Chapter 14 Chapter 23 1953: "Project 156"

Stalin died on March 5, 1953.Also in this month, Beijing and Moscow reached a consensus on China's first five-year plan, and the Soviet side agreed to help aid 156 large-scale industrial projects. project". Since 1949, the Western world has held a hostile attitude towards China, while Mao Zedong adopted a "one-sided" diplomatic strategy.As early as July 1949, Liu Shaoqi rushed to Moscow to meet with Stalin to discuss the economic construction of New China. In August, the Soviet Union sent a 200-member expert group headed by Kovalev. In December, two months after the founding ceremony, Mao Zedong went abroad for the first time in his life and went to Moscow to negotiate in person. The Soviet Union promised a loan of 300 million US dollars. In February 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" and a series of asset transfer agreements, transferring all Soviet properties in Northeast China to China free of charge, including Lushun Military Port, Dalian, Changchun Railway Company and 302 real properties.From the end of 1949 to February 1952, the Soviet Union aided China in 42 construction projects, with an investment equivalent to 4 billion yuan (calculated based on the new version of RMB in 1953, the same below).

Here, it is necessary for us to review the status of Chinese enterprises before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. What the national government left behind was a mess full of sores and catkins.During the more than 20 years of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, the peak moment of the industrial economy was 1936 before the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. Occupying the fourth place, these four products are one-thirtieth, one-hundred-seventh, one-eleventh, and one-half of the United States, respectively.After eight years of resistance against Japan and three years of civil war, until 1949 when the flames of war were extinguished, the national economy had suffered a devastating blow, and the situation was truly in decline. The output value of the country's heavy industry was about 70% lower than that in 1936, and the output value of light industry was 30% lower. Reduced by about 24.5%, and the output of commercial crops was reduced by about half.

Among them, the iron and steel industry, which is the most significant indicator, has reduced its production capacity by 90%. There are only 7 open hearth furnaces and 22 small electric furnaces in the country, and the total number of power generation equipment is only 1.146 million kilowatts.The output of pig iron dropped to 252,000 tons, less than a quarter of the British output in 1835. Only half of the pig iron produced could be smelted into steel, and the rolling capacity was only half of that of steel.Another example is the petroleum industry. The Yumen Oil Mine in Shaanxi Province, China’s first oilfield, which was born during the Anti-Japanese War, produced only 90,000 tons of crude oil in 1949, accounting for three-quarters of the country’s output.Steel can't be smelted, oil can't be extracted anywhere, and the heavy chemical industry is naturally weak.

China in 1949 was basically an agricultural and handicraft country.68.4% of the national income comes from agriculture and only 12.6% from industry.In the industrial field, the handicraft industry accounted for 70% of the industrial output value, and the machine manufacturing industry was mostly repair-oriented enterprises. Most of the heavy industry categories were blank.According to the calculations of the Shanghai Machinery Trade Union, among the 708 machine manufacturing factories, only a quarter of them are capable of both manufacturing and repairing, and the rest can only do some repairing business.

In 1949, except for a few large cities, most small and medium-sized cities and vast rural areas basically had no power supply.Affected by the war, infrastructure such as transportation and communications across the country was completely destroyed. None of the main railways can be fully opened to traffic. There are only 11,000 kilometers of railways that are barely open to traffic, and most of them are in the Northeast. The important "artery" Beijing-Han Railway It has not been opened to traffic for 12 years. The Chengdu-Chongqing Railway from Chengdu to Chongqing was built in the late Qing Dynasty, and it has not been completed even after half a century.The long-distance telecommunications lines were fragmented and could not be connected to each other, and the North China wired power grid centered on Beijing and Tianjin was completely paralyzed.

The cause of talent cultivation is also very backward.The enrollment rate of school-age children is 20%, and 80% of the country's population is illiterate.The total number of college graduates in the past 20 years is only 180,000, only more than 200 masters have been trained, and the number of doctorates is zero.There are less than 40 institutions engaged in scientific research, and only 50,000 research and technical personnel, of which only more than 600 are specialized in scientific research. Modern technology is almost blank. This is really a poor country.The foundation is weak, the wisdom of the people has not been developed, and the gold in the treasury was robbed by Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, coupled with the blockade and provocation by international forces, this can be described as internal and external difficulties, with many contradictions, and the difficulty of founding a country is like another long march.

It was in such a situation that the Soviet Union's aid to China was so important and valuable. In a sense, it was the only opportunity for the republic's economic reconstruction. From 1951, Chen Yun and others began to compile the first five-year plan.This is also the experience learned from the big brother of the Soviet Union - it designed the "Five-Year Plan" from 1923 until the country's disintegration in 1990, and carried out overall plans for the country's economic construction in a five-year cycle. The practice has continued to this day. (British historian Eric Hobsbawm has a very incisive comment on the Soviet-style "Five-Year Plan" model. He believes that this is a typical central command-dominated economy. The "plan" promotes construction and maximizes the effect of high centralization. At the same time, this "plan" is inevitably rough, and its function is only to create new industries without considering how to operate it. At the same time, it forms a serious bureaucracy and centralization. Excessively powerful, "If the planning center has to issue detailed guidelines to every major production group and every production unit, coupled with the lack of an intermediate planning layer, the center's workload will inevitably be overwhelming.")

According to Bo Yibo’s recollection, “To be honest, at the beginning of the formulation of the First Five-Year Plan, we didn’t quite understand what should be done first and then what should be done in industrial construction, and how to achieve mutual cooperation between various departments.” In this process, Soviet experts played a key role. Some participants in the compilation recalled that all the tables of the First Five-Year Plan were made with the help of Soviet experts. "Project 156" is a collective concept. Its first project actually started in 1950, and was completed in 1957 when the "First Five-Year Plan" ended. The rest continued until 1969, when the situation was in chaos. The actual completed projects There are 150 projects, and it took 19 years before and after, with a total investment of 19.61 billion yuan.The impact of these projects on the contemporary Chinese economy is revolutionary and even decisive in terms of industrial layout, industrial structure, technological level, and corporate governance system.

