Chapter 50 2002 Made in China

The prediction made by The Economist in 1979 has finally come true 23 years later.This old British magazine made a bold analysis in March 1979: Although in the short term, China needs a large amount of imports, which will stimulate the production of industrially developed countries, but in the long run, "the flood of Chinese exports will become inevitable". At the beginning of 2002, the American retail giant Wal-Mart decided to move its Asian purchasing center from Hong Kong to Luohu District in Shenzhen. Zhang Jiasheng, the president of the China region, told reporters, "We have found the biggest seller." Not long ago, "Fortune" announced " Among the Fortune Global 500 companies, Wal-Mart ranked first with an operating income of US$219.8 billion. This is the first time in history that a service company has become the leader of the Fortune 500.Wal-Mart's purchases of goods in China this year totaled $12 billion, equivalent to the total trade volume between China and Russia.According to calculations by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, “Wal-Mart, if it were a country, would be China’s sixth-largest commodity exporter and eighth-largest trading partner.”

The wave of "Made in China" that started around 1998 was full of vitality this year, and cheap and high-quality Chinese products finally showed their power to the world.In the South Korea-Japan World Cup football match held in May, the Chinese football team had no harvest, but Chinese products stole the limelight.A toy factory in Yangzhou, Jiangsu produced 300,000 World Cup mascots, a clothing company in Yiwu, Zhejiang produced 2.25 million fan cheering flags and hundreds of thousands of "fan wigs", and a factory in Fujian provided millions of fan uniforms, Wristbands and football socks, etc.The National Bureau of Statistics of China announced at a press conference on August 16 that the comparative advantage of the Chinese economy is still in the manufacturing industry. The economic growth in the past 20 years has mainly relied on the growth of the manufacturing industry. The added value of the manufacturing industry accounts for the proportion of GDP. Basically maintained at around 40%.

Beijing Great Wall Enterprise Strategy Research Institute outlined the outline of "Made in China" in a comprehensive report entitled "Report on China's Science and Technology Development": According to preliminary estimates, the output of hundreds of manufactured products in my country ranks first in the world.Since 1990, mainland China has absorbed 230 billion US dollars of investment, accounting for 45% of the total in Asia. Among them, manufacturing is the most important investment field. China has become the fourth largest producer in the world, and "Made in China" is rising worldwide.In terms of regional structure, "Made in China" has formed three world-class manufacturing centers in the Bohai Bay Rim, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta.The total population of the three major regions accounts for 35.45% of the total population of the country, and the land area is less than 10% of the country, but they have created 57% of the gross domestic product and 66% of the total industrial output value; More than 85% of the share, the utilization of foreign capital is also close to 80% of the national utilization of foreign capital.In the group of exporting enterprises, small enterprises occupy an absolute advantage in quantity, and in terms of output value, there is almost no difference between large enterprises and small enterprises.According to the analysis of the report, "large state-owned enterprises can better reflect the advantages of large-scale production in the manufacturing industry, but there is limited room for improvement; among small enterprises, emerging private manufacturing enterprises represent new forces in the manufacturing industry, and have developed rapidly in recent years. They are "Made in China" The main driving force for its rise is also the main driving force for its future development."

It was also from this year that a real joke began to circulate in various versions: Many people traveled abroad and bought a lot of souvenirs and fashionable products. When they returned home, they picked up the logo and saw that they were all "Made in China" .Behind this dumbfounding joke, there is a special kind of pride. "China Business News" wrote in a commentary, "Made in China is a new term that emerged one night in 2002, or it is an old term, but it was suddenly activated in 2002 and given new meaning. : Under the premise of sluggish world economic development, China's economy is thriving. Due to various reasons such as global economic integration and comparative advantages, the world has increasingly felt the existence and strength of China." The newspaper then said in a very proud tone "Just as the rise and fall of a big country confirms the rise and fall of manufacturing industry, from Great Britain, the empire on which the sun never sets, to the United States, the only superpower in the world today, from Germany, which provoked two world wars, to Japan, which created the miracle of East Asia, there is no one. Exception. Even the "Four Little Dragons" in East Asia later took manufacturing as the pioneer of development. Now, the wave of world economic integration has brought the opportunity of manufacturing to China's doorstep."

Such comments are powerful, but they only observe half of the facts. It will take time for the Chinese public and public opinion to have a deep understanding of "Made in China".In fact, from the very beginning, the whole advantage of "Made in China" has been its low price. Guangdong Galanz is the world's largest professional manufacturer of microwave ovens, and its factory area stretches for 3 kilometers.By 2002, the output of Galanz exceeded 12 million units, accounting for 1/3 of the global market share.Yu Yaochang, vice president in charge of marketing, wrote in the media, "Our only secret is to maximize the advantage of cheap labor." The price is more than 20 US dollars, and European and American companies are more than 30 US dollars. Facing the impact of Japanese goods, European and American companies are in great pain.Galanz negotiated with the American company: bring me the machine, and I will give you $8 for one machine according to the current output of the United States.The Americans happily moved the production line here.Because the wages of Galanz employees are very low, and workers can work in "three shifts" 24 hours a day, only one or two days a week is produced for Americans, and the rest of the time is almost enjoying free dinners. Therefore, Galanz swept the domestic market.In the international arena, its low-price strategy quickly forced the transformer into the tasteless of the Japanese.Galanz went to the Japanese to negotiate again: I will give you 5 dollars per machine, and you can also lease the production line to me.In this way, production lines from many countries converged in Shunde, and Galanz established its leading position as the "World Factory of Microwave Ovens".

