Chapter 25 5. Enter the Dragon

In fact, the root of corruption is the imperial system, just as the enemy of a centralized society is centralization.As I said before, in order to maintain centralized rule in a vast country, the system of official agency must be implemented, and management must be hierarchical, which will inevitably form a bureaucratic group or bureaucratic class.If the group or class has a small number of people and a small scale, and is efficient, clean, and self-disciplined, it can be regarded as a low-cost management method.Unfortunately this is not possible.At the beginning of the founding of the dynasty, it was possible, but after a short honeymoon period, the bureaucratic group will inevitably move towards self-expansion and collective corruption, eroding the entire empire, and then collapse together with the dynasty.

Of course, this is not the wish of officials, let alone the original intention of the empire, so the reason cannot be found subjectively, but the conclusion can only be found from the system.The conclusion is that the official agency system designed by the empire actually has internal contradictions; and the focus of the contradiction is whether officials, as agents of imperial power, should try their best to safeguard the interests of the empire, or use their identities as agents to seek for themselves. Benefit. The theoretical answer is self-evident, but the actual situation is quite different.There are three reasons for this.

First, the so-called empire is actually an abstract symbol.Its so-called "fundamental interests" are also abstract.Officials are living, concrete people.Their interests are also practical and specific.When abstract theory encounters practical problems, it is often the theory that is resolved by practice.Officials have to eat and dress, support their families, and get promoted to make a fortune. This is something they have to do, and it is also in their vital interests.If these issues conflict with the so-called "fundamental interests of the empire," the latter will have to be shelved temporarily, or held high and put down gently.

Second, when the empire designed its institutions, it did not handle its relationship with its agents well.It stands to reason that the agent and the principal are both parties of interest.Their relationship should be a win-win cooperation.However, as the authorizing party, the empire has obviously never considered this issue, or has not made it clear.It neither allows the agent to occupy a certain share, nor stipulates the proportion of the commission based on the performance of the agent.The only way for the empire to reward officials is to promote their official positions, ranks, and titles.However, the promotion of officials is often not based on political performance, but is determined by other factors. Promotion may not really be able to motivate officials to serve the empire.This creates an unavoidable problem, that is, the agent cannot obtain corresponding benefits from his agency unless he uses his power for personal gain.

The third reason is that since the establishment of the imperial system, officials have gradually become professional.Generally speaking, in the official system of the past dynasties, nobles were used in the Spring and Autumn Period (hereditary), scholars were used in the Warring States Period (Keqing), Qin and Han relied on recommendation (inspection), Wei and Jin saw family background (family clan), and after the Sui and Tang Dynasties, selection was carried out through imperial examinations. A large number of people entered the bureaucracy.In the empire, this may be due to the consideration of "the world is for the public", that is, the more it has nothing to do with the royal family or the powerful group, the more likely it is to enforce the law fairly and the less likely it is to usurp the throne and seek rebellion.This is of course not bad, but it will also bring another problem at the same time, that is, since the empire's industry is not owned by the officials, the rise and fall of the empire has no direct relationship with them, so they will not sacrifice their own for the so-called "fundamental interests of the empire". Benefit.If it weren't for the constraints of the Confucian moral creed, they wouldn't even care much about changing dynasties.In fact, there are some who really don't care. For example, Feng Dao in the Five Dynasties lived in four dynasties and entered Zhongshu three times.Regardless of whether the emperor was from Shatuo, Xiyi, or Han, he would always be his prime minister calmly and happily, with long sleeves and good dancing skills, and he had both sides.This is actually a typical agent mentality, that is, only acting as an agent of imperial power, without asking where the imperial power comes from.

