Chapter 24 4. Suicide Policy

It cannot be said that the empire promotes corruption, and no regime or system would promote corruption.Because no matter what kind of system and regime, whether monarchy, democracy, autocracy or republic, corruption will only lead to its demise.An absolute monarchy is even less tolerant of corruption than a democratic republic.Just imagine, how can an emperor who regards the whole world as his king's land allow his subjects to steal "his" property?How could he tolerate the officials under him, using the power he gave him to seek personal gain for himself, regardless of the fundamental interests of him and the empire?Therefore, in those periods when the imperial power was strong and the emperor was dictatorial, such as the Hongwu period of the Ming Dynasty and the Yongzheng period of the Qing Dynasty, the government of officials was often better, and corruption was often less.On the contrary, if corruption is rampant and greed for ink is prevalent, either the emperor's power will be sidelined, or the king willfully condone it.But even if it is connivance, it is mostly an individual case (such as Qianlong's connivance and embarrassment), and it is unlikely to be a rule, let alone advocated.In fact, all dynasties, at least in theory, have regarded the fight against corruption as the top priority of consolidating the political power.As I said in the book "Melancholy of the Empire", China was one of the first countries in the world to establish a supervisory system. It has had a special supervisory department since the Qin and Han Dynasties.It was called "Yushifu" in the Western Han Dynasty, "Yushitai" after the Eastern Han Dynasty, and "Duchayuan" in Ming and Qing Dynasties.Both Yushitai and the Metropolitan Procuratorate are independent departments directly under the emperor. Not only are they not restricted by other officials and departments, but they have the right to supervise all departments and officials.First of all, it has a lot of authority. From the prince Zaifu, the important minister Xungui, down to the governors, counties, officials, officials, and even other supervisory cadres and leaders of the Ministry of Supervision, they can play young.The second is that the responsibility is light. You can "gossip about things" (also called "rumours and bombs"), and you don't have to bear the responsibility of verification, and you are not subject to anti-sitting punishment.The third is strong independence, and juvenile juvenile officials do not need to notify the relevant departments, nor do they need to be approved by their own chiefs.In order to support the censor's independent exercise of supervisory power, the imperial court even stipulated strict procedures and grand etiquette.For any major impeachment case, the censor must wear a crown called "Xiezhi xiezhai crown" and a robe with white inside and red outside, and read the "indictment" in the court hall in front of the emperor and officials. "The impeached official must immediately stand up and await punishment.There is no doubt that supervision is valued.What's more, the dynasties of the past dynasties not only had special agencies to supervise officials, but also had strict laws to punish corruption, and the crackdown was often very severe.Zhu Yuanzhang even stipulated that anyone who accepts 80% bribes must be skinned and real grass (skinned alive, grass stuffed in the stomach).Is the empire condoning corruption?

However, corruption has not been restrained because of this, on the contrary, there is a trend of "corruption from the past and successor to successor".A group of corrupt officials fell, and more corrupt officials followed.The final result is that one dynasty after another collapsed amid widespread and incurable corruption.It's almost become a rule.One of the reasons, I am afraid, is that the empire's anti-corruption and honesty campaign does not cure the symptoms, and it is impossible to cure the root causes.In fact, since power can be redeemed, wherever power relations exist, there is the possibility of corruption.Therefore, in order to eradicate corruption, power must be limited.At the very least, the redemption of power must be curbed.

It is a pity that the actions of the empire are often in the opposite direction. First, it is simply impossible for empires to limit power.On the contrary, as we pointed out in the second chapter of this book, its development process is a process of continuously strengthening the centralization of power.Therefore, the more centralized power is intensified, the more serious the corruption will be.For example, the corruption in the Ming and Qing dynasties was much more serious than that in the Qin, Han, Tang and Song dynasties.These two dynasties were simply corrupt.The so-called "official rules" are the atmosphere at this time.And these two dynasties were the periods with the most centralized power, the strongest imperial power, and the most autocratic.In this sense, it can be said that corruption and autocracy are twins.