If the story of Galanz vividly illustrates the source of the cost advantage of "Made in China", then the story of Barbie can show the status of Chinese products in the value chain. "Barbie" is Disney's best-selling children's brand toy, which is sold in 120 countries around the world every year, and its main manufacturing base is in China.A Barbie doll retails for $20 in the North American market, but the FOB price of a Chinese factory is $1, which includes the cost, profit and various taxes of the manufacturer and distributor. The launch of China's "dual engines" in the two major markets of foreign trade and domestic demand has brought about a prosperity that has not been seen in the macro economy for many years. The haze of the Asian financial turmoil has dissipated. Even people who are not very optimistic about China's economy have to change their views.Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese management scientist, was once one of the proponents of the "China Crash Theory". In his newly published book "China Impact" (China Impact) this year, he admitted: "After flying to China for the 50th time, , I have now become the most active proponent of China's economic prosperity theory. In the next 10 years, the most important issue for the world is how to get along with a strong China." When former Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited China this year, he said A reporter from CCTV said, "To be honest, I am very envious of you. Japan has not been able to solve the economic problem of inflation for a long time, but China's economy has been able to maintain a growth rate of more than 8% for several years. I am not only envious, but also envious."

Anyone who reads the following data will be as envious of China as Hashimoto Ryutaro: In 2002, 30,000 foreign-invested enterprises settled in China, attracting foreign investment of 50 billion US dollars, an increase of 14% over the previous year; the annual domestic private investment growth The growth rate reached 18%, twice the growth rate of the previous year. In Zhejiang, Guangdong and other provinces, private investment accounted for 60% of the total social investment in the province; foreign trade exports increased by more than 20%.According to the statistics of the World Bank, China's per capita GNP has reached 960 US dollars, approaching 1,000 US dollars, which indicates that "Chinese society has gone through the stage of food and clothing and has initially achieved a moderately prosperous life."This year, China has been surrounded by more and more praiseworthy words. Nobel laureate Stiglitz said, "China can be called a model or example of the economic development of the entire world." "Wall Street Journal" The comment is, "China is becoming the most important political force in Asia." "The Economist" magazine speaks with data: "In the global growth from 1995 to 2002, the United States contributed only 20%, while China's proportion was 25%. %."

While the macro-economy is sunny, a series of thrilling corporate turmoil has occurred in the corporate world-Li Jingwei was kicked out of Jianlibao, Gu Chujun succeeded Kelon, Yang Rong left Brilliance, and Chunlan's restructuring was stranded.These incidents that occurred in 2002 seem to have twists and turns, and the inside story is clouded and misty, but their essence is related to the property rights clarification campaign that has been implemented for more than four years. The strategy of "retirement from the state and advancement from the people" with the reform of property rights as the main means has entered the final "closing period". The most important reason is that there will be a change of government at the central, provincial and municipal levels at the beginning of the second year, and the loss-making ratio of state-owned enterprises Obviously one of the most important assessment indicators.Therefore, selling the troubled state-owned and collective enterprises as soon as possible has become a reform task with both political and economic significance.By the end of the year, the results of the work were remarkable. Southern Jiangsu in Jiangsu and Shaoxing and Ningbo in Zhejiang were originally the most famous collective economic zones in the southeast coast. Today, the proportion of private enterprises has exceeded 90%, hundreds of thousands The collective economic operators turned into tens of millions or even billionaires overnight.However, in this wave of advance and retreat, some local governments and entrepreneurs disagreed on the disposal of enterprise property rights, and the game between politics and business directly led to a fatal crisis.

On January 9th, Li Jingwei of Jianlibao sat opposite the mayor of Sanshui City coldly.Since 1998, they have been at loggerheads over disputes over the ownership of Jianlibao.In July of last year, the municipal government held a joint meeting on the transformation of Jianlibao. All the leaders of the municipal party committee and government attended the meeting. Officials at the meeting expressed their views one by one. As a result, 90% of them advocated selling Jianlibao and not selling it to Li Jingwei’s team. In the beginning, Singapore First Foods almost became the new owner of Jianlibao.In the third month after that crucial joint meeting, Li Jingwei was notified to attend a dinner party.At the banquet, a Singaporean businessman named Wei Chenghui was introduced to Li Jingwei. The mayor said clearly that the government had selected Mr. Wei's company to purchase Jianlibao.When Li Jingwei heard the words, he was like a thunderclap, and his resentment can be imagined.The next day, at the internal working meal, he suddenly lost control and uttered foul words, "Damn it, I don't know about the sale of stocks in the market, so I just let me have a meal together." What is embarrassing is that the government refused to sell Jianlibao to his team at a price of 450 million yuan, but accepted the Singaporean's offer of 380 million yuan. In the initialed agreement, the Jianlibao trademark, known as "China's No. The appraisal value is actually zero.

Li Jingwei couldn't understand why the government would rather sell the company to a foreign company he didn't know, than sell it to himself, who had worked hard all his life to build the company and was willing to pay a higher price.Under his behind-the-scenes planning, the domestic media moved upon hearing the news. For a while, public opinions such as "Jianlibao was ruthlessly sold at a low price" and "China's first national brand flag was cut off" were overwhelming. The excitement mixed in it obviously made it difficult for the Sanshui government. On the one hand, it announced to the outside world that it is willing to "redeem" Jianlibao at a price of 450 million yuan.Li Jingwei's confrontational attitude and the surging public opinion offensive pushed the Sanshui government, which originally lacked the ability to deal with public relations, into an extremely embarrassing corner.An official later said angrily, "The media's early intervention disrupted our plans and made us completely passive." domestic buyers".In this way, the mayor and Li Jingwei had another meeting and dialogue.Li Jingwei, who has the upper hand in public opinion, asked the mayor in a critical tone, "Why did you completely abandon Jianlibao's entrepreneurial team and insist on selling Jianlibao to the outside world? Why don't you let us buy it back?!" The mayor immediately stated, " If you want to sell it, I will give you a week."

