Chapter 9 Chapter Four: The Rebellion of Instinct and Reason

We must guard ourselves against thinking that the practice of the scientific method enhances the faculties of the human intellect.The idea that a person who excels in one or more fields of science is also superior in thinking about everyday matters—not least of all, is contradicted by experience. challenge property Although Aristotle was ignorant of the importance of trade and did not understand the phenomenon of evolution at all; although Aristotle's ideas were incorporated into the system of Thomas Aquinas, it was the anti-commercial attitude of the medieval and early modern church. Support was provided, but only later, mainly among French thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were a number of important developments which, taken together, began to pose an effective challenge to the central values ​​and institutions of the extended order .

Foremost among these developments was the growing importance of a particular type of rationalism associated with the rise of modern science.I call it "constructivism" or "scientism" (to copy the French term), and for hundreds of years thereafter it actually dominated serious thinking about reason and its role in human affairs.This particular form of rationalism has been the starting point of my research for the past 60 years.In these studies I have endeavored to demonstrate that it is the product of pathological thinking, a false doctrine of science and rationality abused by reason, and, above all, that it inevitably leads to speculation about the nature and occurrence of human institutions. Wrong interpretation.Using this explanation, in the name of rationality and the highest value of civilization, Taoists have finally begun to flatter some relatively unsuccessful people and instigate people to satisfy their primitive desires.

This kind of rationalism, transmitted from Descartes to modern times, not only abandons tradition, but even claims that no such medium is needed, and that pure reason can directly serve our desires, and it can establish a new world by itself. The world, a new morality, new laws, and even a new pure language can be established.Notwithstanding the obvious errors of this doctrine, it still dominates the minds of most scientists, as well as the minds of men of letters, artists, and intellectuals. In order to clarify what has been said above, I should probably add right away that there is another school, which may also be called rationalism, which treats this problem differently, for instance by considering the rules of moral conduct themselves as rational component.Locke once explained, "However, the so-called reason, I think it does not refer to the understanding ability that constitutes the training of thinking and reasoning and proof, but refers to a clear code of conduct, all good qualities and everything needed to cultivate moral values. It all comes from this" (Locke, 1955: 111).But among those who call themselves rationalists, Locke's views remain in the minority.

Second, related developments that challenged the extended order also came from Rousseau's work and influence.This unique thinker - though often portrayed as an irrationalist and a romantic - also took hold of Descartes' thought with a deep attachment to it.Rousseau's dizzying brew of thought came to dominate "progressive" thought, making people forget that liberty as a political institution arose not because of the "quest for liberty" in the sense of freedom from limitation, but because Their efforts to protect perceived territory of personal safety.Rousseau makes people forget that rules of conduct are necessarily restrictive and that their product is order; that these rules greatly expand the ends that each can successfully pursue by precisely setting the limits of the means with which each can pursue his own ends scope.

It was Rousseau who declared in his opening remarks, "Man is born free, but everywhere in chains," that he wanted men to be freed from all "artificial" restraints--making those who have always been called savages become To be the true heroes of the progressive intellectuals, motivating people to throw off the constraints of productivity and population that held them together, presented a conception of liberty that posed the greatest obstacle to the attainment of liberty.After declaring that animal instincts provided better guidance for man's orderly cooperation than either tradition or reason, Rousseau invented the illusory will of the people, or "general will," through which , the people "become a single being, an individual" (, I, vii; see also Popper, 1945/1966: Ⅱ, 54).The rationalism of modern intellectuals promises to bring us back to heaven, where our instincts, rather than the learned rules that limit them, will enable us to "conquer the world," as in Genesis The same teachings for us--this fatal conceit of rationalism, Rousseau's above remarks are probably the main source of it.

Yes, this is a tempting point of view, but its power (whatever it says about it) is hardly due to reason and evidence.We have long known that the savage was far from free, nor could he conquer the world.He can do almost nothing without the consent of the group to which he belongs.Individual decisions presuppose individual spheres of control and are thus only possible with the evolution of individual property; the development of individual property in turn leads to the growth of an extended order beyond the cognition of chiefs or chiefs—or collectives. Foundation. Despite these contradictions, there is no doubt that Rousseau's appeal has worked, or rather, it has shaken our civilization for the past two hundred years.However, while anti-rationalist at heart, it has been influential on progressivists because of the Cartesian implication that we can use reason to directly satisfy our natural instincts and to use reason to justify it.Rousseau gave intellectuals a license to cast aside cultural constraints, to find reasons for a "freedom" without restrictions—freedom is possible precisely because of these restrictions—and to be able to make this commitment to liberty The attack on the foundations was called "emancipation," and since then property has become increasingly skeptical that it is no longer generally considered a key ingredient in the extended order.It is increasingly believed that the rules governing the extent and transfer of separate property can be replaced by central authority to determine its use.

