Chapter 10 10. The channel is transferred to troops, and the road ahead begins to be smooth

After the Red Army crossed the old mountain boundary, the most urgent problem to be solved was where the Central Red Army was going. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had deployed heavy troops in the direction of the Central Red Army heading towards the base areas of the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. If he followed this path, he would inevitably fight another bloody battle on the Xiangjiang River. The Red Army had no capital to gamble at this time. .Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian suggested to Zhou Enlai to turn to Guizhou, where the enemy's strength is weak.However, in the "group of three" controlled by Li De and Bogu, Zhou Enlai was powerless and could not determine the overall situation; Li De and Bogu were stubborn and made a decision to continue to implement the original plan.

At 20 o'clock in the evening on December 9, 1934, Bogu and Li De sent a telegram to the heads of the corps and columns in the name of Zhu De, the commander of the field army, and issued the deployment of marching and fighting in the original direction tomorrow.At the end of the telegram, a special sentence was added: "But the general direction of progress must not be changed!" According to the deployment of the Red Army Command, the Red Army Corps dispatched passages and at the same time sent alerts to Suining and Jingxian County; Drive into Zhai and Shicun areas, and arrive at Horseshoe Street on the same day. On December 11, the Red Second Division led by Chen Guang and Liu Yalou, the vanguard of the First Red Army, captured Tongtong City. On the 12th, the main force of the First Army and the Ninth Army assembled in the channel and its surrounding areas; the main force of the Third Army entered the Chang'an Fort area; the Fifth and Eighth Army moved westward from Liuyuan, Chenkou, and Malongtang; the Field Army Command , The Military Commission column arrived in Furong Town.

At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had changed the pursuit force of the Kuomintang Army from the original Fifth Route Army to two corps, with Liu Jianxu and Xue Yue as the commander-in-chief respectively.Xue Yue governs the headquarters and Zhou Hunyuan's department, Liu Jianxu governs the headquarters and Li Yunjie's department. The main forces of the enemy's "pursuing and suppressing" forces have entered Chengbu, Suining, Jingxian, Hongjiang, Wugang and other places, constructing fortifications, setting up nets and treat.If the Central Red Army continues to go northward to Xiangxi to join the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps, it will fall into the pocket formation set up by the enemy in advance, and the consequences will be disastrous; this has aroused great concern among most leaders of the Central Committee.Zhou Enlai later recalled: "From the junction of Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou, Chairman Mao, Jiaxiang, and Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) criticized the military line and held meetings and debates along the way..." The channel meeting held on December 12 was this major debate the beginning.

The channel meeting is a central meeting decided temporarily.The main members who participated in the meeting were Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang and Li De.The central issue is the Red Army strategic issues at the time.At the meeting, Mao Zedong strongly advocated abandoning the original plan to join the Second Red Army and the Sixth Red Army, and instead moved to Guizhou, where the enemy's troops were relatively weak, to gain the initiative and save the crisis.This proposition of Mao Zedong is undoubtedly correct.First of all, decisive battles with superior enemy forces can be avoided.At this time, the Red Army was downsizing unprecedentedly and extremely fatigued. If it went north to western Hunan and joined the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps, it would inevitably face a decisive battle with an enemy force five or six times its own size, which would be very detrimental to the Red Army.Secondly, you can avoid the strong and attack the weak to gain the initiative.Among the various enemy armies, the Guizhou army is the weakest, with the worst weapons and equipment, lax discipline and low combat effectiveness.Moreover, there are many factions and contradictions within the Qian army. The Red Army can use these contradictions to break them one by one.Third, it can disrupt the enemy's plan to encircle and annihilate the Red Army on the way north to western Hunan, and it can also form a tripartite situation with the Fourth Red Front Army and the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps, which is beneficial to the future strategic development of the Red Army—that is, going east can compete with the Red Army. The Second Red Army and the Sixth Army will meet up, and they can join forces with the Fourth Red Front Army when they go north.

Mao Zedong made this proposition after careful consideration.He analyzed Li De's method and Chiang Kai-shek's method very clearly. One arranged the pockets and the other drilled them in. The two cooperated well, but in the end it was the Red Army who suffered.Now we must adopt the strategy of "choosing weak troops to fight".Who is the weak army?It is the army of Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie, who are tofu soldiers who have not been beaten.Why did Mao Zedong make such a judgment?That's when he already knew that Wang Jialie's troops were called "Double Spear Soldiers", that is, rifles and opium guns.What's more, Chiang Kai-shek was beyond his reach there.

Mao Zedong's proposal was strongly opposed by Li De, but supported and supported by Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and others.Bogu also had to admit that it was only in Guizhou that he might encounter less resistance from the enemy.The meeting passed the decision to turn the marching route to Guizhou.But in terms of the direction of strategic action, Bogu and Li De still stubbornly insisted on going north to western Hunan, rejecting Mao Zedong's correct proposition of abandoning the rendezvous with the Second and Sixth Red Army. Li De said in "China Chronicle": "Before arriving in Liping, we held a flight meeting, and discussed the future combat plan at the meeting. When talking about the original plan, I draw everyone's attention: whether it is possible to let those who are in the Zhou Hunyuan's troops and other enemy forces chasing us on a parallel route overtook us, and we ourselves turned north behind them to establish contact with the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps—Mao Zedong rejected this suggestion and insisted on continuing westward into the interior of Guizhou This time he not only got the support of Luo Fu and Wang Jiaxiang, but also Zhou Enlai." According to Deng Yingchao's recollection, the meeting was held at a farmer's home outside Tongdao City, which was holding a wedding at that time. ——At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a profound analysis of the current grim situation of the Central Red Army, and strongly advocated abandoning the original plan to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army and instead advance to Guizhou, where the enemy's troops are relatively weak, so as to break through the enemy's heavy encirclement and fight for Take the initiative, look for opportunities to win a few battles, boost the morale of the whole army, and try to turn the crisis.

The channel meeting was an important meeting held by the Central Red Army during the Long March, and it was also the beginning of a series of meetings on the strategic shift of the Red Army. Without the channel meeting, there would be no future Liping Conference, Houchang Conference, and the significant Zunyi Conference.The decision made at this meeting to implement the strategic transfer of the Red Army to Guizhou is related to the life and death of the Red Army.The channel was transferred, and the way forward for the Red Army began to flow. After the channel meeting, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered the Central Red Army to "quickly break away from the enemy in Guangxi and seek maneuvers in order to turn northward." On December 13, the Central Red Army was divided into two armies, left and right, starting from the passage area and continuing westward. On December 17, the column of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission entered Liping.