Let me talk about the industrial layout first.Since the Westernization Movement in the late Qing Dynasty, China’s industrial development has been focused on the coast. In 1934, 94% of the industrial output value outside the Northeast was concentrated in the seven cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Peiping, Nanjing and Wuxi. In the Northeast, four-fifths of the industry in the Northeast is concentrated in the province of Liaoning.Around 1949, 70% of China's industrial facilities were concentrated in the Northeast and the coastal areas. Among them, the number of factories in Shanghai and Tianjin accounted for 63% of the total number of factories in major cities, 61% of the number of employees, and the Northeast accounted for more than half of the country. of heavy industry.More than 90% of the country's power stations are concentrated in a few big cities, of which the Northeast accounts for one-third of the country's power generation.In the textile industry, 83.6% of the country's 5 million spindles are concentrated in Jiangsu, Shandong, Liaoning, Shanghai and Tianjin.

In the Great Northwest, which occupies one-third of the country's land, its industrial output value is less than 2% of the country's total value, and there has been no industrial base for nearly a hundred years.Except for a small number of railways in Shaanxi, the rest of Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang do not have a single railway track. The "156 Project" has completely changed this layout. A large number of iron and steel, non-ferrous metal smelting, and chemical companies are selected in the central and western regions with rich mineral resources and sufficient energy supply, and machinery processing companies are located near raw material production bases. There are 106 civilian-use enterprises in the "156 Project", 50 of which are located in the northeast of the old industrial base, the remaining 29 are in the central part, and 21 are in the west. Among the 44 military enterprises, 35 are located in the central and western regions, except for some shipyards located along the coast.Of the 19.61 billion yuan in investment, except for the Northeast which accounted for 8.7 billion yuan, the central and western regions accounted for 6.5 billion yuan and 3.9 billion yuan respectively, accounting for more than half. The implementation of the "156 Project" completely changed the industrial layout of China's inland areas. After 1960, as Sino-Soviet relations turned hostile, the central government implemented the "Third Front Strategy" and increased its reliance on the west. The layout changed abruptly.

Let's talk about the industrial structure.When Mao Zedong was planning the first five-year plan, he had a vivid description: "What can we make now? We can make tables and chairs, we can make teapots and bowls, we can grow grain and grind it into flour, and we can also make paper. A car, an airplane, a tank, and a tractor cannot be built." Therefore, the focus of the "First Five-Year Plan" is to give priority to the development of heavy industry, and its investment accounted for 85% of the total investment.Under the overall plan, some large factories of metallurgy, energy, and machinery were erected.Still taking iron and steel as an example, within five years, the iron-making capacity has increased by 2.8 million tons and the steel-making capacity has increased by 2.53 million tons. In addition to the production capacity of the original steel mills, my country's pig iron production has soared from 252,000 tons in 1949 to 4.67 million tons, a full increased by nearly 20 times.Steel production also increased to 4.12 million tons.This growth rate is undoubtedly amazing. At the same time, the investment in infrastructure and energy exploration is also huge. During the "First Five-Year Plan" period, the investment in railway transportation, geological exploration and construction industry reached 12.12 billion yuan, equivalent to half of the investment in industrial infrastructure during the same period. There are 33 railways, 22% more than the mileage in 1952, and the mileage of roads has doubled.The achievements in water conservancy construction are also brilliant. The "millennium problem" Huaihe River management project has been completed, several large reservoirs have been built, and the Three Gorges Water Conservancy Project on the Yangtze River has been demonstrated and prepared. Next, let's talk about the technical level.During the period of aid to China, the Soviet Union showed an unreserved and selfless spirit. It provided China with a large amount of materials and design drawings, which reached 23 tons in 1953 and 55 tons in 1954, and almost used all their best technologies. All to China.American scholar Nicholas Lardy believes that "China seems to have accepted the most advanced technology in the Soviet Union. In some cases, the transferred technology is the best in the world. In the most important steel industry aided by the Soviet Union, the Soviets Built and operated the best blast furnaces in the world in the 1950s. The Chinese steel factories in Wuhan and Baotou involved by the Soviets absorbed the latest technology in Soviet blast furnaces and flat furnaces and large-scale iron ore enrichment.” With the selfless help of Soviet experts, China's industrial technology level has been raised to the level of the 1940s in just a few years. It was a century-like construction era. Amid the excited cheers of the people, records were born one after another. It is a Chinese dream to independently develop and manufacture cars.As early as 1931, Zhang Xueliang built an automobile