a broad united front and strengthen the revolutionary forces; economically, we must Make long-term plans, insist on self-reliance, increase production, and practice strict economy.

During this period, some problems also appeared in the combat support work. The troops at all levels went to the government to support the front forces, and there was a lack of organized and planned progress. On the one hand, it caused some waste, on the other hand, government agencies, especially governments at all levels below the county level, were overwhelmed, or unable to support, or violated discipline, and even some local officials went into hiding.At the same time, when the army used the support force, the organization and management were not good, such as lax organization, political ideology, and living guarantees were not implemented, which caused some front-line masses to desert, causing the army to ask the government repeatedly, and so on.In order to correct these chaotic phenomena, each strategic area has been reorganized successively, distinguishing the scope and authority of mobilization, emphasizing that the troops should plan carefully, properly solve the work of food, lodging and ideological education for civilians; minimize needs, try to reduce the burden on the people, and pay attention to balance Combat missions between regions.

In late August 1946, after the Battle of Central Soviet Union, the head of the Central China Field Army pointed out in "A Letter to Military and Political Heads at All Levels to Protect People's Power": Cherishing people's power and material resources is decisive in achieving the final victory of the war today. the elements of. ... During the 40 days of combat, our army began to learn the tactics of mobile warfare of the large corps, the weapons were greatly enriched, and military technology was also improved. ... But during these 40 days, it was neglected by everyone, and it was another decisive task, that is, the work of saving people's resources and material resources. ...But now, due to the large number of civilians, the waste of civilians has reached an astonishing level. Many people don't recite anything, and everything is handed over to the civilians, and many unnecessary things are also picked up by the civilians. Wounded soldiers rushed to build pontoon bridges, and even did not send cover troops when passing the blockade, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In 40 days, there have been hundreds of civilian casualties, and even more people are suffering from illness... Today's war is a comparison of manpower and material resources war.I am at a huge disadvantage in terms of material resources.But the war is fought in the liberated areas, and we have the upper hand in terms of manpower.However, if we cannot cherish this power well and use it economically, then our manpower is still limited, and we will fail due to insufficient manpower and material resources. ...According to the estimate of the 40-day logistics work, the ratio of civilian manpower used in this battle is 1 to 3 to 1 to 4, which means that 1 soldier uses 3 to 4 civilians. This is a Big waste.According to the general principle, at most 1 to 1 is enough for civilians in the front, and 1 to 0.5 is enough for the rear transportation line.

In order to save people's resources and facilitate long-term combat, the following points are stipulated, and we hope that military, political, supply, and health agencies at all levels will strictly implement them. First, every soldier must carry all his belongings by himself, and civilian husbands are not allowed to carry them... Second, those below the rank of cadres should carry it with them, and put the rest in the burden of civilian husbands, and each person should not exceed 8 catties.The company-level cadres of the company share one civilian husband, which should not exceed 60 catties in total, other company-level cadres should not exceed 10 catties each, battalion-level and above cadres should not exceed 15 catties, and regiment-level cadres should not exceed 30 catties. Or subtract 2/3 and put it on the horse.should be strictly limited.

Third, the food burden of each catering unit shall not exceed 2 people. Fourth, the food burden generally should not exceed the food needed for 3 days, that is, the food needed by 10 people is equal to one peasant. Fifth, each regiment should form a transportation team for ammunition, composed of civilian men and captive masters, who are responsible for it, but there must be 1/3 of the old masters for management. Sixth, each regiment forms a stretcher team. 20 stretchers and 60 wives are responsible for rescuing the wounded from the front line and handing them over to civilian husbands after they get off the line of fire.The stretcher soldier can be served by 2/3 of the captives.

Seventh, each division immediately set up an engineering company to take on the task of building bridges and roads. They can choose from captured engineers, but not more than 1/3. ... It must be ensured that the direct users of civilians, except stretchers, cannot exceed 25%, that is, 10,000 troops cannot exceed 2,500 civilians, and gradually reduce them to prepare for protracted operations (Historical Materials on Military Political Work, Vol. 10, Nos. 327-328 Page).