Chapter 78 Smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and strive for a better situation

(December 31, 1940) Heads of Central Plains Bureau, Southeast Bureau, Northern Bureau, Shandong Branch Bureau, Southern Bureau, Southern Committee[1], Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army: (1) Chiang Kai-shek has made up his mind to send Li Xianzhou, Tang Enbo, and Li Pinxian[2] to attack our troops in Central China and Shandong. Tang's and Li's ministries are advancing eastward. Our party and our army are fighting in self-defense to break this attack and gain time. The task of getting better. (2) In addition to ordering the Jiangnan troops to move northward immediately, and dispatching a unit from North China to strengthen the Central China troops, all the party and army in Central China and Shandong must mobilize urgently to fight for the resistance to the Japanese base areas and to break the diehard attacks.

(3) Military command, before commander-in-chief Ye Ting arrived in Jiangbei, was unified under the command of deputy commander-in-chief Chen Yi and political commissar Liu Shaoqi; after Ye Ting arrived in Jiangbei, it was unified under the command of Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi. Obey their orders without disobedience. [3] (4) The Shandong branch was placed under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains Bureau, and the Central Plains Bureau unified leadership of Shandong and Central China. (5) All parts of the country (North China, Central China, Northwest China, Southwest China, and Southeast China) must resolutely oppose this attack by the Kuomintang and its high-pressure policy across the country.It must be pointed out that the danger of the Kuomintang’s action lies in the fact that it is increasingly weakening the resistance against the Japanese. It is not only detrimental to the Communist Party, but even more detrimental to the Kuomintang, and detrimental to the people of the whole country. It is only beneficial to the enemy and the pro-Japanese faction. civil war.It is estimated that the soldiers of the anti-communist army are unwilling, most of the cadres are forced to, and many senior generals are wavering. Therefore, we must not only pay attention to attacking the anti-communist army, but also pay attention to winning over it, paying attention to united front work, and paying attention to using it flexibly. Strategy.

(6) It is estimated that the slogan of the anti-communist army's offensive may be to go behind the enemy lines to fight against Japan, and did not propose to attack the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.On this point, when the central government has instructions, you can express your opinions. (7) It is estimated that the struggle in central China is a long-term struggle and cannot be resolved in a short period of time. Therefore, the anti-friction struggle must be closely linked with the expansion and consolidation of base areas and the expansion and consolidation of the army.In this struggle, gradually weaken the strength of the anti-communist army, gradually strengthen and temper our strength, and finally defeat the anti-communist army.Therefore, we must deal with this situation nervously, but at the same time we must make long-term and patient plans, and we must not be too impatient, and we must not try to win all the victories in a short period of time.

(8) Considering various international and domestic conditions, the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist offensive and high-pressure policy will fail and have no future. Therefore, the entire party and army must increase their confidence in victory and not be intimidated by the Kuomintang’s offensive and high-pressure policies. Overcome possible pessimism. (9) The current task of the Central Plains Bureau is to actively smash the deployment and strength of this offensive, while the current task of the Southern Bureau is to use various contradictions to shake the resolve of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.Although Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang aggressively launched an offensive, they were actually very afraid of civil war and the fundamental breakdown of the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, so their determination may still be shaken.

(10) Regarding Jiang and the Kuomintang’s eagerness to ask us to express our final attitude and reply to Jiang’s order[4], the Central Committee decided to respond calmly and ignore it. Since Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang Jia sent the telegram[5], regardless How to abuse and attack, the Party Central Committee and Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang will ignore him for the time being, and wait for him to become angry and resentful, and he will not be able to step down, and then come out to speak to express our attitude.This is different from the attitudes that lower levels and local parties should express at any time, but it is a good way to deal with the Kuomintang at present.Because Chiang Kai-shek is in a hurry, we are not in a hurry.

Central Secretariat World Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Southern Committee refers to the Southern Working Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. [2] Li Xianzhou (1894-1988), a native of Qihe, Shandong, was the commander of the 92nd Army of the Kuomintang Army at that time.Tang Enbo was then the commander-in-chief of the 31st Army of the Kuomintang Army.Li Pinxian was then the deputy commander-in-chief of the 5th Theater of the Kuomintang Army, the commander-in-chief of the 21st Group Army, and the chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government of the Kuomintang.

[3] The positions of Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi referred to here refer to their positions in the Central China New Fourth Army Eighth Route Army Headquarters.This general headquarters was established in mid-November 1940 in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to unify the command of the Central China New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army. [4] Refers to Chiang Kai-shek's telegram on December 9, 1940: the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River is restricted to move to the area north of the Yangtze River before December 31, and the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yellow River are in 1940. Open to the area north of the Yellow River before January 30 of a year.

[5] Good telegram refers to the telegram sent by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi on November 9, 1940.See pages 310-314 of this volume.