By the nineteenth century, serious rational appraisal and discussion of the role of property in the progress of civilization seemed in many places to be taboo.During this period, too, property was increasingly viewed with suspicion among many who would have thought of studying it, and it became a subject that was shunned by progressives who believed in a rational reconstruction of the institutions of human cooperation. [This taboo continued into the twentieth century, for example in Brian Barry's statement concerning (property's) usage and "analysis" (Barry, 1961: 80), in which justice "is See, is connected with 'deserts' and 'needs', so that some of Hume's 'rules of justice' are rightly said to be unjust".Another example is Myrdal's later remarks on "property and contract taboos" (1969: 17). "For example, the founders of anthropology increasingly ignored the cultural role of property, so Taylor's two-volume "Primitive Culture" did not include entries for property and ownership in the index. Westermark did use a long Chapter 1 discusses property, but under the influence of Saint-Simon and Marx, he regards property as a source of "unearned income" that should be opposed, and concludes from this that "the law of property will sooner or later undergo a major change" (1908: II, 71).The socialist constructivist bias has greatly influenced contemporary archaeology, but its inability to understand economic phenomena is most crudely expressed in sociology (and worse in so-called "sociology of knowledge").Sociology itself could almost be called a socialist science, openly boasting its ability to create a new socialist order (Ferry, 1895) and, more recently, its ability to "predict future developments and shape the future; or . . . to create the future of humanity" (Sejest, 1969: 441).Like "naturology" which once vainly claimed to replace all specialized study of nature, sociology has been arrogantly ignoring the knowledge already acquired by mature disciplines that have long studied the growing structures of law, language, and markets .

I said earlier that the study of traditional institutions like property "became taboo."It is hard to say that this is an exaggeration, because such an interesting and important process of evolutionary selection of moral traditions has been so little studied, and that the direction these traditions provide for the development of civilization has been seriously neglected. Puzzling.To a constructivist there is of course nothing special about such things.If someone is deluded by "social engineering," the idea that human beings can consciously choose their own direction, the discovery of how he arrived at his present state is of course of little importance.

Although I cannot delve into the matter here, I can mention in passing that the challenge to property and traditional values ​​came not only from Rousseau's followers, but also from religious sources, though perhaps of a lesser importance.The revolutionary movements of the age (rationalist socialism, then communism) contributed to the revival of the ancient heretical tradition of religious rebellion against basic property institutions.In earlier centuries these rebellions were led by Gnostics, Manichaeists, Bogomilians and Cathars.By the nineteenth century, these specific heresies were gone, but a new breed of religious revolutionaries emerged by the thousands, who took out their ardor of opposition on property and the family, and called upon primitive instincts to oppose these restrictions.In short, the rebellion against private property and the family was not limited to socialists.The evocation of mystical and supernatural beliefs of all kinds can not only justify the restraint of instinctive habits, such as the mainstream teachings in Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but also in more marginal movements can be used to support the release of instinct.

Space and erudition prevent me from discussing in this book the second traditional target of the atavistic revolt I just mentioned: the family.I should at least point out, however, that I believe that the traditional rules of sexual morality have been somewhat disproved by new knowledge of the facts, and that important changes are likely to take place in this field. I mention Rousseau and his pervasive influence and other historical developments only to remind the reader that the rebellion of serious thinkers against property and conventional morality is not a relatively recent phenomenon, and I shall now turn to Rousseau and some of Descartes' intellectual legacy in the 20th century.

