Chapter 34 Work Report at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

(May 21, 1944) Today, due to time constraints, I can only make a brief work report to the plenary session. Please consider whether a detailed central work report is still needed.I don't think it is necessary to make a detailed report, because the work of the Central Committee in the recent period is known to the comrades in the Central Committee, and the comrades who participated in the plenary session are also generally aware of it.As for whether to make a detailed report on the work of the Central Committee from the Sixth National Congress to the present? I think it has been 16 years since the Sixth National Congress to the present, and the main person in charge of the central government has changed several times. It is difficult to make this detailed report. For the past The inspection of the work is ready to be put in the historical summary.In the past, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of China made a work report to the Congress, which was actually a political report. We only planned to make a political report to the Seventh National Congress, and we did not make another work report. The summary of the work can also be mentioned in this report. Only the solution has matured. central question.

Today I will only talk about the main issues in the preparatory period for the War of Resistance Against Japan and the period of the War of Resistance.During the period of preparations for the War of Resistance Against Japan and the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our aim was to fight for the expulsion of Japanese imperialism from China.To achieve this goal, our policy is to develop ourselves and unite with allies.This policy was initially decided at the Wayaobao Conference[1] (December 1935), the resolution of the Democratic Republic (September 1936), the National Congress of the Party[2] (1935) May 7), the Luochuan Conference[3] (August 1937), the Sixth Plenary Session[4] (September-November 1938) until now, are all aimed at implementing this policy And struggle.In implementing this policy, there were disputes over how to develop ourselves and unite our allies, our views on Japan, the Kuomintang and our party, our assessment of the current situation and specific policies.The purpose of my speech today is to defend the central government's policies.

Here is a report on the Henan War[5] from the Henan Survey and Statistics Department of the Kuomintang to its Central Bureau of Statistics and Statistics. It is one of the typical materials on the recent War of Resistance.This material shows how one of Chiang Kai-shek's three main forces, Tang Enbo[7], was completely incompetent. When the Japanese invaded indiscriminately, they ran around. Hu Zongnan[8] had two divisions in Henan and only one regiment remained.This proves the different results brought about by the two policies in the War of Resistance: the undemocratic policy will inevitably lead to the failure of the War of Resistance, and only the democratic policy can defeat the enemy.Chiang Kai-shek's central army did not have nationalist and democratic education, only fascist education, so its combat effectiveness was completely disintegrated, and it would be defeated in one blow.Our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army carried out education in nationalism and democracy. We fully mobilized the power of the people and established more than a dozen base areas behind the enemy's rear. We stopped the enemy's strategic offensive on the frontal battlefield for five and a half years.Now Japan is attacking Henan because Japan wants to save lives, the Kuomintang is too weak, and the strength of the Communist Party has not yet reached the level of protecting Tang Enbo.Now some of Hu Zongnan's troops have also been transferred to Henan. If Hu Zongnan is like Tang Enbo, two of Chiang Kai-shek's three main forces will collapse, and China's political situation will undergo major changes, as will the balance of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.In the future, under the condition that Britain and the United States are preparing for a counter-offensive, when the morale of the Japanese army and the people in the enemy-occupied areas in China are greatly shaken, the balance of Japanese power with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army will also change.If democracy is implemented, we will win, and if we do not implement democracy, we will lose. This was just an ideal of ours before, but now it is becoming a reality.Last year we published "Comparison of the Achievements of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the War of Resistance", which made foreigners pay attention to the strength of the Communist Party in the war of resistance.Never before have Britain and the United States made such blatant criticisms of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek as they are doing now.After Hu Zhengzhi[9] visited Britain and the United States and returned to China, he invited Comrades Dong Biwu and Pan Zinian[10] to dinner, saying that he had said in foreign countries that the Chinese Communist Party had a future, and that the 12th Plenary Session of the Kuomintang was hopeless.Recently Sun Ke[11] said he would resign, and Yu Youren[12] did not want to attend the Twelfth Plenary Session.These people are cold and hot watches, indicating that the situation is about to change.

