Chapter 18 Chapter 26 1959: The most difficult three years

(In 1959, Ma Yinchu, the president of Peking University, was criticized for proposing family planning. This was his answer when he stood up to the challenge. The policy of encouraging births led to the continuous increase of China's population. In 1949, the national population was 540 million, and in 1964 it was 720 million. , until Ma Yinchu died in 1982, the third national census showed 1.03 billion people.) From 1959 to 1961, later known as the "three-year natural disaster" period, the national economy fell from the crazy leap of the previous year to an unprecedented depression.Nearly half of the factories across the country were shut down, and more than 20 million newly recruited workers were driven back to the countryside.Due to the shortage of food, large-scale starvation broke out in vast rural areas, and the number of abnormal deaths exceeded 20 million. In some places, the tragic situation of "human cannibalism" even appeared.

The occurrence of such a tragic scene has both objective and subjective reasons. In Liu Shaoqi's words, it is "three parts of natural disasters and seven parts of man-made disasters." Regarding whether serious natural disasters occurred in China in the past three years, later generations have two different observations. The British "Times" said in a report on November 9, 1960, "From 1959 to 1960, the severe drought will be recorded in the history of China. In the vast area of ​​the north, there was no rain for about 200 days. There has also been no snow, and many areas have been flooded with heavy rains after a late-summer drought hiatus...Communists have been rarely lucky with the weather, but this past year has been the worst." According to the National Bureau of Statistics, The "1949-1995 Disaster Situation Report in China" compiled by the Ministry of Civil Affairs records that in 1959, there were serious natural disasters in the whole country with "the scope of the disaster was so large that it was unprecedented in the 1950s". In Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Heilongjiang and other provinces and regions, in addition to drought, frost, floods, wind and hail, there were also rare plagues of locusts, armyworms, and rats. In 1960, the disaster situation continued to expand. The severe drought continued to break out in the north, and the eastern coastal provinces and regions were hit by severe typhoon floods. The area of ​​affected farmland expanded to 65.46 million hectares.After entering 1961, the disaster has not been eased. The severe drought has spread to the Yellow River, Huaihe River and the entire Yangtze River Basin. The wheat production in the three main grain-producing areas of Hebei, Shandong and Henan has dropped by 50% compared with the lowest level of the previous year, and many farmlands have failed to harvest. . From August to October, the southeastern coastal provinces were hit by 11 typhoons, of which 9 were above level 12, the most since the founding of the People's Republic of China.

However, some scholars believe that the natural disasters that occurred in the past three years cannot be regarded as national catastrophes.According to the map of the average distance of aridity in various provinces and cities across the country from 1959 to 1961 depicted in the book "Floods and Droughts in China", the average distance of aridity in the three years is within the normal range of variation.In addition, according to the "Drought and Flood Grade Data Tables of All Over the Country Over the Years" compiled by meteorological experts from 1895 to 1979, there were no serious natural disasters in these three years, which belonged to normal years. In terms of drought, the drought in 1960 was mild. in 1972 and 1978. "Time" magazine said in a report on January 6, 1961, "Not all Western observers believe that drought and floods should be responsible for the food shortage. They pointed out that Japan's weather report shows that there is nothing unusual about China's weather this year , they suspect that the so-called natural disasters are invented and exaggerated in order to cover up the real cause of the food shortage: the government deprives food exports to foreign countries in exchange for machinery and equipment for industrial construction." By September 15, the magazine Also citing a study by EStuart Kirby, an economist at the University of Hong Kong, pointed out that Hong Kong, Taiwan and Guangdong, China have very similar weather. The weather is indeed bad, but Hong Kong’s crop production has decreased by 8%, and Taiwan’s production has decreased by 13%. In Guangdong it was 30 per cent, and Professor Bryant concluded that China's problems were not just the weather, but widespread demoralization among farmers.

Professor Kirby's observation should be closer to the truth. The sharp reduction in grain production is not only related to natural disasters, but also the result of excessive policies. The aftermath of the "Great Leap Forward" was serious.The first is the high levy caused by "satellite release".The output is fictitious, but the requisition is real. In 1958, the actual grain output was only 400 billion catties, but the procurement was based on the false report of 750 billion catties. The whole country expropriated 109.5 billion catties, accounting for 27.3% of the annual output, which has reached the capacity of rural areas. However, in 1959 the expropriation was as high as 134.8 billion catties, accounting for 39.6% of the annual output. Farmers’ rations and next year’s seeds were also confiscated. Farmers refused to pay, so they engaged in anti-rightist, anti-production, and anti-rightist movements. Private division, even arresting, imprisoning and beating people.Secondly, a large number of young and middle-aged farmers were still dragged to make steel and repair reservoirs. In the autumn and winter of 1959, when the drought was severe, 8.87 million young and middle-aged farmers were making steel and building reservoirs in Shandong alone. The autumn sowing area in the province was less than a quarter of that of previous years Third, in three years, a total of 5,000 to 60,000,000 mu of farmland in Shandong were barren.In this way, the terrible food crisis came. By 1960, the national grain, cotton, oil and pigs had decreased by 29.7%, 38.5%, 56.1% and 36.4% respectively compared with 1957, and the grain output had actually dropped to 2870. 100 million catties, while the purchase amount was even more than the previous year, as high as 140.8 billion catties.In the book "Contemporary China's Grain Work", Zhao Fafa disclosed a fact: Due to the misjudgment of the situation, China even exported a large amount of grain in the three years from 1958 to 1960. Among them, the net export in 1958 was 65%. billion catties, a sharp increase of 73.1% over 1957. In 1959, the net export was 9.48 billion catties, an increase of 45.8% over the previous year. In 1960, the net export was still 2 billion catties.

