Chapter 24 Chapter 23 Repay the Country with the Fruit of Victory
At the beginning of 1941, the Emperor of Japan sent the following "inquiry" to the Chief of Staff:
Is it reorganizing its troops in China as planned?According to the Chief Attaché, the planned 650,000 has become 720,000.Make up your mind to organize, don't give up halfway.Are the rear preparations complete?Napoleon's invasion of Moscow was defeated by a war of attrition and guerrilla warfare.Won't the Japanese army get into trouble in China?
Regarding the question of whether the Japanese army would get into trouble in China, Chief of Staff Sugiyama Moto approached Minister of War Hideki Tojo to discuss how to answer the emperor.The final result of the discussion was: it is necessary to continue to implement comprehensive military oppression against China, especially the serious security problem in North China, and it is necessary to concentrate the army and aviation forces to fight in this area.Other than that, there is no other way.
On January 16, the Japanese army base camp held an army meeting to review the "Guidelines for the Long-term War in Greater East Asia" and the "Guidance Plan for the Long-term War Against China". "Two words.When the army generals answered the questions of the heads of the cabinet about the current war situation, they were full of vague fantasies and concealed helplessness: 1. The danger of war between Japan and the United States was extremely high, but it was unlikely within 1941; 2. If it attacks Southeast Asia, the Army needs five or six months of preparation time; third, if the Soviet Union goes to war with Japan, the Soviet Union will have to prepare for three or four months, but the Soviet Union is currently not prepared to deal with a two-fronted war; fourth, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" In addition to including Japan, Manchuria, and China, French Indochina and Thailand should also be added. The "Guidelines for the Long-Term War in Greater East Asia" is no longer in the archives. Its general content is: "use force to solve the southern issue", "make French Indochina and Thailand the backbone of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", "continue to implement Oppression, and strive to solve the Chinese incident with comprehensive military, political, and strategic pressure in the summer and autumn of the 16th year of Showa", "For the north, the current policy is to maintain stability, and to establish perseverance in the fourteen divisions in Manchuria and North Korea." inexorable posture".The gist of the "Guidance Plan for Long-Term Combat Against China" adopted at the meeting is:
1. Before the 16th year of Showa (1942), do not relax the current pressure on China, and use all methods during this period, especially taking advantage of the changes in the international situation, to try to resolve the Chinese incident.After the 16th year of Showa, it turned to a long-term and persistent situation, and the number of troops in China was maintained at 500,000 in a few years.
2. The main purpose of the operation is to maintain law and order and occupy the area, and large-scale offensive operations will no longer be carried out.If necessary, a short-term surprise attack with the purpose of cutting off can be carried out, but the principle is not to expand the occupied area and return to the original station.
3. Prepare to exert comprehensive combat power during the summer and autumn of the 16th year of the Showa era, put heavy pressure on the enemy, and strive to resolve the incident.However, considering the changes in the international situation caused by the evolution of the European war situation (adjustment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, etc.), it is necessary to fully prepare for political and military adjustments.
Fourth, do not relax the air offensive operations, continue to increase the pressure.
5. Throughout the period, strive to strengthen the blockade on the ground, at sea and in the air.Cut off the channel of French Indochina, block the channel of Burma, block the sea with the navy and block the seaport with the army in parallel, and strengthen the economic oppression of China.
Sixth, make full use of political and strategic measures aimed at dialogue and oppression.
7. Government affairs guidance is based on the "Outline for Handling Incidents in China".In particular, efforts should be made to enrich the national strength of the empire and enhance the mobility of national defense.
8. In order to adapt to the policy of long-term combat, strive to carry out rationalization reforms in the required establishment, system and other aspects.
Every year when the Japanese military headquarters promulgated the "Guidance Plan for Combat against China", it stipulated that year as the deadline for "resolving the incident in China". However, until 1941, the huge Japanese army was still trapped in the Chinese battlefield.Therefore, this time, Anan Keiji, Deputy Minister of the Army, made it clear at the meeting that he himself was "more worried about actively trying to resolve the incident in China."
On January 19, the Tokyo General Staff Headquarters sent people to Nanjing, China with the "Guidance Plan for Long-term Combat against China" to meet with Hisao Nishio, commander-in-chief of the Chinese Expeditionary Force.Hisao Nishio was deeply troubled by the decision of the base camp to reduce its troops in China: What does it mean "the North must persevere"?What is "long-term combat posture"?What is "appropriate economic measures"?
Doesn't the Japanese army need perseverance on the Chinese battlefield?Is it possible to maintain a long-term combat posture by reducing the number of troops in China?Could the pro-Japanese Chinese armed forces make up for the weakening of the Japanese army's combat effectiveness in China?Can we increase our combat power by simply preventing anti-war materials from flowing into enemy areas?Hisao Nishio's conclusion is that this plan is very unrealistic.
Nishio Hiszo made the following written response to the "guidance" from the base camp:
1. In the operations in 1941, in accordance with the current tasks, we should roughly secure the currently occupied areas.Especially in the summer and autumn seasons, we will exert comprehensive combat power and exert great pressure on the enemy. We are especially looking forward to the battle to eliminate the Central Army in the south of Shanxi in North China.
2. During summer and autumn, maximize the power of aviation offensive operations.
3. Strengthen land and sea blockades throughout the entire period to prevent inflows and outflows, with special emphasis on Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou and other places.
4. The policy of government affairs shall be handled in accordance with the "Outline for Handling Incidents in China".Especially in the occupied areas, establish areas isolated from the enemy.
5. Regardless of whether it is to adapt to the intention of the Central Ministry to obtain clues to resolve the incident in 1941 or to take into account the international situation after next year, it is necessary to achieve remarkable results in eliminating the combat effectiveness of the enemy within this year.
Hisao Nishio’s core point of view is: the only way to end the war in China is to continue fighting.
The eagerness to "achieve remarkable results" has evolved into the general anxiety of the Japanese invaders.Anxiety stems from this contradiction: you have to fight, and not fighting is tantamount to consumption on the spot. You can neither get supplies that are increasingly in short supply, nor can you plunder domestic resources that are in short supply, let alone talk about "putting greater pressure on the enemy" so that end the war.However, it is impossible to fight on a large scale, not to mention that the base camp needs to reduce its troops in China. As far as the existing troops are concerned, large-scale operations cannot consolidate the occupied areas, and several battles have proved that the Chinese army will run away as soon as it hits. It is impossible to capture their main force and annihilate them.
Hisao Nishio decided that the Japanese army's future combat method should be "short-range interception operations."That is, in order to save troops and reduce consumption, instead of long-distance and large-depth battles with the Chinese army, short-term assaults were adopted. "The division's entry limit is between ten and fifteen miles (the distance from the enemy's division headquarters)."The problem is: the rapid assault to the position "ten to fifteen miles" away from the division headquarters of the Chinese army is entirely wishful thinking by Hisao Nishio. See the shadow of the Chinese division headquarters ten miles away?
