Chapter 23 The relationship between policy and experience

(March 6, 1948) Comrade Shaoqi: (1) Ugly and clever electricity [1] is known early.The points mentioned are very good, and have been included in the Central Committee’s Instructions on the Work of Old and Semi-Old Areas [2].However, the relationship between policy and experience should be understood as whether the policy is correct or not and the degree of correctness is to be tested by experience; any experience (practice) is obtained from the process of implementing a certain policy. Great experience is the result of implementing wrong policies, and correct experience is the result of implementing correct policies.Therefore, no matter what you do, everything that concerns the masses should have a policy with clear boundaries.I feel that many mistakes have been made in various places. The main reason (bad people making trouble is not the main reason) is due to the lack of clarity in the policies stipulated by the leading organs, and there is no clear and clear distinction between what is allowed to do and what is not allowed to do. .The reason why they fail to clearly distinguish the boundaries is that the leaders themselves lack sufficient experience in what to do (they have not had sufficient experience in implementing a certain policy), or they do not pay attention to the experience of others, or due to undue negligence, Failure to distinguish policy boundaries.Secondly, although the leaders knew the boundaries of the policy, they only gave simple explanations and did not give systematic explanations.According to experience, if any policy is only briefly explained, but not systematically explained, it will not be able to mobilize the party and the masses to engage in correct practice.In the above two cases, the central bureaus and the central government should share the responsibility.We have done a lot of work in the past, but we have not been able to clearly distinguish the boundaries openly (this is very important, that is, published in newspapers so that the general public can know), and we have not given systematic explanations, and we cannot specifically blame the Central Bureaus. I myself feel this responsibility deeply.In the past three months or so, we have worked hard to study and explain various policies to make up for this deficiency.But of course the Central Bureaus have their own responsibility in this respect.And secondly, the policy itself is wrong.On this point, many lower-level Party departments arbitrarily decide on policies that they think are correct but are actually wrong, and not only do not consult the Central Committee, but they also do not consult the Central Bureau.For example, the indiscriminate killings in many places are like this.However, there are quite a few Central Bureaux who themselves made mistakes in certain policies.For example, the Shanxi-Sui Branch Bureau made its own mistakes in violating the middle peasants in terms of quotas, in imposing devastating industrial and commercial taxes, and in abandoning enlightened gentlemen.However, it seems that it was not Jinsui who made more serious "Left" mistakes, but North China, East China, and Central China (since Japan surrendered, and also before the surrender). Jinsui seems to be the second most serious.Whether this is the case, please review it.And secondly, there are mistakes in the leadership method, that is, there is not enough communication between the upper and lower levels, and the failure to quickly understand the situation of the movement and quickly correct the mistakes at the lower levels.Please formally raise the above-mentioned points to the comrades who participated in the meeting of the Central Working Committee, and discuss them once.

(2) After the class division draft [3] was written, I felt that what was written in the January draft decision [4] was not enough. Now I am rewriting a decision based on a large section in the middle of the January draft, and I plan to make it public as soon as possible published.The first and last paragraphs of the January draft were published in an editorial.Because the central government issued the key points of land reform in the new district, there was no need to send the telegram[5] I sent to Su Yu, so it was decided that it would be beneficial to publish some parts of it in an editorial instead of sending it.

(3) Suyu's troops will not be fully concentrated in Yanggu until March 15th. You, Rao, Chen, Kang, and Deng [6] may go to Yanggu around March 20th. Do you have enough time? Discuss all policy issues (centering on the book on classification), organizational issues of the North China Bureau, and other issues. Mao Zedong March 6 According to the "Selected Letters of Mao Zedong" published by People's Publishing House in 1983. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Refers to Liu Shaoqi's telegram to Mao Zedong on February 18, 1948.He expressed in the telegram that he hoped to quickly obtain the documents of the Party Central Committee on the issue of land reform, and said: "Without these documents, it is impossible to avoid mistakes and detours in general. Although we have these documents, we still have to make some mistakes. Yes, in our party, we mainly rely on the personal experience of party members and cadres to set the right path, but with correct documents, we can avoid many detours." Liu Shaoqi also commented on the land reform in the old areas in the telegram Specific suggestions were put forward on issues such as not having to divide the land equally again, not artificially setting up poor peasant leagues, and how to carry out land adjustments.

[2] Refers to the "Land Reform and Party Consolidation Work in Old and Semi-Old Areas" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on February 22, 1948. [3] Refers to the "Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Division and Treatment of Social Classes in Land Reform" (draft).See note [1] on page 62 of this volume. [4] Refers to the draft decision drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on January 18, 1948.See note [1] on page 42 of this volume. [5] Refers to Mao Zedong's telegram to Su Yu, Deputy Commander of the East China Field Army on January 22, 1948, regarding land reform in the newly liberated areas, see pages 35-39 of this volume.

[6] Rao, refers to Rao Shushi (1903-1975), a native of Linchuan, Jiangxi Province, who was then secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and political commissar of the East China Military Region.Chen, refers to Chen Yi, who was then the first deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the commander of the East China Military Region.Kang, refers to Kang Sheng (1898-1975), a native of Zhucheng, Shandong, who was the second deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at that time.Deng refers to Deng Zihui, who was then deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy political commissar of the East China Military Region.