When a tragedy happened, the place where the satellites were most active was the place where the scene was the most tragic. Henan had the most satellites in the country, and Henan's Xinyang area, where the "Chaya Mountain Satellite" was located, was the most dazzling.In the past three years, the number of abnormal deaths in Henan has exceeded 2 million, more than 740,000 livestock have died, and more than 4.4 million mu of barren land has become the worst province in the country. More than one million people starved to death, many villages had no food and households, edema disease spread in a large area, a large number of farmers fled or starved to death, and the "Xinyang Incident" that shocked the whole country broke out. Wang Renzhong, a field investigator in Henan, recalled, "(Xinyang) Xiping County suffered more than 10,000 people because of the release of the wheat satellite. More than 7,000 people were beaten away, and more than 300 people were killed. What a cruel thing this is!" Henan Province In its review to the central government, the Provincial Party Committee also claimed that Xinyang during this period "formed a world of terror and darkness for a while."

Since the spring of 1959, the food crisis has burned into the big cities. In February, a reporter from the American "Time" magazine discovered that the most common cabbage in the north had become a "rationing material."Its reporter described: "Although the Chinese government claims to have increased food production by 102% last month, the city's food rations have been cut, and cabbage is starting to appear on the ration list for the first time. Rationing also began, and sugar was reduced to just over a pound per person per month. There was a shortage of fish in coastal Canton, and meat was hard to come by in Shanghai." Reports of deaths have come up from time to time. On May 16, 1960, it was reported that "news from a certain commune said that 50% of the children there died from malnutrition. Produce was shipped to the cities for industrial workers, or sold abroad for foreign exchange, and in one place farmers derailed a train and robbed the train that was carrying their grain north." In a report on August 22 , the reporter quoted a letter from a mother in Fuzhou to her son in Hong Kong saying, "If you hadn't sent some money back, we wouldn't have eaten a piece of meat a year."

The actual situation is not too far from the sporadic description of the "Time" reporter.By June 1960, Beijing’s grain stocks were only enough for 7 days’ sales, Tianjin’s was only enough for 10 days, and Shanghai had no stocks. It relied on exporting rice from the foreign trade department to survive. I need rice urgently.Wuhan Iron and Steel Works, the largest iron and steel enterprise in central China, did not have much rice in stock, so the workers had to invent the "ultrasonic" rice steaming method, steaming the rice several times in a row to make it expand and "fill" the stomach.Tsinghua University has successfully invented the "increasing rice method": put 300 catties of rice in a pot, and add water gradually.First dry cook for 40 minutes, then add 120 catties of water for the first time.After 15 minutes, add 200 catties of water for the second time.After another 15 minutes, add 520 catties of water for the third time.After the rice is put into the pot, add 100 catties of water at the end, wait for 10 minutes, and then the rice can be served.This method is widely promoted as a major scientific research invention.

In September, the central government issued a directive, asking the people everywhere to "lower the standard and substitute melons and vegetables" to promote substitute food.Not long ago, scientists who were still working day and night on "what to do when there is too much food" specially "developed" "food substitutes", such as corn root powder, wheat root powder, corn stalk koji powder, artificial meat essence, chlorella Wait, these terms look very "scientific", but they are actually crushed corn and wheat stalks that were originally used as fertilizer or fed to pigs and eaten as grain. The so-called "artificial meat essence" is a kind of edible yeast.

Among the food substitutes, the most famous is "Chlorella", which is a floating plant on the water surface. On July 6, 1960, "People's Daily" published an editorial "Mass Production of Chlorella", arguing that Chlorella is not only a good concentrate feed, but also has high food value.Chlorella "has five times the protein content of rice and more than three times that of wheat," the editorial reads. "Cakes and breads made with chlorella are of high quality, delicious, and delicious." A student named Zhou Ziren, who was studying at Chengdu No. 5 Middle School at the time, described in detail the experience of cultivating "Chlorella" in his memoirs: he changed the pool used to fetch water for students' laundry in the dormitory area into an "algae breeding pool".Fill it with water first, then urinate.Because it is said that "chlorella" reproduces particularly rapidly in an environment with a high concentration of urine.Then pour in the "algae" seedlings and stir for ten and a half months. The water in the pool turns green first, then black, and finally stinks. The algae cultivation is declared successful, so two buckets are taken out and poured into the pot in the big dining hall. At the same time, the water is replenished. Two barrels of new urine.Repeat this to ensure that students have enough chlorella in every meal.

While the domestic economic situation was deteriorating rapidly, a major diplomatic event occurred at the same time. On July 16, 1960, the Soviet Union suddenly announced the recall of all experts aiding China, and the two largest socialist countries in the world broke completely. Sino-Soviet relations have become awkward since Stalin's death, especially after Khrushchev's "secret report". At the beginning of 1958, Mao Zedong proposed "anti-dogmatism" and criticized the Soviet Union's economic development. He believed that the fundamental problem of the Soviet Union was "seeing things but not seeing people." It limits the enthusiasm of the masses.The Soviet Union also could not understand China's economic development strategy. On July 26 of that year, Xinhua News Agency's "Internal Reference" published a telegram, revealing that some Soviet officials and experts did not take China's "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune seriously. The newspapers say nothing about the burgeoning People's Commune movement, much to the annoyance of China's leaders.

