Chapter 10 Chapter Five: The Fatal Conceit

Traditional Morality Cannot Satisfy Rationalism's Requirements The four requirements mentioned above—anything that is not scientifically proven, or not fully understood, or whose purpose is not fully explained, or has some unknown consequences, are irrational—are very consistent with constructivism. Tastes of rationalism and socialist thought.Both positions themselves derive from a mechanistic or physicalist interpretation of the extended order of human cooperation, from an understanding of order such that, as long as all the facts known to the members of the group are available, people A group can be arranged or controlled.But the extended order is not, and cannot be, such an order.

I would therefore like to admit in advance that most of the tenets, institutions, and ways of doing things of traditional morality and of capitalism do not meet these requirements or standards, and—from the point of view of this theory of reason and science—are “unnatural.” rational" and "unscientific".Moreover, as we have also acknowledged, those who continue to follow traditional practice often do not themselves understand how it was formed or maintained, and it is hardly surprising that traditionalists sometimes offer alternatives for their practice. Some of the so-called "proofs" are often naive (thus providing us intellectuals with something to hunt) and have nothing to do with the real reasons for the success of these practices.Many traditionalists are unwilling to even bother with proofs that they simply cannot provide (which allows intellectuals to accuse them of being anti-intellectual or dogmatic), and instead, out of habit or religious belief, continue to pursue their own practices.This is not a "new discovery".As early as 250 years ago, Hume observed that "moral rules are not the conclusions of our reason".But Hume's words are not enough to stop most modern rationalists from continuing to think - and it is inexplicable how often they cite Hume as a kindred spirit - that everything that does not come from reason is either nonsense or arbitrary prejudice, so they continue to demand rational proofs.

Not only traditional religious beliefs, such as belief in God, and many traditional morals related to sex and family (I do not want to discuss these issues in this book), cannot meet these requirements, even some special moral traditions that I am concerned with here, The same is true of private property, thrift, exchange, honesty, fulfillment of contracts, and so on. The situation looks all the more ominous when one considers that not only do the traditions, institutions, and beliefs mentioned here fail to meet the above logical, methodological, and epistemological requirements, but that socialists often object to them on other grounds as well.Chisholm and Keynes, for example, regard them as 'an ancient burden', and Wells and Forster see them as intimately connected with mean trade and commerce (see Chapter 6).They are also seen as a source of alienation and oppression, of "social injustice," an especially fashionable view today.

These objections lead to the urgent need for a new, rationally reformed and justified morality that meets the above requirements so that it does not become a stale burden, an alienating, oppressive No or "unjust" power, nor will it be complicit in trade.But that was only part of the grand task that the creators of these new theorems—socialists like Einstein, Monod, Russell, and the self-proclaimed “amoral” Keynes—had set for themselves.New rationalist language and laws must also be established, for for the same reason existing language and laws cannot meet these requirements (not even the laws of science, for that matter, see Hume, 1739/1951; Popper, 1934/9).Since they themselves no longer believe that morality has any supernatural basis (to say nothing of language, law, and science), but still believe that there must be some kind of proof, this daunting task seems to them all the more daunting. for urgent.

Man, proud of having built his world according to his own design, and ashamed of not having designed it better, now sets out to do so.The aim of socialism is nothing less than a total redesign of our traditional morality, law, and language, on the basis of which it will condemn the old order, which stands in the way of reason, perfection, true liberty, and justice, The unreasonable state of transformation was swept away. Demonstration and Improvement of Traditional Ethics This view, and the rationalist standards upon which the whole project rests, are at best advice for perfection and at worst discredited tenets of an archaic methodology that may have been at odds with what was regarded as science. Things come together, but have nothing to do with real research.In our extended order, a highly evolved complex moral system coexists with naive rational theories favored by constructivism, scientism, positivism, hedonism, and socialism.To say this is not to oppose reason and science, but to oppose these theories about rationality and science, and some behaviors that arise from them.This becomes apparent just by realizing that nothing can be proven on such a claim.This is true not only of morality, but of language, law, and even science itself.

Many who are not familiar with recent developments and debates within the philosophy of science may find it strange that the points I have made also apply to science.Yet it is true that not only are the laws of our present science unprovable in the manner required by constructivist methodologists, we even have reason to think that we will eventually learn that many of our present scientific conjectures are also wrong.The notion that guides us to do more successfully than we have previously realized, though it may be considered a great advance, is as fundamentally wrong as its predecessors.We know from Karl Popper (19341959) that our aim can only be to speed up our process of making mistakes as much as possible.In the meantime, if we discard all current unprovable conjectures, we will soon return to the level of savages who trust only their instincts.Yet this is what all scientist positions—from Cartesian rationalism to modern positivism—suggest.

It is true that things like traditional morality cannot be justified by reason, but it is equally true that any possible rules of morality, including those that socialists can come up with, cannot be justified by reason either.Therefore, no matter what rules we obey, we cannot prove them on demand.It follows that no argument about morality—or science, or law, or language—can legitimately be turned into a problem of proof (see Bartley, 1962/1984; 1964, 1982).If we do nothing because we don't know why, or because we can't prove it meets the requirements, we probably won't live long.

This problem of proof is of course a nonsense, partly due to faulty and inconsistent assumptions drawn from our mainstream epistemological and methodological traditions, sometimes going back to ancient times.The confusion over the question of proof, especially as it relates to our main concern, also comes from Auguste Comte, who believed that we could overhaul our moral system in a completely constructed, proven (or, as Comte himself put it, "proven") rule systems instead. Here I do not want to list all the reasons why the traditional proof requirement is inappropriate.Consider, for example, a common way of proving moral beliefs (which also applies to the argument in the next section).It should be pointed out that it is purely nonsensical to assume, as the ethics of rationalism and hedonism do, that our moral purpose is to create or pursue certain goals, and only within this range can such morality be justified. talk.There is no reason to think that evolutionarily selected practices that enable people to raise larger populations have much to do with creating happiness, let alone be swayed by the pursuit of happiness.On the contrary, there are many things that show that those who seek pure happiness are defeated by those who want to preserve life.