According to the deployment of the dispatched army headquarters, Sonobe and Ichiro, the commander of the Japanese Eleventh Army, began to actively look for fighters for "short-range interception operations".After the Battle of Suizao and the Battle of Zaoyi, for some reason, the generals of the Japanese Eleventh Army still believed that the main force of the Chinese army in front of them was still Tang Enbo's troops.After the Eleventh Army occupied Yichang, Tang Enbo's troops were the closest Chinese army to confront the Japanese army. However, soon, the Japanese army could not find Tang Enbo's troops.In January 1941, information suddenly came out that Tang Enbo's tribe appeared in the area of Suiping and Xiangcheng, about 100 kilometers north of Xinyang, Henan.What did Tang Enbo do in Henan?After analysis, the Japanese army believed that the purpose of its movement was not to target the Japanese army, but to target the Communist armed forces:
Due to the intensification of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Tang Enbo's group's eastward advance was intended to crusade against the New Fourth Army in Anhui Province.However, for fear that the Japanese army would cut off its retreat, it will no longer advance eastward.The reason why they moved to the plains was the issue of supplies, so this judgment is more appropriate.Therefore, his position will not move for the time being, and when I attack, it is estimated that he will retreat to the northwest.
This judgment made the Japanese army very excited.The 11th Army immediately drew up a combat plan: First, carry out a feint attack in the direction of Xiangyang in the Fifth Theater of China, so as to create the illusion that the Japanese army is attacking the Fifth Theater on a large scale. Dodging in the direction, at that time surrounded and annihilated it halfway.According to the principle of "short distance", the 11th Army of the Japanese Army set the attack limit to Gwangju, Xincai and Xiping, 80 kilometers northeast of Xinyang, Henan Province. They estimated that Tang Enbo's troops could only run here and be surrounded. Living.
Why is it judged that Tang Enbo's troops will be surrounded and wiped out within the set range?
The southern part of Henan refers to the great plain west of the Huaihe Plain, north of the Dabie Mountains and Tongbai Mountains, and east of the Funiu Mountains. The Ping-Han Railway runs through it, and the roads extend in all directions. It is an important strategic support point for China's Anti-Japanese War.
After the Japanese army occupied Yichang, they were still threatened by the Chinese army on their backs. Therefore, the forces confronting the Fifth Theater consisted of about seven and a half divisions of infantry, one brigade of independent cavalry, three regiments of independent tanks, and one independent field heavy artillery. The wing has a total strength of 150,000, and more than 100 aircraft concentrated at airports such as Anyang, Xinxiang, and Xinyang can provide combat support at any time.
As for Tang Enbo's 31st Group Army, which is located in the Pinghan Road and Yellow Flooding Area, except for Li Xianzhou's 92nd Army, which was deployed at Jieshou at the junction of Henan and Anhui to monitor the Japanese troops in eastern Henan, all other armies were deployed in The front of Pinghan Road.At this time, the approximate positions of the other troops in China's fifth war zone were: in the Dabie Mountain area on the east side of Pinghan Road, two divisions of Mo Shujie's 84th Army; in the Tongbai Mountain area, Cao Fulin's 55th Army and Sun Du the five divisions of the 58th Army of China; the five divisions of the 41st Army of Sun Zhen and the 45th Army of Chen Dingxun in the Suizao area; the 44th Army of Liao Zhen from Dahongshan to the east bank of the Xiang River and four divisions of Yu Nianci's 67th Army; on the west bank of the Xiang River, defending in the direction of Yichang were Chifengcheng's 30th Army, Liu Heding's 39th Army, and Feng Zhian's 77th Army's Sixth Army. teacher.In addition, the Second Cavalry Army of He Zhuguo was deployed in the Yellow Flood Area.Judging from the distribution of troops in the fifth war zone, Tang Enbo's 31st Army is a bit isolated to the east—although the Japanese army judged that Tang Enbo's troops went east to fight the New Fourth Army, there is no real evidence to support it, but its position is indeed a bit strange.
In order to encircle and wipe out the Tang Enbo Group, the Eleventh Army of the Japanese Army mobilized the main forces of the Third and Fortieth Divisions and a part of the Fourth Division to participate in the battle. A reinforcement from the Fifth Division.The troops participating in the war were divided into three groups. The deployment of troops was as follows: the Left Corps consisted of the main force of the 3rd Division and the 8th Infantry Regiment attached to the 4th Division, and the Mizuno Tank Unit. The Central Corps is composed of the main force of the 17th Division and the 67th Infantry Regiment attached to the 15th Division, as well as tank units such as Jisong and Nanda. Hong Kong attacked in the direction of Xiping in the north; the Right Corps, composed of the main force of the 40th Division, attacked from Zhengyang to the north in the direction of Shangcai in the east of Pinghan Road.In addition, in order to prepare for the battle, the 4th Cavalry Brigade and a unit of the 21st Division of the Japanese Cavalry attacked westward from Su County in the direction of northern Anhui on the periphery of the battlefield; Two infantry regiments, one cavalry unit, one tank unit and one artillery unit were dispatched to attack the Yellow Flood Area from Kaifeng and Zhuxian Town in the south.
The Japanese army began to gather forces.
In the vast land of China, there is no secret to the large-scale mobilization of the Japanese army, and the Chinese side has poured in information about the assembly of the Japanese army: the Japanese army has transferred 30,000 troops from the Northeast to North China; the Japanese army south of the Yangtze River has signs of moving to the north of the Yangtze River; The Japanese warships in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, loaded with infantry and ammunition, were heading upstream; the number of Japanese troops in Hankou suddenly increased by tens of thousands; From Gongshan to Guangshui, new designations of Japanese divisions appeared; the Japanese army transported a large amount of railway equipment along the southern section of Pinghan Road. ——It is very obvious that the Japanese army will launch an offensive in southern Henan.
The Chinese side's judgment is correct: the Japanese army will not only launch an offensive in southern Henan, but also attack northward along the Pinghan Road. The target is Tang Enbo's 31st Group Army stationed in the area east of Nanyang; The Japanese army committed crimes to the West in order to respond to the offensive on Pinghan Road.
On January 25, Chiang Kai-shek called Tang Enbo directly:
urgent.Commander-in-Chief Tang En Bo: The enemy will attack the ministries under my brother at the beginning of next month or at the end of this month. We must strictly order the ministries to actively prepare and not be controlled by the enemy.The scope of the enemy's offensive this time must be far-reaching. Shangcheng, Fuyang, and Yancheng in the southeast of Henan, Nanyang, and Linru in the west of Henan are all their intended targets. Nearby are Wuyang, Mianyang, Tongbai, Queshan, Zhengyang, since it is the way to escape, hopes to take this enemy's intention and quickly take countermeasures, and the arrangements will be completed by the end of this month.Always avoid a decisive frontal battle with the enemy, but use a small number of troops to resist on the front, lead them to penetrate deep, use the main force to make active side attacks on the two wings of the enemy's approach; Specialize in cutting off its traffic.It is hoped that the arrangement will be completed within this month, and the eastern part of Henan should pay special attention.Resume quickly after power on.Zhongzheng raised his hand.
