Chapter 55 It is correct to focus on Jinzhou and Jinxi.

(October 4, 1948) Lin Luoliu[1] also reported to the Northeast Bureau: Telegram [2] at 9 o'clock on the 3rd. (1) It is very good and comforting that you are determined to attack Jinzhou. (2) You have decided to use all four and eleven columns and the two independent divisions at Rehe [3] to deal with the enemy from Jinxi and Huludao, and to attack the enemy with six columns of one, two, three, seven, eight and nine. In Jinzhou, it is absolutely correct to use four columns of five, six, ten and twelve to deal with the enemy who aided Jin from Shenyang, and to use nine independent divisions to deal with the enemy in Changchun.By doing this, you have focused your operations on Jinzhou and Jinxi, and you have corrected the long-term mistake of not focusing on the division of troops between the north and the south. This idea, so it has no effect in fact).We have sent telegrams many times in the past month asking you to do this, and you have only now figured out this important point, not to divide the troops equally, but to focus the main force on the two sides.Although you should have done this from the very beginning in terms of time, it has been almost a month since your troops started to operate, and you have just figured out the key points of the attack and added two columns to the Liangjin side. It will be affected to some extent (whether there is and the magnitude of the influence depends on the outcome of the battle), but the mistake of dividing the troops equally has been corrected.You should learn two lessons from this incident: the first lesson is that your command posts should move ahead of your troops in the direction you want to attack (we pointed this out to you early on), since you did not Doing so will limit your vision for a long time; the second lesson is that under normal circumstances you must concentrate your main force to attack one point instead of dividing your forces equally.

(3) The sooner the time to attack Jinzhou, the better, but because your troops have not yet arrived, your command post has just approached the vicinity of Jinzhou, and the preparations for the mobilization of the troops have not yet been carried out. Finish your preparations and start attacking.But you should try to shorten this preparatory process, don't delay it too long, and certainly don't make any haste. (4) The reasons why we should not return to attack Changchun are not, as you said, "too time-consuming" and "even if Changchun is not attacked, the enemy will break out of the siege automatically, and I can regain Changchun and wipe out part of the enemy", Rather, it is the same reason as we mentioned in the two telegrams [4] at 17:00 and 19:00 yesterday, that is, if you really go back to attack Changchun, you will make a big mistake.Take the point of breaking out of the encirclement as an example. At present, it is more beneficial for the enemy to break through the encirclement later, and it is more advantageous not to break through.

(5) All the disagreements between us and you before this are gone now. I hope you will follow your deployment at 9 o'clock on the 3rd, boldly let go and implement persistently, and strive to conquer Jinzhou first, and then attack Jinxi . (6) Chiang Kai-shek has arrived in Shenyang, but only to cheer up his subordinates who have lost confidence.Whatever he says or does, you ignore him at all, and resolutely follow your 9 o'clock telegram every three days to do it. Military Commission four days six o'clock Published according to Mao Zedong's manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------

note [1] Lin Luoliu refers to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who were respectively the commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the Northeast Field Army at that time. [2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 9:00 on October 3, 1948.The telegram said: "We still plan to attack Jinzhou. As long as our army is fully prepared and then launches a general attack, it is still possible to wipe out the Jin enemy, at least part or most of the enemy. At present, it would take too much time to attack Changchun again. , even if Changchun is not attacked, the enemy will automatically break through, and I can regain Changchun and wipe out part of the enemy.” The telegram also reported the specific deployment of troops to focus on Jinzhou and Jinxi, and stated that it would start as soon as possible In the general offensive, strive to resolve the battle quickly, and the main purpose of the battle is to annihilate the enemy.

[3] Rehe, namely Rehe Province.See note [8] on page 82 of this volume. [4] Refers to the two telegrams drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 17:00 and 19:00 on October 3, 1948 to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou.See note [2] on page 165 of this volume and pages 164-165.