This contradiction is naturally reflected in the thousands of experts aiding China.Ma Bin, who was the deputy general manager and chief engineer of Anshan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., recounted a memory to historian Luo Shixu 30 years later: In 1958, in Beidaihe, he heard Chairman Mao’s talk about doubling steel output from 5.35 million tons to 10.7 million tons. Thousands of tons of speech, the meeting was full of enthusiasm, and someone wrote a poem on the spot, saying, "Sit at 800 to see 1,000, the local method does not cost money, everyone works hard together, and it will be realized by the end of the year." Ma Bin was very skeptical about this goal. , but did not dare to question it openly. After returning to the factory, "the rules and regulations stipulated by the Soviet experts are no longer required. The quality is not checked.” Later, the result was that the output of first-grade steel rails produced by Anshan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. was reduced from 93% in the past to 42%. This kind of leap forward made Soviet experts very puzzled.There was a new iron-making plant in Guangxi and Soviet experts were invited to guide it, but the experts read from the newspaper that the iron-making in that plant was fired with firewood, so they refused to go.The Fulaerji Iron and Steel Plant in Qiqihar was completely assisted by the Soviets. It was the largest special steel plant with the best technical level at that time. When producing large forging nails for steam turbines, the Chinese side violated the established process in order to create records. According to the regulations, a ton of hard work was done in full swing, and a lot of waste products were produced as a result.Some Soviet experts were very worried about the blind overheating in the steel field. They reported it to the Soviet embassy, ​​and then the embassy gave their opinions to the Chinese superiors. Of course, the result aroused great resentment. Conflicts in the steel sector are not alone.What happened to the 202nd Factory of the Second Ministry of Machinery Industry was that this factory was developing nuclear weapon components and was in the design stage at that time. Soviet experts conventionally proposed that the design work should be divided into three steps, namely preliminary design, technical Design and Construction Design.However, the Chinese side believes that under the current great situation of the Great Leap Forward, it is necessary to break the routine, take three steps and do two steps, and cancel the technical design link.In order to convince the Soviet experts, the Chinese side specially organized them to visit Xushui County, which had a record yield of 10,000 jin per mu, and tried to impress them with the spirit of "satellite release" by Chinese farmers. Authenticity is doubted.Under the circumstances of the dispute, the Chinese side decided not to listen to the opinions of the Soviets. As a result, in the subsequent construction process, they continued to encounter troubles and made hundreds of large and small revisions. Bestovsky, who works in water conservancy and power systems, reported that "the Chinese comrades decided to simplify the electrical installations, which will reduce their reliability, and the result will inevitably lead to accidents." Harbin Thermal Power Plant Expert Group Chief Klimov submitted more than 10 letters of protest and appeal to the Chinese side from July to October 1959, reporting that the factory violated the operating regulations of the boiler and rushed forward, but no one cared about it, and finally caused a big explosion in the factory, causing major casualties. casualties.The most ridiculous thing is the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics, which asked Soviet experts to help design an aircraft with a speed of 3,700 kilometers per hour, which made them very embarrassed, because only rockets can reach such a speed. At the beginning of 1959, many Soviet experts complained to the country that some Chinese enterprises canceled the technical departments established in accordance with the Soviet technical plans and technical regulations, and canceled the necessary technical specifications and standards. The production responsibility stipulated in the contract, but in fact it has been unable to perform its own duties.Twelve Soviet engineers at the Wuhan Metallurgical Company said they had been out of work for three months.The Chinese leaders of the First Design Institute of the First Ministry of Machinery Industry did not meet with Soviet experts for eight months. The event that most vividly embodies China's autonomy is the birth of the "Ansteel Constitution". Anshan Iron and Steel Works was the largest integrated iron and steel enterprise in China at that time, and was known as the "eldest son of the Republic's iron and steel industry". During the "First Five-Year Plan" period, Anshan Iron and Steel completed a total of 1.545 billion yuan in infrastructure investment, accounting for 100% of the country's total metallurgical industry infrastructure investment during the same period. one third.Over the past five years, Angang has produced a total of 10.9 million tons of iron, 8.46 million tons of steel, and 5.66 million tons of steel; accounting for 54.3%, 50.8%, and 42.91% of the country's total output over the same period, which can be described as half of the country. On March 11, 1960, the