China's fifth war zone quickly adjusted its deployment: Sun Lianzhong's Second Army was located west of Pinghan Road, and its main force was assembled near Biyang in southern Henan; Tang Enbo's 31st Army was assembled on the east and west sides of Pinghan Road, starting from Xianghe in the west The line from Kanto to Runan; the main force of Mo Shujie's 84th Army is located on the side of the 31st Army Group and is assembled in Xixian County south of Runan; Huang Weigang's 59th Army is heading towards the junction of northern Hubei and southern Henan. Wang Yanxu's 29th Army marched towards Tongbai and Xincheng east of Zaoyang; the 29th Army and the Second Army still needed to send powerful troops to sneak into the rear of the Japanese army to harass.
Tang Enbo judged that the Japanese army would go northward along the road from Biyang to Wuyang and the branch of the Pinghan Railway.Based on this judgment, he deployed the 31st Army Group as follows: The 13th Army controlled Shangdian, Xiangheguan, Tushan Town, and Yifeng Town to the south of Wuyang, forming a pincer attack that could be carried out either eastward or westward. The Eighty-Fifth Army sent a division along the front of the Ping-Han Railway to resist step by step, and was responsible for luring the enemy to go deep. The 29th Army, located in Sui County, northern Hubei, advanced to the vicinity of Tongbai in southern Henan, followed the Japanese army all the way northward, and waited for an opportunity to act.Then, Tang Enbo replied to Chiang Kai-shek and said: "Everything should be handled according to Jun's telegram. If the enemy boldly commits a crime in the north, I will deal a serious blow to the enemy."
Regardless of Chiang Kai-shek's combat strategy or Tang Enbo's deployment to defend against the enemy, in fact it was the tactical method formed by the Chinese army in the first Changsha battle: use small troops to block the Japanese army in the front and slow down its advance speed; send another force to the Japanese army's rear Turn around, harass and even cut off the Japanese army's rear; the main force quickly retreated to the two wings in the direction of the Japanese attack, waiting for the right time to implement a siege from both sides.This method of warfare was also used by the Chinese army in the Zaoyi Battle after the Changsha Battle.What is puzzling is that the Japanese generals were not only not vigilant, but also stubbornly believed that it was because the Chinese army's combat effectiveness was low that they dared not fight head-on.On the frontal battlefield, it can be said that the Chinese army does not take the initiative to launch an offensive. Once the Japanese army launches an offensive and the two sides fight together, the question of whether to be passive or not will instantly be transformed into a tactical issue-the opponent will be defeated head-on. A single move can create a fighter. At least on the battlefield in Changsha, this tactic has caused the Japanese army a lot of losses. Why can the Japanese army advance in multiple ways so nonchalantly this time?
On the 20th, in order to conceal the intention of attacking southern Henan, and also to contain the troops of China's Fifth Theater and attract them to move westward, the Japanese army independently merged into the Eighteenth Brigade and one part each of the Fourth and Thirty-ninth Divisions. In the direction of Dangyang, Jingmen, and Zhongxiang in Hubei, a feint attack was carried out on the positions of Feng Zhian's 33rd Army and Wang Yanxu's 29th Army, and they rushed all the way to the Yuan'an area north of Dangyang.However, the feigned attack of the Japanese army was not only repelled by the Chinese defenders, but also did not have the expected effect-the main force of China's Fifth Theater did not move.On the night of the 24th, the 3rd Division of the Left Corps of the Japanese Army launched an attack on the Chinese garrison position on the north side of Xinyang in an attempt to cut off the retreat of the Chinese garrison in one fell swoop, but was stubbornly blocked by the 68th Army of the Second Army of the Chinese Army. .The Japanese attack along the way did not work either.
Although the initial battle failed to achieve its goal, the Japanese army's official offensive to southern Henan began on the 25th: the left wing was on the front line of Xiaolindian, Gucheng and Chashan, the central corps was near Minggang, and the right wing was between Huaijiao Town and Zhengyang. During this period, the Japanese troops of the three routes marched side by side along Pinghan Road and attacked northward.As usual, the Japanese air force coordinated ground operations and carried out heavy bombing of the Chinese defenders' positions.
The Chinese defenders were deployed according to the plan, with a small number of troops stranded in the front to block the attack, while the main force gradually shifted to the side and rear of the Japanese attack route.
On the 26th, the Japanese left wing and the Central Corps advanced to the lines of Biyang, Xingdian, and Queshan; on the 27th, they continued northward and advanced to the lines of Chunshui, Shahedian, and Zhumadian.The two Japanese troops penetrated nearly 100 kilometers within two days.On this day, the order of China's fifth war zone was: Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group pursued and flanked the Japanese army behind the main attack line of the Japanese army.That is, Zhang Xuezhong's Thirteenth Army attacked the Japanese 3rd Division near Xiangheguan on the west side of Pinghan Road; Li Chuying's 85th Army attacked the Japanese 40th Division near Shangcai on the east side of Pinghan Road group.At the same time, the Fifth War Zone ordered Mo Yushuo's Eighty-sixth Army to chase after the Japanese Third Division and launch an attack; Cao Fulin's Fifty-fifth Army moved from Tanghe in northern Hubei to Biyang in southern Henan. The 59th Army of the Second Army Huang Weigang also quickly moved closer to Nanyang.
The Chinese army's attack on the Japanese army began.
On the 29th, Tang Enbo's left and right armies fell into fierce battles with the Japanese army.
After the Central Corps of the Japanese Army learned that both wings were in a bitter battle, it seemed a bit in a dilemma.In order to save the battlefield decline and the crisis on the two wings, the Eleventh Army Command had to change its deployment and ordered the Central Corps to detour to the two wings respectively, that is, the Fifteenth Division moved eastward, trying to join forces with the 40th Division to attack the Chinese Army's 80th. The main force of the Fifth Army; the 17th Division moved westward, trying to join forces with the 3rd Division to attack the main force of the 13th Army of the Chinese Army.The Japanese army in the Central Corps quickly divided up and rushed to the two wings, but the Chinese army used the old method again and ordered the troops in front to retreat quickly, leaving only a small number of troops to entangle with the Japanese army.