factory in Shenyang to produce Minsheng brand trucks, but after the trial production was successful, it was occupied by the invading Japanese.When Yan Xishan governed Shanxi, he also built a car repair factory, imitating dozens of 1.5-ton small trucks from the United States. The Chinese Automobile Manufacturing Company under the Chiang Kai-shek government used imported parts to assemble more than 2,000 cars, but these were small troubles. , not a climate.The real realization of the car dream was during the "First Five-Year Plan" period. On March 19, 1953, the Government Affairs Council formally approved the construction of the First Automobile Factory, and Mao Zedong issued a death order, requiring three years to see the car.FAW's factory site was selected in a village called Mengjiatun in the suburbs of Changchun, Jilin Province, and the factory design was all handed over to the Soviet Automobile and Tractor Design Institute.The first employee of the factory was Chen Zutao, who was 25 years old at the time. Chen Zutao's father was Chen Changhao. During the Long March, he served as the general political commissar of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and the commander-in-chief of the West Route Army. Because he followed Zhang Guotao and made a wrong line, he was never reused.Chen Zutao was sent to the Soviet Union when he was 11 years old, where he finished elementary school and middle school, and then he was admitted to the Bauman Supreme Technical Institute to major in automobiles. In February 1951, he graduated early and returned to China, and was ordered to participate in the construction of an automobile factory.The Soviet Union promised to help China build a comprehensive automobile factory. Its scale would be the same as that of the largest and most advanced Stalin Automobile Factory in the Soviet Union at that time. Whatever equipment the Stalin Automobile Factory had, China would have the same equipment. What kind of equipment did the Stalin Automobile Factory have? China's production level, what kind of production level does China have. Chen Zutao later recalled, "The entire design was done by the Soviets, and they organized the best group of people to gather all the technical section chiefs of the Stalin Automobile Factory. They were very experienced people with white hair. Yes. Their superior is Chivetkov, the chief craftsman, and he organized these people to do the design. I participated in the entire design work as his assistant." He wrote in the book "My Automobile Career" "In December 1951, the preliminary design was completed, and the design institute informed me to go and hand over dozens of thick design books and drawings to me. At that time, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union was very good, and so many design materials were handed over to me. There was no ceremony, no complicated handover procedures, and no receipt. I put the design materials in a diplomatic pouch, and flew directly to Beijing by myself. Chen Yun convened various central ministries and commissions to review the Soviet design. Everyone Basically, it was completely passed without any discussion, and then stamped with a bright red seal, all the procedures are considered complete." Chen Zutao went on to describe, "After the design is completed, it is very complicated to implement this design, how many workshops, what equipment each workshop uses, what power supply, and water supply are all made by them. And all equipment is supplied by the Soviet Union. , because Western countries blocked us at that time, except for the Soviet Union, we could not get anything. At the time of the economic crisis, the West did not supply Soviet equipment in the 1930s, and the Soviet Union used gold to buy Western equipment. I will buy it later, people No. The Soviet Union also bought from the West, so the equipment he provided us with a lot of special equipment, many special equipment only one, from the West, the second one is not available, and they can’t buy it, so they make it for us . Really selfless." The total number of equipment for the construction of FAW is more than 10,000, which are basically supplied by the Soviet Union. What we can manufacture is only small auxiliary machinery such as washing machines.Chen Zutao gave an example. One piece of equipment is a press machine for the production of automobile frames. It weighs 3,000 tons. There is no factory in the Soviet Union that can manufacture this equipment, because it is too large and requires a special large factory building.For this reason, the Soviet Union built a super-large workshop at the Stalin Automobile Factory and used it to cast one for China.After it was built, it had to be transported. This equipment was heavy and wide. Along the railway line, the trains on the opposite side had to stop and avoid. The entire Soviet railway system was mobilized. From the Stalin Automobile Factory to Changchun, it was delivered by a long drive of more than 10,000 kilometers. . While aiding in the construction of equipment, the Soviet Union also helped China cultivate automobile talents.Under the personal auspices of Kryrov, the director of the Stalin Automobile Factory, Soviet experts proposed a complete list of personnel required for each department and production process from production to management, including the factory director, division chief, and workshop director. , The length of the section is as long as that of ordinary adjustment workers.There were as many as 518 people on this list, all of whom were sent to the Stalin Automobile Factory for internships. The Soviet Union gave each person a monthly allowance