Our moral traditions, though not constructable, justifiable, or justifiable in the required manner, are partly modifiable in their formation, and in doing so we understand to a certain extent what they satisfy. need.To the extent that our work can be successful, we will of course ask ourselves to eliminate those recognized defects through bit by bit improvement on the basis of internal criticism.That is, to improve and revise our moral tradition by analyzing the mutual coordination and coherence of its various parts and making corresponding repairs to the system (see Popper, 1945/1966; 1983: 29-30).

The new contemporary research on copyright and patents, which we mentioned earlier, is an example of such small improvements.Another example is that we think that the classical (Roman law) concept of personal property is mainly about our exclusive right to use or abuse some kind of object in any way we like, but it is oversimplified to maintain efficient markets. The rules required by the economy, so a whole new branch of economics grew up, which hoped to clarify how to improve the traditional property system in order to make the market function better. The first step in this analysis involves a so-called "rational reconstruction" of how the system came about.This is actually a historical, even natural history study, not to construct, prove or validate the system itself.It is akin to what Hume's followers are accustomed to call "conjectural history," which enables one to understand why these and not those rules prevailed (but by no means loses sight of Hume's fundamental assertion that "the rules of morality do not not the conclusions of our reason", which is often not reiterated enough).Not only Scottish philosophers have taken this line, but a wide range of researchers of cultural evolution, from the grammarians and linguists of ancient Rome to Bernard Mandeville, through Herder , to Giambattista Vico [he has a profound insight: homo non intelli-gendo fit omnia ("Man has become like this, but he does not understand this process"); 1854: V , 183], and the German legal historians whom we have mentioned such as Savigny, up to Menger.Menger is the only one of these to appear after Darwin, and it is they who all endeavor to provide a plausible reconstruction, a speculative history or an evolutionary explanation, for the emergence of cultural institutions.

I find myself in a predicament on this point, and I am tempted to say that it must be members of my own profession, the economists, who are most likely to account for the moral traditions which have allowed civilization to grow and flourish, and who understand Experts in the formation process of extended order.Only one who can account for the relative role of such factors as separate property can explain why such a pattern of behavior favors groups that obey it over those whose morals are more fitted to achieve other ends.There is some justification in my desire to please my colleagues in economics, and it would have been more appropriate if not so many of them had been influenced by constructivism. How did morality arise?What do we mean by "reasonable reconstruction"?We have outlined this in previous chapters.In addition to constructivism's claim that correct morality can be designed and reconstructed by reason, there are at least two possible sources of morality.The first is what we said about intrinsic morality, our instinctive morality (community, altruism, collective decision-making, etc.), and the resulting behavioral patterns are not sufficient to sustain our current extended order and its population. Second are the evolved morals (thrift, divided property, honesty, etc.) that sustain the extended order.We have seen that this morality lies between instinct and reason, obscured by the false dichotomy between instinct and reason.The extended order relies on this morality because it arose in fact precisely because groups that obeyed its basic rules prospered relative to other groups.The mystery of our extended order and markets, a mystery that stumbles socialists and constructivists alike, is that we can use this process to yield greater gains in the resources of discovery than we can with processes dominated by humans (of course in More resources will be discovered along the way).To justify this kind of morality, although it cannot be based on the fact that it allows us to do these things and thus survive, it does enable us to survive, and there is probably something in it that needs to be explained. The limitation of being guided by factual knowledge; the impossibility of observing our moral role Probably the root of this false assumption that there is a possibility to prove, to construct, or to verify is scientism.But even if the adherents of scientism knew this, they would no doubt fall back on