Seeing the turn of events, no one expected that in this week, a 28-year-old capital dealer Zhang Hai would appear.He proposed to buy according to Li Jingwei's bid, and the company that would come forward would be a state-owned enterprise called Zhejiang International Investment Trust Company (Zhejiang Guotou).Sanshui officials, who were holding back their anger, met Kuangshi Guanyin. On January 14, on the sixth day after they promised to "raise enough money within a week and sell it to the management team", Li Jingwei, who was looking around to raise funds, was suddenly caught by an emergency. Called to the city hall.Before his buttocks reached the chair, the mayor informed him, "This matter has been settled. We have now decided to sell Jianlibao to Zhejiang Guotou." The next day, at the Jianlibao Villa in Sanshui, a hasty The preparatory signing ceremony was held in full view.The Sanshui Municipal Government transferred 75% of Jianlibao's shares to Zhejiang State Investment Corporation at a price of 338 million yuan.During the ceremony, Li Jingwei, who was on the verge of success, was like an abandoned old horse, sitting silently in a corner of the venue, with a lonely look on his face that could not be concealed.The next day, the photo of him "looking up to the sky with tears in his eyes and not saying a word" was published on all domestic news websites and financial media, and the viewers were all moved by it.This photo can be called the saddest photo of an entrepreneur in the 30-year history of corporate data. Li Jingwei's bad luck has not yet come to an end.On the ninth day after the signing ceremony, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage at home, and his relatives dialed "120" to send him to Guangzhou Air Force Hospital for emergency treatment. pull out.Since then, he has never left the ward.There are voices of sympathy for it all over the country. In mid-October, Li Jingwei, who was on the sick bed, received a notice that the 37th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth People's Congress of Guangdong Province passed a decision to dismiss him as a deputy to the National People's Congress on charges of corruption.The reason for the procuratorate's strong case is: "As a person entrusted by the state agency to manage and operate state-owned property, he ignored the laws of the state and collaborated with others to take advantage of his position to embezzle 3.3188 million yuan of state-owned property in the form of purchasing life insurance." Li Jingwei Three of the four vice presidents in the team were shuanggui and resisted arrest one after another, and one "fled" abroad. So far, the confusing and twists and turns Jianlibao property rights transaction incident has been settled with Li Jingwei's alleged crime.In any case, no one wants to sympathize with a corrupt criminal.Jianlibao's vitality has been seriously injured so far. In 2004, Zhang Hai was dismissed due to poor management, and the company was on the verge of suspending production. In 2007, Jianlibao once again changed hands to Taiwan Uni-President Group, and the “No. 1 Beverage Company in China” at that time has now become a second-rate company.What is puzzling is that Li Jingwei has been "restricted to live" in the hospital as a pending crime, and the procuratorate has never formally filed a lawsuit against him. Objectively speaking, during the Jianlibao turmoil, the local government did not intend to bring down the company. Officials abandoned Li Jingwei's team and chose the strategy of "preferring to be with foreigners rather than with family members". There are two main reasons: first, they are worried about management Second, in order to avoid suspicion, they are afraid of taking responsibility for the loss of state-owned assets. In the process of implementing the "National Retirement and Democratic Advancement" in various places, there is always only a strategy but no specific legal basis. There is indeed a phenomenon of private granting and acceptance. Many companies have realized the privatization of property rights through black-box operations.Therefore, some government officials are afraid of taking relevant responsibilities, and out of consideration of avoiding suspicion, they would rather sell the company to outsiders with simple interpersonal relationships.It is precisely under the premise of this "institutional defect" that the strong exclusion of existing operators is in stark contrast to the blind trust of external forces. Industrialists ruthlessly block the business palace they created. The so-called capital brokers can easily enter and exit through the small door.In the process of dealing with these skilled "barbarians at the gate", the local government has shown an immaturity that is easy to trust and not good at games. We have seen the most ridiculous scene of Chinese corporate reform! If it is said that local officials showed suspicion and impulsiveness during the Jianlibao incident, then the Kelong incident that also occurred in South China revealed another way of intervening.In January of this year, a man named Gu Chujun suddenly became the new owner of Kelong. Since the founder Pan Ning suddenly "resigned" at the end of 1998 with "unfounded" reasons, this enterprise with the most high-tech characteristics and the best benefits in China's national electrical appliance industry has since fallen into mysterious turmoil.After Pan Ning left, he was replaced by Wang Guoduan, his assistant for many years.One and a half years after Wang Guoduan took office, he announced his resignation, and Xu Tiefeng, the mayor of Ronggui Town, stepped up and became the president of Kelon himself.In South China, where the wind of opening up is strong, the full-time official of the town government was transferred to the president of the largest company in the jurisdiction.There is no precedent for this.This personnel change aroused a lot of exclamation. Perhaps it was also from this extraordinary move that the media sniffed out the drama of the Kelon incident. In 2000, Kelon reported a loss of 678 million yuan.For this star company, which has been the leader in China's refrigerator industry for eight years, the huge loss is undoubtedly a big bomb thrown on the market, and the market's reaction to this can almost be described as "shocking". According to public explanations, Kelon's losses were caused by poor management.However, since 1997, Kelon's profitability has been maintained at more than 600 million yuan per year. In 1999, the net profit was 630 million yuan, the production of refrigerators reached a record 2.65 million units, and the total sales volume was 5.8 billion yuan.However, how could Kelon turn around and lose nearly 700 million yuan in the coming year, and how can we explain the contrast of nearly 1.4 billion yuan?From a financial point of view, there are three possibilities for Kelon’s loss: The first possibility is that a major and vicious event suddenly occurred in the market, and sales shrank sharply, resulting in a huge deficit due to excessive operating costs.In fact, this situation did not happen at the time.The second possibility is that the receivables are too large and huge bad debts form a financial black hole.Qu Yunbo, who was in charge of Kelon's marketing, disclosed, "When I took office in 2000, Kelon owed more than 200 million yuan in advertising fees. Before I came, Kelon's highest accounts receivable was 1.2 billion. When I first took office, it was Seven or eight hundred million. And when I left at the end of 2001, there were only tens of millions of advertising expenses left, and there were still 200 million in accounts receivable on the books, which should be within the normal range.” If so, then That is to say, although the company's receivables were staggering around 2000, they did not form bad debts in the end. The last possibility is that major shareholders are suspected of transferring assets.After Pan Ning created the Kelon brand, his superior has always had a "Rongsheng Group", which is the major shareholder of Kelon Electric and is entrusted by the government to manage collective assets.Although Kelon has been listed in Hong Kong and Shenzhen successively and became a public company, the "Rongsheng Group" that really holds the asset rights has always been hidden behind.What is the status of the assets between Kelon and the major shareholder? Although there are various speculations from the outside world, there has never been a clear explanation.Some experts boldly speculated that after vetoing Pan Ning's restructuring plan, the state-owned shareholders adopted the method of "transferring assets" to withdraw from Kelon Electric. In just three years, Kelon Electric was completely "hollowed out" and "consumed and empty".Qu Yunbo, a marketing expert, served as the vice president of marketing of Kelon Group from 2000 to 2001. After he left, he kept silent about what he knew about Kelon until August 2005, when he was interviewed by a reporter from the Economic Observer. Only then did he say flickeringly, "From earning 700 million yuan in the first year (actually 630 million yuan) to losing 700 million yuan in the second year (actually 678 million yuan), this has aroused great concern from everyone. It’s 1.4 billion in one round. Unless it’s a special case, it’s just making a loss.” He also said, “I can turn losses into a good thing, and change the leadership’s constant replacement into a bad thing. Good thing, but I don't have the ability to turn a bad thing like stealing money into a good thing." On October 31, 2001, financial reporters from major media across the country got a piece of news without warning: a little-known Greencool company became the largest shareholder of Kelon, a leading refrigeration appliance company.Greencool acquired a 20.6% stake in Kelon Electric for 560 million yuan (the amount was later reduced to 348 million yuan). Gu Chujun is an entrepreneur with a very suspicious history.When he was 30 years old, he "invented" a set of "Gu's" thermodynamic cycle theory named after himself, which claimed to be able to produce energy-saving air conditioners. Pan Ning also sent people to inquire about the feasibility of this technology. In 1991, he set up an air-conditioning factory in Huizhou. The advertisement claimed to be "the most energy-efficient household air conditioner in the world." Later, the Technical Supervision Bureau found that the quality