The Thirteenth Army of the Chinese Army is the basic unit of Tang Enbo. He served as a division commander and army commander in the army. The army now governs the new First Division of Cai Qi, the 110th Division of Wu Shaozhou and the 80th Division of Shu Rong. Nine divisions.In order to block the Japanese attack, Army Commander Zhang Xuezhong personally went to Wuyang to command the battle. He put the 89th Division on the front line, and the 110th Division and the newly reorganized 1st Division on the second line, between the two lines of defense. Thirty kilometers apart.However, due to the increase in Japanese troops, Shu Rong's 89th Division failed to hold up at Xianghe Pass, causing the 110th Division on the second line to suddenly face the enemy at Shangdian.The Japanese army carried out indiscriminate bombardment of the 328th Regiment's position at the front of the 110th Division, and then the infantry began to attack under the cover of artillery fire.At 3:00 p.m., the position of the 328th Regiment was breached by the Japanese, and the second-line position was shaken across the board—the mortar battalion and anti-aircraft artillery company retreated first, and then the infantry retreated.The division commander Wu Shaozhou ordered Chen Qinwen, the head of the 330th regiment, to block the reinforcements from the Japanese troops swarming along the highway.In order to seize the commanding height of the general's tomb by the side of the road with the Japanese army, regiment leader Chen Qinwen personally led the officers and soldiers to attack on their backs and rushed to the halfway up the mountain.Commander Chen Qinwen, who rushed to the front, was wearing a gray-blue khaki military uniform that was different from the soldiers. Because the target was too obvious, he was shot and killed by the Japanese sniper rifle.After the death of the regiment commander, the troops were in chaos. The Japanese fighter planes strafed wildly at low altitude. The lost positions of the Chinese defenders could no longer be recovered.
In fact, the blocking mission of the 330th Regiment was to hit and run.
The Thirteenth Army on the west of Pinghan Road and the Eighty-fifth Army on the east of Pinghan Road took advantage of the encirclement of the Japanese army before closing, the Thirteenth Army turned to the north of Ye County, and the Eighty-fifth Army turned to Yancheng and Shang. To the north of the river, after the Japanese army broke into the Wuyang and Shangcai areas, they found that there was not a single soldier of the Chinese army in the encirclement, and they could not even find the front of the Chinese army, let alone a distance of ten to ten miles from the "enemy division headquarters". Five miles away.At this point, the Japanese army dared not and could no longer pursue it, which was required by "short-range interception operations".
At this time, the 59th, 55th and 68th Armies of the Chinese Army in western Henan were marching northward from Tanghe and Biyang respectively to Wuyang, and the 84th Army and guerrilla troops in western Anhui were also heading towards Wuyang. Zhengyang marched northward, and the Chinese army was on the rear of the Japanese army on the east and west sides of Pinghan Road.
The Japanese army found that the situation on the battlefield was a bit unfavorable: neither captured the main force of the Chinese army nor concentrated superior forces in any part of the battlefield to control the situation. The three armies may surround them at any time.On the night of February 2, the Japanese Eleventh Army decided to retreat in an all-round way.
It was easy for the Japanese army to advance, but retreating was another matter.
On February 3, the Japanese army retreated to Nanyang via Dashiqiao and Zhenping, and captured Nanyang when they crossed the border on the 4th.Among the Chinese troops blocking Nanyang, there was a local Hui guerrilla group. In addition to transporting ammunition, nursing the wounded and laying mines, the young guerrilla members directly participated in the battle.The Hui guerrillas are brave and brave, and the leader is Hu Zhenqing, a big man who is good at martial arts, nicknamed Hu Dawa.During the battle, Hu Dawa guarded the gate of a village alone, swearing to die.The Japanese army took advantage of the night to sneak around behind Hu Dawa. Hu Dawa mistakenly thought he was one of his own, but was hacked to death by the rushing Japanese army with knives.The members of the Muslim guerrillas pursued the retreating Japanese army with great hatred, and finally captured five Japanese soldiers who had fallen behind, avenging the heroic Captain Hu.Because the Hui guerrillas killed more than a hundred enemies in this battle, Sun Lianzhong, the commander-in-chief of the Second Army after the war, personally expressed condolences and presented them with a silk banner of "winning glory for the country".
On February 4, in view of the danger of the 3rd Division retreating southward alone, the main force of the 17th Division and part of the 15th and 4th Divisions of the Japanese Army moved from Xiangheguan to approach the 3rd Division in an attempt to meet them. While retreating, it flanked the 68th, 55th and 29th armies of the Chinese army with the third division.However, as soon as the main force of the 17th Division of the Japanese Army came out of Xiangheguan, it was violently blocked by the Chinese army; Dead bodies, baggage, luggage and vehicles were strewn about.
This was the most distressing moment for the Japanese army: Although the tail pursuit and two-wing siege of the Chinese army could not be regarded as a decisive move forward, the endless entanglement and hard fighting made the Japanese army exhausted.The Japanese army had to fight with this Chinese army for a while, and then with another Chinese army for a while. Just after opening the passage in front, the rear bit up again. The Japanese army, who had no intention of fighting, had to run back desperately.
The Chinese army has been driving the Japanese back to their original starting point.
In the north of Anhui and the east of Henan, the Japanese troops fighting on the Ping-Han Road also began to split their attacks on January 25: one was the Ota Regiment of the 21st Division, which attacked from Suzhou to the southwest; It is the Pinglin tank unit attached to the Fourth Cavalry Brigade, attacking westward from Bo County.The Fourth Cavalry Brigade was the main force of the attack. Its troops were divided into three groups, and the distribution of troops was a bit messy.The Chinese cavalry troops clashed with the Japanese cavalry near Shizihe and Niqiuji, and the infantry of both sides also launched an offensive and defensive battle on the Great Plains.As far as the Chinese army in this direction is concerned, the biggest threat comes from the air. Japanese fighter planes taking off from Anyang and other airports caused great casualties in the bombing of the Chinese defenders' front-line positions.The Chinese defenders had no choice but to retreat while fighting, and the Japanese finally captured Taihe and Jieshou.However, when the Japanese army in the direction of Pinghan Road began to retreat, the Japanese army attacking in this direction also wavered. The Chinese defenders who retreated to the two wings took the opportunity to counterattack. Back to the original place of departure.
This battle was called the "Southern Henan Battle" in Japanese military history, and the "Southern Henan Battle" in Chinese military history.Japan’s comment on this battle was simple, and even a little taboo, saying that “the enemy’s combat strength in this battle was about 95,000, with 16,000 casualties, and the Japanese army suffered only minor losses.”
The announcement of the Chinese side is: "The enemy suffered more than 9,000 casualties. I burned and wiped out more than 300 enemy vehicles near Nanyang. The military supplies captured were useless. I won a great victory." As for our casualties, the Chinese side The announcement was also "minor loss".
After this battle, Wang Hongshao, Chief of Staff of the Fifth Theater, was very optimistic:
The fighting strength of the enemy army has indeed weakened too much compared to before.In the area of Nanyang and Fangcheng, the captives were all dressed in single clothes, their hands and faces were black, and they looked haggard. When they were interrogated, they all cried out in pain, and their will to fight was low, so urgent.In the future, if the enemy is assigned with non-mechanized units (especially the air force), and we only use infantry to fight against us, their combat capabilities will be far inferior to ours.