another requirement of their old methodology, which was related to the requirement of proof but did not strictly depend on it.For example (referring back to the requirements we enumerated earlier) it would be objected that it is impossible for people to fully understand traditional moral rules and how they function; purposes of illustration; compliance with these rules has consequences that cannot be directly observed, and therefore cannot be determined to be beneficial - and in no case can they be fully known or foreseen. In other words, traditional moral rules fail to satisfy the second, third and fourth requirements.It can be seen that these requirements are closely related to each other, so that after pointing out their different emphases, they can still be viewed as a whole.So to simply indicate their interrelationships, it can be said that people do not understand what they are doing, or what their ends are, unless they know and can fully account for the observable consequences of their actions in advance.It is said that, if action is to be rational, it must be deliberate and foreseeable action. Unless these requirements are interpreted in such a broad and superficial way that they lose all their specific practical significance, for example, the intelligible purpose of the market order is that it brings about the favorable result of 'making wealth', otherwise the traditional behavior will be observed. methods of conduct, such as the manner in which market order is produced, clearly do not meet these requirements. I do not think that any party involved in our discussions would view them on the basis of such a superficial interpretation; There is such an intention. We admit that our traditional institutions are not understood, that they have no purpose and function, advantageous or unfavorable, that have been explained in advance, and that perhaps we can draw a clearer picture of our actual situation from this. awareness. And it would be better for those systems. Under market conditions (like other institutions in our extended order), unexpected outcomes matter: the allocation of resources is done by impersonal processes in which, for their own ends (they are themselves often quite ambiguous) the individuals who act do not know and cannot know the net result of their intercourse. Take, for example, the requirement that it is irrational to follow or act blindly (i.e., lacking understanding), and that a purposeful act must not only have its intentions and consequences fully known in advance, but they must also be able to be understood. Fully observed, and most beneficial.Let us now measure the notion of extended order against this requirement.The absurdity of this claim becomes apparent when we think about this order within the broad evolutionary framework that produced it.The decisiveness which led to the creation of the order itself, the dominance of certain modes of conduct over others, was a long afterward result of earlier individual actions.It is almost impossible for earlier individuals to have any idea of ​​such effects upon groups, and even if earlier individuals could know of their effects, the effects are likely to be of no benefit to them, whatever later individuals may think. .There is no reason for later individuals to think that all their members (or anyone else) should have to look at history—leaving evolutionary theory aside—in order to understand why the group in which they behaved was more prosperous than other groups. Knowledge and economics--and all things that must be known are well-informed, though no doubt some people are always good at finding reasons for current or local ways of behaving.The many rules that have evolved to provide for greater cooperation and prosperity in the extended order may be radically different from anything that could have been foreseen, and it is even possible that, sooner or later in the evolution of the order, some people will Resentment.In the extended order, the circumstances that determine what each must do to achieve his own ends obviously involve the inaction of many other strangers as to what means to achieve their own ends. Known decision.At no point in the process, therefore, can the individual design the functioning of the rules that come into being order according to his own ends.It was only later that we were able, retrospectively, to give some imperfect explanations of this formation process in principle (see Hayek, 1967, the first two papers). In English and German, there is no ready-made vocabulary that can be used to show precisely that the extended order, or the way it works, is contrary to what rationalists want.The only proper word—"transcendent"—has been abused, which makes me hesitate to use it.But in its literal sense, it does refer to that phenomenon that is vastly beyond our