Anshan Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China wrote the "Report on the Development of Technological Innovation and Technological Revolution Movement on the Industrial Front" to the central government. The bourgeois line of putting economy and technology in command and relying on a small number of experts to run enterprises, resolutely implement the proletarian line of adhering to the leadership of the party, insisting on putting politics in command, and relying on the masses to run enterprises; continue to thoroughly criticize and overcome dogmatism and Jia Gui thought , and further establish the communist style of daring to think, speak and act, and make the movement move forward wave after wave.” Mao Zedong was very excited after reading this report, and made important instructions on March 22: "Anshan Iron and Steel is the largest enterprise in the country, with more than 100,000 employees. In the past, they thought that this enterprise was modern, and there was no need to worry about it. The technological revolution is even more opposed to large-scale mass movements, the policy of combining two participations, one reform and three integrations, and putting politics in command. It only trusts a few people to do it coldly. Many people advocate the one-management system and oppose the factory director responsibility system under the leadership of the party committee. They believe that the "Magang Constitution" is sacred and inviolable. This was the situation before the Great Leap Forward in 1958. This was the first stage. The second stage was 1959. People began to think about problems and began to believe The mass movement began to doubt the one-man system, began to doubt the Maanshan Iron and Steel Constitution... The current report is more progressive. It is not the Maanshan Iron and Steel Constitution, but created a Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution. The Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution appeared in the Far East and in China. " Masteel, the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Company of the Soviet Union, was the largest iron and steel complex in the world at that time. A pride of the pattern. The proposal of the "Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution" is obviously aimed at the "Maanshan Iron and Steel Constitution". There are two core experiences of the "Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution". "Two participations, one reform and three combinations" means: cadres participate in collective production labor, workers participate in enterprise management, reform unreasonable rules and regulations, and implement a combination of leading cadres, technicians and workers in the reform and improvement of production, technology, and management. , it is considered to be "a very unique and important experience in the democratic and scientific management of industrial enterprises in my country." Regarding political leadership, Yuan Zhen, then the second secretary of the Anshan Municipal Party Committee and the first secretary and manager of the Anshan Iron and Steel Party Committee, expressed this: "The basic content of the Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution is to adhere to the leadership of the party, insist on political leadership, and persist in mass movements. Adhere to continuous revolution, adhere to the general line, and the Great Leap Forward. The Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution is the concrete embodiment of Mao Zedong Thought in economic work, and it is the fundamental line for the proletariat to run enterprises." Li Dongye, Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, directly compared the "Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution" with the "Ma He said: "What is the essence of the Anshan Iron and Steel Constitution? The central instructions pointed out that the essence is the issue of the responsibility system of the factory director under the leadership of the party committee, that is, the party's leadership, politics in command, and mass movements... …What is the Masteel Constitution? One does not require the leadership of the party, the other does not require mass movements, and the third is a purely technical point of view.” On May 23, the Ministry of Metallurgy held an on-site meeting in Anshan, calling on enterprises across the country to study and promote the "Ansteel Constitution". More than a month later, on July 16, the Soviet government suddenly notified the Chinese government, proposing to withdraw all experts working in China.In the diplomatic note, the reason put forward by the Soviet side was, "Recently, the Chinese side has begun to pursue a line that is obviously unfriendly to the Soviet Union in dealing with the issue of Soviet experts working in China. All this hurt the feelings of the Soviet experts, and the distrust of them from the Chinese side aroused their anger, and they were forced to ask the Soviet government to return home.” From July 28 to On September 1, the Soviet side withdrew 1,390 experts, stopped dispatching more than 900 experts, suspended 343 expert contracts and contract supplements, and abolished 257 scientific and technological cooperation projects.By December 1960, there was only one Soviet expert left in China. The withdrawal of the Soviet experts was a general outbreak of differences in various positions and interests between China