The Battle of Southern Henan was not large in scale, and the two sides did not invest many troops. The principle of "short-distance interception operations" prevented the Japanese army from rushing too far and retreated quickly.Therefore, it is too early to conclude that the Japanese army's field combat capabilities are "far inferior to mine" based on this battle.However, for the Japanese army in this battle, under the influence of various factors such as anxiety, arrogance, and recklessness, there were huge loopholes in whether it was early planning, combat implementation, or even mutual coordination on the battlefield.This battle once again strengthened the confidence of the Chinese Supreme Command to deal with the Japanese army on the frontal battlefield:
With inferior equipment, I could not compete with the enemy in terms of firepower. I boldly stayed on the enemy's side and carried out tail strike interception. Since then, I have gradually matured and used it very flexibly. Since then, it has become more obvious in all battles.
Unfortunately, the Japanese army has always had a vague understanding of this tactic of the Chinese army.
Less than a month after the end of the Battle of Southern Henan, the Japanese army launched another offensive in the Shanggao area near Nanchang, fighting against the troops of the Ninth Theater of China.
The Chinese side called this battle "Shanggao Battle", while the Japanese side called it "Jinjiang Battle".
The Jinjiang River is a tributary of the Ganjiang River. It originates from the Mufu Mountains at the junction of Hunan and Jiangxi, flows through the counties of Wanzai, Shanggao, and Gao'an in the northwest of Jiangxi, and flows into the Ganjiang River at Shicha Street near Nanchang.Shanggao County, between the mountains, is located on the north bank of the upper reaches of the Jinjiang River about 12 kilometers southwest of Nanchang. Out of Changsha, the Nineteenth Army Command of China's Ninth Theater is stationed here.
In 1941, the Japanese army in Nanchang was also in a state of anxiety: since the capture of Nanchang in March 1939, the Japanese army defended Nanchang and the vicinity of the Nanxun Railway with the 33rd and 34th divisions, and fought with the Chinese army. The Nineteenth Army Luo Zhuoying confronted each other, and neither side had made any major military moves in the past two years.However, the Japanese army in Nanchang always felt uneasy and believed that they were surrounded by the Chinese army: In the east of Jiangxi, from the southeast of Nanchang in the west to the east bank of Poyang Lake in the east, Shangguan, the commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army of the Third Theater of China, Yunxiang Department; in northern Jiangxi, it is Luo Zhuoying, deputy commander-in-chief of the Ninth Theater and commander-in-chief of the 19th Army; in western Jiangxi, it is Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army.In particular, Xue Yue, the commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone, and Luo Zhuoying, the deputy commander-in-chief, are both very strong opponents in combat. It is hard to say that they are not eyeing the map and plotting to attack Nanchang.In fact, this is indeed the case: the Ganjiang River Basin is the junction of China's Third Theater and the Ninth Theater. In order to regain Nanchang, Xue Yue and Luo Zhuoying suggested that the Military Commission extend the combat area of the Ninth Theater to the right, so that Liu who is stationed on the east bank of the Ganjiang River Duoquan's Forty-Ninth Army was included in the ninth theater sequence.After Luo Zhuoying gained command on the east bank of the Ganjiang River, he deployed Li Jue's 70th Army to the south bank of the Jinjiang River, west of the Ganjiang River, in order to prepare for the attack on Nanchang.
The Japanese army stationed in Nanchang originally had only the 33rd and 34th Divisions, but the headquarters decided to transfer the 33rd Division to North China, because the Communist Party there was so strong that the main divisions had to be used. It's time to fight.In order to make up for the weak strength in Nanchang, the 11th Army transferred from Shanghai the independent and mixed 20th Brigade.This movement of the Japanese army made Ka Mao, the head of the 34th Division, discover an opportunity: the 33rd Division will be dispatched in April, and the 20th Brigade will be dispatched in February. moon.That is to say, from February to April, the 33rd Division had not yet left, but the 20th Brigade had already arrived, and the Japanese army in Nanchang would have one more brigade than before.Isn't this the best time to take the opportunity to launch an offensive against Luo Zhuoying's Nineteenth Army, which is the greatest threat to Nanchang?
Now or never.
If I don't deal a fatal blow to the main force of the Chinese army in front of me before the 33rd Division is transferred, I will be very sad in the future when I guard Nanchang alone.
Ohgamo began to encourage the 11th Army Command to carry out the "Jinjiang Operation".
The battle blueprint drawn by Ogamo Xiangjun Sonobe and Ichiro is: use the 33rd Division as the right wing (North Road), attack southwest from Anyi in the northwest of Nanchang; form the 20th Brigade independently For the left wing (South Road), attack westward from the southwest of Nanchang along the south bank of the Jinjiang River; the 34th Division is in the middle, attacking westward along the north bank of the Jinjiang River.The three-way troops divided into joint attacks, encircled the 19th Group Army of the Chinese Army in the Shanggao area and annihilated them.The core of its operation is: use the 33rd Division to oppress the flank of the Chinese army, and press it into the combat area of the 34th Division on the south side of the battlefield, and then the 34th Division will obtain the results.
Oga Mao's idea did not get a positive response from Sonobe and Ichiro.Although the Eleventh Army Command finally approved the operation, Sonobe and Ichiro did not go to Nanchang to guide the operation as usual, and did not even set up an army command post in Nanchang. The 3rd Division and the independent 20th Brigade are discussing the meaning of doing it.
The negative attitude of the commander was noticed by Tanaka Shinichi, the head of the Operation Department of the General Staff Headquarters who arrived in Nanchang. He believed that this was the phenomenon caused by "singing the negative policy of 'short-range interception operations'":
This is three corps fighting side by side, and the Eleventh Army did not set up a special headquarters for this operation, but was guided by the Hankou Army Command in a normal situation.Is this being dominated by conservative thinking?Or is it a manifestation of underestimating the enemy's thinking?Since the beginning of the battle, the will of the various headquarters has not been unified, and there is a very dangerous problem hidden here.
The logical explanation is: due to the bad ending of the battle in southern Henan, the Eleventh Army has lost interest in the "short-range interception operations" advocated by the commander-in-chief of the dispatched army, Hisao Nishio.
So why did Sonobe and Ichiro approve this operation?This was largely due to the Japanese practice of having to attack once before a unit could be transferred.It is not without plausible reasons that Ogamo took the 33rd Division to apply for battle together.
For this battle, except for a small number of rear troops, the Japanese troops in Nanchang almost came out in full force: the 33rd Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai, the commander of the division. One part of the Third Wing, with a strength of about 15,000; the 34th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kamo, the head of the division, lacked the 218th Infantry Wing, but was attached to the Second Independent Mountain Artillery Wing and The 51st Brigade of Independent Mountain Artillery has a strength of about 20,000; the 20th Independent Mixed Brigade is commanded by Major General Ikeda Naozo, head of the brigade, and is attached to the 102nd and 105th Brigades of the Independent Infantry and the 2nd Independent Engineer Brigade The Wing has a strength of about 8,000 people.