comprehension, our desires and intentions, our perceptions, that of coordinating and generating knowledge - that no single brain or organization can possess or invent This knowledge—the phenomenon.This is evident in its religious meaning, as in the petition we see in the Lord's Prayer, "Let your will (that is to say, not mine) be carried out on earth, as it is into the kingdom of heaven," or as the Gospel says: "You did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you to go and bear fruit, that your fruit should remain." (John 15:16) But once a purer ordering, that is, a purely naturalistic ordering (not from any supernatural force), as is the case in evolution, but abandons the animism that still exists in religion: there is a unique The idea that the mind or will (such as that of Almighty God) can exercise control and establish order. A denial of the claims of rationalism on this ground would have important consequences for anthropomorphism and animism of all kinds—and thus for socialism as well.If the coordination of individual activities in the marketplace, like other traditional morals and institutions, is the result of a process of natural, spontaneous, and self-generating order, designed to accommodate a multitude of concrete facts that no single mind can know or even conceive, Clearly, then, only a naive anthropomorphism would require these processes to be just, or to have some other moral attitude (see Chapter 7).There is certainly nothing wrong with making such a claim on a human being who governs a process by the controlling power of reason, or on a God who hears prayers, but it is not wrong to make such a claim on an actually functioning, impersonal process of spontaneously generating order. The request is quite inappropriate. In an order so extended as to exceed the comprehension and possible control of any single mind, it is certainly difficult for a unified will to determine the interests of each member in accordance with some particular conception of justice, or according to accepted measures.This is not only because anthropomorphism is problematic, but also because "there is no principle (some say one way, another that) about the person who receives the benefit or distributes it; This again depends on concrete facts, and therefore there can be no general principles" (Kant, 1798: II, 6, note 2).The conclusion drawn by Hume and Kant, that the flourishing of spontaneity requires the full implementation of universal rules, has never been refuted but merely ignored or forgotten. Although "interests have no principles" (and therefore no spontaneous order), the resistance to just rules that bring about extended order, and the accusation that they are immoral, arise from the certainty that there are certain interests Faith in principle, born of an attitude of refusal to admit that an extended order arose out of a competitive process, and that it was that process that determined its success, not the sanction of some great mind, some committee, or some divine master, Nor is it because it conforms to some accepted principle of personal merit.It is an order in which the progress made by some is at the expense of the equally sincere and even laudable efforts of others.Rewards are not for merit (eg following moral rules. See Hayek, 1960:94).For example, we can meet the needs of others without regard to their merits or the reasons why we can meet those needs.As Kant knew, there is no common standard of merit that can make judgments about the different opportunities faced by different individuals because they have different information, different abilities, and different desires.This latter situation is of course very common.Most discoveries that give someone an advantage are unexpected, for winners and losers alike.The values ​​of the products resulting from the necessary improvements in the conduct of individuals can hardly be justified, since their necessity arises from unforeseeable events.If justice means conforming to preconceived notions of right and wrong, conforming to the "common good," conforming to the possibilities afforded by circumstances that have been acquired in the past, then evolutionary progress into previously unknown territory will not appear just. People's understandable aversion to such morally blind results, which are inseparable from any process of trial and error, leads them to wish for a paradoxical situation: to eliminate the need for evolution— — that is, the process of trial and error — to control, and to shape evolution with one's own current desire.But the morality invented as a result of this response makes self-contradictory demands which no system can satisfy, and which thus become an inexhaustible source of conflict.A vain attempt to justify a situation by its very nature, whose outcome cannot depend on