However, it is impossible to ask the empire to give up centralization, because power is its lifeline.Without this coercive centralization, the imperial system would collapse in an instant.Not even to limit power.Because if you want to limit, you must first limit the power of the emperor, which is tantamount to not wanting the imperial system.Of course, the powers of officials are also limited.But this "limitation" is only relative to the imperial power.Compared with the public, there are almost no restrictions.In fact, since the empire wanted to maintain its absolute rule over its subjects, and the emperor himself could not personally herd the people, he had to give his agents absolute power in the practice of agency.Undoubtedly, officials have this unlimited power only when they exercise agency.If they no longer represent the imperial power, then they have nothing, nothing.But this is enough to cause corruption.No one would be stupid enough to engage in corruption when they were not representing the imperial power, and in fact no one would come to buy it back then.On the contrary, precisely because officials understood that their power was unlimited (and in that sense limited) only on behalf of the empire, it was imperative to seize the moment to cash in on it.The right to use it is invalid, and it becomes invalid after the expiration date. This is why many officials are very anxious and crazy when using power for personal gain.

The limited power of officials is also because they are subject to the supervision of superior leaders and supervisory departments.The problem is that these people are also officials, and they are essentially the same as the officials being supervised.This is tantamount to letting the big wolf dog supervise the shepherd dog, and the effect can be imagined.In fact, the power (supervisory power and supervisory power) in the hands of these officials can also be sold or leased. Same as robbery.The so-called "official rules" are actually an unwritten norm for this kind of spoils distribution.Since the establishment of this standard, the shepherd dogs have become more handy and bold when exploiting the people and selling power.

Obviously, the question is not entirely about whether power and its use are restricted and supervised, but more about who will restrict and supervise it.It is precisely on this most important issue that the empire cannot make the right choice.Because it is simply impossible to hand over the power of supervision to the people. Although this is the only possible way to eradicate corruption, it is tantamount to suicide for the imperial system.Therefore, it would rather choose a solution that treats the symptoms rather than the root cause, and even tolerates corruption semi-openly.There is no doubt that under such a system, any supervision of power, and the design of such supervision, will be futile and even in vain.The problem is not how many technical difficulties there are, but whether the empire really has the desire to supervise itself, and whether, as a typical power society (centralized society), the power possessed by the empire can really be supervised.

It seems that the fundamental reason lies in the system, and the imperial system itself is absurd and contradictory.Empire is a large company with no shareholders and no equity.Its wealth and property rights are unclear, and its source of power is unclear.Obviously relying on taxes to support operations, but refuses to admit that taxpayers are the masters.Obviously relying on violence to maintain the rule, but it is said that the emperor's grace is mighty.As a result, the people who are most qualified to supervise (the people) have no right to supervise, and the people (emperor) who should be supervised are not supervised, and the bureaucratic group caught in the middle can take both.What hope is there for such a system?

The only thing you can count on is morality.It is undeniable that it is precisely because of the role of morality that the officials of the empire will not be corrupted and wiped out.In the history of the empire, there is indeed no shortage of officials at all levels who are self-denying and dedicated to public service, and there are also no shortage of supervisory officials who persist in fighting and even die in order to curb corruption and crack down on corrupt officials.They are people with ideals and beliefs.In their view, dedicating oneself to ideals and beliefs is noble and glorious.In fact, they also deservedly received the commendation of the empire and the respect of the people (such as Bao Zheng, such as Hai Rui).For most officials, however, this nobility and glory cannot be imitated, because the price is too high.Similarly, unscrupulous corruption and breaking the law should not follow suit, because the risk is too great.What is more feasible is that corruption does not violate the law, and greed comes with distaste.For example, collecting the "consumption envy" and "rule rules" that everyone accepts is within the scope of authority, that is, on the premise of not obviously violating imperial laws and generally accepted morals, to seek appropriate benefits for oneself and others.This is likely the mindset of most officials.In all fairness, as people who have read Confucian classics, these officials once had ideals and beliefs.It's a pity that ideals and beliefs cannot be eaten.The salary is too low, so they have to choose "atypical corruption" that everyone can still recognize.I even suspect that the so-called "official rules" were invented precisely out of this mentality.