and the Soviet Union, and the relationship between the two countries was completely destroyed from then on. The "withdrawal order" had no warning in advance. It was ordered rashly today, and people would be swept away tomorrow. There was no room for negotiation, which fully demonstrated Khrushchev's rough and arbitrary leadership style.Just at the beginning of April of this year, China's State Council Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs also submitted a report, which believed that "the work of experts has been greatly improved. On the 1st, the State Council issued a notice on matters related to the employment of Soviet experts in the next year in accordance with the usual practice, requiring all departments to do a good job in continuing and increasing the employment. China's division of labor and management measures for major scientific research breakthroughs have been issued nationwide.This shows that despite all the frictions, quarrels and unhappiness between the two countries in the past few years, there is no inevitability leading to a break.It can be seen how sudden and ruthless the "withdrawal order" came in July. It not only disrupted China's industrialization process, but also hurt the self-esteem of the Chinese people. However, some experts in later generations have their own observations on the objective consequences of the "withdrawal order". too high.He believes that "due to political reasons, Chinese officials overemphasized the role of Soviet retreat experts in causing economic difficulties in the early 1960s." According to his research, since the completion of the "156" project, in the Second Five-Year Plan During this period, the assistance of Soviet experts to China focused on the military industry, especially the research and development of nuclear weapons.Judging from the distribution of more than 1,000 economic experts, more than 80% are concentrated in national defense enterprises, ministries and scientific research institutions related to the national defense industry, and more than 10% are experts in metallurgy, chemical industry, and hydropower. In departments such as agriculture, agriculture, and railway transportation, there are only a very small number of experts, with a minimum of 1 person and a maximum of 7 people. In the fields of aquatic products, grain, and textiles, there are no Soviet experts.Therefore, just like the problems in the agricultural field, the impact of the withdrawal of Soviet experts on the industrial economy was not decisive, and most of the economic recession was due to mistakes in decision-making.In fact, the withdrawal of the Soviets had two associated consequences. One is a new round of radicalization triggered by grief. After 1958, Sino-U.S. relations continued to be tense due to the Taiwan Strait issue. The U.S. Pacific Fleet sailed in the eastern waters. threaten.As a result, a sense of isolation, and the resulting great tragedy, plunged Chinese leaders into an even greater self-enclosure and pride complex. Second, due to the increase of external threats, the industrial layout has become deformed.Some important factories originally established in the northeast and coastal areas were moved to the central region. The industrial layout was guided by the strategy of "preparing for war and famine". Difficulties at home and abroad, the current situation is difficult, the young republic encountered unprecedented difficulties in its tenth year.What makes people sigh is that during this period, the central decision-making has undergone several swings due to various reasons. At the beginning of the disaster in 1959, the target of steel production was still set at 13 million tons.From July to September of this year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Lushan, Jiangxi. It was originally decided to reflect on the current out-of-control scene, but the final result was closed in a more radical way, holding the "Great Leap Forward" Defense Minister Marshal Peng Dehuai and others who had different views were severely criticized. The consensus reached at the meeting was: the situation is excellent, the future is bright, and the Great Leap Forward will continue. The sudden change in the direction of the Lushan Conference made China lose an opportunity to wake up.By the beginning of 1960, the voices of reflection among the decision-makers resurfaced, and various economic indicators were suppressed. However, after the Sino-Soviet relations turned hostile, radical sentiments suddenly heated up again. Ton.It is precisely because of this policy mistake that the situation has deteriorated day by day and eventually led to a major tragedy. Until 1961, in order to get out of the desperate situation, the central government gradually adjusted its radical economic policy and put forward the eight-character policy of "adjustment, consolidation, enrichment, and improvement".At that time, there were two main tasks, one was to solve the food problem, and the other was to slow down the industrial speed. The top priority is, of course, to alleviate the food crisis.It is absolutely impossible to rapidly increase food production in a short period of time, but only relying on Tsinghua University's "rice increase method" can only temporarily deceive the stomach.Therefore, the central government took a special approach to rescue from two aspects: importing food and reducing the urban population. In January 1961, the State Council