Chapter 4 Combat Policy for the Liberation of Southwest China

(October 19, 1949) Comrade Lin Biao[1] also told Ye and Chen[2]: Telegram [3] at 12 o'clock on the 18th. (1) You plan to cut off the enemy's retreat to Yunnan by taking a big detour first. This plan is very good. (2) The center of gravity in the southwest is Sichuan. The main force of our second field must occupy the area around Syria[4], Luzhou, and Chongqing in December. He[5] led the Eighteenth Corps to occupy the area around Chengdu in January, and quickly expanded to occupy the whole area. In Sichuan, the arrangement for spring plowing next year will be conducive to production and construction.Therefore, regardless of whether Bai Chongxi[6] retreated to Yunnan or not, our third and fifth corps only planned to occupy Guiyang with one army (i.e., the 18th army) and manage Guizhou; They all take Syria, Lu, and Chongqing directly from the Xiangxi Branch Road (leaving a part in the Zunyi area), aiming to reach this area in December, and set up the Southwest Military and Political Committee to coordinate the overall situation of the Southwest.Otherwise, the financial problems of 1.5 million people will be in great difficulty.The 1.5 million people mentioned here refers to the 600,000 troops of our army (including 500,000 soldiers of the Erye Army and 100,000 soldiers of the He tribe), and the Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and It is said that there are 900,000 military and political personnel in the four provinces of Kang[8], mainly in Sichuan. (3) According to the big roundabout plan you mentioned, it is estimated that half or more of Bai Chongxi's tribe may be annihilated by me in Guangxi, and not many retreated to Yunnan.Now assuming that the main force of the White Bandits has retreated to Yunnan, and the enemy from Guizhou has also retreated to Yunnan, together with the Lu Han [9] and other troops in Yunnan, the total number of enemy troops is about 150,000. In addition to the local guerrilla forces (it is said that there are more than 20,000 people) to deal with it, we will have the initiative.Because the road is far away and there is a lack of food, it is not easy to go back and forth. If you go to two corps (200,000 people), you may be in trouble.It is estimated that Chen Geng entered Yunnan with 100,000 people, and the problem can be solved by adopting various methods of annihilating the enemy, but the time will be slightly extended. (4) Please deploy according to the above guidelines. (5) Liu and Deng [10] will go to Hunan from Beijing via Han tomorrow or the day after, and command Erye to march towards Sichuan.3rd and 5th Liang Corps, please order them to fill up their cotton clothes and go to the border of Hunan and Guizhou to stand by.

Mao Zedong You Hao Printed from manuscript. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Lin Biao, then the commander of the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the commander of the Central China Military Region. [2] Ye, refers to Ye Jianying, who was then the commander and political commissar of the Guangdong Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.Chen, referring to Chen Geng (1903-1961), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan, who was then the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao and others to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 12:00 on October 18, 1949.The telegram said: 1. Regarding the Guangxi campaign, we are going to use the method of encirclement and long-term pursuit to try to wipe out the enemy in Guode and the area east of Nanning.At present, Guilin and the east and north of Quanzhou are far away from each other. It is estimated that it is very difficult for our frontal troops to capture and detain the enemy.Therefore, it is planned to use a large detour to cut off the enemy's retreat to Yunnan.2. If it is estimated that the enemies from Guangdong, Guangxi and Sichuan may all retreat to Yunnan, then can our Second Field Army occupy Kunming first with the Fifth Corps and Guiyang with the Third Corps, seize the enemy's rear, divide and isolate the enemy, and then the Second Field can be divided by It is better for Kunming to go north to solve the Sichuan problem.

[4] Xufu, now Yibin, Sichuan. [5] He, referring to He Long, was appointed as the commander of the Southwest Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 1949. At this time, he was still in the Northwest and had not yet taken up his post. [6] Bai Chongxi (1893-1966), a native of Guilin, Guangxi.In April 1949, he was appointed as the chief of the Central China Military and Political Chief Office of the Kuomintang government. [7] Zhang Qun (1889-1990), a native of Huayang, Sichuan (now Shuangliu).In April 1949, he was appointed as the chief of the Southwest Military and Political Chief Office of the Kuomintang government.

[8] Kang, referring to Xikang Province, was revoked in 1955, and the original jurisdiction was assigned to Sichuan Province. [9] Lu Han (1895-1974), born in Zhaotong, Yunnan.At that time, he was the chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government of the Kuomintang and the director of the Yunnan Appeasement Office of the Kuomintang Army.On December 9, 1949, he led an uprising in Kunming. [10] Liu, referring to Liu Bocheng, who was then the commander of the Second Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who was then the Political Commissar of the Second Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.