First, though, I should emphasize that here I have largely left out the long history of this rebellion, and the different variations it has had in different places.Before Augustus Comte proposed the use of the term "positivism" to refer to the view of "verified (i.e., confirmed by reason) ethics" as the only possible alternative to the supernatural "ethics of revelation" (1854:I, 356), Jeremy Bentham already established an extremely solid foundation for what we now call legal and moral positivism: he gave a constructivist account of the legal and moral system, On this interpretation, their utility and significance are said to depend entirely on the wishes and intentions of their designers.Bentham himself was a latecomer in this development.This constructivism includes not only the Benthamist tradition represented and carried on by John Stuart Mill and later the British Liberal Party, but indeed all contemporary Americans who call themselves "liberals" (In contrast to other very different thinkers, more common in Europe, also known as "Liberals", but more properly called "Old Whigs", the most prominent of which was Thor Craigville and Sir Acton).As a sharp-eyed contemporary Swiss analyst puts it, if one accepts the present liberal (read "socialist") philosophy that since the distinction between good and evil has always meant something to him, he himself must, And can carefully draw a boundary for them (Korsh, 1981: 17), then this constructivist way of thinking is actually an inevitable phenomenon. Our Intellectuals and Their Tradition of Rational Socialism My observations on morality and tradition, economics and markets and their evolution clearly conflict with many influential ideas, not only the old-fashioned social Darwinism discussed in Chapter 1 - which is no longer widely accepted - And it conflicts with many views, past and present: those of Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau and the founders of socialism, Saint-Simon, Karl Marx, and many others. My basic contention is that moral norms, especially our systems of property, liberty, and notarial justice, are not created by human reason, but are a unique second nature endowed to humans by cultural evolution.This view is of course in opposition to the mainstream view of intellectuals in the 20th century.The influence of rationalism is wide and deep, so generally speaking the more intelligent and educated a person is, the more likely he or she is not only to be a rationalist, but also to hold socialist views (regardless of their beliefs Is it enough to label one's views with some label, including "socialism").The higher we climb on the intellectual ladder, the more we talk to intellectuals, the more likely we are to encounter socialist beliefs.Most rationalists are likely to be smart and learned, and smart intellectuals tend to be mostly socialists. If I may insert two personal comments here, I consider myself qualified to speak of this view of the world on the basis of some personal experience, since these rationalist views, which I have been evaluating and criticizing systematically over the years, are precisely I am, in this respect, the same as most of the secular European thinkers of my generation in terms of the views that shaped my own worldview at the turn of the century.At the time those views seemed self-evident, and following them seemed the way out of every harmful superstition.It took me a while to shake off these notions myself, and in the process I did discover that they themselves were also superstitions.Therefore, from a personal point of view, it is almost difficult for me to criticize the authors mentioned below. However, in order not to lead the reader to the wrong conclusions, it is probably appropriate to mention here my essay "Why I Am Not a Conservative" (1960: postscript).My argument is against socialism, but like Edmund Burke, I have little resemblance to the conservatives of the Toho party.My conservatism, as it is, is limited to a defined morality.I'm all for experimentation - and certainly for more freedom than conservative governments are happy to allow.My objection to the rationalist intellectuals with whom I discussed the matter was not that they were experimenting; on the contrary, they were experimenting too little, and that most of the experiments they were passionate about turned out to be mediocre things— The idea of ​​returning to instinct is as