decided to urgently import grain from abroad.First, it was determined to import 1.5 million tons, and it was quickly increased to 2.5 million tons.Lei Renmin, the vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade who handled the matter, recalled that when it came to the issue of imported grain, the thinking within the party was inconsistent at that time, because not long ago they were shouting that there was no end to food, and now they suddenly want to complain about all evil, decay, and imminent The extinct capitalist countries can't afford to lose face when they buy rice to eat. Therefore, the food import work has been kept in a state of extreme secrecy.China Resources and Bank of China, a Chinese-funded company in Hong Kong, were entrusted with the relevant matters. First, a large amount of grain was ordered from Australia, Canada, and France. Later, even American grain came in through entrepot trade.From 1961 to 1965, the country imported about 5 million tons of grain every year. Importing grain requires foreign exchange, and there are not many commodities that can be exchanged for foreign exchange. Apart from coal, the main one is cotton, so the supply of cotton cloth is reduced. In 1960, the cloth tickets allocated to residents across the country fell by one foot per capita.According to the calculations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, if each foot of cloth is reduced, each person can get 5 US dollars for export, and the national total is 35 million US dollars, which can increase the import of 1 billion catties of wheat. Historian Chen Mingyuan recorded in the article "The Story of Cloth Tickets" that at the beginning of Sichuan towns, each person had 15 feet of cloth tickets per year, which could be used to make a set of underwear. In 1959, the cloth tickets were suddenly reduced to 7 feet 4 inches per person per year. , the small ones can still be made into a top, and the big ones can be made into a pair of trousers at most.In 1960, it was halved again, and only 3 feet 7 inches of cloth tickets were issued. At that time, buying a pair of socks required two inches of cloth tickets, which meant that the cloth tickets allocated to one person in a year were only enough to buy more than 10 pairs of socks. In the first half of 1961, each person in Shanghai was only issued a 2-foot-6-inch cloth ticket, which was not enough for a family of four to sew a set of adult clothes.The cloth ticket for each person in Shandong towns is only 1 foot 6 inches.The unprecedented shortage of supplies is evident. Even if people across the country eat less and wear less, the food crisis cannot be alleviated. On June 28, 1961, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Notice on Several Issues Concerning Reducing the Work of Employees", proposing to reduce the urban population by more than 20 million within three years.Objectively speaking, when the food supply cannot be increased, this cruel decision finally played a role in mitigating. Since 1958, a large number of rural young and middle-aged laborers have been recruited to cities for the purpose of making steel. In three years, more than 25 million new workers have been recruited, and the urban population has increased from 99 million to 130 million. Food supplies are tight.When the economy suddenly went into recession, the factories were overcrowded immediately. The textile industry stopped 5 million spindles, and the food industry increased by 550,000 people in three years. Many factory workers had no jobs to do.According to calculations, the reduction of 20 million people from the city can reduce the supply of food by 3 billion catties.The Central Committee's "Notice on Reduction" pointed out that "the main target of this reduction is the new rural workers (including temporary workers, contract workers, apprentices and formal workers) who have joined the work since January 1958, so that they can return to their respective hometown and participate in agricultural production.” From the implementation of the streamlining policy to June 1963, the number of employees nationwide decreased by 18.87 million, the urban population decreased by 26 million, and the number of people who ate commercial grain decreased by 28 million.Facts have shown that this policy has eased the tightness of urban supply and has also played a revival role in the recuperation of agriculture.Chinese farmers, known for their perseverance and meekness, have always been the biggest supporters of the Chinese economy. They contribute cheap agricultural products in normal years. Once a crisis occurs, the vast countryside becomes the lowest-cost "flood release area". It will happen again and again in the future. In this sense, the growth of China's industrial and commercial economy has always been benefiting from "farmers' dividends." Urban people owe too much to farmers. Among the more than 20 million people who were sent to the countryside, there was a 16-year-old rural youth named Lu Guanqiu. Lu Guanqiu's hometown is in Tongjiatang, Jinyi Village, Xiaoshan County, Zhejiang Province, across the Qiantang River from Hangzhou City. His childhood dream was to be able to work in the city as a worker. In 1958, in the upsurge of steelmaking.Before graduating from elementary school, he was conscripted into Xiaoshan County and worked as a blacksmith in a blacksmith cooperative.At the end of the three-year apprenticeship, the salary increased