of 700 rubles—equivalent to the monthly salary of a Soviet engineer, and was equipped with fur coats and woolen suits.In addition to being arranged to study in the workshop, interns also have one-on-one lectures by experts according to their majors. The lecture time is: 300 hours for workers, 400 hours for management cadres, and 500 hours for technicians.These interns have since become the technical and management core of China's automobile and even machinery manufacturing industries, and the outstanding talents among them have even become national leaders, such as Jiang Zemin, Li Lanqing, Ye Xuanping and so on.Back then, Jiang Zemin was the director of the power department, and he was interned by the most famous power expert in the Soviet Union, Kilev. On July 13, 1956, the first batch of ten cars rolled off the production line. It was named "Jiefang Brand" and inscribed by Mao Zedong.It is modeled on the Soviet Gies 150, with a load capacity of four tons, six cylinders with 90 horsepower, and a maximum speed of 65 kilometers per hour. During the "First Five-Year Plan" period, the Chinese not only manufactured automobiles, but also successfully trial-produced the first jet aircraft, built the first factory for manufacturing machine tools, and built the first bridge on the Yangtze River—Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge. Opened the air line from Beijing to Lhasa, Tibet, built two new large-scale steelmaking plants in Wuhan and Baotou, completed the construction of a large-scale steel rolling plant project of Anshan Iron and Steel Company, and built a tractor factory and a bearing factory in Luoyang and Harbin, and built a tractor factory and a bearing factory in Lanzhou Built a large oil refining base. All these projects are inseparable from the support of the Soviet Union.In five years, 8,500 Soviet experts came to China. This is an "international column" that should not be forgotten. "Project 156" was not in the newspapers at the time, and there were almost no public reports, and it was even more forgotten in the future. Few people knew about it decades later, and even comprehensive research on it was rare. It was not published until 2004 He published the first research monograph "The Cornerstone of New China's Industry - 156 Construction Studies" (authors Dong Zhikai and Wu Jiang), with a circulation of only 5,000 copies.The reasons for this are complex. First of all, 44 of the "Project 156" are military enterprises, and many of them are supporting the military. Therefore, many factories have only one code name. For example, the Capital Aerospace Machinery Company is the state-owned 211 factory, and the Shenyang Xinguang Machinery Factory is the state-owned 111 factory. , Sichuan Changhong Machinery Factory is a state-owned 780 factory - the only airborne fire control radar production base in China at that time. After the 1990s, it was famous for color TV manufacturing, and so on.For a long time, the locations and products of these factories were classified as confidential, and the staff were not allowed to disclose the situation of the factories to the outside world or even their families, and their work contents were also regarded as state secrets.Civilian projects related to these military factories are also kept secret.It is precisely because of these mysterious factory names and strict confidentiality discipline that the "156 Project" has been covered with a mysterious veil. Secondly, Sino-Soviet relations suddenly turned bad in 1960, and all Soviet experts were recalled, which caused difficulties for many projects under construction.Since then, in our public propaganda, we often emphasize independence and self-reliance, while deliberately avoiding the assistance of the Soviets. Third, in the more than ten years after entering the 1960s, China fell into the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution, and normal economic activities were interrupted. It was not until 1978 that the main axis of economic construction was turned again. Therefore, the "156 Project" became A distant past that seems to have disappeared. But in fact, these Soviet-aid projects have been an important part of China’s economic entities for a long time. Many heavy industries, military industries, and major water conservancy projects built at that time are still functioning more than half a century later. They are truly worthwhile. It is called the "cornerstone" of the new Chinese economy.This is the most comprehensive and generous technology transfer from country to country in modern history. "Cambridge History of the People's Republic of China" therefore commented, "The importance of Soviet technical assistance and capital goods cannot be overestimated, and its transfer of design capabilities has been described as unprecedented in the history of technology transfer." Looking down from the perspective of globalization, we can see that in the early 1950s, the Eastern and Western worlds, which were already openly opposed, launched two large-scale international aid programs. One was from 1948 to 1952. The "Marshall Plan" was implemented, and the other was the "Project 156" that the Soviet Union began to aid China in 1953.They have all achieved the expected goal of revitalizing the economy, but they have different paths and results.This is a very interesting comparative topic in economic history. Just as the Americans exported capital, commodities, and technology to Europe, they also exported its values ​​and social governance system, so the Soviets brought technology and equipment to China, and at the same time brought the entire system of the planned economy, Chen Zutao