Chapter 42 Strive for all possible victories on a solid and reliable basis

(October 23, 1950) Peng [1], and Gao [2]: Telegram [3] at Xushi on the 22nd.Your policy is sound, and we should start from a sound base, and refrain from doing things that cannot be done.From the military point of view, the situation in the Korean War will be determined by the following points.The first is whether the campaign currently being deployed can take advantage of the enemy's unexpected sudden annihilation of two, three or even four puppet divisions (the puppet third division will follow the puppet sixth division, and the puppet first division may also reinforce ).If this battle is a big victory, the enemy will redeploy and occupy Sinuiju, Xuanchuan, Dingju, etc. for at least a period of time. However, Changjin can be protected, and whether Sinanju and Suncheon can be conservative may also be a problem. The section of the railway from Seongcheon to Yangdeok without troops has opened up a big gap for me. Under the conditions of the existing troops, the enemy will immediately Passive status.If the sudden victory in this sudden battle is not great, and the main force of the Pseudo Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions is not quickly annihilated, or they escape, or they actually stand by and wait for reinforcements, the Puppet No. If we retreat before the formation, the situation will change to the enemy's advantage, and the conservation of Xichuan and Changjin will also encounter difficulties.The second is the extent to which the enemy's aircraft killed and injured our personnel and hindered our activities.If I can use night marches to achieve a very proficient level, and although the enemy has a large number of aircraft, they will not cause me too much damage or hindrance, then our army can continue to conduct field battles and attack many isolated strongholds, that is to say, except for Pyongyang, Except for Wonsan, Seoul, Daegu, Busan and other big cities and their surrounding areas, which I cannot attack without aircraft, the enemies in other places may be wiped out by me one by one. Even if the United States adds a few more divisions, I can also annihilate them one by one.In this way, it is possible to force the United States to conduct diplomatic negotiations with me, or to open these big cities one by one after the conditions for our aircraft and artillery are met.If the casualties and hindrances of enemy planes to us are so great that we cannot carry out favorable operations, our army will be in a very difficult position within six months to one year before our planes are ready.Third, if the United States transfers another five to ten divisions to North Korea, and our army has failed to annihilate several American divisions and several puppet divisions in mobile warfare and operations against isolated strongholds before then, the situation will be very serious. It will be against me, and if it is the other way around, it will be in my favor.All of the above points can be experienced and proved in this battle and in the following months.I think we should strive for a complete victory in this battle, strive to maintain a strong morale to carry out effective combat despite the enemy's bombardment, and strive to wipe out a few more of the enemy's forces before the enemy deploys more troops from the United States or other places to North Korea. Troops so that their supplements cannot keep up with their losses.In short, we should strive for all possible victories on a solid and reliable basis.

Mao Zedong October 23 Printed from manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Peng, referring to Peng Dehuai, who was then the commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers. [2] Gao, referring to Gao Gang, was then the commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. [3] Refers to Peng Dehuai's telegram to Mao Zedong and Gao Gang on the current campaign plan on October 22, 1950 at Xushi.The telegram stated: The basic policy of our army within half a year is to maintain Changjin, Xichuan, and the mountainous area north of Guicheng, as well as the Changdian River Estuary, Ji'an, and Linjiang lines to cross the river, and buy time to prepare for the counterattack.The current campaign plan is to contain the enemy with one army, and at the same time concentrate three armies to find opportunities to eliminate two or three divisions of the puppet army, strive to expand and consolidate the mountainous areas north of the Wonsan and Pyongyang lines, and develop guerrilla warfare in South Korea.