from the initial 14 yuan to 36.5 yuan, which made him very satisfied.But just two months after receiving the new salary, he was suddenly reduced, and he packed up and returned to Tongjiatang.Many years later, he recalled, "At that time, I thought very clearly that I didn't want to farm. I felt that the peasants didn't have enough food and clothing, so I just wanted to be a worker. I raised 110 yuan and built a straw hut. I opened a repair shop and began to repair bicycles for the village. At that time, there were few bicycles in the countryside, and the business was very weak.” The big downsizing that happened in 1961 left serious sequelae in the heart of young Lu Guanqiu. Jinyi Village is less than two kilometers away from Xiaoshan County, but he never went back to work since then. He said, "I I vowed never to go to the city again, and I will set up factories in the countryside.” Twenty years later, Lu Guanqiu, who wanted to be a worker, became the most famous farmer entrepreneur in China. While trying to alleviate the food crisis, it is also necessary to slow down the excessive industrial speed. In the first quarter of 1961, various industrial indicators experienced a major collapse. Among the 25 major industrial products, except for sugar, all of them dropped by 30% to 40% compared with the fourth quarter of the previous year. Brake hard.At the Central Work Conference held on May 21, various indicators were greatly lowered, and it was proposed to "resolutely retreat" and "must retreat enough." Mao Zedong said helplessly, "It is good to retreat enough. It is nothing more than foreigners scolding, saying The Chinese can’t do it. Now we have to honestly admit that we haven’t learned it, and it will take eleven years to do it well, at least ten years. If you don’t retreat, what can you do?” In August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a working conference in Lushan and passed the "Regulations on the Work of State-owned Industrial Enterprises (Draft)" - referred to as "Industrial Seventy Articles". On the one hand, it continued to emphasize that "state-owned industrial enterprises are socialist economies owned by the whole people Organization. Its production activities are subject to the unified plan of the state. Its products are allocated by the state.” At the same time, it changed the “distribution according to need” during the Great Leap Forward to “distribution according to work”. The piecework wage system and other systems were restored. In 1962, the national capital construction investment was reduced to 4.6 billion yuan, only 12% of the 38.4 billion yuan in 1960. By the end of the year, 44,000 factories had closed down nationwide, accounting for 96,000 enterprises in 1960. 44.8%, that is to say, nearly half of the factories were closed within a year.Among them, metallurgical enterprises decreased by 70%, building materials enterprises decreased by 50%, chemical enterprises decreased by 42%, and machinery enterprises decreased by 31%.Compared with 1960, the total industrial output value dropped sharply by 47%, of which heavy industry dropped by 57%, and steel output fell to 6.67 million tons.In the industrial circle at that time, the closure of factories and the reduction of workers were collectively referred to as "monk demolishing temples and moving". The catastrophic consequences of the Great Leap Forward on the Chinese economy have been reflected and summarized in countless papers and books in the future.According to data from the National Statistics Department, during the Second Five-Year Plan period (1958-1962), the average annual growth rate of the national industrial and agricultural production value was only 0.6%, which was far lower than that during the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-1957). 10.9%.According to calculations by American scholar Mike Farquhar in his book "The Origin of the Cultural Revolution", "The total loss caused by the Great Leap Forward to the national economy is estimated to be 100 billion yuan, which is almost twice the total investment in capital construction during the First Five-Year Plan period." .” During the three-year disaster period, there are still two economic events worth recording, one is the experiment of contracting output to households and its premature death, and the other is the discovery of Daqing Oilfield. The people's communes of "no money for food" and "one big and two communes" only made farmers happy for a short period of time. Soon, the inefficiency and absurdity of the planned economy were clearly presented one by one. In March 1961, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China drafted and promulgated the "Regulations on the Work of Rural People's Commune (Draft)" - referred to as "Agricultural Sixty Articles", which canceled the supply system and public canteens in rural areas, but the model of people's communes was affirmed and solidified down. In June of this year, Chen Yun returned to Xiaozheng Commune, Qingpu County, his hometown, to do research for half a month. His secretary Zhou Taihe, economist Xue Muqiao and others all recalled that unforgettable trip in the future: Qingpu County, located on the outskirts of Shanghai, has been the richest land of fish and rice since ancient times. However, after the "Great Leap Forward", the farmers here can only drink porridge. Also ate up.Chen Yun and others walked in the small town and saw many farmers drying wheat stalks. According to the local people, this was distributed to farmers after the production team milled wheat. , as a result, a lot of wheat can be rubbed down.Chen Yun asked an old peasant woman how much wheat can be rubbed by rubbing like this.The old peasant woman said that if you save it, you can have a bucket.Chen Yun was shocked.