So, why did the empire implement a low-wage system? Low wages naturally have a reason for low wages, and this reason is the so-called "moral principle".In ancient Chinese society, morality was paramount.It is not only the "foundation of the country", but also the "prescription for governing the country".In other words, state power is established by moral principles, and state government orders are also carried out by moral principles.In this way, as the issuers and executors of state decrees, officials at all levels should theoretically be moral models.They should take the lead in thrift, honesty and honesty, and of course they should not get too high a salary, so as not to be lazy and waste extravagance.On the contrary, if they can be diligent and frugal, save their clothes and food, share their worries with their fathers, and set an example for the common people, they can keep the country rich and the people strong, and the world peaceful.

But this is probably just a high-sounding statement, and the actual situation is likely to be: the empire's finances simply cannot afford a huge bureaucratic group.We know that a strong army and competent officials are necessary for centralized government over a vast country.In addition, the grandeur of the royal family and the ostentation of the government are also political needs, because otherwise it is not enough to reflect the sanctity of imperial power, and it is not enough to awe the common people and fear the foreign countries.This requires sufficient financial resources, and the ideals or illusions of "kingly land" and "lord of Yao and Shun" do not allow the empire to directly levy excessive taxes on its people.In such a situation, you can only choose: the royal style must be guaranteed, otherwise the dignity will not survive; the army's food and salary must also be guaranteed, otherwise the political power will not be guaranteed; the one that can be careless is the salary of officials. .In fact, in some periods, even these extremely low or relatively low salaries were often not received by officials, or were deducted by the court in disguise.At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, officials even had to pay money to the court in turn when they took office.Sima Zhi, who used to be the prefect of Julu, had to commit suicide on the way to Jinjing because he couldn't pay the newly appointed "assignment money" and refused to exploit the people.

It seems that the empire's calculations are very precise.When dealing with the army, they give money but not power or status.When dealing with civil servants, they give power but not money (or less), but they don't hesitate to give status.The bosses of the empire knew very well that the military should not be too powerful.If the power is too heavy, the tail will not be lost, so money should be used to buy its force.If the army has money but no power, it will only guard the house and will not rebel.Not to mention not giving money.If he doesn't give money, no one will work for him.If a dynasty has to deduct even the army's food and pay, it will not be far from the end.Civil servants do not need to spend money to redeem them.Because civil servants originally had nothing, their power and status were bestowed by the empire, and these powers and status themselves were resources and wealth.Therefore, not only does it not need to be rewarded with generous salaries for civil servants, but they can be publicly tendered and sold in the market at a clear price. Selling officials to sell (yu) nobles had already happened at the beginning of the empire, and the talented Qin Huang and Han Wu were the instigators of it.In the fourth year of Qin Shihuang (243 BC), he began to confer titles, and a thousand stones of millet worshiped the first level.Selling officials began with Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, and six hundred stones can buy Langguan.In the following dynasties, there have been such situations, some selling real shortages, and some buying names.Of course, selling officials to sell titles is only a special case, not a general rule. Most people still enter the officialdom through the "right way" (such as the imperial examination).But the official title can be sold, which means that the power can be redeemed.Civil servants have no other way to make money, so what if they don't seek rent?Since the empire is unwilling and unable to provide high salaries to maintain integrity, it can only condone (at least acquiesce) officials to sell power.Perhaps, from the perspective of the empire, it is only natural for officials who have the merit of shepherding to ask the flock to donate a little wool! However, this is tantamount to passing on the financial crisis of the empire to the people.On the surface, this seems to be very clever—it not only saves money, but also maintains the illusion of "kingly way" of low taxes and low salaries for the people, but it is actually a very stupid and dangerous suicide policy, because it shakes the foundation of the country. .What is the country?The people are the foundation of the country.The capacity of the people is limited, but the exploitation of officials is endless.The first tax is light, the second tax is heavy, and the third tax is a bottomless pit.As long as taxes are allowed on top of taxes and fees are charged on top of fees, the sheep will be plucked one day.When the people are exploited to the point where they can't bear it, they will take risks and revolt. At that time, it will be too late to regret.