anyone's knowledge or knowledge available, can only destroy the very function of the process itself. It is grossly inappropriate to make these claims of justice against a natural process of evolution, not only with respect to what has happened in the past, but with respect to what is happening now.Because this evolutionary process is clearly still evolving.Civilization is not only a product of evolution, but a process; it allows itself to evolve by establishing a framework of universal rules and individual freedoms.This evolution cannot be dictated by human needs, and often does not produce results that meet human needs.People will find that some previously unfulfilled wishes are fulfilled at the cost of the disappointment of many others.Although an individual can increase his chances by acting ethically, the resulting evolution will not satisfy all his moral wishes.Evolution cannot be just. Insisting that all future changes be consistent with justice is tantamount to calling for an end to the evolutionary process.Evolution leads us forward, and is sure to bring about many outcomes that we neither want nor foresee, let alone preconceived ideas about its moral nature.It is good to ask what would have happened if, in the past, the power to carry out—say—egalitarian or meritocratic creeds had been vested with some mystical power.It will soon be discovered that this event would make the evolution of civilization impossible.Thus, Rawls's world (Rawls, 1971) is absolutely impossible to become civilized: the suppression of differences due to luck destroys most possibilities of discovering new opportunities.In such a world we would lose the information that alone, as a result of thousands of changes in the circumstances in which we live, can tell everyone what we must do in order to maintain production or—if possible—increase it. something. Intellectuals can certainly claim to have invented a new and better "social" morality which can accomplish this task, but these "new" rules are nothing but the repeated blunder of a return to the original morality of the micro-order, which It is very difficult to maintain the life and health of millions of people based on the macro order. We must reject anthropomorphism because it is wrong, but the idea is not difficult to understand.Thus we see the positive and sympathetic side of the intellectual views we refute.The inventive spirit of man has done so much to establish structures beyond the individual within which the individual finds some great opportunities that he imagines that he can design the whole as well as the parts, simply by virtue of the existence of such structures. The vast structure means that they can be specially designed.While it was a mistake, it was a noble one, a "magnificent...ambitious...noble...courageous" mistake, in the words of Mises. Unclear Goals: Most of the goals of the Expansion Order force are not conscious or deliberate There are special points and questions, most of which deepen the above, that help clarify how these things work together. The first is the question of how our knowledge actually arises.Much of the acquisition of knowledge--I admit, it took me a while to realize this--comes not from direct experience or observation, but from an ongoing process of sifting through learned traditions, which Individuals are required to recognize and obey moral traditions that cannot be justified by traditional rational doctrines.The product of the traditional selection process, the selection object is those irrational, or rather "unproven" beliefs.These beliefs, beyond the reach of anyone's knowledge and intentions, help those who profess them to prosper (which is not necessarily related to the reasons for professing them, such as religious ones).This process of selection, which forms customs and morals, can take advantage of far greater realities than individuals can perceive, and so tradition is in some respects superior, or "smarter" than human reason ( see previous chapter).This important insight can only be realized by a very critical rationalist. Then there is the closely related question raised earlier, that is, what are the real determinants in the evolutionary selection of behavioral rules.Humans like to focus on the immediately felt consequences of actions, but they are unimportant in this choice; on the contrary, in the long run—it is this long run that Keynes ridiculed (1971, C.W. : Ⅳ, 65)——The results of decisions made under the guidance of behavioral rules are the basis for choice.As the preceding arguments and the following discussion show, these results rely heavily on property and contractual rules that secure each person's private sphere.Hume pointed this out long ago when he wrote that rules "do not arise from the utility or advantage which particular individuals or publics