Although Feng Dao's approach is quite contemptuous by Qingliu Zhengzheng, it doesn't mean that other people don't have the agent mentality.The so-called "agent mentality" means "non-owner mentality" or "wage earner mentality".These "agents" or "wage earners" are very clear in their hearts: the sheep are not theirs, and they don't need to restrain themselves to maximize the long-term interests of the ranch.On the contrary, if you don't take advantage of this opportunity to take advantage of it, you will have nothing if you lose your agency.Therefore, although they knew that the excessive exploitation of the people would eventually lead to the demise of the dynasty, they would not delay or reduce this exploitation a little bit.

This was not the case in the Bangguo era when the "retainer system" was implemented, because the "officials" at that time were not professional bureaucrats.Whether you are a Qing or a doctor, each has his own fief.Their "family" and the "country" of the princes are connected as one, and they share weal and woe, or at least they are bitter.Their "official career" is not to make a living, but to really "engage in politics", that is, to realize their political ambitions and ideals.Of course, there were such officials in the imperial era, but they were a minority.Most people make a living by being an official, which is the so-called "being an official for thousands of miles is only for money".In the late imperial era, such "investment projects" even appeared: money merchants saw that someone had a "great future", and they took the initiative to lend to him when he was poor, and then doubled the repayment after he took office, so as to make huge profits.It is conceivable that when such an official becomes "one parent", it is strange that he does not scratch the ground!

The so-called "bureaucratic group" is composed of such people.Among them, there are personal grievances, official feuds, sect views, and factional disputes, but they also have common interests, which are the interests of the "agent class".Just because this kind of interest belongs not to any one person, but to the entire bureaucratic group, once the reform or reform touches this interest, the bureaucratic group will temporarily stop the party struggle among them and attack it in groups.Even the rectification of a corrupt official will arouse their sense of sadness, if the corrupt official is not "too shameful".This is also one of the reasons why the reforms and anti-corruption struggles of the past dynasties have repeatedly failed, and reformers (such as Wang Anshi) are instead regarded as "villains" and "national thieves".

Indeed, due to the professionalization of imperial officials over the long course of history, a special "professional agent class" was formed.They are a group of people who are not only different from the royal relatives, but also different from the general public. They have their own unique codes of conduct, relationship titles, customs and etiquette, and even language symbols that only belong to this class, that is, "official rules."Of course, they also have common interests as a class and group.When the interests of the empire coincide with their group interests, they are the backbone and the mainstay of the Empire State Building.Once interests conflict, they are likely to collectively fight against the supreme ruler (as was the case in the Ming Dynasty), or to collectively slow down work (as was the case in the Qing Dynasty).The empire has nothing to do with this group—it can neither rely on them nor guard against them, and in the end it has to compromise with them and reach a tacit agreement that is unannounced.Because the supreme ruler of the empire can remove and punish one of them, but he cannot take down the entire bureaucracy.The only thing that can be done, perhaps, is to fight wits and courage with them and deal with them repeatedly.

This is an asymmetrical struggle.From a clear point of view, the emperor is a strong party, while the bureaucracy is in a weak position, because the emperor, who is both an athlete and a referee, holds the highest arbitration power.However, although the emperor has great power, the number of people is small, that is, himself and a few cronies, and these cronies are often "eunuchs" like eunuchs.The bureaucracy is a huge group.They are numerous, powerful, complex and well-informed.If the emperor wants to fight against them (for example, to rectify the administration of officials and eliminate corruption), he is doomed to fight alone, and he often does not have a good reputation (such as Yongzheng).

