Chapter 44 V. Volunteers implement the requirements of the central government and deploy anti-landing operations

According to the decision-making and deployment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission, from late December 1952 to April 1953, the Volunteer Army prepared for an unprecedented scale of anti-landing operations with the attitude of winning the "passing the battle". After Deng Hua returned to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army from Beijing, he co-chaired it with Yang Dezhi. From December 17th to 21st, meetings of the Volunteer Army Party Committee and cadres above the military level were held consecutively to convey the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong’s instructions. Prepare for battle.

On the 17th, the Volunteer Army held a party committee meeting, and there were various corps, the Volunteer Army Rear Service Command, the heads of the Front Transport Command, as well as Cui Yongjian, Park Yiyu, and Jin Guangxia from the People's Army, and Simonov, the chief adviser of the Soviet Army to the Volunteer Army. will attend the meeting.The meeting unanimously agreed and supported Mao Zedong's judgment and determination to affirm that the "United Nations Army" will land, and affirm the landing on the west coast, and discussed and determined the preliminary plan for anti-landing operations. Instructions to annihilate the enemy on the sea or on the beach, and absolutely not allow the enemy to gain a foothold behind. This is not only the case on the west coast, but also on the east coast, Wonsan, Tongchuan and Haizhou should be fully prepared, and the front should actively attack the enemy, constantly Annihilate the enemy, seize the enemy, destroy the enemy's landing plan, and achieve the annihilation of the enemy within the next year."

The meeting focused on the preparations for deployment on the west coast, and made preliminary decisions on the adjustment of troop deployment on the entire battlefield, the adjustment of command relations, the construction of fortifications on the east and west coasts and the frontal front, and determined that all preparations should be done before March 15, 1953. Finish. Immediately afterwards, from the 18th to the 21st, a meeting of cadres above the Volunteer Army was held, which conveyed Mao Zedong's instructions to Deng Hua's report "On the Korean War and the Volunteer Army's Policy and Tasks in 1953," and conveyed the 12th anniversary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. On the 20th, he gave instructions to the Volunteers about preparing for anti-landing operations, and further studied and deployed preparations for anti-landing operations.Deng Hua made a report at the meeting.

The meeting pointed out: "The future task is to continue to implement the general policy of protracted combat and active defense, to strengthen the coastal defenses of the two wings, especially the defense of the west coast, with the greatest determination and efforts, and to prepare to attack the enemy's landing, airborne and Drop the atomic bomb....We must spare no sacrifices and overcome any difficulties. We must resolutely not allow the enemy to land. When the enemy lands, we must resolutely destroy it. We must never allow the enemy to establish a front line behind us. Frontal forces must be prepared to attack the enemy's attack. And should actively attack the enemy, constantly annihilate the enemy to seize the enemy, and destroy the enemy's landing plan."

After the meeting, Deng Hua and Yang Dezhi issued the anti-landing combat preparations to the troops on the 23rd. According to Mao Zedong's instructions on deploying troops with combat experience in North Korea to the east and west coasts, especially the west coast, they decided to use the first phase of rotation to enter North Korea's 23rd, 24th, and 46th armies will take over the defense of the front-line 38th, 15th, and 40th armies respectively, and deploy the 15th, 38th, and 40th armies on the east coast or west coast; The area south of the Datong River on the west coast is under the command of the 19th Corps; the headquarters of the 9th Corps on the east coast is swapped with the headquarters of the 3rd Corps on the front, and the headquarters of the 3rd Corps is also the East Coast Command.At the same time, requirements were put forward for the construction of fortifications, anti-tank and anti-airborne.The adjustment of troop deployment is required to start immediately, and the adjustment will be completed before January 20, 1953; all preparations will be completed by the end of February and no later than March 15.

On the same day, a deployment order was issued for preparations for anti-landing operations on the west coast, and specific instructions were given for infantry deployment, special forces deployment, anti-tank and anti-airborne deployment, and fortification deployment. That night, Deng Hua went to Pyongyang and reported to Kim Il Sung the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong's analysis of the war situation and instructions for future operations, as well as the specific measures taken by the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army to implement the instructions of the Central Committee. Anti-login deployment problem. On December 24, Kim Il Sung presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. Deng Hua attended the meeting and introduced the relevant situation.The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and Kim Il Sung "fully agree with the views and decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the situation in North Korea, and agree with the specific measures of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army."

The Workers' Party of Korea and the government also decided to appoint Jin Xiong as the deputy commander of the East Coast Command and Fang Hushan as the deputy commander of the West Coast Command; mobilize a large number of workers across the country to participate in the construction of coastal fortifications, and try their best to meet the needs of civil and engineering materials for anti-landing operations. On the 25th, Deng Hua telegraphed the situation to Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission. On December 27, Mao Zedong replied to Deng Hua, agreeing to the various matters agreed with Kim Il Sung and the various military deployments of the Volunteer Army.

According to the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army have made substantial adjustments to the command structures on the east and west coasts. Deng Hua, Acting Commander and Political Commissar of the Volunteer Army concurrently served as Commander and Political Commissar of the West Coast Joint Command; Liang Xingchu, Fang Hushan (People's Army), and Wu Xinquan served as Deputy Commanders of the West Coast Command; Du Ping served as Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department , Wang Zhengzhu served as chief of staff.Under the West Coast Command, the Air Force Front Command Post, Naval Operations Office (Navy Command Post), Armored Forces Second Command Post (Director Roger) and Artillery Director's Office (later changed to Command Post, Commander Gao Cunxin, Political Commissar Liu He) were established.

The East Coast Joint Command (East Sea Finger) is concurrently served by the headquarters of the Volunteer Army's 3rd Corps. Army Jin Xiong served as deputy commander of the East Coast Command, Wang Yunrui, chief of staff of the Volunteer Army's 3rd Corps, concurrently served as chief of staff of the East Coast Command, and Liu Youguang, director of the Political Department of the 3rd Corps, concurrently served as director of the Political Department of the East Coast Command. According to the deployment of the Volunteer Army Party Committee, starting from January 1953, the two headquarters on the east and west coasts generally carried out in-depth political mobilization of the troops under their command. On January 16, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission issued "Key Points for Political Mobilization on Actively Preparing to Resolutely Crush the Enemy's Landing Adventure" to the Volunteer Army and the Political Departments of major units of the entire army.The general administration required all commanders and fighters of the Volunteer Army to "in addition to continue to strengthen the 38th line operations and actively annihilate the enemy, they must use all their strength to intensify their rearward preparations and fight to completely crush the enemy's landing attack."Subsequently, the Political Department of the Volunteer Army issued instructions, requiring all units to further conduct extensive and in-depth ideological and political mobilization work based on the political mobilization points of the General Political Department of the Military Commission.

After taking office, Eisenhower delivered a State of the Union address on February 2, vigorously advocating the US policy of global aggression and expansion, and formally announced the policy of "release Chiang from the cage". On February 7, Mao Zedong responded to Eisenhower: "We want peace, but as long as U.S. imperialism does not give up its outrageous and unreasonable demands and plots to expand aggression, the Chinese people's determination is to work with the Korean people to continue Continue to fight. This is not because we are belligerent. We are willing to cease the war immediately, and the remaining problems will be resolved in the future. But the U.S. imperialists do not want to do this. How many years are you planning to fight with him, until the time when the U.S. imperialists are willing to stop, until the time when the Chinese and North Korean people are completely victorious."