enjoy in enjoying any particular benefit" (1739/1886: II, 273).People do not foresee the benefits of these rules until they are adopted, although some will come to understand what they gain from the whole system. Our previous assertion that learned traditions function as "adaptations to the unknown" must be taken with a grain of salt.The ability to adapt to unknown things is the key to all evolutionary processes. Of course, it is impossible for anyone to grasp all the events that the modern market order is targeting when it is constantly adjusting itself.The information available to an individual or an organization in adapting to the unknown is certainly incomplete. It is transmitted by some signals (such as prices) through many interlocking individuals, each in a different combination. Abstract flow of market signals.But the whole structure of behavior tends to take advantage of these local and fragmented signals, to adapt, even if by no means to a perfect degree, to conditions unknown or foreseeable to any individual.This is why the structure survives, and why the people who take advantage of it survive and prosper. It is impossible to deliberately plan an alternative to this spontaneous order-generating process of adaptation to the unknown.Neither human reason nor his inner "good nature" can make people do this. When facing the competitive group that started to expand because he found some rules first, in order to protect himself, he only To be able to obey rules that he didn't like - there was only this harsh inevitability. If we are the ones who have carefully constructed or are consciously shaping this structure of human behavior, then we need only ask each individual why they interact with any particular structure.In fact, however, those professional researchers, even after generations of effort, found it extremely difficult to explain these problems, and they could not reach a consensus on what caused specific events and what effects they caused.One of the wonderful tasks of economics is to show people how little they really know about the things they think they can design. To the naive mind, which understands order only as the product of deliberate arrangements, order and adaptability to the unknown, and the differentiation of power, are more effectively achieved under complex conditions by decentralized decisions. The notion that the world would expand the possibility of general order is ludicrous.However, this decentralization actually makes more information available, which is the main reason for denying the demands of constructivist rationalism.By the same token, the variable distribution of the power to allocate resources among many individuals who can actually determine the use of those resources—through individual liberty and separate property—is what makes decentralized knowledge get the most out of it. It is only possible to make use of the many specific knowledge possessed by any individual only if the individual can use his knowledge according to his own decision.No one can communicate all his knowledge to another, since much of what he can use himself becomes clear in the course of formulating a plan of action.Such information, such as an awareness of the relative scarcity of the various materials available to him, will emerge as he proceeds to specific tasks in his own circumstances.Only then can the individual discover what he is looking for in the marketplace, and what helps him to do this is the reaction of others to what they find in his personal circumstances.The whole problem is not just to use existing knowledge, but to discover as much valuable information as possible under the existing conditions. It has often been charged that the system of property is a selfish system, because it benefits only those who own some property, and of course it was "invented" by those who received some personal wealth, for the exclusive enjoyment of the benefit, It is hoped that these wealth will not be violated by others.Indeed, Rousseau's wrath, his assertion that it is selfish and exploitative interests that keep us in "chains" are fueled by these ideas.But it fails to take into account that our entire production scale has become so large solely because we have been able to use widely distributed knowledge of specific facts to configure the H.The market is the only known method that can provide information by which individuals can weigh the relative benefits of different uses of resources of which they have direct knowledge, and, whether they intend to Serving the needs of distant strangers.This decentralized knowledge can only be decentralized in nature.It cannot be centralized and passed on to some authority dedicated to the task of creating order. 因此，分立的财产制度并不是自私的制度，它不是、也不可能是为了把财主的意志强加给其他人而“发明”出来的。