Describe it as "the imprint of the mother's womb". In fact, as early as the end of World War II, the debate on planned economy and market economy had become the core focus of the global economic circles. In early 1944, the British economist Hayek published "The Road to Serfdom". ", he called the planned economy "the great Utopia", and believed that the control of production will inevitably lead to the control of consumption, thus making free market competition impossible, which will be a dangerous "road to slavery". path of".His views were considered heretical for a long time.In Western economic circles, Keynesianism, which emphasizes state intervention, is still the mainstream, and Hayek's ideas were not taken seriously until the mid-1960s.In the socialist camp, the planned economy has become an unquestionable governance model. In 1952, Stalin published the book "Problems of the Socialist Economy in the Soviet Union", which comprehensively elaborated and planned the planned economy model theoretically. In this classic work , the product economy and the commodity economy are opposite and mutually exclusive, and the use of the law of value is considered to be a practice that is backward in productivity. In Stalin's words, the means of production have "lost the attributes of commodities, are no longer commodities, and have escaped from the law of value to function. range, only maintaining the shell of the commodity (valuation, etc.)".In the first five-year plan, China not only introduced the technology and funds from the Soviet Union, but also fully introduced this mature authoritative theory. The introduction of this system is reflected in the establishment of a highly centralized and unified investment management system. In order to manage the national economy in a unified manner, the State Planning Commission was established in July 1952, and the China Construction Bank was established in February 1954—it became the cash center, credit center and settlement center in the field of capital construction. Institutions such as the Committee, the State Technical Committee, and the State General Administration of Material Supply, all of which are subordinate to the county-level government, form a closed, vertical planning management system, which is an extremely large and ubiquitous "visible hand" ". The First Five-Year Plan and the "156 Project" are the first time this management system has been effective.This is an investment allocation and management system that is "all inclusive" by the state: what kind of factories the state needs to build, what products to produce, how much production capacity to cultivate, as well as the output of products and the scale of investment are all directly determined by the state through planning. arrange.The so-called departmental allocation of investment means that the national planning department plans to divide the capital construction investment in the five-year plan or annual plan into several pieces, distribute them to various central departments, and then allocate them to their own construction projects.Under this system, all the projects and investments used by new and old enterprises for the construction of fixed assets are planned by the state; the required funds are uniformly allocated by the state finance and allocated free of charge; materials for construction and production are provided by the state through commercial The construction team is uniformly allocated by the material department; the construction team engaged in construction is arranged by the state; the new labor force engaged in production is trained and distributed by the state; the products produced are purchased and sold by the state; the profit of the enterprise is all turned over to the state treasury; If there is a loss, it will also be subsidized by the state finance. Under this ambitious and rigorous planning system, the state not only makes macro decisions on investment scale, investment structure, and investment layout at the macro level, but also undertakes project decision-making and management tasks at the micro level.The advantages and disadvantages of this system will be presented very clearly in the future. Strong planning greatly improves the ability to gather resources, and can accomplish great things with the "power of the whole country", but what it will inevitably bring is low efficiency, Waste and slow response and other symptoms.As we will see in the future, bureaucracy and a shortage economy will emerge side by side with the planned economy. From 1956 to 1983, when Changchun FAW was built, it has only produced one model for 27 years. Its tonnage is small, fuel consumption is high, and the speed is slow. car level.The fundamental reason is that the Soviet Union did not help FAW to establish its own automobile research and development organization.Chen Zutao said helplessly, “It’s not that they don’t give it to us; This model is also cloned to FAW. In addition to the "two skins", there are two other problems that come with the "mother's womb". One is the decoupling of production and sales, and the other is the lack of independent funds. Under the planned economic system, enterprises have no enthusiasm for product improvement.Chen Zutao, who later served as the leader of China's auto industry for a long time, described, "Our production plan is issued by the State Planning Commission, and the cars produced are directly put into the national treasury, and then distributed by the Planning Commission. Users' opinions on cars cannot reach our hands. We If you want to improve your product, you have to report it first, and then the national organization