was not up to standard, and the factory was shut down.Then he went on to build a new CFC-free refrigerant factory in Tianjin, named "Greencool". In 2000, Greencool was listed on the Growth Enterprise Market of Hong Kong.In the first year of listing, Greencool announced a profit of 269 million yuan, and its operating income has increased by 3300 times in the past three years, ranking first in Hong Kong's GEM profit.In the 2001 annual report, the company announced that it had realized an operating income of 516 million yuan, a gross profit of 410 million yuan, and a net profit of 340 million yuan. Caijing magazine, which is famous for its rigorous financial analysis, directly stated, "Its income is simply an unattainable Numbers." "21st Century Business Herald" broke the news that Greencool's so-called performance comes from a large number of false contracts, "The core of its story is to sign false orders everywhere, so many fake orders can be packed in sacks." It is such a surrounding Entrepreneurs with many gray auras walked into Kelong in the fog.According to Chen Lei, the author of "Gu Chujun Investigation", quoting an insider who used to be the secretary of the board of directors of Kelon Electric, the important bargaining chip for Gu Chujun to negotiate with the government is the large number of connections hidden under the books between Kelon Electric and its parent company Rongsheng Group Transaction, "Gu Chujun told the government that if he was allowed to buy it, Rongsheng Group would not have to pay back the money owed to Kelon." Gu Chujun later recalled in detail the situation before and after the acquisition of Kelon: "When we signed the contract on September 27, 2001, we only knew that we might lose 100 million yuan. By the end of November, we were told that the loss might exceed 600 million yuan. We were shocked at that time. , and the signed agreement has been announced. In this case, we went back and held a meeting, and finally came to the conclusion that there is a big problem with Kelon's cost control. If it is done very strictly, it is possible to make profits. I Joined Kelon in January 2002. When the audit report came out in March, Kelon had a loss of 1.5 billion yuan. The initial report was 1.8 billion yuan. We were worried that such a large loss would make creditor banks lose confidence, so we decided to take it back through mergers and acquisitions. 300 million. For about half a year to eight months, the bank only charged Kelon and did not lend.” In April 2002 after Gu Chujun took over, Kelon Electric announced its annual report as usual. Although the market had no illusions about its performance, the data it heard still made people jump off their stools: the loss in the previous year was more than 600 million On the basis of RMB 1.5 billion, the company continued to report a loss of RMB 1.555 billion for the year, and a loss of RMB 2.2 billion for two consecutive years, setting the record among listed companies in China's home appliances.Based on these data and memories, one conclusion can be drawn: the Kelong that Gu Chujun obtained was a weak body that had been hollowed out.After Gu Chujun took over, Kelon experienced a brief revival, but soon, as Gu Chujun launched a crazy acquisition storm, Kelon’s funds were once again embezzled in large quantities. In 2005, Kelon suffered a huge loss of 3.693 billion yuan, setting a new record in one fell swoop. It set a record for the loss of listed companies in the mainland that year; it was involved in 93 lawsuits, the largest number of cases involving listed companies in the mainland in recent years, and the company's net assets were -1.09 billion yuan.A home appliance company that was once the most promising has become a victim in the obscure property rights game.Professor Zhou Qiren of Peking University, who has had contacts with Pan Ning, commented, “It was not Kelon’s restructuring that gave Greencool a chance, but it was precisely because it did not reform in time. The main lesson of Kelon is that it did not initiate and develop in time in the Panning era. Complete the reform of property rights, otherwise Gu Chujun will have no chance to become the owner.” He wrote in a column titled “It’s a pity, Kelon”: “Reading Kelon’s report, I was tortured by a question: If you still start a business Under the leadership of Boss Pan Ning’s generation, did Kelon end up where he is today? Knowing that history cannot be assumed, I can’t help but think that way... Kelon’s ending seems to be due to timing, luck, and fate. Desire Cry without tears." These property rights scandals detonated one after another in various places, which was dazzling at the time.A fact worth remembering is that in the process of large-scale property rights restructuring, there has been a phenomenon that "small enterprises are easy to reform, large enterprises are difficult to reform, unknown enterprises are easy to reform, well-known enterprises are difficult to reform, loss-making enterprises are easy to reform, and profitable companies are difficult to reform". As a result, the property rights reform of some well-known large enterprises with strong profitability has become a difficult task.At the beginning of the