相反，它的好处是普遍的，因为它把生产的支配权，从少数不管如何自负知识毕竟有限的个人那儿，转移给了一个过程，即扩展秩序，它使所有人的知识得到了最大限度的利用，因此使没有财产的人得到几乎和有产者同样多的利益。 所有的人在法治下享有自由，并不要求所有的人都能拥有个人财产，而是要求许多人都能够这样做。我本人宁愿没有财产生活在一片其他许多人拥有一些财产的土地上，也不愿生活在一个全部财产“集体所有”、由权力机构安排其用途的地方。 然而，这种观点也会受到批驳甚至嘲讽，说这是在为特权阶层的自私辩解。根据从物理学之类的领域中学来的解释有限因果关系的方法思考问题的知识分子，发现可以轻而易举地让体力劳动者相信，是资本的个人所有者的自私决定——而不是市场过程本身——在利用着广泛分布的机会和不断变化着的相关事实。根据市场价格进行核算的全过程，有时甚至被说成是资本家为了掩盖其剥削工人的行为而采取的阴谋诡计的一部分。然而这种批驳却没有顾及一再有人说过的论点和事实：某种可用于操纵全局的假定的客观事实整体，资本家是得不到的，就像社会主义者希望用来取代资本家的那些管理人员也得不到一样。这种客观事实根本就不存在，因此也不可能为任何人所用。 第三，对行为规则的遵守不同于对某些事物的知识（各种人以各种方式指出过这种不同，例如吉尔伯特·赖尔对“知其然”和“知其所以然”的区分。见1945－46：1－16）。遵守行为规则的习惯是一种能力，它同某人的行为会有何种结果的知识极为不同。这种习惯行为应被视为理所当然，它是使自己适应或采纳一种模式的技巧，而个人对这种模式的存在几乎浑然不觉，对它的类属也几乎一无所知。然而，大多数人虽然无法解释或描述各种不同的模式，却能够意识到并使自己适应它们。因此，一个人如何对感知到的事件做出反应，起决定作用的不一定是他对自己行为结果的知识。因为我们经常没有、也不可能有这样的知识。既然我们无法获得这样的知识，要求我们应当具有这种知识，便很难说有任何合理之处；而且事实上，如果我们的所作所为，全让我们对这些结果确实掌握的有限知识来支配，我们的处境会更加可怜。 大脑或思维中预先形成的秩序或模式，不仅不是一种使秩序得以确立的高级方式，甚至是一种很初级的方式。因为它肯定只能是一个整体系统中的一小部分，在这个整体系统中，更大系统的某些特征能够反映自身。人的大脑几乎根本不可能充分解释自身（哈耶克，1952：8．66－8．86），就像它不可能说明或预测众多人类大脑相互作用的结果一样。 第四，重要的一点是，许多个人根据不同的信息分散做出决定，由此产生的秩序，不可能由不同目标相对重要性的统一尺度来决定。这使我们十分接近于边际效用问题，我们将把这个重要问题放到第六章再做讨论。不过这里不妨一般性地谈谈扩展秩序造成的差异所带来的好处。自由包括与众不同的自由——在自己的领地上追求自己的目标；但是，不仅在人类事务的领域，无论是在什么地方，秩序需要以它的构成因素之间的差异为前提。这种差异可能仅限于其构成因素时空位置的差异，但是，除非一种秩序有比这更大的差异，它就是一种没有意义的秩序。秩序之所以可取，不在于它能保持一切因素各就其位，而在于它能够生成在其他情况下不可能存在的新力量。对有序化水平——即秩序创造并提供的新力量——更有决定性作用的，不是其构成要素的时空位置，而是它们的多样性。 这方面的事例随处可见。想想遗传进化促进了人类婴幼儿期和童年期独特的延长这一现象吧，因为它能够产生极大的多样性，从而大大加快文化进化和人种的增加。虽然个人之间受生物学决定的差异，很可能要小于一些家养动物（尤其是狗）的差异，但是出生之后那个漫长的学习期，使个人有更多的时间去适应自己的具体环境并吸收自己生于其中的不同传统。使劳动分工、从而也使扩展秩序成为可能的技能多样化，要大大归功于这些不同的传统，而促进这些传统的则是人的各种天赋和偏好。然而，整个传统又是无比复杂的，不可能受任何个人智力的支配，因此除非让众多不同的个人吸收其不同成分，它便不可能得到继承。个体差异的巨大优势，在于它使庞大的群体更有效率。 可见，个体差异增强了合作的群体的力量，使其超出个人努力的总和。协调的合作让独特的天赋发挥作用，而具备这种天赋的人若是被迫孤身一人为生存而奋斗，就会使它得不到利用。专业化造成并鼓励少数个人的发展，使他们独特的贡献足以养活自己，甚至能够超过另一些人为整体做出的贡献。约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒曾把威廉·冯·洪堡的一句名言写在他的的书名页上，用这句名言说，文明就是“人类最为丰富的多样性的发展”。 对这种差异或许起着主要作用的知识，远不是任何哪个人的知识，更不是某个发号施令的超级头脑的知识，而是从一个过程中产生的，在这个过程中，散布在千百万相互交往的个人中的。各不相同甚至彼此冲突的信念之间发生着实验性相互作用。人类表现出智力的提高，更主要的原因不是个人私有知识的增加，而是收集各种不同的分散信息的方式，这反过来又产生了秩序并提高了生产力。 由此可见，多样性的发展是文化进化的重要组成部分，个人对于别人的价值，大多是由于他和别人有所不同。秩序的重要性和价值会随着构成因素多样性的发展而增加，而更大的秩序又会提高多样性的价值，由此使人类合作秩序的扩展变得无限广阔。假如不是这样，譬如说，假如千人一面，谁都不能和别人有所不同，劳动分工就会变得没有意义（也许只有不同地区的人除外），相互协作的努力不会带来多少好处，也不会存在建立任何强大或巨大秩序的前景。 因此可以说，个人在能够自由加入复杂的合作结构之前，必须变得与众不同。进一步说，他们还必须结成一个性质独特的实体：它不仅仅是个总和，而且是一个结构，它在某些方面类似于有机体，在某些重要的方面又和它不同。 第五，有个问题是，既然存在着所有这些困难和反驳，为什么还会有人提出这样的要求，要把人们的行为限制在一心追求已知的和可观察的有益目标上呢？这部分是小群体中本能的、谨小慎微的、小家子气的伦理学的残留物。在这种小群体里，取得共识的目标是以彼此相识的同伴的需要为转移的（即休戚与共和利他主义）。前面我曾说过，在扩展秩序中，休戚与共和利他主义只能以某种有限的方式在一些小团体中有可能行得通，而且，如果把整个团体的行为限制在这种行为上，会破坏其成员的协作努力。相互合作的团体的成员的大多数生产活动一旦超出个人知觉的范围，遵守天生的利他主义本能这种古老的冲动，就会实际阻碍更大范围的秩序的形成。 一切道德体系都在教诲向别人行善，从这个意义上说，它们当然都赞扬利他主义行为，但问题在于如何做到这一点。光有良好的愿望是不够的——我们都知道这会铺出一条什么道路。严格地只去做那些对具体的他人明显有利的事情，并不足以形成扩展秩序，甚至与这种秩序相悖。市场的道德规则使我们惠及他人，不是因为我们愿望这样做，而是因为它让我们按照正好可以造成这种结果的方式采取行动。扩展秩序以一种单凭良好的愿望无法做到的方式，弥补了个人的无知（由此也使我们——就像前面讨论的那样——适应了未知事物），因而确实使我们的努力产生了利他主义的结果。 在一个利用广泛的劳动分工导致的更高生产力的秩序中，个人再也不可能知道他的努力是在为谁或应当为谁服务，他也不可能知道自己的行为会给那些他不认识但消费着他的产品的人或给他所提供的产品带来什么后果。这样一来，他根本不可能再用利他主义来指导自己的生产活动。即使我们仍可把他的动机称为利他主义，因为他的动机最终注定会给别人带来好处，然而它们有此结果，却不是因为他的目标或愿望就是服务于别人的具体需要，而是因为他遵守了抽象的规则。就这种新的意义而言，我们的“利他主义”非常不同于出自本能的利他主义。不再是被追求的目标，而是得到遵守的规则，决定着行为的善恶。遵守这些规则，在约束着我们大多数谋生活动的同时，也使我们能够贡献出一些超出我们具体了解范围的好处（同时它很难阻止我们把自己剩余的所得用于满足我们出自本能的愿望，做些可观察到的善事）。由于社会生物学家对“利他主义”一词系统的滥用，这一切已经变得晦暗不明了。 要求人们的行为局限在一心追求已知的有利目标上，对此做出的另一种解释也值得一提。这种要求不仅是出自远古时代不明事理的本能，也来自赞成这种要求的知识分子所特有的一种品质——一种完全可以理解、但仍然是不攻自破的品质。知识分子特别急于知道，他们称之为自己“理智的产物”的思想，到底该用于什么终极目标。因此他们热切关注着自己思想的命运，他们非常不愿意失去对自己思想的控制权，尤甚于体力劳动者不愿意失去自己的物质产品。这种反应常常使这些饱学之士不愿投身于交换过程——为不可知的目标而工作的过程，在这种情况下，他们的努力惟一可以辨认的结果，也许就是另一些人的利润。体力劳动者随时乐于承认，他的雇主的职责就是了解他的双手所从事的劳动最终会满足什么需求。而在一个服务或观念网络中相互作用的众多知识分子的产品中，一个知识分子个人的工作所占的位置却是不那么容易辨认的。受教育越多的人，越不愿意屈从于一些不可理解的指示——例如市场（尽管他们也在谈论“观念的市场”）。由此造成的结果是（也不是有意的），他们倾向于反对那些正可提高他们对自己同胞的作用的工作（他们没有理解的工作）。 这种消极立场有助于进一步解释知识分子对市场秩序的敌视，以及他们更为亲近社会主义的原因。如果这些人更好地理解了抽象的和自发形成秩序的模式在全部生命领域所起的作用，大概这种敌视和亲近倾向会趋于消失；假如他们对进化、生物学和经济学有更好的了解，他们无疑会做到这一点。但是在面对这些领域的知识时，他们往往听不进去，甚至不愿承认存在着我们的头脑只能得到一些抽象知识的复杂事物。因为有关这类事物一般结构的单纯的抽象知识，不足以使我们有能力真正“建造”它们（也就是说，用已知的片断把它们拼装在一起）或预见到它们所采取的具体形式。它充其量只能指出在什么样的一般条件下——我们有时或许能够创造这种条件——许多这样的秩序或系统会自动形成。研究类似的复杂现象的化学家很熟悉这种问题，而那些习惯于根据少数可观察的事件之间的简单关系解释一切的科学家，通常并不了解这种现象。因此，这种人会情不自禁地用一种泛灵论的方式，把较为复杂的结构解释成设计的结果，并且猜测，在到处都找不到其设计者的“设计物”背后，可能有种神秘莫测的操纵力——例如统治“阶级”的某种阴谋。这又使他们更加不愿意在市场秩序中放弃对自己产品的控制权。知识分子中有一种普遍的现象：感到自己不过是隐蔽的——即便是非人格的——市场力量的工具，这简直就像是一种对人格的侮辱。 他们显然没有认识到，他们以为资本家在支配着这一过程，其实资本家也是一个非人格过程的工具，他们也不清楚他们的努力的最终结果和目的，他们所关心的不过是整个结构中较高层次、因而范围也较大的事情。而且，想到他们自己的目标是否得到满足的问题要由这些人——只关心手段的人——的活动来决定，这件事本身就让他们生厌。 未知事物的有序化 英语中不幸缺少一个十分通俗的德语单词：Machbarkeit（可以办到的）。我有时突发奇想，说不定打造一个英语同义词，会对一项有益的事业有所贡献，这个词就是“makeability”——“manufacturability”（可以制造的）不十分恰当[我本人使用的“constructivism”（建构主义）也很难用“constructible”（可以建造的）来表示〕。我们可以用它来表示我们在本章和前一章所提出、评价和批驳的观点，即利用人类的智巧，能够让通过进化产生的事物变得更好。 这种观点是站不住脚的。因为事实上，我们能够让未知事物有序化，惟一的办法就是诱导它自己产生秩序。对于我们的自然环境，我们为了达到自己的目标，有时当然可以依靠自然界自发的有序化力量，却不能随意地为各种因素安排我们希望它们采取的秩序。