experts will review it. After the review is completed, the project can be approved. After the project is approved, you can wait in line for funding from the national finance department. Only when the funds arrive can you start. There are many links and procedures. Complicated, any level can kill you. Moreover, this kind of modification has no benefit to our manufacturer. It is laborious and has no benefit. How can the enterprise be motivated? Therefore, one thing more is worse than one thing less. This is A typical planned economic system malpractice." In more than 20 years, FAW can use 0.1% of the profit for technological transformation.Chen Zutao said, "The profit of an automobile factory is already low. What can 0.1% do? It is just a symbolic way to give your company a little money, and the 0.1% is for you to pay the full amount of the profit first, and then the state will give it to you. Refund, sometimes financial difficulties, this repayment will be delayed, and in the end it will be delayed." Liu Shouhua, who was the director of FAW factory, once said, "I am such a big factory director of FAW, and the money I have the right to control is not enough. Build a toilet of 100 square meters." In the "156 Project", there are also some projects that have caused major controversy, the most famous of which is the construction of the Sanmenxia Reservoir. For thousands of years, the flooding of the Yellow River has been a serious problem for the Chinese nation. Even, "the Yellow River is clear, and the sages come out" has become a kind of people's longing for a prosperous age.Therefore, in the Soviet aid project and the first five-year plan, "Treating the Yellow River" has become a symbolic number one project. In January 1954, a Soviet expert group headed by Korolyov, deputy chief engineer of the Leningrad Hydropower Design Institute of the Ministry of Power Stations of the Soviet Union, visited China. More than 120 Chinese and Soviet experts traveled more than 12,000 kilometers to conduct a large-scale on-site survey of the Yellow River.In the end, Soviet experts selected the Sanmenxia dam site at the junction of Shaanxi, Shanxi and Henan provinces.Korolyov concluded: "No other dam site can replace Sanmenxia to obtain such great benefits for the downstream, nor can it comprehensively solve the problems of flood control, irrigation, power generation and other aspects like Sanmenxia." At the end of 1954, the Yellow River Planning Committee officially put forward the "Technical and Economic Report on the Planning of Comprehensive Utilization of the Yellow River", and the Sanmenxia Water Conservancy Project became the main project of the first phase of the project. In July 1955, the Second Session of the First National People's Congress passed a resolution approving the principles and basic content of the comprehensive plan proposed by the State Council to eradicate the Yellow River water damage and develop the Yellow River water conservancy. Just like all the projects in the "156 Project", the Sanmenxia plan proposed by the Soviet experts was confirmed almost without "falsification". At the end of 1956, the Ministry of Water Resources held the Sanmenxia Water Conservancy Planning Conference. 70 water conservancy experts attended the meeting. Unexpectedly, one person stood up to oppose the case. He was Huang Wanli (1911-2001), the son of Huang Yanpei and a professor of the Water Conservancy Department of Tsinghua University.Huang Wanli believes that building a high dam at Sanmenxia will slow down the water flow in the reservoir area. The section of the Yellow River in Tongguan is originally a siltation section. The reservoir will store water and block sediment, which will inevitably increase the siltation of the Yellow River in this section, and the river bed of the Weihe River will also silt up rapidly. In addition, the Weihe River's entry into the Yellow River will also be raised, which will directly threaten the safety of Qinchuan and Xi'an in the eight hundred miles, and the flood disaster in the lower reaches will be moved to the middle reaches.He predicted, "The floods downstream today will surely appear upstream in the next year." Huang Wanli also raised scientific doubts about the vision of "the Yellow River is clear, and the sage comes out". He said, "It is against objective laws to expect the Yellow River to be clear."When the Yellow River flows to the middle reaches, the Loess Plateau is eroded by rainwater. The cutting of the loess layer by the Yellow River and its tributaries is a natural process. Even if there is no artificial vegetation damage on both sides of the Yellow River, the Yellow River is also a river with a large sediment content. It is also inevitable.Huang Wanli said: "The clear water coming out of the reservoir will produce terrible rapid erosion, and it will take a lot of effort to prevent it. 6,000 cubic meters of clear water may be more difficult to control than short-term muddy water of 10,000 cubic seconds. That is, there are only 600 cubic meters of water throughout the year. It is not easy to deal with clear water in the second cubic meter." Huang Wanli's views were considered dangerous and "rebellious". At that planning meeting, he debated fiercely with other experts for seven days and finally lost.Later, he recalled that those experts who agreed to build the Sanmenxia Dam did not understand the truth, but because the Soviet experts said it could be built, and the leaders also said it could be built, these experts began to follow suit.In an essay titled "A Little Talk in the Flower Cong", he wrote sarcastically, "It is not surprising that there are so many