common as wind and rain, and it is being attempted so often today that it is no longer clear in what sense it can even be considered an experiment.I object to rationalists who claim that their experiments, by their very nature, are the results of reason, disguise them with pseudo-scientific methodology, and thereby recruit among the powerful to make the extremely valuable Conventional ways of doing things (the product of trial and error over generations of evolution) are under attack for no reason, thus keeping their own "experiments" from the scrutiny of the world. Reasonable people tend to overestimate reason, to think that we must attribute the advantages and opportunities our civilization offers to deliberate design rather than obedience to traditional rules, or to think that we use our reason , through more rational thinking about our tasks, and even more appropriate design and "rational coordination," any remaining undesirable phenomena can be eliminated.Once we realize this, our original astonishment at seeing intelligent people tend to be socialists will melt away.This ideological orientation can lead one to automatically favor the centralized planning and control of the economy, which is at the heart of socialism.Intellectuals, of course, demand a general explanation of what they wish to do, and are unwilling to accept, because of unknown origins, the modes of conduct which happen to govern in the society in which they live; Those who tacitly accept the prevailing rules of conduct clash, or at least look down upon them.It is not difficult to understand that they would also like to ally themselves with science and reason, with the extraordinary progress made by natural science in the past few hundred years, because they have been taught that the results of science and reason are nothing more than constructivism and rationality. Scientists find it hard to believe that there can be any useful knowledge other than deliberate experimentation, or to recognize the utility of any tradition other than their own rational tradition.A good historian has written in this attitude: "By definition, tradition is almost only reprehensible, as something comical and abominable." (Setton-Watson, 1983: 1270) By definition: Barry (1961, supra) wanted to use "analytical definitions" to turn morality and justice into immorality and injustice; Seton-Watson here wants to do the same with tradition, using strict Definition turns it into something reprehensible.We will return to these "words," these "new terms" in Chapter 7, but let us now examine the facts more closely. These reactions are not difficult to understand, but they have serious consequences.These serious consequences, both for reason and for morality, are especially dangerous if: Preferring this well-established tradition of reason to the real product of reason leads intellectuals to ignore the limits of reason in theory, Considering a world made up of historical and scientific information always disregards human sciences such as biological sciences and economics, leading them to misinterpret the origin and function of our traditional moral rules. Like other traditions, the rational tradition is learned, not innate.It also stands between instinct and reason; the question of the plausibility and truth of this so-called tradition of reason and truth must now be critically assessed. Morality and Reason: Some Examples Lest it be thought that I am exaggerating, I would like to present a few examples at once.I intend to comment on the thinking of some of our great scientists and philosophers, but I do not want to do them any justice.Although, in their own view, they reflect the seriousness of the problem that our philosophy and natural sciences are far from understanding the role played by our major traditions, they generally take no responsibility for the popularization of these ideas. Direct responsibility, because they have better things to do.On the other hand, it should not be considered that the remarks I am about to mention are merely temporary or individual aberrations of eminent authors.On the contrary, they are consistent conclusions drawn from a deeply rooted rationalist tradition.I certainly have no doubt that some of these great minds, who have endeavored to understand the extended order of human cooperation, have in the end often and unconsciously become staunch opponents of this order. But the people