例如，当我们引发产生结晶或新化学物质的过程时，我们就是在做这样的事情（见前一节以及补论C）。在化学中，甚至在生物学中，我们只能通过强化措施利用自发的有序化过程；我们能够创造出它们的运行的条件，但我们无法决定任何特定的因素会发生什么情况。大多数人造化学合成物都不是“可以建造的”，其意思是说，我们不能通过把构成它们的各种成分放在适当的位置上，把它们创造出来。我们所能做到的，不过是诱发它们的形成。 为了启动能够协调超出我们观察范围的个人行为的过程，也必须遵循类似的方式。为了诱发一定的人际关系抽象结构自发地形成，需要我们提供某些非常一般化的条件作为保障，然后让每个成员在这个更大秩序中找到自己的位置。我们对这一过程所能够提供的最大帮助，就是让这些成员只服从必要的规则。我们希望其产生的结构越复杂，我们的这种能力受到的限制也会越大。 一个发现自己在扩展秩序中处于一定的位置、只对自己身边的环境有所了解的个人，可以把这种建议用于自己的处境。他大概首先需要不断地对自己视野范围以外的事情进行探索，以便建立和维持创造了全面秩序的交流过程。当然，维持秩序内的交流，需要让分散的信息被许多彼此素不相识的不同的个人所利用，由此使千百万人的不同知识形成一个外展的或物质的模式。每个人都变成众多传递链中的一环，他通过这些传递链接收信号，使他能够让自己的计划适应并不了解的环境。全面的秩序由此变得具有无限的可扩展性，它自动地提供着有关日益扩大的手段范围的信息，而不是仅仅服务于特定的目标。 前面我们思考过这些交往过程——包括具有必要而不断的价格变化的市场——的某些重要方面。这里只需补充和强调一点，除了协调当前的商品生产和服务供应外，同样的传统和行为方式还供应着未来，它们的作用不仅会表现为一种空间秩序，还会表现为一种时间秩序。各种行为不但适应在空间上相距遥远的另一些人，也会适应超出行为者个人预期寿命的事情。只有自称不道德的人，才会在捍卫政策措施时拿“从长远看我们终有一死”做理由。因为只有那些习惯于努力为子女和有可能根本见不到的后代提供需要的群体，才做到了日益扩展和兴旺发达。 有些人被市场秩序的某些结果搞得心烦意乱，因此他们竟然忽略了一点：不管他们多么不喜欢甚至感到不可思议，这种秩序还是在现代世界的大多数地方占了上风，我们在这个世界里发现，千百万人民在不断变化着的环境中工作，为另一些他们大多数素不相识的人提供着物质手段，同时又在满足着自己的期待，因为他们自己也会得到同样素不相识的人所生产的各种商品和服务。即使是在最糟糕的时候，他们十有八九也会发现这些期待得到了证实。 这样一个秩序，虽然远不是尽善尽美，甚至经常失效，但是它和人们特意让无数成员“各得其所”而创造出来的任何秩序相比，却能够扩展到更大的范围。这种自发秩序的大多数缺陷和失效，多是因为有人试图干涉甚至阻碍它的机制运行，或是想改进它的具体结果。这种干预自发秩序的企图，很少会造成符合人们愿望的后果，因为决定这些秩序的，是任何执行这种干预的人都无从知道的许多具体事实。譬如，为消除秩序内的成员因为随机性而造成的利益不平等而特意进行的干涉，有可能毁掉整体的运行，而与任何同它对立的秩序所能提供的机会相比，自发形成秩序的过程能够保证使这个群体中的随便哪个成员，在一个人人都可利用的更大的机会范围内，交上更好的运气。 为何不知道的也是不能计划的 前面两章把我们带到了何处？卢梭对个人财产制度的怀疑，变成了社会主义的基础，并且还在继续影响着我们这个世纪一些最了不起的思想家。甚至像罗素这样的大人物，也把自由定义为“实现我们的愿望不存在障碍”（1940：251）。至少在东欧社会主义经济明显失败之前，这些理性主义者广泛认为，中央计划经济不仅会提供“社会公正”（见下面的第七章），还能使经济资源得到更有效的利用。这种观点乍看上去似乎合情合理。但是它忽略了刚才讨论过的那些事实：任何人都根本不可能知道人们在这种计划中所能够动用的资源总和，因此对这些资源不可能进行集中控制。 然而，社会主义者仍然不愿正视在让分散的个人决定符合那种自称为“计划”的共同的模式时遇到的障碍。一方面是自卢梭以来一直被等同于“道德”的我们的本能，另一方面是在文化进化中生存下来并限制着这种本能的道德传统，这两者之间的冲突，体现在如今经常做出的一种阵营划分上，一方是某些伦理哲学和政治哲学，另一方是经济学。关键不在于凡是经济学确定为有效的就是“正确的”，而在于过去一些被认为是正确的行为方式，经济分析能够阐明它们的作用——任何哲学，只要它不赞成使我们的文明陷入崩溃的痛苦和死亡，都会接受这种作用。因此，奢谈“公正的社会”而不仔细想想贯彻这种观点的经济后果，这根本就算不上是在关心他人。在经历了70年的社会主义试验之后，可以有把握地说，在从事过社会主义试验的地区——东欧和第三世界——以外的大多数知识分子，他们仍然自负地把可以在经济学中找到的教训置之度外，他们不愿意想一下，经常有人进行尝试的社会主义，为什么从来就没有产生它的知识分子领袖所设想的结果，这其中说不定会有某种理由。这些“知识分子”徒劳地追求一个真正的社会主义共同体，其结果是，他们先是把似乎无休止的“乌托邦”思潮理想化，然后是对它的幻灭——苏联，然后是古巴、中国、南斯拉夫、越南、坦桑尼亚和尼加拉瓜，这应当证明了社会主义或许有些不符合事实的东西。但是，这些一百多年前首先由经济学家做出解释的事实，一些人至今不予理会，他们沾沾自喜地站在理性主义立场上否定一种观点，即存在着某些事实，它们超越了历史背景，或对人类的欲望构成了难以逾越的障碍。 在这段时间里，在那些继承了曼德维尔、休谟和斯密的传统，从事经济学研究的人中间，不仅逐渐表现出对市场过程的理解，而且对于用社会主义取代这种过程的可能性，也日益持强烈的批判态度。这种市场方法的优越性与预期的情况如此不同，因此只能从回顾的角度，通过分析这种自发的形态本身来加以解释。人们在从事这项工作时发现，对资源进行分散的控制，通过个人财产进行控制，与集中管制所能做到的情况相比，可以导致产生更多的信息并使其得到利用。要想对超出任何中央权力视野之外的范围进行命令和控制，必须让那些能够对可见的和潜在的资源做出计算的地方管理者，也要做到随时了解这些资源不断变化着的相对重要性，然后把相关的全部准确细节及时通知某个中央计划当局，使它能够根据它从另一些地区或地方管理者那里——他们当然也会在获得和传递这种信息上面临同样的困难——得到的全部另一些不同的具体信息，告诉他们该做些什么。 一旦我们认识到这个中央计划当局所承担的是什么样的任务，我们就会明白，它必须发出的命令不可能是来自地方管理者视为重要的信息，而是只能通过明确控制着总量有限的资源的个人或团体之间的直接交易来决定。在描述市场过程时（从事这种描述的理论家通常并不想支持社会主义）惯于采用的虚拟假设造成的后果是，所有这些事实（或“数据”）可以被假定为是从事解释的理论家全部掌握的，这使整个问题变得含糊不清，结果造成了一些有助于维护各种社会主义思想的荒唐骗局。 扩展的经济秩序是、也只能是由一种完全不同的过程形成的，它是从一种由演化而来的交往方式中产生的，通过这种方式而得到传递的，不是有关具体事实的无数报告，而仅仅是各种具体条件的某些抽象性质，例如有竞争力的价格，为了达成全面的秩序，必须使这种信息进入相互交流。这些价格传达着各个参与者在他们能够支配其用途的商品或服务中发现的不同的替代率或均衡率。任何一定数量的这种事物，都可以证明是处于均衡状态，或可以相互替代，不管是为了满足具体的人类需要，还是为了直接或间接生产能够满足这些需求的资料。竟然能够存在这样一个过程，更有甚者，它是在没有特意设计的情况下，由进化选择造成的，这固然令人惊奇，但是我不知道有谁试图反驳这种观点，或不信任这一过程本身——除非有人头脑简单地看待这种说法：不管怎么说，所有这些事实都能够被某个中央计划当局所掌握（关于这个问题，可参见有关经济核算的讨论，见巴贝奇，1832；戈森，1854／1889／1927；皮尔森，1902／1912；米塞斯，1922／1981；哈耶克，1935；拉特兰，1985；罗伯茨，1971）。 当然，整个“集中控制”的思想就是混乱的。没有、也不可能有一个单独的行使指挥权的头脑，总是存在着某个委员会之类的组织，负责为某项事业制定行动方案。虽然每个成员有时为了说服别人，援引一些对他们的观点有影响的具体信息，但是这个机构的结论并不是建立在共同的知识上，而是建立在根据不同的信息形成的各种观点之间达成的一致上。一个人所提供的每一点知识，都有可能使其他人想起另一些事实，他们是在得知一些过去他们并不知道的情况后，才意识到了这些事实的相关性。因此可以说，这个过程仍然是个利用分散知识的过程（因此也是一个鼓励交易的过程，虽然是采用了一种极无效率的方式——一种通常缺乏竞争并减少责任的过程），而不是一个把一些人的知识集中起来的过程。这个团体的成员很少能够相互说明他们的特定理由；他们主要是在交流他们从有关手头问题的个人知识中得出的结论。进一步说，那些思考相同境况的不同的人，他们所处的环境几乎很难说是真正相同的——至少就它涉及到扩展秩序中某个部门而不是仅仅涉及到一个多少自给自足的团体而言，事情只能如此。 在一个扩展的经济秩序中，离开由竞争性市场形成的价格的指导，不可能对资源进行精心的“合理”分配，大概这方面最好的事例，就是将现有流动资本在能够增加最终产品的不同用途之间进行分配的问题。从本质上说，这是一个能够节约出多少正在增加的生产资源，提供给和当前的需要有冲突的遥远未来的问题。当亚当·斯密思考这种资本的个人所有者所面对的问题时，意识到了这个问题的典型性，他写道：“他能够把自己的资本用于哪些类型的国内产业呢，其中哪一种产品有可能最值钱呢？显然，处在自己环境中的个人所做出的判断，要比任何政治家或立法者为他做出的判断好得多。”（1776/1976） 如果我们考虑一下这样一个问题，即在扩展的经济系统中，在惟一一个发布命令的权力当局统治下，对一切可用于投资的手段加以利用，那么第一个困难就是，没有哪个人能够知道这些当前可用资本的确切总量，虽然从投资如果超出或少于这个量，肯定会造成不同商品和服务的需求差异这种结果的意义上说，这些资本肯定是有限的。这种差异不会自我修正，而是只能从发布命令的当局所发出的某些指令无法得到执行中表现出来，这或者是因为有些必要的货物并不存在，或者是因为缺少必要的辅助手段（工具、原料、劳动力），使提供的原料或设备得不到利用。任何必须予以考虑的量，都无法用调查或测算“既定”物品加以确定，而是只能由另一些人根据他当时具备的知识做出选择的可能范围来决定。要想使这项任务大体上得到解决，只能通过这样一些人的相互作用，他们能够通过当时各种条件对市场价格的作用，确定它们所揭示出的具体环境的相关性。譬如说，在这种情况下，现有“资本数量”就会证明，当现有“资本量”用于遥远的未来需求的份额，大于人们打算从现在的消费中节约下来以便为这种未来增加储备——即他们节约的愿望——的份额时，会发生什么事情。 理解了信息（或事实知识）传递的作用，也就为理解扩展秩序敞开了大门。然而这些问题是十分抽象的，受到支配着我们教育系统的机械论的、唯科学主义的和建构主义的理性教条熏陶，因而倾向于对生物学、经济学和进化论一无所知的人，尤其难以领会这一点。我承认，从我在“经济学和知识”（1936/1948）一文中首次取得突破，通过认识到“竞争是一种发现的方法”（1978：23－34）和“知识的虚妄”，再到阐述我的信息分散理论，直到最后提出我的有关自发形态比中央管制更优越的结论，的确也花费了一段漫长的时光。