With regard to developing ourselves, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas, as the central force representing the Chinese nation to fight against the Japanese invaders, the central government has done a lot of work to fight against comrades who oppose this policy or do not actively implement it.Central China and Shandong made the most serious mistakes on this issue, and it took almost a whole year in 1939 to correct them. However, the Southern Anhui Incident[13] occurred later, and they were not completely corrected until after the Southern Anhui Incident.When the Japanese army occupied Jiangsu and Zhejiang and the Kuomintang fled, our comrades did not dare to become county magistrates, saying that no one had appointed them.When the old and new armies clashed in Shanxi[14], and the old army fired at the new army, it became a question whether the new army should return their guns.These are concrete manifestations of not daring to implement an independent policy in the national war.The question is whether to have an independent policy.In today's world, the policy of the Soviet Union is the most independent, followed by the United States, and the United Kingdom is hesitant. On issues such as France, Italy, and Poland, the United Kingdom is hovering between the two.The same is true of Chiang Kai-shek, who showed hesitation and duplicity towards the Communist Party and many other policies.Both Tang and Hu used the anti-communist "Bandit Suppression Handbook" as a textbook to educate their troops. Such an army must have no combat effectiveness against Japan.We are different. We have always adopted an independent policy. We have always stood on the stand of uniting the Kuomintang to resist Japan, but we have to fight against it when encountering anti-communist friction, so that the Kuomintang can neither surrender to Japan nor attack the Communist Party on a large scale, and lead the Kuomintang to fight against the enemy. Fight for a goal to go up.In anti-friction, we adopted a reasonable, favorable, and restrained policy to ease the friction and struggle. We did the same for the three anti-communist upsurges[15].We were only a small party (no more than 40,000 organized party members) and a small army (only 45,000 members) in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, and now we have nearly one million party members and nearly half a million members. army.When the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area marched to northern Shaanxi in the winter of 1935, there were only 7,000 people left, and they became "skin and bone".We said at the time that the Long March was a victory, and that the Long March was a planter and a propaganda team. Don’t underestimate the power left behind. It has a great future for development.At that time, some comrades felt pessimistic, which was actually very unrealistic.From 1936 to 1939, we hoped to reform the Kuomintang, based on Zhang Xueliang's [16] progressive precedent and the Kuomintang's loss of territory in Jiangsu and Zhejiang.But this hope was dashed, but we did not lose money.In the final analysis, it was mainly the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that saved the nation from peril, fighting against 58% of the Japanese army and 90% of the puppet army.Without the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army's war of resistance, China's war of resistance would never have been what it is today.Our policy of developing the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the anti-Japanese base areas is completely correct, and our policy of uniting with friendly forces is also completely correct.

The development of our party during the Anti-Japanese War went through three stages.The first stage is from 1937 to 1940.In the first two years of this period, Japan used the main force to deal with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was also more vigorous, and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was relatively good. We adopted the policy of guerrilla warfare, developed the army, established base areas, and opened cadre schools.On the issue of mobile warfare or guerrilla warfare, we also had internal debates, but we still implemented the correct strategic policy of focusing on guerrilla warfare.The united front policy suffered a setback in 1938, which was later corrected by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee.In the first stage, a sense of arrogance grew in our ranks. Some comrades looked down on Japan too much, believed too much in the Kuomintang, thought everything was going well, and were very proud. This was a disadvantage.

The second stage is from 1941 to 1942.Japan used the main force to deal with the Communist Party, carried out countless cruel "mopping ups", and implemented the "cannibalization" policy and the "three alls" policy. Our base areas, population and army have all shrunk.But this kind of difficulty has educated our comrades, and we have adopted appropriate policies, such as fighting against the enemy, rectifying the three winds, streamlining the army and streamlining administration, supporting the government and loving the people, developing production, unifying leadership, the "three-three system"[17], reducing rent and interest, etc. , have achieved results, so we have a firm foothold in the enemy's rear.Although we have suffered losses, we have gained experience and overcome difficulties.At this stage, Japan adopted a policy of politically inducing surrender to the Kuomintang, supplemented by military strikes. To put it bluntly, Japan has almost no major military operations against the Kuomintang.The Kuomintang, on the other hand, was becoming more and more reactionary, adopting a passive attitude towards the Japanese attack, while being active in launching attacks against the Communist Party and the masses of the people.

The third stage started last year.Our base area, population and army have risen again.The army now has 470,000 people, and its combat effectiveness has increased; the number of party members has grown to more than 900,000; the population of the base areas, which directly and indirectly borne food taxes in the first stage, was nearly 10 million, and in the second stage it fell to less than 50 million. In 1943, it rose to more than 80 million.Various policies are more progressive, especially the rectification of the three winds and the development of the economy.The rectification movement is aimed at clarifying ideas and uniting the whole party.Our party is basically united, but there are many different opinions on various policy issues and various petty-bourgeois ideological styles, and after being corrected, it is united again.Unification is the first aspect of our party, and non-unification is the second aspect. Both aspects must be seen.The sects that once played a bad role in history no longer exist politically and organizationally, but remnants of dogmatism and empiricism still exist.There is still a serious tendency towards blind mountainism, which is caused by the vast and long-divided rural base areas of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and the inadequacy of our party's education work, and must be overcome.We have lacked experience in economic work for a long time, and now we must pay great attention to it.