year, the once high-profile "Chunlan Restructuring" was officially announced to be stranded. The transformation of Chunlan has a strong specimen significance.The predecessor of Chunlan was Taizhou Air Conditioning Equipment Factory, a county-run collective enterprise on the verge of bankruptcy in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province. In 1985, its assets were 2.8 million yuan, its liabilities were 5.5 million yuan, and its net asset value was negative.Under the management of Tao Jianxing, Chunlan emerged suddenly in the air conditioner market. By 1994, Chunlan became the largest air conditioner production base in China and one of the top seven air conditioners in the world. In 2000, Chunlan's asset scale reached 12 billion yuan, with a net asset of 8 billion yuan, becoming a leader in China's home appliance industry.Therefore, Tao Jianxing was elected as an alternate member of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China together with Ni Runfeng from Changhong, Sichuan. In October 2000, under the background of the sound of property rights reform and the large-scale transformation of the "Southern Jiangsu Model", Chunlan's board of directors issued an announcement announcing that Chunlan Group would change from a collective of nearly 5 billion yuan to Cut 25% of the assets, and use cash to carry out quantitative allotment of shares to the management and more than 10,000 employees in a ratio of 1:1.Tao Jianxing believes that the restructuring of Chunlan is in line with the central government's policy, so it has been implemented in a high-profile manner, attracting widespread and enthusiastic public attention.He seems to have considered various possible hidden dangers. For example, the restructuring plan clearly stipulates that the company shall not help anyone purchase company shares in any form including guarantees, subsidies, and loans.In order to solve technical problems, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Jiangsu Branch of China Construction Bank and Chunlan reached an agreement that the two banks would provide 90% of the loan to all Chunlan employees in the form of stock pledge.In order to "avoid suspicion", Tao Jianxing also refused to accept other people's suggestions that the management should control the majority of shares, but instead implemented the "Generic System of Preferences", which also means that he voluntarily gave up shares worth hundreds of millions of yuan.He told the reporter of "Sanlian Life Weekly", "Relevant departments have considered giving me 10% of Chunlan Group's shares, but I refused. I worked hard in Chunlan, really not for making more money. Give me 700 million, what am I going to do?" Flowers? In my heart, Chunlan seems to be my own. Money has zero driving force for me.” Tao Jianxing's self-confidence and high profile unexpectedly made him the focus of public discussion.Some people calculated that the restructuring of Chunlan will create thousands of millionaires, hundreds of multi-millionaires and several billionaires overnight, and Tao Jianxing's own wealth will naturally become the biggest focus.Before the restructuring, his monthly salary was 3,500 yuan, but according to the restructuring plan, he estimates that he can get about 50 million yuan (shares).As a result, various doubts followed. The first question was, "What is Chunlan's surname?" Someone asked, "Chunlan's state-owned shares account for 75%. According to Chunlan's plan, when employees buy shares, they will also Employees are allocated dividend rights (dry shares) at a ratio of 1:1, so where does this part of dividend rights come from? Does it mean that state-owned shareholders give up their dividend rights and give up a piece? Is there a problem of loss of state-owned assets? "The second question is, "Why Tao Jianxing?" An operator of a large state-owned enterprise and a reformer who enjoyed a prominent political position became a billionaire overnight. Big cognitive gap.The last and bigger question is, "What will the Chunlan effect bring?" Some people commented, "The gap between the rich and the poor in China is widening, and one of the most important manifestations is the process of property rights restructuring of some operators in state-owned enterprises. In the process, the rapid expansion of wealth has been realized. If the transformation is successful, Tao Jianxing may become the vanguard of China's state-owned enterprise reform and the pacesetter of wealth. Chunlan Group's actions show the world that a state-owned enterprise can still become a rich man. After the completion of the Chunlan restructuring, There may be a wave of large-scale reform of the property rights system of state-owned enterprises in China. Zhang Ruimin of Qingdao Haier, Zhou Houjian of Qingdao Hisense, and Ni Runfeng of Sichuan Changhong may all become the first batch of capitalists in the history of China in the 21st century.” These are questions that are difficult to answer directly. In a sense, they almost touch the institutional and moral bottom line that has been evaded in corporate reform.Tao Jianxing's high-profile made Chunlan's restructuring accidentally plunged into a very sensitive debate.Some people regard the