Ohgamo was constantly busy in order to facilitate this battle. His troops began urgently reorganizing their equipment in mid-February. In order to adapt to mountain operations, they also refitted and trained the artillery on pack horses, and recruited a large number of Chinese civilians in the local area.Shinichi Tanaka, the head of the combat department from Tokyo, believed that Ogamo was simply desperate, because "it was common sense in the Chinese battlefield that the news of the requisition of civilian husbands quickly spread to the Chongqing Army, and it was common sense on the Chinese battlefield to strengthen their defenses."
Sure enough, the Chinese side noticed the actions of the Japanese army in Nanchang.
Luo Zhuoying continued to send telegrams to Chongqing about the development of the Japanese army in Nanchang:
...The enemy in Nanchang has been increased by about 5,000, and they are now assembled in Nanchang and Wangchenggang, but there seems to be no movement.Its team numbers include infantry units such as Ikeda, Morishige, and Kimoto, and Kanai artillery units.Another 1,500 Anyi enemies were added, all separated from the front, like supplementary soldiers...
…Thirty-four divisions, with a combined increase of about 15,600 enemies, in addition to guarding the front line of about 4,000, assembled more than 1,000 in Shangchendian, 4,000 in Liantang, 2,000 in Luojiaji, and 4,000 in Nanchang, And Laf more than two thousand.莲塘线出现运输甚繁，有窜扰模样。新旧机场现停机二十架。
事实证明，以上情报相当准确。
第九战区代司令长官薛岳制订的作战方针是：当日军向上高、万载进犯时，位于赣西的第十九集团军各部队，应从市汊街开始沿锦江南岸绵亘至锦江以北构筑第一线、第二线阵地，逐次对进犯日军予以打击，诱敌深入至上高东北的第三线阵地后“与敌决战”。
日军采用的依旧是分路合击的战法。
薛岳采取的应对战术依旧是诱敌深入。
三月十四日，利用暗夜作掩护，日军第三十三师团在干洲街、第三十四师团在万寿宫、独立混成第二十旅团在厚田街，三路攻击部队集结完毕。十五日凌晨，北路日军第三十三师团由安义分成两股向当面中国守军李觉的第七十军发动攻击，目标是攻占奉新城。第七十军唐伯寅的第十九师、宋英仲的第一〇七师和张言传的预备第九师的正面阵地全都发生了激战。当时，预备第九师在奉新城东，第十九师在奉新城西，中国官兵两面抵抗，很快就支持不住了。日军的重炮和飞机将奉新外围阵地炸成一片废墟，预备第九师虽然组织过反击，但因战力过于悬殊被迫退守奉新城内。当外围阵地大部失守后，奉新成为一座孤城。日军的重炮部队迅速向前推进，向奉新城内展开猛烈轰击，日军的飞机也低空盘旋投弹，小小的奉新顿时被炸得稀烂，日军步兵从被炸塌的城墙废墟上蜂拥而入，县城很快落入日军手中。第三十三师团占领奉新后，越过潦河，再次推进到第十九师和预备第九师的阵地前。两个师的阵地于南北隔着潦河而设置，日军趁夜色从两师阵地的接合部钻了进去，渗透到奉新西面的车坪、棺材山一带。预备第九师拼死抵抗，但第十九师没有主动协同，使得日军继续向西推进，于十六日拂晓进至水口甘附近。
南路日军独立混成第二十旅团，是刚由日本陆军第五师团在上海改编而成的部队，改编后不足两个月便被调往南昌前线。该旅团在池田直三的指挥下，十五日凌晨从赣江北岸的牛行出发，企图利用黎明前的暗夜偷渡锦江向西进攻，但却出师便不利。旅团出击的位置在锦江即将汇入赣江的大拐弯处，因此必须首先向西再向南两次渡过锦河。两次偷渡，都被中国守军第七十军第一〇七师击退，直到十六日凌晨借助炮兵和飞机的掩护才渡河成功。第一〇七师退守仙姑岭阵地。罗卓英得知这股日军渡过锦江之后，立即命令王耀武的第七十四军出动一个团，前往独城附近会合第一〇七师对日军实施阻击。第七十四军派出的部队是李天霞的第五十一师的主力团。在红石岭一带，独立混成第二十旅团遭到了他们没有想到的顽强阻击，激战中该旅团伤亡四百余人，向西推进的计划顿时受挫。
独立混成第二十旅团还有一支被称作“赣江支队”的单独作战的部队。这支部队的任务是沿着赣江南下，直扑樟树、清江、丰城，然后实施偷渡，为接应攻击上高的主力回撤作掩护。十九日晨，赣江支队先头部队二百余人企图偷渡赣江，立即遭到中国军队第四十九军第二十六师的迎头痛击，偷渡的日军有一半被打死在江中，另一半不得不退守江心的沙洲以待增援。可是，援兵乘坐的舰船又被中国守军击沉，日军的尸体顺流东下，残敌向东面的曲江方向撤退。此时，支队长坂本正带领支队主力攻击清江，没想到中国军队第二十六师的七十六团迎面而来，日军猝不及防，在张家山、崇祯观和蜀家地附近被冲得七零八落，仅崇祯观一地就遗留下尸体四十余具、战马三十多匹。赣江支队主力的残部也向曲江方向后撤。