他很快猜出了答案：这是农民们故意在打麦场上不碾干净，然后再把麦杆分回到家里，私下留了一点口粮。陈云感叹地说，我们不能多拿农民的东西，你要拿，他们总是有办法应付的。 陈云去参观公社的养猪场，干部们告诉他，去年一年公养猪没赚到钱，反而亏了3.8万元，平均每个农户要负担16元，建猪场，搞基建还化了7万元。陈云算了一笔帐，允许私人养猪的时候，平均一头母猪一年生十四、五头苗猪，苗猪死亡率为6％，实行公养后，一头母猪全年平均只生四、五头苗猪，苗猪死亡率竟高达89％。这么强烈的对比，又让陈云大吃一惊。 更让陈云吃惊的荒唐事还有不少。到了傍晚，陈云听到小镇上合作商店的店员在吆喝：“棒冰，棒冰，两分一碗”。他很好奇，棒冰应该论根卖，怎么会用碗卖呢？出去一看才知道，原来棒冰是上海做的，然后通过国营商业渠道，运到县里，再从县里用汽车、小船运到各公社，公社再往大队、小队分，到了基层的商店，棒冰就成了棒冰水，店员舍不得倒掉，就只好用碗来卖了。陈云听了直摇头叹息：现在商品流通是按行政区划来管理的，不合理，可是又改不过来。 小蒸公社靠近黄浦江，过去有许多渔民下午开船到江上去捕鱼，黎明运到上海城里去卖。实行统购统销之后，青浦县禁止渔民私自贩售，捕上的鱼必须运回青浦，卖给国营的县水产公司和下属的收购点，再由它们运到上海去完成供应任务。这样多次来回运输，自然就耽误了时间，把活鱼硬生生运成了死鱼。渔民只好把鲜鱼做成咸鱼上交，从此，上海城里的鲜鱼越来越少，甚至连咸鱼也因为运输费和手续费一加，价格比以前高了不少。陈云了解到这一情况后非常惊讶。他亲自找来青浦县委和水产局的负责人谈话，劝他们准许渔民直接去上海卖鱼。那些负责人很为难，他们说，如果这样做，必须要改变现在的供销社制度。陈云听罢，沉默良久，然后深叹一口气，对周太和说，“我一个党中央副主席，连这样一个小问题都解决不了，实在对不起人民。”在其后将近二十时间里，上海市民只能吃到黄浦江里的死鱼。 任何一种经济制度，当它固化成型之后，即便是它的设计者也无力变更它内在的逻辑，这正是陈云在小蒸公社所遭遇到的景象。在与老乡们交谈时，陈云问，“我是好人，还是坏人？”众答，“好人。”陈接着说，“我虽是好人，结果办了错事情。”回到北京后，陈云给时任中共中央书记处总书记邓小平写了一封信，随附三个调研报告，其中包括《母猪也应该下放给农民私养》、《按中央规定留足自留地》等。 就当陈云在家乡做调研的同时，在安徽、广西等地正刮起一股包产到户的“单干风”。 在大跃进和人民公社运动中，安徽曾经是最积极的省份之一，可也是付出代价最大的地区之一，在1959到1961年的三年中，安徽总人口净减439万人，而在之前的六年间，人口每年平均增加65万以上，据《剑桥中华人民共和国史》的记载，“安徽可能是人口减少最严重的，1960年全省的死亡率猛增到68％，为全国平均数的3.5倍多”。正是在如此的绝境之下，1961年2月，省委书记曾希圣提出“按劳动底分包耕地，按实产粮食记工分”的联产到户责任制新办法，先是在每个县搞“责任田”试点，然后渐渐推广，在短短两个月里，就让全省39％的生产队都推行了新政策。曾希圣还在3月底专门给毛泽东写信，为“定产到田，责任到人”的做法进行辩护。国家粮食部专门对该省肥东县两个叫做路东和路西的生产队进行了对比调研，路东队实行的是责任田模式，结果夏收粮食亩产112斤，秋收亩产245斤，而吃大锅饭的路西队，夏收和秋收亩产分别是100斤和195斤。几乎就在安徽搞包产到户的同时，广西的龙胜县也开始分田单干的试验，全县1994个生产队有一半把土地分包给了农民。农村工业部部长邓子恢亲自南下做调研，并给予了肯定，其子邓淮生后来回忆，他曾问父亲对包产到户的看法，邓子恢说，“包产到户不是单干，是农村经济管理的一种形式，因为土地所有制没变啊！好比工人计时做工和计件做工，单位时间内生产多少个零件。农民也一样，一年内交多少粮食。工人做工可以包工包料，农民种地为何不能也采取这种办法？” 安徽和广西的做法，引发一场大争辩，《人民日报》专门辟出专栏进行讨论，赞同者认为这是提高农民积极性和增加粮食产量的好办法，反对者指责这是在走农村资本主义的道路，是一种大倒退。7月，颇受压力的安徽省委专门给中央打报告，希望得到政策上的肯定。到这一年的11月，安徽的“责任田”已经推广到91％的生产队。此外，甘肃、浙江等地也开始学安徽，中共党史出版社出版的《建国以来农业合作化史料汇编》一书曾引用当时甘肃农民的话说，“我们的脑子想进步，就是肚子太反动了。” 1961年11月13日，中央表明了态度，在这一天发出的《关于在农村进行社会主义教育的指示》文件中，明确指出，“目前在个别地方出现的包产到户和一些变相单干的做法，都是不符合社会主义集体经济的原则，因而也是不正确的。”不久后，曾希圣因“犯了方向性的严重错误”而遭到批判并被撤去职务，赞同包产到户的邓子恢等人日后也因此纷纷受到批判，邓被认定是“资本主义农业专家”。从此，早萌的包产到户改革嘎然而至。它的复燃将在17年后的1978年，而发动之地居然仍是安徽。 1960年4月29日，4万多人聚集在黑龙江的萨尔图大草原，北方的春天，杂草已经长起，但是大风刮在脸上还是干涩而微有寒意，这年的雨季来得特别早，人们站在泥泞不堪的草地上，每个人的脸上都亢奋不已。一条巨大的横幅在空旷的草原上非常醒目——“石油大会战万人誓师大会。” 在三年困难时期，这是最让人振奋的一个时刻，同时，在中国企业史上，也是一个非常重要的时刻。 中国的东北发现了大油田。 就跟很多的古老发明一样，中国是世界上最早认识并使用石油的国家之一。早在公元前一世纪，人们已在陕西延长一带发现了石油，把它盛入容器用来点灯，《汉书·地理志》称之为“可燃之水”。北宋沈括在他的《梦溪笔谈》一书中，第一次使用了“石油”一词，宋人用石油制作石烛、墨和用于军事的“猛火油”。但进入近代之后，中国人在石油上的运用远远落后于西方。1903年，德国人在陕西探得油矿，第二年，清廷筹办延长石油官厂，凿出第一口油井。可悲的是，一直到1934年，全中国只有延长这一口井在出油，每天出150斤，聊胜于无。1939年，地质学家孙健初在甘肃玉门发现油田，到1949年，玉门油田年产原油8万吨。美国美孚石油公司的地质专家在中国进行了二十年多年的勘探，最终得出结论，认定中国大陆的地质构造不会有大油田。 1950年代，中国组织多支勘探队遍走全国寻找油田。1953年，地质部部长、地质学家李四光提出“新华夏构造体系”，认定在东北的松辽平原和华北平原有可能存在大油田，可是，直到1957年，只探得石油储量0.56亿吨。在“一五”计划中，石油工业是惟一没有完成指标的部门。因为石油缺乏，连北京的公共汽车都不得不烧煤气，每辆公共汽车上都要背上一个硕大的煤气包。 1958年，在李四光等人的坚持下，勘探人员在松辽盆地展开重点勘探，1959年9月26日，位于黑龙江省安达县大同镇的松基三井突然喷出原油！大油田被发现了。因为喷油之日非常接近共和国的十年国庆，因此，这块新发现的油田被命名为“大庆油田”。 大油田被发现后，石油工业部当即从各地抽调了7万石油工人和转业军人会师萨尔图，由石油部部长余秋里和副部长康世恩亲自率领，展开了一场空前的大会战。当时条件之恶劣难以想像，工人睡在简陋的帐篷、木板房、牛棚、马厩里，日夜作战，无怨无悔。在这支令人生敬的石油大军中出现了建国后最著名的工人——“铁人”王进喜（1923－1970）。 王进喜是玉门油田的一个钻井队队长，他领导钻井队创造了月进尺5000米的全国纪录，成为中国中型钻机最高标杆单位，被命名为“钢铁井队”。1959年，他进京参加建国十年大典，接着就奉命率队赶到东北参与大会战。很快，他成了新的典型。 据当时的报纸报道：1960年3月25日，王进喜和他的钻井队到达萨尔图车站，一下车，他一不问吃，二不问住，而是逢人就问三句话，“我们的钻机到了没有，井位在哪里，这里的最高记录是多少？”他所在的钻井点在马家窑，在第一口油井打好之后，王进喜的腿被滚落的钻杆砸伤，他却顾不上住院．拄着拐杖缠着绷带连夜回到井队，从安装钻机到完钻，他一连7天7夜没有离开工地，这口井成为大会战后打出的第一口油井。 王进喜打出的第二口井地处高压区，打到700多米时突然发生了井喷，强大的高压液柱冲出井口，一场大事故眼看就要发生。要压住井喷，当时惟一的办法是往泥浆中加水泥和黄土，可是，由于没有搅拌机，倒进去的水泥沉在泥浆池底，与泥浆无法溶和。就在这时，王进喜扔掉双拐，纵身跳进泥浆池，用身体搅拌泥浆。在他的带动下，工友们也纷纷跳进入。经过三个多小时，井喷被制服，保住了油井和钻机，工进喜身上却被碱性很大的泥浆烧起了数十个血泡。记者写道，“这是有史以来从未有过的压井方法。” 因为工作不要命，王进喜被称为“铁人”。在4月29日的誓师大会上，王进喜登上主席台发言，他高喊，“石油工人一声吼，地球也要抖三抖！人活一口气，拼死干到底，为了把贫油落后帽子摘掉，宁可少活二十年，拼命也要拿下大油田。”话音未落，全场吼声震天。 1960年，大庆产出原油97万吨，从大会战开始，大庆逐渐探明了一个含油面积达800多平方公里、地质储量达22.6亿吨的大油田——截至2006年8月，大庆油田探明储量达到61．3亿吨。到1963年底，开发建设了146平方公里的油田，三年多时间里开采原油1155万吨。 大庆油田的发现，是中国经济史上的一个重大事件。它大大增强了中国工业的自主能力。同时，它也涌现了“铁人”王进喜这样的典型人物，并形成了一系列的经验，它们成为全中国的国营企业学习的标杆。其中最出名的是： “三老四严”——当老实人，办老实事，说老实话，严格要求，严明纪律； “四个一样”——黑天和白天干工作一个样，坏天气和好天气干工作一个样，领导不在场和领导在场干工作一个样，没有人检查和有人检查干工作一个样； “学两论”——石油部给每个工人配送了毛泽东所写的《实践论》和《矛盾论》，形成日日学习的制度。石油部长余秋里提出，“毛泽东思想是我们全部工作的指针，'两论'是会战的灵魂。这两篇文章一定要很好地读，反复地读。读了毛主席的著作，就会感到头脑清醒，浑身是劲，就有办法；离开了毛泽东思想，就什么事情也搞不成。”职工白天上班时把“两论”带在身边，晚上则集中学习，时人赋诗曰，“青天一顶星星亮，草原一片篝火红；人人手里捧毛选，'两论'学习方向明”。 大庆的这些做法逐渐被总结和规范为经验和制度，在全国广泛推广。这些经验带有浓烈的意识形态气质，弘扬集体主义和“只讲付出，不求回报”的奉献精神，充分强调基层工人的劳动主动性，它与之前的“鞍钢宪法”一起，构成了一套极其富有中国特色的工厂管理制度。 在1963年12月的全国人大二届四次会议上，周恩来总理宣告，“我国经济建设、国防建设和人民生活所需要的石油，不论在数量或者品种方面，基本上都可以自给了！中国人民使用洋油的时代，即将一去不复返了！” 一个有趣的细节是，一直到周恩来对世界宣告“石油自给”时候，国际上仍然无法判断这条新闻是真的还是假的。 尽管中国在1960年就开始了石油大会战，但是，它是在极其保密的状态下进行的，大庆油田对外的称呼是“安达农垦总场”。1964年4月20日，《人民日报》刊登“大庆精神大庆人”的报道，日本媒体才首次确定“中国的大庆油田，确有其事”，但是，他们依然搞不清楚油田究竟在什么地方。 又过了两年，1966年7月的《中国画报》上刊登了一组大庆油田的照片，日本人从一张油田工人的服装衣着上判定，“大庆油田是在冬季为零下30度的北满，大致在哈尔滨与齐齐哈尔之间。”他们又从一张炼油厂反应塔的照片上推算出大庆油田的大概规模——日本人从反应塔上的扶手栏杆开始推算，得出反应塔内径约为5米，据此，他们推断，大庆炼油厂的加工能力为每日900千升，如以残留油为原油的30%计算，原油加工能力为每日3000千升，一年以360天计算，年产量为100万千升。 到10月份，日本人又从《人民中国》杂志上找到了王进喜的报道事迹，他们分析道，最早钻井是在安达东北的北安附近下手的，并且从钻井设备运输情况看，离火车站不会太远。在事迹中有这样一个细节，王进喜一到马家窑看到大片的荒野说：“好大的油田！把石油工业落后的帽子丢到太平洋去。”于是，日本人从前满洲国地图上查到“马家窑是位于黑龙江海伦县东面的一个小村，在北安铁路上一个小站东边十多公里处”。就这样，终于把大庆的地理位置搞清楚了。