who did the most to spread these ideas, the true believers in constructivist rationalism and socialism, were not these brilliant scientists.Rather, most of them were so-called "intellectuals," those whom I in another article (1949/1967: 178-194) called "professional scalpers": teachers, journalists, and "media representatives." ", after having acquired some hearsay scientific knowledge, they proclaimed themselves representatives of modern thought, intellectually and morally superior to those who still valued traditional values, and shouldered the responsibility of providing new ideas to the public. people.In order to make their stuff look new, they have to make a big mockery of everything that is traditional.For such people, it becomes the main value to attribute "novelty" or "newness" to one's position rather than truth, although it is difficult to say that this is their intention-although in what they offer, the new The ones are nothing more than the real thing.Moreover, one wonders whether these intellectuals, who have a better sense of what should be done, are paid much less than those who run practical affairs, are not motivated by the resulting resentment.Wells, whose work is of the highest quality, can serve as an excellent example of these literary interpreters of scientific and technological progress begging for ideas from real scientists while vigorously disseminating the central imperative of giving everyone their fair share. The socialist ideal of the economy is far superior to the latter.Another such example is that of the early George Orwell, who at one point argued that "everyone with a mind knows perfectly well that, so far as the possible It can be "exploited as much as possible, and we can all live like princes and nobles if we choose." What I want to focus on here is not the works of writers like Wells and Orwell, but the views advocated by the greatest scientists.We can start with Jacques Monod.Monod is a great man, and I admire his work very much. In essence, he is the founder of modern molecular biology.But his thinking on ethics has different characteristics. In 1970, he said at a Nobel Foundation conference on "The Place of Values ​​in a Factual World": "The development of science has finally destroyed the idea that ethics and values ​​are not of our free choice. It is not a question, but a question of imposing obligations on us; the development of science has turned this view into a fallacy, and reduced it to the stream of wild speculation without factual basis." (1970: 20-21) Later in the year, he again Reaffirming his point of view, he made the same claim in a now famous book (1970/1977).He exhorts us to renounce all spiritual nourishment, to recognize science as the only new source of truth, and to transform the foundations of ethics accordingly.Like many such expositions, the book ends with the view that "ethics, which is inherently impersonal, is forever barred from the domain of knowledge" (1970/1977: 162). The new "ethics of knowledge is not imposed on man; on the contrary, man imposes it on himself" (1970/1977: 164).This new "ethics of knowledge, Monod says, is the only attitude both rationalistic and uncompromisingly idealistic upon which genuine socialism can be built" (1970/1977: 165-166).Monod's thinking is typical because it is deeply rooted in a theory of knowledge that attempts to build a science of behavior on the grounds that certain types of behavior are more satisfying to our desires—whether you call it Call it euphorism, utilitarianism, socialism, or whatever.We are advised that we should hope that our actions will create a state of affairs which will gratify our desires, make us happier, and so on.In other words, there is a need for an ethic that people are free to follow in pursuit of known, desirable, and pre-chosen goals. Monod's conclusion follows from his view that, apart from attributing morality to a human invention, the only other possible way of explaining its origin is that of the animistic one offered by many religions. or anthropomorphic explanations.Yes, "all religions are inseparable from the anthropomorphic view of humanity as a whole, which compares God to a father, friend, or ruler to whom one must devote allegiance, pray to it, etc." ( Cohen, 1931: 112).I, like Monod and most natural scientists, cannot accept this aspect of religion.It seems to me that this reduces something that is so much