大贺茂指挥的第三十四师团气焰嚣张。在南北两路日军发动攻击第二天，即三月十六日拂晓，该师团从锦江以北的万寿宫出发，沿着湘赣公路大举向西。这是一支由两万人组成的部队，头顶上有飞机的掩护，地面上是炮兵、骑兵和步兵的混合，浩浩荡荡，烟尘蔽日。大贺茂的设想是：在这条西进的路上，没有任何一支中国军队能够阻挡这支部队，他要一直把部队推进到上高，不但将中国军队主力第七十四军包围歼灭，还要把北路第三十三师团向南压下来的第七十军一起吃掉。部队还没有抵近高安城，大贺茂首先碰上的是中国军队第七十军的第一〇七师，双方在高安城以东展开了阵地攻防战。激战至中午，日军相继占领赵家山和莲花山。李觉的第七十军，前身是湘军的一部，第十九师是其基本部队，第一〇七师是一九三九年新组建的部队。第七十军拥有一定的战斗力，负责防御南昌以西的第一线阵地。其第十九师和预备第九师在日军第三十三师团的攻击路线上，是右翼防御；而第一〇七师面对的是日军第三十四师团，为左翼防御。第一〇七师为加强阻击力量，把二线阵地的部队推进到一线，其三二〇团位于一线的支撑阵上地。日军第三十四师团发始攻击后，三二〇团的前沿阵地立即遭到被中国官兵称为“猛虎洗脸”式的重炮轰击和飞机轰炸，然后便是步兵在坦克掩护下的冲击。三二〇团的最前沿是个圆锥形的小山包，三营官兵顽强阻击，死伤者被一个个地抬下来，但阵地仍是没有失守。下午，日军的十几辆轻型坦克在左侧强行突破，绕到了三营的背后，三营终于支持不住撤了下来。但是，在三二〇团的主阵地前，日军再次受到阻挡，主阵地前面的开阔地成为日军官兵的死亡之地，中国守军各种火力编织的火网让日军的多辆坦克中弹起火瘫痪在稻田中。晚上，日军组织起精锐小队实施偷袭，一营一连的前沿只有一个班，结果除副班长跑出来之外，班长胡晃等九名士兵都死在日军的刺刀下。第二天，日军再攻三二〇团的主阵地，由于右边三一九团的阵地被日军突破，三二〇团的阵地开始动摇。苦战持续了一整天，接到撤退命令的时候，第一〇七师已付出惨重的伤亡代价，仅三二〇团官兵就伤亡了一半多。
第一〇七师的苦战迟滞了大贺茂的推进速度，为中国军队的调整部署赢得了宝贵时间。十八日，罗卓英下令高安附近的中国守军迅速脱离战场。日军第三十四师团顺利突过高安后，大距离地快速奔袭，西进至上高与高安之间的龙团圩。在龙团圩，他们遇到了他们要找的中国军队第七十四军。
第七十四军，中央军嫡系部队之一，辖第五十一、第五十七和第五十八师。此次战役前不久，为加强陆军的攻击力量，蒋介石命令把中央军嫡系部队中的第一、第二、第五和第七十四军，装备成四个“攻击军”。所谓攻击军，即在人员编制和武器编配上比常规部队提升一步：常规部队每个军通常为两个师加一个新编师，攻击军的每个军辖三个正规步兵师，且员额齐整；在武器配备上，攻击军拥有野炮山炮混编成的炮兵团、特务团、工兵团、辎重兵团和补充团各一个，战车防御炮、重迫击炮营各一个，由骑兵和脚踏车混编成的搜索营一个，通信营一个，特务队一个。除此之外，每师还配属了山炮或重迫击炮营一个，战车防御炮和高炮各一队。攻击军可谓当时中国陆军中最具战斗力的部队。
第七十四军军长王耀武遵照罗卓英的指令，将其部队部署在龙团圩至上高之间日军第三十四师团的攻击路线上：余程万的第五十七师进入坎头岭、索子山、下曹港一线的主阵地；廖龄奇的第五十八师进入桥头、官桥、棠浦、泗溪一线的主阵地，并以龙王街、杨公圩、黄峰岭一线为前进阵地；李天霞的第五十一师作为军的右翼在锦江南岸的泉港街、钩水岭和石头街一线。十八日晚八时，在龙团圩西南方向，王耀武派出的搜索部队与日军第三十四师团的前哨遭遇，激战随即开始。日军千余人冲击中国军队的阵地前沿，受到第五十七师补充团的阻击，尽管日军后续部队一再增援，且一度试图迂回补充团的侧背，但始终没能突破正面阵地。十九日，日军在飞机的助战下再攻第五十八师阵地，第五十八师以一个团在正面死守，另派一个团迂回到日军的侧后，双方一直混战到天黑，都伤亡惨重。在无法突破当面阵地的困境中，大贺茂亲率一万多人死攻第五十八师的左翼。军长王耀武认为这种态势令第五十八师有被包围的危险，遂下令部队乘夜色从龙团圩西南后退至官桥街、泗溪防御线以西，与日军第三十四师团形成对峙。
按照大贺茂的作战计划，从南昌出击的三路日军都需以上高为目标向心突击，在钳形攻势里将中国军队的第七十、第七十四和第十九集团军司令部全部压缩在上高附近的狭窄地域里，然后合围歼灭。但是，在日军发起三路攻击的第五天——三月十九日晚，大贺茂突然发现情形有些不对劲了。从第三十四师团的攻击进程上看，似乎没有什么意外，不但击溃了阻击的中国军队，而且捕捉到其主力第七十四军，并且将第七十四军粘在了对面的战场上。可是，另外的两路——第三十三师团和独立混成第二十旅团，现在又在哪里呢？
日军入侵中国之后少有的战势反常情况，于一九四一年三月在江西西北部的大山里出现了。首先是独立混成第二十旅团受到中国军队的顽强阻击，现在还处于苦战之中。该旅团从一出发就受到阻击，好不容易推进到锦河南岸，又遭遇中国军队第五十一师李天霞部，第五十一师在死守鸡公山阵地的过程中实施了反击。在迫击炮的掩护下，中国官兵冲入敌阵与日军展开肉搏战，在预备队的增援下与日军血战一天，日军伤亡二百余人，樊逢春连长和他率领的百余名中国官兵全部以身殉国。黄昏，独立混成第二十旅团一部在飞机的掩护下再次向鸡公山阵地猛扑，中国守军阵地落下的航空炸弹和炮弹在五百发以上，阵地上一个营的官兵大部伤亡。第五十一师随即派出一支小部队猛烈突击日军的侧背，毙伤日军三百多人，日军被迫退守猪头山顽抗。半夜，日军独立混成第二十旅团的三个独立大队联合反扑，与第五十一师反复争夺阵地，持续不断的激战中，日军伤亡达千人以上。独立混成第二十旅团推进艰难，无法得知什么时候才能与第三十四师团会合。更为严重的是，第三十四师团的南翼等于向中国军队敞开了。
而在战场的北面，日军第三十三师团竟然不打了，掉头回去了。
第三十三师团师团长樱井省三在此战中表现得十分古怪。按照原定作战计划，他的师团应把当面中国军队第七十军不断地由北向南挤压，一直挤压到第三十四师团的主战区域里，然后与第三十四师团一起对上高附近的中国军队实施合围。但是，第三十三师团从南昌出发后，遭遇中国军队第七十军的阻击，部队一边打一边向西前推，推至五桥河、村前街一带时，第七十军突然脱离战场跑了。按照一般的战场原理，第七十军撤退的方向应是主力所在地，这样既可以加强集团防御的力量，保卫第十九集团军司令部，还可以获得自身的相对安全。但是，此时第七十军的两个师朝着相反的方向而去，一直跑进赣西北上富地区的深山里了。这下，樱井省三不得不面临选择：要不就朝着预定战场相反的方向去追第七十军，要不就放弃第七十军，遵循原定作战计划，转头向南面的上高方向推进，与第三十四师团一起合围中国军队主力第七十四军。——较为合理的选择，应该是放弃追击第七十军，继续执行预定计划，后果只不过是让中国军队第七十军漏网而已。