The line of the Sixth National Congress was basically correct, but instead of solving the problem of base areas, it proposed preparations for riots and the seizure of big cities.This has been impossible since the Sixth National Congress, but it will be implemented after the Seventh National Congress. After the Seventh National Congress, we must implement this policy.In 1927 we cooperated with Xue Yue[19] to occupy Shanghai, but were immediately attacked by the Kuomintang.Now we are going to change Xue Yuejin into Shanghai into Chen Yi[20] into Shanghai, and we have dozens of "Xue Yue".From the Sixth to the Seventh National Congress, we actually took the route of the base areas, and now we must stick to the base areas.In the base areas, we must develop the economy.In 1939 there were only 700 factory workers in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region, in 1942 there were 4,000, and this year there are 12,000.If there are 30,000 factory workers in the border region, the ratio of the workers in the border region to the population of the border region exceeds the ratio of the workers to the population of the whole country.There have been many disputes in the past when the focus of the Party's work has shifted from the cities to the countryside. In the future, many problems will arise when the shift from the countryside to the cities occurs. This requires us to be mentally prepared to learn to do economic work and learn to do urban work.In the future, the countryside will provide food and cadres for the army. Without us, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, it would be impossible to drive the Japanese invaders out of the big cities.

Our party must be prepared to deal with major changes in the future.The Seventh National Congress must elect a stronger and more capable central government than in the past 23 years. Regarding the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Comrade Lin Boqu[21] went out this time, and the Kuomintang sent two officials, civil and military[22], to greet him, talk for four hours a day, and entertain along the way, which is unprecedented.It turned out that our estimate was very low, and we thought that we could not solve the problem this time, so we asked Comrade Lin Boqu to raise only some trivial matters.The other party proposed to negotiate based on the four points proposed by Lin Biao last year[23], and Mr. Lin replied that they should negotiate based on the five points proposed by Enlai this year[24].There are only two prospects: one is still procrastinating; the other is to solve some problems, such as the army problem, the border area problem, the defense area problem, and the problem of running the party and newspapers in individual places.If they are determined to solve these four problems, we should be prepared to accept them and express to the whole country that we are willing to improve the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

This year the military is still focused on refinement.Next year, we plan to develop and occupy a number of small cities, and prepare to expel the Japanese invaders from China. Published based on the transcript of the speech kept by the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] The Wayaobao Meeting refers to the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Wayaobao, Anding County, Shaanxi Province (now Zichang County) from December 17 to 25, 1935.The meeting passed the "Resolution on the Current Political Situation and the Party's Tasks" and the "Central Resolution on Military Strategy Issues" drafted by Mao Zedong.The meeting comprehensively analyzed the situation at home and abroad and the changes in class relations, determined the policy of establishing the anti-Japanese national united front, criticized closed-doorism, which became the main danger in the party at that time, and pointed out the prevention of right opportunism in the new revolutionary period. The necessity of resurrection satisfactorily solves the problem of the party's political line.