literati without bones. The main reason is that Chinese scholars are very political. Look at Zhang Mou. His own set of opinions on harnessing the Yellow River, when the plan for Sanmenxia came out, he immediately gave up his own opinions quickly, slammed Goethe, and echoed, "The Yellow River is clear when the sage comes out." Tend to the principle of carrying a certain amount of sediment, but shyly said that the yellow water will really be cleared, and the downstream will be cured at once, so as to please the party and government that leads him. Just think, will this be beneficial to the people and the government? Harmful? Is his motive to love the government or his own job?" Because of his opposition to the Sanmenxia project, Huang Wanli was labeled as a rightist, lost the right to teach, and was sent to Miyun Reservoir as a coolie. On April 13, 1957, the groundbreaking ceremony of the Sanmenxia Water Conservancy Project was grandly held. In November 1958, the Sanmenxia project began to intercept the Yellow River. In June 1960, the high dam was built to 340 meters, and the flood began to be blocked. In September 1960, the Sanmenxia Dam was completed and the gates of the dam were lowered to store water.The total investment of the project is 4 billion yuan, which is equivalent to the cost of 40 Wuhan Yangtze River Bridges. What happened later was unfortunately corrected by Huang Wanli.The Soviet Union has rich experience in cascade development of ordinary rivers, but there is no such a large river with a lot of sediment as the Yellow River on their territory, because the ecological environment and sediment conditions of the Yellow River Basin are underestimated.In the year when the dam was built, the Weihe River above Tongguan was silted up, destroying 800,000 mu of fertile land.Only one and a half years later, more than 1.5 billion tons of sediment had accumulated in the reservoir, far exceeding expectations, and barricades had formed at the mouth of the Weihe River. Forcing Xi'an.The water level of the Sanmenxia reservoir has never been raised again. In 1967, the Yellow River backflowed, and all the river channels at the mouth of the Weihe River were silted up. Especially in 1968, the Weihe River broke through in Huaxian, Shaanxi, causing a large area to be submerged.The Sanmenxia Reservoir was converted to low-water head power generation, and the installed capacity was repeatedly reduced to only a quarter of the original design. Sanmenxia became one of the most controversial water conservancy projects after the founding of the People's Republic of China, and there were endless voices of reflection in the following decades. On March 21, 1979, Chen Yun said at the Politburo meeting, "Among the 156 large-scale engineering projects, the Sanmenxia Project went through my hands, so it cannot be said to be a success. It is a lesson from failure." In October 2003, Zhang Guangdou, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and Qian Zhengying, a former minister of water resources and an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, jointly called for the Sanmenxia Reservoir to stop water storage and power generation as soon as possible. In addition to the ineffectiveness of water conservancy, the construction of Sanmenxia also destroyed many cultural landscapes, the most distressing of which was the demolition of Tongguan. Tongguan is located at the eastern end of the Guanzhong Plain, between the Qinling Mountains and the Yellow River, and is one of the most famous cultural landmarks in Chinese history.From the Shang and Zhou dynasties to the Tang and Song dynasties, China's political center has been oscillating between Chang'an and Luoyang for a long time. Between them, Tongguan is the fulcrum that shoulders the two capitals and is overwhelming.Here, there have been hundreds of wars, large and small, of which more than 60 have affected the fate of the whole of China, such as the battle between Taishi Wen and Jiang Ziya in the Yin and Zhou Dynasties, the battle between Ma Chao and Cao Cao in the Three Kingdoms, and the battle between An Lushan and Ge Shuhan in the Tang Dynasty. , the Huangchao rebel army captured Tongguan, and the desperate battle between Li Zicheng and the Ming army in the Ming Dynasty.During the construction of the Sanmenxia Reservoir, Tongguan was within the water storage level planned by Soviet experts, so the old city of Tongguan was completely demolished.But in fact, the water storage level of Sanmenxia never reached and submerged Tongguan City, that is to say, a technical misjudgment destroyed a memory of Chinese history. Along with Tongguan, ancient cities such as Puzhou, Chaoyi, and Shanzhou were also demolished. Huang Wanli wrote a poem sadly in the future: "How much is a little knowledge in the world, cut off the quicksand and close the three doors!" During the "First Five-Year Plan" period, including the Soviet aid project, China completed 595 large and medium-sized construction projects, and completed a total capital construction investment of 58.847 billion yuan. From 1978 to 1978, the period of fastest economic growth.Let's go on to answer two doubts. First, where did the large-scale construction funds during the "First Five-Year Plan" period come from?Second, what role does private capital play in this major construction? Of the more than 50 billion yuan of funds, 3% were loans from the Soviet Union, and the rest were state investments, of which 79% came from the central government.这么庞大的资金供应，主要来自两块，一是全民勒紧腰带抓工业，二是农业对工业的反哺。 为了在短时间内把重工业抓上去，从中央到地方倾全力而为之，计划经济的威力以及因此而形成的“举国效应”发挥了重大作用，以用电量为例，一五期间，全国电力的八成以上都用于工业，农村用电只占全国电量的0.6％，城市生活用电占13.5％。 