beyond our comprehension to a level not much higher than human intelligence.But rejecting this aspect of religion does not prevent us from realizing that we can attribute - perhaps for the wrong reasons - certain ways of doing things to those religions which, in enabling the survival of the human race in large numbers, are More important than most things that reason can accomplish. Monod is not the only biologist to discuss issues in this way.False interpretations of the "Laws of Evolution" can lead brilliant minds to such absurd situations that I have seen almost no one who can express himself more clearly than the words of another great biologist and learned scholar. State the problem (see Chapter 1).Needham wrote: "A new world order of social justice and solidarity, a rational classless state, is not a dream of fanatical idealism, but a logical corollary from the whole evolutionary process, its authoritative No less than its premises, it is therefore the most rational of all beliefs." (Needham, 1943:41) I'll come back to Mono again, but I've got a few more examples to collect.A case in point that I have discussed in the past (1978) is that of John Keynes, one of the most representative intellectual leaders of a generation liberated from conventional morality.Keynes believed that by calculating some foreseeable consequences, he could build a better world than one formed by following traditional abstract rules.Keynes liked to express his contempt for "conventional wisdom," and in a frankly autobiographical statement he referred to the Cambridge circle of his youth - most of whose members later belonged to Bloomsbury. Li groups - "have all abandoned our personal obligations to obey general rules", they are "in the strict sense, all are immoral people".He modestly added that, at the age of forty-five, he was too old to change and had to continue to be an immoral person.This unusual figure also justifies some of his economic views and his belief in managing market order on the grounds that "in the long run we are mortal" (that is, we don't have to care what we create long-term harm; think only of the immediate—including public opinion, demands, votes, and the bullshit and promises of demagogues). The statement "In the long run we are mortal" is a typical expression of unwillingness to admit that morality involves long-term consequences-consequences that we have no way of experiencing, and tend to favor learned rules with a long-term perspective. Discard it like a shoe. Keynes also rejected the traditional "virtue of thrift" by refusing, like thousands of shallow economists, to recognize that increasing capital goods (i.e., investment) generally required a decrease in consumption demand.This in turn led him to put his formidable intellect to use to build his economic "general" theory - which, we believe, is the reason for the rare inflation in the world for more than 20 years in the second half of this century and the inevitable subsequent emergence. The causes of severe unemployment in the United States (1972/1978). It can be seen that what confused Keynes was not only philosophy, but also economics.Alfred Marshall understood the problem, but he seems to have failed to capture the important insight John Stuart Mill had made in his youth that "the demand for commodities differs from the demand for labour-power" in keeping Keynes Make a deep enough impression.Sir Leslie Stephen (father of Virginia Wolfe, another member of the Bloomsbury group) described this theory in 1876 as "a theory not understood by Its adequate valuation serves as the best test of the economist"—and Keynes ridiculed him for saying so (cf. Hayek, 1970/1978:15-16, 1973:25; For a discussion see 1941:433following pages). Whatever Keynes himself thought, he did much to curtail liberty, and they were outraged that he did not take the same socialist stand as his friends at Bloomsbury; Be a socialist of one sort or another.Neither he nor his students recognized that the extended order must be based on long-term considerations. There is a philosophical illusion behind Keynes's view that there is an indefinable property of "goodness" - a property for everyone to discover, which makes everyone obliged to pursue this good, as long as the recognition This kind of good justifies contempt and disregard for many traditional moral norms [a view that dominated the Bloomsbury group through Moore's work (1903)]—a