[2] The National Congress of the Party refers to the National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Yan'an from May 2 to 14, 1937.At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a report on "The Tasks of the Communist Party of China in the Anti-Japanese Period" and a conclusion on "Struggle to Win Millions of People into the Anti-Japanese National United Front".He analyzed the general situation in which the Sino-Japanese contradiction has risen to become the main contradiction, and pointed out that the new period of the Chinese revolution that began with the 129th Movement has entered the second stage. The main task of this stage is to strive for democracy. The three-in-one task of the Anti-Japanese War emphasized the importance of upholding the leadership of the proletariat in the united front, and called on the whole party to fight for millions of people to join the anti-Japanese national united front.The meeting adopted Mao Zedong's report and conclusions, approved the political line of the Party Central Committee since the Zunyi Meeting, and made important political and organizational preparations for the arrival of the National Anti-Japanese War. [3] The Luochuan meeting refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Luochuan, Shaanxi Province from August 22 to 25, 1937.At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a report on military issues and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.The meeting passed the "Decision on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks" and the "Ten Programs for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation".The meeting analyzed the political situation after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, and pointed out that the Anti-Japanese War was a hard and protracted war. The "Outline" is a concrete road to realize the all-round war of resistance.The meeting decided to launch independent guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and establish anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear; to launch anti-Japanese mass movements in the Kuomintang-ruled areas to promote the national war of resistance and strive for the political and economic rights that the people should have; The basic policy to solve the peasants' land problems during the war. [4] The Sixth Plenary Session refers to the expanded sixth plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Yan'an from September 29 to November 6, 1938.At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a political report "On the New Stage".The plenary session approved the line of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong, determined to continuously consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese national united front, adhere to the principle of independence and self-reliance in the united front, criticized Wang Ming's wrong slogan of "everything goes through the united front", and reiterated the party's The policy of independently organizing the people's armed struggle against Japan determined that the main work of the party should be placed in the theater of war and behind enemy lines.This meeting basically overcame the mistakes of Wang Ming's Rightist capitulationism, made a comprehensive strategic plan for the realization of the party's leadership in the war against Japan, and promoted the rapid development of various tasks. [5] Refers to the Henan campaign launched by the Japanese invading army in mid-April 1944 and ended in late May in order to open up traffic on the southern section of the Ping-Han Railway.The Kuomintang troops Jiang Dingwen, Tang Enbo, and Hu Zongnan retreated before the attack of the Japanese invading army, and 38 counties and cities including Zhengzhou and Luoyang fell one after another. [6] Wang Shoudao, born in 1906, from Liuyang, Hunan.At that time, he was the director of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. [7] Tang Enbo (1900-1954), a native of Wuyi, Zhejiang.At that time, he served as the deputy commander-in-chief of the First Theater of the Kuomintang Army and the commander-in-chief of the Shandong-Su-Yu-Anhui border area. [8] Hu Zongnan, then commander-in-chief of the 34th Army of the Kuomintang Army. [9] Hu Zhengzhi (1889-1949), born in Chengdu, Sichuan.At that time, he was the general manager of Ta Kung Pao. [10] Dong Biwu, then deputy secretary of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, head of the Propaganda Department, and head of the United Front Work Department.Pan Zinian (1893-1972), born in Yixing, Jiangsu, was the president of Xinhua Daily at that time. [11] Sun Ke (1891-1973), born in Xiangshan (now Zhongshan), Guangdong.At that time, he was the president of the Legislative Yuan of the Kuomintang government. [12] Yu Youren (1879-1964), a native of Sanyuan, Shaanxi.At that time, he was the president of the Supervisory Council of the Kuomintang government. [13] For the Southern Anhui Incident, see note [8] on page 50 of this volume. [14] Shanxi New Army refers to the Shanxi Youth Anti-Enemy Death Squad, which is the Shanxi people's anti-Japanese armed forces developed under the leadership and influence of the Communist Party of China in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War.Shanxi Old Army refers to Yan Xishan's army.In early December 1939, Yan Xishan launched the Jinxi Incident, an armed attack on the Shanxi New Army and the Eighth Route Army.The Shanxi New Army launched a resolute counterattack together with the Eighth Route Army, severely inflicting heavy losses on the stubborn army and consolidating the anti-Japanese base areas.Since then, the Shanxi New Army has been included in the battle order of the Eighth Route Army. [15] From 1939 to 1943, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang launched three consecutive anti-communist upsurges.The first time was from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, when the Kuomintang troops invaded and occupied the county towns of Ningxian and Zhenyuan in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region; Army; Shi Yousan, Zhu Huaibing and other troops attacked the Eighth Route Army in the southern Hebei and Taihang anti-Japanese base areas.The second time was from the autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1941. During this period, the Kuomintang troops surrounded and attacked the troops of the New Fourth Army that had moved from southern Anhui to the north, creating the Southern Anhui Incident that shocked China and the world.The third time was from the spring to autumn of 1943, when Chiang Kai-shek published the anti-communist and anti-people book "The Destiny of China", and taking advantage of the dissolution of the Communist International, he ordered the spies to pretend to be mass organizations to clamor for "disbanding the Communist Party" and "abolishing the Communist Party". Northern Shaanxi Special Zone", and mobilized a large number of river defense troops to prepare for a blitz attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area. [16] Zhang Xueliang, born in 1901, from Haicheng, Liaoning.On December 12, 1936, he and Yang Hucheng launched the Xi'an Incident, demanding that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite in the resistance against Japan.After the Xi'an Incident was resolved peacefully, he was imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek for a long time. [17] "Three-Three System", see note [8] on page 25 of this volume. [18] Wang Jingwei, at that time was the chairman of the Nanjing Puppet "National Government" supported by Japanese imperialism. [19] Xue Yue, born in 1896, is from Lechang, Guangdong.In 1927, he was the commander of the First Division of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army. [20] Chen Yi, who was the acting commander of the New Fourth Army at the time, was in Yan'an preparing to attend the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. [21] Lin Boqu, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at that time, chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government, and a representative of the Communist Party of China during the Anti-Japanese War, was negotiating in Chongqing. [22] Refers to Wang Shijie, director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang, and Zhang Zhizhong, director of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang government.At that time, they were representatives of the Kuomintang participating in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. [23] See note [4] on page 135 of this volume. [24] Refers to Zhou Enlai's five-point request to the Kuomintang government in his speech "On Constitutionalism and Unity Issues" delivered on March 12, 1944 at the meeting commemorating the 19th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death in Yan'an, namely: to recognize China The legal status of the Communist Party throughout the country; recognition of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas as the local government of the Kuomintang government; recognition of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all anti-Japanese armed forces behind enemy lines as troops under the jurisdiction of the Kuomintang government; the restoration of the designation of the New Fourth Army; The blockade and siege of the Ganning-Ningxia Border Region and various anti-Japanese base areas. [25] Twenty articles, see pages 131-134 of this volume.