restructuring of Chunlan as "a breakthrough change of the highest order of magnitude among large domestic state-owned enterprises." A reporter from "21st Century Business Herald" wrote: "Chunlan's restructuring, the whole of China is paying attention to this matter with bated breath. . . . " Another comment pointed out that "Tao Jianxing gave Chunlan 'dividends' in dozens of days".Some media interviewed Chen Biting, the vice-governor in charge of industry in Jiangsu Province. Chen Biting skillfully replied: "I personally support this." Officials from relevant central departments said that the country has not formulated corresponding policies to do so.An economic observer named Zhang Yong commented, "Although the Chunlan restructuring seems to be inappropriate from an economic point of view, the number of people affected and the amount of money have never been seen before. Such a quantification, It was really scary." As a result of the "scary jump", Chunlan restructured "Die in the Light".In fact, when the news of Chunlan's restructuring was made public, its employee stock ownership plan was basically completed.However, under the pressure of huge public opinion, the restructuring came to an abrupt halt, and the Chunlan plan was submitted to the central government for discussion, and there was hardly any reason to veto it. At the beginning of 2001, Tao Jianxing was told that "there are still legal obstacles to this plan, and more scientific, rigorous, and reasonable demonstrations and calculations are required, and collective consultations by economists and jurists are required."By 2002, the program had come to an end.Tao Jianxing, who thought that the good game was over, used too much force, the chess fell to pieces, and he sighed when he had nothing to do. The suspension of Chunlan's restructuring is a landmark event in the property rights clarification movement.Since then, the restructuring plans of those large enterprises that are very similar to it, such as Haier, Changhong and Hisense, have been shelved one by one. In this property rights movement, due to the lack of institutional guarantees and norms, the property rights reform of almost all enterprises has become a huge adventure. There is often no clear line between right and wrong, legal and illegal, and the fate of entrepreneurs suddenly It has become extremely dangerous and unpredictable.In this year, two legendary figures in China's dairy industry both explored property rights in the companies they founded, and the difference in their fates still makes people feel embarrassing after many years. On October 8, "People's Daily" published a close-up of reform figures "Zheng Junhuai: Building a National Brand".The article commented on the entrepreneur who had just been elected as a representative of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, saying, "It has been nearly 20 years since Zheng Junhuai first came to Yili. Now 52 years old, Zheng Junhuai has dedicated his best years to an enterprise. Courage created the brand of "Yili" in China's dairy industry." In 1983, Yili was just a Muslim food factory under the Hohhot Municipal Government with an annual profit and tax of only 47,000 yuan.Under the management of Zheng Junhuai, Yili seized the development opportunity of China's pure milk market and built the largest dairy company in China at that time. In 1996, Yili became one of the first listed companies in Inner Mongolia. In 2002, its sales revenue reached 4 billion. Yuan. As early as 1999, Zheng Junhuai tried to carry out property rights reform. Under the premise that it was impossible to directly clarify property rights, he, like many people at that time, chose the road of curved MBO.He and more than 20 executives of Yili invested in the establishment of a "Huashi Trading Company", and successively acquired the legal person shares of Yili held by some state-owned enterprises.Since Zheng Junhuai's team did not have much cash, they adopted a gray approach in the acquisition. Once, Zheng Junhuai transferred 1.5 million yuan of funds from Yili Company to Huashi Company, and used the money to buy Yili's legal person shares. Soon after , and quietly returned the money.Another time, for a 15 million yuan stake in Yili, he instructed a dairy farm that had close business relations with Yili to borrow from a bank for Huashi to purchase Yili shares, and then Huashi pledged the purchased legal person shares. The loan is obtained from the bank and returned to the dairy farm, which then returns the money to the bank.This "empty glove white wolf" approach was almost a commonly used "MBO method" back then.Zheng Junhuai's approach seems to be very smooth, and seems to have the tacit approval of the local government.By this year, the State-owned Assets Administration Bureau of Hohhot City had transferred all the state shares it held to the Municipal Finance Bureau, and transferred 5 million shares of them to the company invested by Zheng Junhuai's team. At this time, Huashi Trading had already It was renamed Qiyuan Investment, and the latter became the second largest shareholder of Yili. While Zheng Junhuai was trying to acquire Yili, one of his old subordinates, Niu Gensheng, chose another way.