philosophical illusion that made him less interested in raising himself The source of this produced a typically hostile attitude.This is also evident in E.In the case of Foster, he once solemnly argued that the emancipation of mankind from the evils of the "commercial system" was as urgent as the emancipation of them from slavery. Similar sentiments to those of Monod and Keynes also came from a lesser-known but influential scientist: Chisholm, the psychoanalyst who served as the first Secretary-General of the World Health Organization.He was literally advocating the “elimination of right and wrong,” insisting that the task of psychologists was to free humans from “the stale burden of good and evil”—advice that was lauded by America’s top legal authorities at the time.Morality is here again seen as - since it has no "scientific" basis - irrational, it is not recognized as cultural knowledge accumulated over generations. But let's take a look at a scientist even greater than Monod and Keynes - Einstein, perhaps the greatest genius of our time.Einstein was concerned with a different but closely related problem.He adopted a popular socialist slogan, arguing that "production for profit" in the capitalist order should be replaced by "production for use" (1956:129). "Production for use" here refers to labor performed in small groups based on the prediction of who will use the product.But this sentiment does not take into account the point made in the preceding chapters, which should be reiterated as follows: In a spontaneously generated order, only the difference between the expected prices of different goods and services and their costs can tell everyone how to pay for a The reservoir makes the greatest contribution, and we all draw from this reservoir in proportion to our contribution.Einstein did not seem to understand that only by accounting and allocating according to market prices can the resources we discover be used intensively, guide production to serve various purposes beyond the imagination of producers, and enable everyone to participate effectively Productive Exchange [Firstly, by serving the majority of the public, whom he does not know, and satisfying those needs of which he can really contribute; known, is also induced by market signals to serve his needs (see previous chapter)].Einstein resigned himself to such sentiments, showing a lack of understanding, or genuine interest, in the actual process of coordinating human effort. According to his biographers, Einstein thought it self-evident that "human reason must be able to discover a mode of distribution as efficient as a mode of production" (Clarke, 1971: 559).This account is reminiscent of the philosopher Bertrand Russell's assertion that a society can hardly be considered "completely scientific" unless "it has carefully established some structure for the achievement of definite ends" (1931: 203 ).This claim, especially from Einstein, seems so plausible on the surface that when a wise philosopher laughed at Einstein's sloppiness in some of his popular books, he also said approvingly, "Love Einstein was well aware that the present economic crisis is to be blamed on our system of producing for profit rather than for use, and on the fact that the enormous increases in our productivity have not in fact been accompanied by a commensurate increase in the purchasing power of the broad masses” (M R. Cohen, 1931: 119). We also find Einstein repeating (see op. cit.) the socialist demagogic cliché of "economic anarchy in a capitalist society" in which "the worker's compensation is not determined by the value of the product ”，而“计划经济……会把需要做的工作分配给全体有劳动能力的人”，如此等等。 与此相似但更为审慎的另一种观点，出现在爱因斯坦的合作者马克斯·玻恩的一篇文章里（1968：第五章）。玻恩显然认识到我们的扩展秩序已不再满足原始的本能，然而他也没有仔细地考察一下创造并维持这种秩序的结构，或认识到我们出自本能的道德在过去五千多年里，已经逐渐被废除或受到了限制。因此，虽然他知道“科学技术大概已经无可挽回地破坏了文明的伦理基础”，他却虚幻地以为，它们之所以造成这样的结果，不是因为它们系统地使信念失去了威信，而是因为它们揭示出，这些信念没有满足建构论理性主义所要求的某些'可以接受的标准”（见下文）。玻恩同意，“至今尚没有人设计出一种不需要传统的伦理原则也能维护社会团结的方法”，他却希望能够“用科学中所使用的传统方法”来取代它们。他也没有明白，处在本能和理性之间的东西，是不能用“科学中使用的传统方法”来代替的。 我的事例取自20世纪一些重要人物的言论；我没有把无数这样的人包括进来，例如米利坎、爱丁顿、索迪、奥斯特瓦尔德、索尔维、贝尔纳等人，他们全都曾经在经济问题上信口开河。当然，人们还可以引用出自较有名气的科学家和哲学家之口的数百条类似的言论——不管是过去数百年里的还是当今这个时代的。不过我相信，更细致地考察一下这些当代的具体事例，而不是简单地罗列那些引语和例证，我们能够得到更多的教益。大概首先应当指出的，这些事例尽管不能说如出一辙，却具有某种家族式的共性。 错误序列 在这些事例中出现的观点，全都有一些相互密切联系在一起的主题根源，它们并没有共同的历史前辈。对一些背景文献不熟悉的读者，也许不会一眼就能看出其中的一些相互关系。因此在进一步探讨这些观点本身之前，我打算先找出一些反复出现的主题，它们中间的大部分，乍一看上去好像无懈可击，而且它们全都为人们所熟知，但是它们加在一起，却构成一种论证。