但是，樱井省三作出了两个不可理喻的决定。首先，他决定去追第七十军，也就是说，他将带着部队向预定合围战场的相反方向而去。作为军事将领，樱井省三不可能不知道这样做的后果，那就是不但大部队进入深山后给养跟不上，且机械化部队于山区作战很难取得战果。更重要的是，他向相反方向的运动必会使战场的侧翼出现空白，第三十四师团很有可能因为侧翼的暴露而招致灾难。接着，樱井省三作出的另一个决定更为离奇。他认为，第三十三师团所担负的任务是驱赶第七十军——至于驱赶到哪个方向他不管，现在驱赶的任务已经完成，他的师团四月就要调到华北去了。于是，他只派出师团的一部象征性地去追击第七十军，而大部队则朝着出发地安义开始打道回府了。日本战史对樱井省三的举动叙述得模棱两可：“北翼的第三十三师团，按预定从北面攻击敌七十军的两个师，将其向南压迫，十九日达到目的，开始返回。也就是说，夺取了村前街西侧高地的步兵第二一四联队，从十八日半夜返回；当夜在凤凰墟大休息的步兵二一五联队，十九日拂晓前从当地出发北进，在长隘路突破敌群，烧毁了上富镇，二十三日返回原驻地。”
或许对南翼独立混成第二十旅团的受阻情况不甚了解，或许尚没确定北翼的第三十三师团已离开战场的消息是否属实，中路的日军第三十四师团依旧斗志昂扬，大贺茂命令部队继续向当面中国军队第七十四军实施猛烈突击。
薛岳终于看到了战机。
位于赣江东岸的第四十九军军长刘多荃致电战区长官部，称第四十九军连续袭击南昌外围，发现南昌守军缩在碉堡里不敢迎战，还把南昌城墙外的城壕里都灌满了水。薛岳判断，南昌日军已倾巢出动，因此可以调动赣江东岸的部队前来参战。于是当即命令罗卓英严饬各军积极向日军实施攻击，将孤军深入的日军第三十四师团歼灭在锦河南北地区，并调位于赣北的第三十集团军的两个师迅速南下参战。
十九日，罗卓英下定了作战决心：把深入锦江南岸的独立混成第二十旅团的先头部队吃掉，再向第三十四师团主力实施合围。具体部署是：第四十九军第一〇五师王铁汉部渡过赣江西进，与第二十六师王克俊部和第五十一师李天霞部协力，先将锦江南岸的独立混成第二十旅的先头部队歼灭，然后从南向北压缩；第七十军第十九师唐伯寅部和预备第九师张言传部向村前街、龙团圩以及高安推进，从北向南压缩；第七十四军第五十七师余程万部和第五十八师廖龄奇部在正面坚守上高城，把日军第三十四师团死死顶住，并将其滞留在战场以待合围之后歼灭。
就薛岳和罗卓英的决心而言，围歼日军第三十四师团的关键在于王耀武的第七十四军正面的两个师。他们能够顶得住，才能给围歼部队的移动争取时间；一旦他们顶不住，或是让日军攻占上高，或是让大贺茂率队跑了，都会使中国军队的围歼计划成为泡影。
二十日，大贺茂把他的师团指挥部推至距上高东北仅十公里的毕家。日军集中起大量的重炮以及三十多架战机，采取锥形突入的方式猛攻泗水西岸第七十四军的阵地，试图一举攻陷上高城。激战之时，一部日军强渡泗水，第五十八师奋力堵塞缺口，两军于泗水两岸混战到天黑。这时候，第五十八师一七二团的阵地被日军突破。师长廖龄奇派预备队补充团对日军实施逆袭，尽管暂时遏制了日军的攻击速度，但第五十八师的阻击面太宽，每个营的防御正面约七公里，阵地显得十分单薄。二十一日午夜时分，师长廖龄奇率部转移到白茅山、梓树下、荷舍线，与第五十七师余程万部的阵地衔接成一体。日军第三十四师团主力跟随而至，向第五十七、第五十八师猛攻不止，但整整一个白天始终没能突破中国守军的阵地。
在锦江南岸方向，根据罗卓英的命令，李天霞的第五十一师于二十日向日军独立混成第二十旅团发动了进攻。但是，其前锋刚从石头街出发，便遇到大批日军从北岸横渡而来，原来日军首先发动了攻势。第五十一师的前锋部队受到日军两面夹击，加上重炮的轰击和飞机的轰炸，被迫退守石头街西南高地。军长王耀武立即改变部署，命令第五十师主力向左翼转移，同时命令军直属补充团迅速前往阻截日军，坚决不能使其继续向西接近第三十四师团。补充团的官兵冒着日军的轰，不顾一切地急促行军，于二十一日凌晨赶到战场，率先占据了一个无名高地。中国官兵刚刚站稳，日军独立混成第二十旅团主力便蜂拥而至。补充团兵力并不充足，但面对日军凶焊的攻击毫无惧色，日军付出巨大伤亡代价后，中国守军的阵地岿然不动。日军向补充团的侧翼熊坊迂回，补充团也随即转移防御方向，仍旧与日军死战不止。日军在无法突破的情况下，从空中向补充团阵地投掷燃烧弹，在地面投放大量的毒气弹，补充团官兵伤亡巨大，熊坊失守。李天霞命令第五十一师的两个团火速增援，增援部队向日军猛冲猛打，午夜时分把熊坊夺了回来，同时夺回的还有石头街和鸡公岭阵地。血战至二十二日，双方伤亡都在四千人以上。日军独立混成第二十旅团的后面是锦江，前面是挡在路上与他们死战的中国军队第五十一师，他们无异于陷入了背水为阵、进退两难的境地。
此时上高方向的战事依旧胶着，中国军队第七十四军的两个师横在路上，日军第三十四师团就是过不去。大贺茂对上高城近在咫尺却不能得而备感焦虑，连支援其作战的日军第三飞行团指挥官都感到再这样拖下去前景不妙。二十二日这天，第三飞行团团长远藤三郎给大贺茂空投下来一封信，信上话说得很客气，但催促的意思也非常明显：
大贺中将阁下：连日连夜之战斗，想极辛苦，气象台虽稍报天气恶化，但仍继续晴天，可谓天佑。上高占领，即在目前，请继续奋斗，以收赫赫战缋，不胜盼切。池田支队、圾本支队，已取得联络，弹药已投下，状况较为缓和，请安心！本团虽力量微薄，当尽死力协助于上高占领，倘因时间迁延，故敌将整顿态势，后方扰乱，亦将活泼。希望迅速占领，即行回师。请示知上高总攻击时刻，本团当以全力协助之！请决定时刻，一举突入如何？
这封信没能空投到大贺茂手里。
中国军队截获后送到了罗卓英的指挥部。
即使大贺茂收到了这封信，被挡在上高城外围的他又如何能够确定对上高城实施总攻的时间？
大贺茂依旧在指挥部队向第七十四军阵地发动猛攻。
在余程万的第五十七师方向，日军投入了四千兵力，还有三十多架飞机参战，曾一度突进到距余程万的师部千米左右处，但一线阻击主阵地仍在中国守军之手。随着日军骑兵部队迂回到侧后，第五十七师开始两面受