此外，农业对工业的反哺非常之大。这也形成了延续数十年的城乡“剪刀差”现象。 就在城里大动土木的时候，在广袤的农村正发生着一场粮食危机。从1952年到1954年，华北和长江淮河流域发生洪灾，再加上工业发展对粮食的需求大增，以及大量人口进城当工人，粮食短缺突然变得十分的突出。 1952年7月到1953年6月的一年中，国家收入粮食547亿斤，支出587亿斤，赤字40亿斤。1953年的城镇人口比上一年增加600万人，农村里吃商品粮的人口也高达一亿人。（中国人口在1953年突破6亿，该年进行了第一次人口普查，得601938035人，其中农民5.2亿，城镇人口8千万。）粮食形势十分严峻。许多地方出现了抢购粮食的现象，农民更是囤粮惜售。在河南、湖广等粮区，私人粮贩再度大量出现，民间粮市的牌价比国家收购价格高出20％到30％。到1953年的秋天，一些城镇出现数千人以至上万人在国家售粮点排队争购粮食的景象，甚至连北京和天津等大城市，也不得不实行限额配售。全国财经委员会召开紧急会议，讨论的结果是，“问题很大，办法不多，难以为继。” 中央决策面临两难，陈云自喻是“挑着一担炸药”。他说，我这个人属于温和派，不属于激烈派，总是希望抵抗少一点。但我现在是挑着一担炸药，前面是黑色炸药，后面是黄色炸药，如果搞不到粮食，整个市场就要波动，如果采取征购的办法，农民又可能造反，两个中间要选一个，都是危险家伙。 最后，陈云在深思熟虑之后，提出了最强硬的办法，那就是在农村实行征购，在城市实行配给，简称为“统购统销”。1953年11月23日，政务院发布《关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供应的命令》，提出定产、定购、定销的“三定”政策，要求全国各地以乡为单位，确定全乡每户的常年计划产量和全乡粮食统购统销的数量，粮食买卖纳入国家的整体计划。这一工作的难度非常之大，中共中央要求“全党动手，全力以赴”，仅中南地区就动员了330万干部和积极分子下乡做农民的思想工作，毛泽东也深知此事的艰难，说，这样做可能出的毛病，第一农民不满，第二市民不满，第三外国舆论不满，问题是看我们的工作。他要求，宣传工作要大张旗鼓，但报纸一字不登。 在控制了粮食的购销渠道后，随即在城市实行定量供应，1955年8月25日，国务院全体会议第17次会议通过《市镇粮食定量供应凭证印制暂行办法》，从此，在中国经济史上出现了一个新的名词，粮票。所有城镇居民都配发到一个《居民粮食供应本》，凭此到指定的国营粮店兑换。没有粮票，将无法购买到一粒粮食。粮票的发明是计划经济最生动的体现，从此，中国进入“票证的年代”，随后，各种民用商品如猪肉、食油、煤球、自行车、糕点、鸡蛋、鱼甚至火柴等等，都需要用特定的票证才能购买。 比粮食还要早一年多的是布票。1954年全国棉纱、棉布统购统销后，9月份就实行了凭“布票”（又称棉布购买票、购布证、购布券）限量供应棉布的政策，这是工业消费品的第一种票证。 当时，根据南北各地的气候不同，城镇大小不同，对于棉布的最低需求量不同，而制订了不同的布票定量标准。例如：北京市每人每年发放17尺3寸布票，刚够成人做一套蓝布制服。天津市每人每年可领取13尺，江西省发放11尺，最北方冬季漫长又严寒的哈尔滨市每人每年24尺布票，可做一套棉衣；而南方亚热带地区城镇每人每年7尺4寸布票。布票的取消，是在1984年，而粮票的取消则要到1993年。 票证的发明，不但将城镇居民消费彻底纳入到计划的轨道上，同时，它与户籍制度形成一种结构性屏蔽，没有票证的农民从此无法在城市里购买到必需生活品，因而不可能任意进城，从而在物资短缺的年代里，减轻了城市的人口压力。 统购统销政策的实行，在当时解决了粮食及商品危机，同时形成了农业对工业的反哺机制，它的后遗症也是深远的。购销两头被卡住后，农民产粮、产棉的利益被刚性化，再加上后来推行的人民公社制度，最终使生产积极性严重受挫，农作物产量长期徘徊不前。薄一波反思说，“问题和教训在于，大跃进和十年动乱的大曲折，人口增长的失控，不仅使我们长期找不到机会来改变这一政策，而且还不得不从购销两头越勒越死。”农业发展的停滞，进而造成原料物资及各种产成品的全面紧缺，中国经济逐渐滑入短缺的周期中。 美国的《时代》周刊早在1954年3月的一篇报道中就报道了农民生产积极性下降的景象，稍微富裕的农民不敢借出生产工具，即使出借也不敢要租金，一些人干脆把公牛卖了，这使得生产积极性下降，产量也随之下降。在1957年12月9日的观察记中，它更将统购政策、城市配给制度以及工业化建设联系了起来，它描述道，“北京也和其他城市一样，猪肉实行着配给制。但是即使是在配给制的状态下，猪肉仍然供不应求，记者报道上海市民早晨三点钟就起床，为的是在菜市场排在前面能够买到肉。农村虽然不施行配给，但是农民现在吃的肉还不如过去的一半数量，因为国家用固定的底价垄断地购买了猪肉，然后再按照垄断的高价格出售，农民远远买不起这样价格的猪肉。猪肉都去哪里了？答案是政府用肉偿还从苏联进口的工业产品……政府的雄心在于不惜代价的提高工业实力。”。 农业对工业的反哺是巨大的。据董志凯和吴江的研究，在“一五”时期，全部工业产值中，以农产品为主要原料的产值约占50％左右，农副产品和用农业原料制成的工业品，在国内市场主要商品供应量中约占80％，在出口总额中约占75％。农民每年把净收入的约7％作为农业税上缴国家，同时，由于工农产品之间的差价——也就是“剪刀差”，农民又把相当于净收入的约5％奉献给国家积累，两项合计为12％。以另外一种方式计算，国家预算收入中，农民所交农业税约占10％，由于农业及其副业品收购、加工、销售和运输等的利润和税收，间接构成财政收入的40％（其中包括了工人所追加的价值），合计为50％。然而，一五时期国家对农业的投入比重为基本建设总额的7.1％，加上农村救灾经费、推广优良品种、新式农具、改良农业技术的经费，合计约等于农民缴纳税款的三分之一。It can be seen that the funds required for industrialization are mainly generated by agricultural accumulation. 粮食和棉花的统购统销政策将一直执行到1985年，长达32年之久。2007年，中央党校教授周天勇撰文认为，“建国后我们一直通过工农价格差、城乡剪刀差向城市和工业提供丰厚的原始积累，农民为工业化和城市化提供的积累，最保守的估计高达30万亿元。” 在“一五”建设规划中，私人企业和私人资本的参与度几乎为零，它们已经被彻底的边缘化。With the establishment of the planned economic system and the rapid expansion of state-owned capital, the space given to them has become smaller and smaller.在这样的情形下，资本家所期望的最后一件事情是，他们现有的资本及投资收益到底能否保全。 1954年9月，全国人大颁布了新中国的第一部宪法，它正式确定了国营经济的主导地位，明确提出国家对资本主义工商业采取“利用、限制和改造”的政策，逐步以全民所有制代替资本家所有制，以发展生产合作社作为改造个体手工业的主要道路。同月，政务院通过《公私合营工业企业暂行条例》，《条例》对“公私合营工业企业”的定义是这样的，“由国家或者公私合营企业投资并由国家派干部，同资本家实行合营的工业企业”，第三条规定“合营企业中，社会主义成分居于领导地位”，第九条规定“公私合营企业受公方领导，由政府主管部门派代表同私方代表负责管理”。这意味着，私人所有者基本上失去了对企业的支配权和管理权，而生产经营的目的不再是为了盈利，而是为了满足国家的需要。 据1954年统计，公股在全部公私合营企业中的比重为40.6%，单个企业公私合营的，平均每1万元资本额，国家实际投资为1，273元。尽管在股权比例上不占多数，但是公方还是合法地成了取代者。关于敏感的企业盈利分配方式，在这个条例的第四章“盈余分配”中，提出了“四马分肥”的方案，既“股东股息红利，加上董事、经理和厂长等人的酬劳金，共可占到全年盈余总额的25%左右”。 “四马分肥”给私人股东留下了四分之一的盈余收益，看上去是一个较温和的计算方法，但是，却存在一个显在的争议点，那就是，私营企业的原料供应和成品销售两个渠道都被卡住了，中间的利润多少已经完全受制于人。所以，不满和矛盾仍然很突出。1955年，陈云终于想出“赎买定息”的方案，国家根据核定的私股股额按期发给私股股东固定的股息。 关于定息的比例，工商界的普遍想法是“坐三望四”，也就是年息为3％，最好能够到4％。而陈云最终公布的定息为5％，这让资本家们“喜出望外”。根据规定，“全国公私合营企业的定息户，不分工商、不分大小、不分盈余户亏损户，不分地区、不分行业、不分老合营新合营，统一规定为年息五厘，即年息百分之五。”据吴承明在《中国资本主义与国内市场》一书中的记载，当时公私合营企业的私股总额为23.07亿元，其中工业企业为17.83亿元、商业企业为3.53亿元，饮食、服务和运输业为1.29亿元，金融业为0.42亿元，全年发放股息为1.15亿元。按陈云的看法，用这点钱就能使资本家敲锣打鼓地要求进行社会主义改造，使国家能统统把他们买下来，这是值得的。定息从1956年1月1日起计，原定到1962年止息，后延长到文化大革命开始前的1965年，利息有所降低。 The fixed-rate redemption policy has designed an "exit channel" for the demise of private capital, which means that the transformation of property rights has been substantially completed.从此，私人所有者对企业的财产关系发生了彻底的变化，资本家作为企业所有制的身份失去了意义，他们只是一个“银行存款者”，与企业营运本身再无任何财产权利关系。资本的实质已经消失，仅存一个躯壳。据社科院经济所的资料显示，全国拿定息的在职私营业主为71万人，吃息代理人为10万人，这81万人就是残存的资本家阶层。这些人大多集中在沪津等几个大中城市，其中，上海市公私合营企业中的私股为11.2亿元，几乎占总私股的一半。其中私股在500万元以上的五个大户中，有四人属于荣氏家族，第一名是荣毅仁的堂兄荣鸿三（他在香港），占975万元，每年可得定息48.7万元，即每月可得4万元；荣毅仁则占第三位，他在8个城市拥有24家纺织、印染、面粉和机械工厂。 在定息政策出台后，选择公私合营、把企业交给国家几乎成了惟一的选择。 一位资本家日后对口述史记录者桂勇回忆说，“不合营，你也生存不下去。为什么？劳资纠纷不断，就是工人斗你，你也不能开除他，工人即使不干活也得发工资、企业原材料不足、业务不足，国家把金融、原材料等全部控制好了，私营企业拿不到原材料，给你拿到的，也是价格两样的。工人的组织——工会已经成立，税务机构已经较完善了。我们已经是走投无路了，不要说厂里，连家里的钱都拿到厂里开支，到最后家都破产了，资本家风险压力很大。这样，资本家就没有什么内在的积极性了。” 1955年1月，周恩来在一次中央工作会议上以荣毅仁为例，讲道，“他是全国第一号的资本家，他在这个地方讲，他那个阶级应该消灭，可是，另外碰到的一个人又跟他讲说，你祖宗三代辛辛苦苦地搞了这点工厂民族你手里送出去实在可惜呀！他也眼泪直流，这是很自然的，合乎情理。两种情形都存在，都是真实的。这种又接受和平改造，又感到痛苦的表现，如实地反映了中国民族资产阶级的心态。如果交出工厂，如弃敝履，没有一点痛苦，那就不是资产阶级了。” 对于私人资本在中国的命运，决策层的想法在这些年也有一些渐进式的判断。 在1952年的五反运动后，毛泽东就断定，私人资本主义与计划经济的矛盾是不可调和的，他说，“资本主义所有者与社会主义所有制的矛盾，资本主义所有制和资本主义的生产社会性之间的矛盾，资本主义生产的无政府状态和国家有计划的经济建设之间的矛盾，资本主义企业内的工人和资本家之间的矛盾，都是不可克服的。”1953年，他第一次提出让资本主义在中国“绝种”，不过，他当时的时间表是十五年。在6月份的一次讲话中，他说，“所谓过渡时期，就是很剧烈很深刻的变动，按照它的社会的深刻性来说，资本主义到十五年后基本绝种了。过去枪炮很激烈，不决定资本主义绝种。”根据过渡时期总路线的规划，私人资本在中国的消亡时间是1967年。 两年多后的1955年10月，他的时间表突然提前了，在《农业合作社的一场辩论和当前的阶级斗争》一文中他明确提出要让资本主义马上“绝种”。他在七届六中全会上说，“马克思主义是有那么凶哩，良心不多哩，就是要使帝国主义绝种，封建主义绝种，资本主义绝种，小生产也绝种。这方面，良心少一点好”、“我们的目的就是要使资本主义绝种，要使它在地球上绝种，变成历史的东西。” 工商界的头面人物也都意识到了历史的必然，最后的时刻到了。11月1日，全国工商联首届执行委员会举行第二次会议，主任委员、前浙江兴业银行董事陈叔通在开幕词中，号召一切爱国的工商业者把自己的命运和国家发展的前途联系起来，在现有的基础上进一步接受社会主义改造。执委会在《告全国工商界书》中写到，“我们工商业当前的首要任务是应该坚守爱国守法的立场，积极接受社会主义改造。” 两个月后，私人资本和资产阶级作为一种经济成份和阶级结构，果然在中国“绝种”了。