这种“论证”也可以被称为一个“错误序列”（litany of errors），或一个炮制推断式的理性主义的配方，我把它称为唯科学主义或建构主义。在动身之前，我们不妨先来参考一份“知识资源”，一本字典，即一部包含着许多配方的书。我从十分有用的《方塔纳-哈泼现代思想词典》中找出了四个基本哲学概念的简短定义，这些概念对于在唯科学主义和建构主义这条线上受过教育的当代思想家，有着普遍的指导作用：理性主义、经验主义、实证主义和功利主义。在过去几百年里，这些概念渐渐地被人们认为是科学的“时代精神”具有代表性的用语，根据这些由一位英国哲学家、牛津三一学院院长昆顿写下定义，理性主义认为，除非有经验和推理——不管它是归纳的还是演绎的——的基础，一切信念都是不可接受的。经验主义主张，任何声称表达知识的命题，仅限于那些其正当性有经验依据的命题。实证主义则被定义为这样一种观点，所有真正的知识都是科学知识，这里所谓的科学，是指它描述了可观察现象的共存性和连续性。而功利主义“把行为给每个人造成的快乐和痛苦，作为行为正当与否的标准”。 就像人们会在前一节引用的事例中隐约感到的那样，在这些定义里人们会十分清楚地看到现代科学和科学哲学的信仰宣言，以及它们针对传统道德的战争宣言。这些宣言、定义和主张给人的印象是，惟有可以用理性加以证实的，惟有被观察实验所证明的，惟有那些能够体验到的，惟有那些能够加以检测的，才是值得相信的；惟有让人愉快的事才是应当做的，其他事情必须统统放弃。这又直接导致一种主张，认为过去和今天创造着我们的文化的主流道德传统——它们肯定无法用这样的方式加以证实——是不值得遵守的，我们的任务只能是在科学知识的基础上建立一种新道德——通常是社会主义的新道德。 对这些定义连同我们前面的事例，如果给予更为细致的评价，可证明它们包含着如下预设： （1）凡是不能得到科学证明或观察验证的事情，就没有理由遵守（莫诺，玻恩）。 （2）凡是没有理解的事情，就没有理由遵守。这种观点隐含在我们的所有事例中，不过我必须坦白，我本人也曾持有这种观点，并且我还能够从一位大体说我们观点一致的哲学家那里发现这种观点。卡尔·波普尔爵士曾经说过（1948／1963：122；着重体是我加的），理性主义思想家“不会盲从任何传统”，当然，这就像不服从任何传统也是不可能的一样。不过这肯定是个笔误，因为他在别的地方曾正确地说过，“我们根本不可能知道自己在谈论什么”（1974／1976：27，另见巴特利，1985／1987）。 （虽然自由人会坚持有权评估任何传统，并且在适当的情况下有权拒绝任何传统，但是如果他不假思索地拒绝一切传统，并且对其作用始终一无所知，那么他是不可能和其他人生活在一起的。） （3）与此相关的观点是，对于一项具体的事业，除非对它的目标事先有充分的说明，就没有理由参与其中（爱因斯坦，罗素，凯恩斯）。 （4）另一个与此有密切关系的观点是，任何事情，除非不仅事先完全知道它的后果，并且还能充分观察到这种后果并能将它视为有益的，那就没有理由去做这件事情。 （第2、3、4条虽然侧重点有所不同，其实它们大体上一样。我在这里对它们加以区分，是想提醒人们注意一个事实，支持这些观点的论证——这取决于是谁在捍卫它们——或是根据缺乏普遍的可知性，或更具体一点说，是根据缺乏明确的目的或有关后果的全面而可观察的知识。） 还可以举出进一步的要求，不过这四项要求——我们将在以下两章加以评价——已可满足我们（主要是为了阐明观点）的目的。关于这些要求，首先可以指出两点：第一，对于我们的知识或我们的理性在某些领域可能有其局限性，它们都没有表现出任何自觉，或者说，它们都没有考虑，在这种情况下科学最重要的任务，可能就是找出这种局限性。下面我们就会知道，确实存在着这种局限性，它们能够部分地得到克服，譬如利用经济科学或“交换学”（catallactics），但是如果坚持以上四条要求，它们是不可能得到克服的。第二，我们发现，在支持这些要求的态度中，不仅缺乏对这些问题的理解，不仅没有考虑或解决这些问题，甚至令人不解地缺乏一种好奇心，丝毫没有想想我们的扩展秩序是如何出现的，它是如何得到维持的，假如破坏了创造并维持这种秩序的传统，会造成什么后果。 积极自由与消极自由 有些理性主义者会发出进一步的抱怨，对此我们几乎还没有给予考虑：资本主义的道德和各种制度，不但未能满足以上评论过的那些逻辑的、方法论的和认识论的要求，它甚至还给我们的自由，例如我们不受限制地“表达”自我的自由，加上了不堪承受的重负。 对付这种抱怨不能依靠否定显而易见的事实，即我们着手写作本书时所依靠的真理——道德传统确实会让许多人有些负担感。不管是在这里还是在以下各章，为了回答这种抱怨，还得观察一下我们从承受这种负担中得到了什么，以及不这样做会有什么结果。我认为，实际上文明的一切好处，甚至包括我们的生存，都取决于我们不间断地愿意承担起传统的负担。这些好处固然不能使负担变得“合理”，但是改弦易辙只会造成贫困和饥荒。 我不想一一清点或评论所有这些好处，也不想“记下主对我们的恩赐”，但是我可以在一个略有不同的背景下，再次提出一个也许最让人哭笑不得的好处——我这里想到正是我们的自由。自由要求允许个人追求他自己的目标：所谓自由的人，是一个在和平年代不再受其共同体具体的共同目标束缚的人。这种个人决定的自由之成为可能，是因为规定了明确的个人权利（例如财产权），并界定了每个人能够把自己所掌握的手段用于个人目标的范围。也就是说，为每个人都规定了一块公认的自由领地。这件事至关重要，因为拥有自己的东西，不管它多么少，构成了独立的个体得以形成的基础，它创造了能够追求具体的个人目标的特定环境。 但是，一种普遍的臆断，即有可能取得这种没有限制的自由，却造成了混乱。这种臆断反映在出自伏尔泰之口的格言：“quand je peux faire ce que je veux，voila la liberte”（“自由者，可随心所欲之谓也”），反映在边沁的“每一条法律都是罪恶，因为每一条法律都是对自由的破坏”这种言论上（1789／1887：48），也反映在伯特兰·罗素的自由“就是我们实现自己的愿望不存在障碍”这种定义上（1940：252），以及无数其他文献上。然而这种意义上的普遍自由是不可能的，因为每个人的自由都会颠覆所有其他人拥有的无限自由，即不受限制的自由。 因此，问题在于如何为所有的人保障尽可能多的自由。这可以通过用抽象规则对一切人的自由做出统一的限制加以保障，这些规则禁止对所有其他人（或由他们）实施任意的或歧视性的强制，禁止对任何其他人自由领域的侵犯（见哈耶克，1960，1973，以及本书第二章）。简言之，要用抽象规则代替共同的具体目标；政府的必要性仅仅在于实施这些抽象规则，以此保护个人的自由领域不受他人的强制或侵犯。所谓奴隶制，无非就是强制人们服从共同的具体目标，而服从共同的抽象现则（不管他们是否有负担感），则为最不同寻常的自由和多样性提供了空间。有时人们担心这种多样性会导致混乱，它威胁到和我们的文明联系在一起的相对秩序，其实更大的多样性却会带来更大的秩序。因此，和没有限制的自由相比，通过服从抽象规则而实现的自由，正如普鲁东所言，是“秩序之母，而不是它的女儿”。 其实，没有理由期待习惯做法得到的进化选择会产生幸福。对幸福的强调是理性主义哲学家所为，他们认为，必须为人们的道德选择找出自觉的理由，所谓理性，也就是对幸福的自觉追求。但是，追问人们有什么自觉的理由采用自己的道德规则，就像追问人们有什么自觉的理由运用他的理性一样错误。 不过不应忘记，我们生活于其中的演化的秩序为我们提供的幸福，有可能等于乃至超过原始秩序为极少数人提供的幸福（这并不是说这种事是可以计算的）。现代生活中的许多“异化”和不幸有两个来源，其中一个主要影响到知识分子，另一个影响到物质丰富的全体受益者。前者是一个有关任何生活在不符合自觉控制这一理性主义标准的“制度”中的人进行自我完善的预言。因此从卢梭到福柯和哈贝马斯这些法国和德国的当代思想界人士，都认为异化存在于一切未经个人自觉的同意便把秩序“强加于”他们的任何制度之中；因此他们的追随者倾向于认为文明是不堪忍受的——根据定义，事情只能如此。其次，坚持利他主义和休戚与共的原始本能，使那些遵守扩展秩序中非人格化规则的人，不得不承受“坏了良心”这种如今十分流行的恶名。同样，取得物质上的成功据说会面对内疚感（或“社会良知”）。于是在物质丰富的环境里，不但有残留的贫困造成的不幸，而且有——在本能和狂妄的理性看来——同秩序格格不入而引起的不幸，因为这种秩序有着非本能的和超越理性的明确特征。 “解放”和秩序 在不像反“异化”的论证那般玄妙的层面上，是从文明的负担中获得“解放”（liberation）的要求——这些负担包括遵守劳动纪律、责任心、承担风险、节俭、诚信守诺，以及普遍规则对人类敌视陌生人、愿意同和自己相似的人同甘共苦的本能反应——这是对政治自由更为严重的威胁——加以约束引起的麻烦。因此“解放”虽然说起来是个新概念，就它摆脱传统道德的要求而言，其实也是一种很古老的现象。赢得了这种解放的人，将破坏自由的基础，允许人们做那些将文明赖以存在的条件摧毁贻尽的事情。一个例子是“解放神学”，尤其是南美洲天主教会中的这种货色。不过这场运动并不限于南美洲。人们到处在以解放的名义弃绝那些使他们能够达到目前的合作规模和程度的行为方式，因为根据他们的观点，他们也没有理性地认识到，和集中控制的做法相比，法律和道德规则对个人自由的某些限制，如何使一个更大的——而且是更自由的！——秩序成为可能。 这些要求主要来自我们已经讨论过的理性主义的自由主义传统（十分不同于源自英国老辉格党的政治自由主义），它意味着自由不能和个人行为受到的任何普遍限制共存。从上述伏尔泰、边沁和罗素的言论中，都可以听到这个传统的声音。不幸的是，它甚至渗透到了英国“理性主义圣人”约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒的著作中。 在这些作者的影响下，大概尤其是在穆勒的影响下，我们只能以服从某些行为规则为代价才能享有使我们得以形成扩展秩序的自由这个事实，历来被用于为重返野蛮人所享有的“自由”状态的要求进行辩护，按照18世纪思想家的定义，这些野蛮人“尚不知财产为何物”。但是这种野蛮状态——其中包含着共同追求自己同胞的具体目标以及服从头领命令的义务或责任——很难被说成是一种自由状态（虽然它可能包含着从某些具体负担中得到解放的内容），甚至难以把它说成是一种道德状态。只有那些当人们根据自己的目标做出个人决定时必须予以考虑的普遍而抽象的规则，才担当得起道德之名。