比郑俊怀小4岁的牛根生曾跟郑俊怀一起打拼天下，他是一个苦孩子，出生一个月就被贫困之极的父母以50元的价钱卖给了别人，他从小随养父在大草原上放牛，后来进回民食品厂当了一名洗瓶工，靠苦干升到车间主任，1992年得到郑俊怀赏识，担任主管经营的副总经理。牛根生做市场有特别的狠劲，而且很会体恤人心。此人读书不多，却天生懂得“财散人聚，财聚人散”的道理。有一年，郑俊怀发奖金让他购买一辆高档轿车，他一转身就把这笔钱分拆成几辆低档车分给了部下。由于他分管伊利的市场营销与广告宣传，因此在媒体上表现得十分活跃，外界一度“只知老牛不识郑”。 1998年，郑、牛关系急速恶化，后者突然被免职，理由是“莫须有”。第二年，牛根生就带着几个旧部筹集1000万元资金创办蒙牛，他后来回忆说，“当时在呼和浩特的一个居民区里租了一间小平房作为办公室，一共只有53平方米，月租金二百多元。蒙牛成立的时候，没有奶源，没有厂房，没有市场，可以说是一无所有。在全国乳制品企业中的排名是第1116位。”牛根生有的是多年来在市场经营中积累下来的人脉和经验。当时，全球最大的软包装供应商利乐公司在中国推广“利乐枕”（那时候，国内牛奶包装主要采用“利乐砖”和“巴氏奶”），并愿意免费向牛奶工厂提供生产设备，伊利等大企业都不愿冒险，唯有没钱买生产线的牛根生敢于一试，不料想竟大获成功。到2001年底，蒙牛销售收入已突破7.24亿元，成为国内第四大乳制品企业。 2002年，几乎跟郑俊怀搞曲线MBO同一时间，牛根生也进行了股权上的创新。6月，摩根士丹利、鼎晖投资、英联投资三家国际机构宣布投资6000万美元入股蒙牛。三家投资商在投资的同时，还提出一个苛刻的“对赌协议”：未来三年，如果蒙牛每年每股盈利复合增长率低于50％，以牛根生为首的管理层要向三家外资股东赔上7830万股股票，或者以等值现金代价支付；如果管理层可以完成上述指标，三家外资股东会将7800万股股票赠予牛根生团队。牛根生“求钱若渴”，再度冒险签字。“对赌协议”，准确地说是《股东协议》中的Valuation Adjustment Mechanism（估值调整机制）条款，该条款最大风险在于，如果达不到约定目标，管理层将失去对蒙牛的控股权。由于蒙牛的业绩表现“超出预期”，2005年4月6日，3家外资投资者提前终止该条款，代价是向蒙牛管理层支付598.7644万美元的可换股票据。牛根生有惊无险地保住了控股权。 郑、牛两人的命运在此处走上了不同方向。2004年6月，郑俊怀被举报“侵吞国有资产”，曲线MBO的做法原本就游走在法律的灰色地带，郑有口难辩。在法庭之上，郑俊怀称，“所为一切均是为了解决管理层持股的来源问题，至今不明白我的行为已经犯法。”而审判此案的包头市中级人民法院副院长对媒体说，“其实，华世商贸公司的股东如果是伊利整个管理层，如果他们挪用的资金，经过了伊利董事会集体研究同意批准就没有问题。”记者问，“多大的范围是整个管理层？如果董事会集体通过，就能挪用资金了吗？”法院人士莫衷一是。最终，郑俊怀以挪用公款罪被判有期徒刑6年。 牛根生则成了一个幸运儿。又是一个时间上的巧合，2004年6月10日，就在郑俊怀被举报的同一个月，蒙牛在香港联交所挂牌上市，共募集资金13.74亿港元，牛根生以1.35亿美元的身价进入当年度《福布斯》的“中国富豪榜”。 在未来相当长时期内，对于企业产权改革的讨论将成为中国公众社会及政商学界观点分歧最严重的经济话题。其中有两个重要的争议焦点，一是如何看待“国有和集体资产的严重流失”，二是如何看待国有或集体企业的经营者“赎买”。这场关于流失的争论从1998年就隐约开始了，将在2004年出现十分火爆的激辩场面。 以香港教授郎咸平为代表的观点认为，“国退民进”是一场分食国有资产的盛宴，其间出现了“掌勺者私分大锅饭”的现象，改革的策略出现了严重的过失与扭曲。而北京大学的张维迎教授和同样来自香港的张五常教授则不以为然，他们认为，尽管改制中存在种种灰色行为，但是改革总体的方向和积极效应是不容怀疑的。张五常的观点更为直接，他辩论道：“不可能完全没有这种事情，可是总是要慢慢改良的。你想把那么多人全部杀掉，你杀不了那么多人的。改革过程中，有些事情是无可避免的，是需要改进，但你不要因为有这种事情就说这个国家不行。怎么可以避免呢？这个国企我把它买过来，我拿过来的手段未必很正确，但是我把赔钱的国企变成赚钱的企业，这对中国的经济整体来说不是一件坏事。”比张教授更为激进的观点是所谓的“冰棒理论”。一些专家认为国有资产就像太阳下的冰棒，如果不把它“吃掉”，那么它也会完全融化掉、浪费掉。这样的论调显然很难拿到阳光下来讨论，郑俊怀是做冰棒起家的，他就栽倒在“冰棒理论”上。 这年，在中国人的政治生活中，最重要的新闻是中国共产党第十六次代表大会的召开。在11月15日举行的一中全会上，胡锦涛当选为中央委员会总书记。很多外电评论说，十六大清除了经济改革中最后的意识形态障碍。昔日的争论，如今都变成了常识，国内的主要问题已经变得越来越细微和复杂，这些问题无关乎哲学和意识形态的基本冲突，却关系到实现共同目标的途径和手段。 12月3日，在摩纳哥蒙特卡洛举行的国际展览局第132次代表大会上，中国上海在与其他4个申办城市的激烈角逐中一路领先，最终以54票的大比数赢得了2010年世博会的主办权。这是中国继北京成功申办奥运会之后，另一个重大的国际性胜利。世博会将在上海举办半年，预计吸引6000万人观展。无疑，这成为继北京奥运会之后，中国经济将在未来数年内持续成长的又一个醒目的指标。 这一年，中国出口国外的最大“单宗商品”，是一个叫姚明的篮球运动员。这位身高2.26米的亚洲小巨人以选秀冠军的身份到美国职业篮球联盟（NBA）打球。有人替他算账，如果他在NBA打球打到38岁，可以有2.7-2.9亿美元的收入，这还不包括他获得的场外赞助、广告等巨额收入。仅这一价值按当时的国际商品价值来换算，就相当于中国出口了102万吨大米或46万吨钢材，或239万台电视机，或630万辆自行车，或98万吨原油，或6489万米丝绸。 在上海，最时尚而热闹的地方是“新天地”。它位于闹市中心的淮海中路附近。过去的几年里，一个叫罗康瑞的香港商人将两千多户老居民迁走，却把他们的老宅留下来，改造成形形色色的西餐馆、咖啡馆、酒吧、时装店和画廊。这是一个被掏空了的、半世笙箫的老上海。 最具时尚气质的画家陈逸飞在这里开出了他的“逸飞之家”，将他刚刚完成的雕塑作品《上海少女》摆在了这里。这是一件两米多高的青铜雕塑，一个身材细高、扭身顾盼的盘发少女，穿着无袖旗袍，坡跟尖头拖凉鞋，右手执扇，左手手指钩着一个鸟笼。少女的眼神中有上海少女特有的娇嗲、时尚和空虚。夜幕降临，各种肤色的青年男女沿着灰砖路面行走在狭窄的弄堂，两边是百年斑驳的石库门旧屋，举目全是英文招牌的弄堂、民国时代的美人月历牌和缠绵悱恻的周璇歌声，擦肩而过的半是碧眼金发的西洋男女。在新天地的东南角有一幢两层老宅，在五光十色的夜景中它显得无比沉静和庄重。80年前，13个年轻人在这里会集，宣布了中国共产党的成立。“中老年人感到它很怀旧，年轻人感到它很时尚，外国人感到它很'中国'，中国人感到它很洋气。”媒体用这种充满了错觉感的文字介绍此地。 就在罗康瑞的“新天地”一夜喧腾的同时，在北京，一个叫洪晃的女文化人看中了京城东北角一片灰暗的大厂房。那是一家创办于20世纪50年代初的老国营工厂“华北无线电器材联合厂”，因为是军工厂，所以还有一个神秘的番号：798。华北无线电联合器材厂，下属706厂、707厂、718厂、797厂、798厂及751厂等，798是其中的一个工厂。当年在这里工作的工人都十分自豪，“谁要是问我在哪儿工作，我都说是军工厂，其他一概保密。”从90年代初开始，798跟所有的国营企业一样日薄西山，这个红极一时的大院企业陷于半停产状态，工厂一半以上的工人下岗分流，大多数生产车间停止运行，在职人员从近两万人递减到不足4000人，工厂实在没活干，只好靠出租闲置厂房和卖地皮来赚钱。 2002年，洪晃突然瞄上了它。洪晃是民国政治家章士钊的外孙女、共和国前外交部长乔冠华的女儿，一向有“红门痞女”之称。她看中798独特的国营工厂气息——衰败、僵硬、与商业气质格格不入，于是在这里以极便宜的价格租了一个车间，当做自己的艺术工作室。跟她一起看中798的，还有做艺术网站的美国人罗伯特，他租下了120平方米的回民食堂，改造成前店后公司的模样。在洪晃和罗伯特的鼓吹和示范下，一些前卫艺术家也先后喜欢上了这里宽敞的空间和低廉的租金，纷纷租下一些厂房作为工作室或展示空间，798艺术家群体的“雪球”就这样滚了起来。美国《时代周刊》将这里评为最有文化标志性的22个城市艺术中心之一，《纽约时报》甚至将之与纽约当代艺术家聚集区SOHO并论，就这样，一个濒临死亡的国营工厂突然摇身变成了北京城最具时尚气质的地方。 798厂区内的所有车间、厂房甚至斑驳的机床、生产线等都被保留了下来，它们像一堆被摘去灵魂的躯体，艺术家们用各自的表现手法将之彻底地“波普化”。曾经萦绕在此四十多年的劳动热情、革命纪律和政治崇拜突然被凝固，并呈现出一种很夸张和怪异的神情。到2004年，这里已经聚集了二百多家、来自十几个国家的文化机构和个人工作室，北京市政府决定将这里列为“优秀近现代建筑”进行保留。很多年后，当全中国的老牌国营工厂都已经被拆迁一空之后，798作为仅有的幸存者被留存下来。Of course, in a way no one expected. 这年，国内最火的电影是冯小刚导演的《大腕》，这是一部尽情嘲笑新兴暴富阶层的贺岁喜剧片。男主角葛优一本正经地说：“什么叫成功人士你知道吗？成功人士就是买什么东西都买最贵的，不买最好的。所以，我们做房地产的口号就是。不求最好，但求最贵。”每当演到这里，影厅里必然会爆发出阵阵发泄式的笑声。 9月23日的美国《时代周刊》刊登了一篇题为《可怜的过剩》的中国特稿，作者哈尔比屈（Hannah Beech）指名道姓地描述了几位中国富豪的生活，其文字之戏虐竟跟《大腕》有异曲同工之妙：“这些人建造奢华俗气的仿白宫办公室、仿洛可可式别墅；在郊区建造别墅却不敢打开豪华吊灯（因为害怕导致穷困的邻居家里跳闸）；他们的妻子忍受着丈夫的无数情人，备感孤独，只能以养昂贵的宠物、上庙烧香和多生孩子打发生命；他们往最昂贵的葡萄酒里倒雪碧，像喝水一样地咕嘟嘟往下灌，吃的是煎鳗鱼、焖海藻和炖蚝……充分享受着穷奢极欲的每一分钟。” 这幅栩栩如生的、可怜的中国暴发户的素描迅速在网上传播，给被采访者带来了无尽的烦恼。它似乎印证了美国商业作家康尼尔在《大狗：富人的物种起源》中写过的那句话：“超乎想象的财富是任何人都难以适应的。财富是违反自然的，有钱人的行为往往表现出彻底的适应不良。”很显然，日渐扩大的贫富差距正在诱发一个很危险的社会病，中国人民大学的一次民意调查显示，60％的被调查者认为，富人是通过不合法手段发财的。评论家们由此提及法国作家巴尔扎克的那句格言，“每一笔巨大财富的背后都存在犯罪。”还有人将《福布斯》评选出的中国前50个富豪与国家税务局公布的“私营企业纳税50强”名单进行了一个比较，结果发现重合的名字只有4个。于是，关于“富人逃税”的话题被讨论了很长一段时间。 富有戏剧性的是，被当做“过街老鼠”抓出来的不是《福布斯》富豪榜上的衮衮诸公，而是娱乐界的一个“大姐大”。这年夏天，自称“亿万富姐”的著名影星刘晓庆因涉嫌偷漏税而被拘捕。刘晓庆是20世纪80年代中国知名度最高的女演员，她以个性泼辣和敢为敢言而闻名，流传最广的刘氏名言是“做人难，做女人更难，做名女人难上加难”。在一本题为《我的自白录》的书中，刘晓庆说，“其实，我已拥有26家甚至还要多的企业，这些企业投资总需求量已超过50个亿。我通过各种方法融资，从海外引入资金，与国内外有经验、有实力的集团合作，在银行借，同时，投入自己拥有的钱。” 如此招摇显富，自然引来很大的关注。当“富人逃税”的舆论日渐汹涌之际，她便成了最“适当”的靶子。据税务机构调查，她创办的晓庆文化艺术有限责任公司自1996年以来采取不列或少列收入、多列支出、虚假申报等多种手段，偷漏税款1458.3万元。“刘晓庆税案”成为2002年度兼具娱乐和商业丑闻两大特性的爆炸性新闻。年底，由国家税务总局办公厅、《中国税务报》和搜狐网联手评选出的“2002年十大税务新闻”中，此案名列第一。不过，后来发生的事实则比电影的情节还幽默。2004年4月，北京市朝阳区人民法院对此案做出判决，刘晓庆的妹夫靖军以偷税罪被判刑三年，而刘晓庆本人未被起诉，她已在半年前被取保出狱，并拍摄了一部很爆笑的古装电视连续剧《永乐英雄儿女》。