What's more, this group actually monopolizes all the resources of the empire, including power and information.In traditional Chinese society, the people at the bottom are insulated from politics.The emperor could neither think nor be able to use them to fight and restrain the bureaucracy.As for the aloof emperor himself, especially those "maintainers" of later generations, they were raised in the deep palace without anyone knowing.They neither understand the actual situation nor are they familiar with the operation process.There will be no result other than being coaxed by officials. In fact, deception is a common practice of officials, and protecting each other and stealing positions is their survival strategy and housekeeping skills.There are usually two situations in the so-called "deception".One is "report good news but not worry", and the other is "report suffering but not tiredness".If you report good news but not bad news, your political achievements will be outstanding; if you don’t complain about suffering, you will have enough funds.Anyway, when you want an official, you announce the good news, and when you want money, you cry poor.How to report the situation depends entirely on its needs.Even if you lose a battle, you can win a victory; if you suffer a big loss, you can celebrate your victory (please refer to my book "The War of Opium and the Opium of War").What the supreme ruler hears is either "the emperor is wise" or "the world is peaceful." The bureaucratic group can turn the emperor into a fool without any difficulty. This is yet another struggle that is doomed to no good results.On one side is the imperial head of state who holds absolute power, and on the other side is the bureaucratic group with long-standing malpractices.One side is a dragon and the other side is a tiger. If a dragon fights against a tiger, both sides will suffer.If it is the "lord of male guessing" like Yongzheng, both parties will suffer.If it is a "strike emperor" like Wanli, it will be no good.In fact, although the emperor has the power to monopolize the cadres and make decisions arbitrarily, he actually has only one trump card in his hand, and that is "dismissal from office".But this is not detrimental to the entire officialdom.On the contrary, one of the laws or rules of officialdom is to keep shuffling the cards.Someone has to step down so often that someone else might come up.In the same way, there must be constant ups and downs, continuous learning of the old and the new, so that the officialdom can have vitality.Therefore, if the emperor uses the method of dismissing officials to fight against the entire bureaucratic group, then the ultimate loser can only be the emperor himself. Therefore, after repeated defeats, the supreme ruler of the empire had to admit the existence of the bureaucratic group as a relatively independent force and the existence of a series of unwritten "rules of the game" (such as bureaucratic rules) formulated by officials in the officialdom. Legitimacy and effectiveness, and even partly transfer their own power, such as handing over the selection and appointment of low-level officials to the bureaucratic group.To be more extreme, after the Ming Dynasty Xuanzong (Emperor Xuande), the emperors simply ignored the state affairs, and the state power was actually in the hands of the civil official group, which was close to the "republic of virtual monarchs".This does not seem to be wrong with the empire.After Xuanzong, there were eleven emperors in the Ming Dynasty, including Ying, Dai, Xian, Xiao, Wu, Shi, Mu, Shen, Guang, Xi, and Si, which lasted for two hundred years.The role of the bureaucracy cannot be underestimated. However, for the people, this is tantamount to handing over the sheep to the wolves to graze.A single official may not be a wolf, but a bureaucracy will definitely be a pack of wolves.Because they have great power, and the operating cost of safeguarding their own interests (including the personal interests of officials and the interests of bureaucratic groups) is high, it is impossible not to use their powers to extort and plunder.That is to say, as a group, they cannot survive a day without sucking blood.Coupled with the fact that the supreme ruler is unable to supervise and the weak people are unable to resist, over time, the bureaucratic group will gradually change from a group of shepherd dogs to a group of big bad wolves, until there are ten sheep and nine shepherds, and there are no sheep to eat. When talking about the bad governance of the empire, Mr. Wu Si said: "Bad governance can cultivate a self-inflated interest group with independent life." ("Unspoken Rules") In fact, "good governance" is the same.As long as the official agency system is implemented under the premise of non-democracy, such a group will emerge sooner or later.What's more frightening is that this group has the function of self-replication and self-repair, so it is not afraid of the elimination and elimination of individuals.In other words, the punishment of individual corrupt officials (including dismissal and beheading) does not harm the entire group, because the same people will immediately fill the gaps.It is not even afraid of the amputation of "limbs" (such as the abolition of a certain organization, or the elimination of a certain team).Because if you cut one out, it will immediately reproduce another one, and any new mechanism must be a copy or clone of the old mechanism before long.It seems that for the empire, it is not the "sorrow of separation" but the bureaucracy that "cuts constantly and makes things chaotic".