Chapter 18 Chapter 17 Opening Up New Revolutionary Bases

After the main force of the Fourth Red Army left Jinggang Mountains, under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, they embarked on a journey to attack southern Jiangxi. More than 3,600 people marched along the narrow path, braving the wind and snow.The troops passed through Dafen and Zuo'an in Suichuan, wiped out a battalion of enemies who came to intercept them in Dafen, and jumped out of the enemy's tight siege.Afterwards, the troops entered Shangyou and Chongyi in southern Jiangxi in late January 1929. He Jian, the acting commander-in-chief of the Hunan-Jiangxi "Conference and Suppression" Army, found that the main force of the Fourth Red Army had left Jinggangshan and went south. He sent an urgent telegram to Chiang Kai-shek and reported the deployment of the "Conference and Suppression" to Jinggangshan; , Liu Shiyi, the 15th Brigade of the Fifth Division followed and pursued the Fourth Red Army.

Under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, the main force of the Fourth Red Army adopted a circling "circle" tactic to avoid the strong and attack the weak, and finally got rid of the pursuit of heavy troops. On January 22, the Fourth Red Army attacked Dayu County. On the 24th, the enemy Li Wenbin's brigade besieged Dayu County and fought fiercely with the Fourth Red Army.Due to the long journey and exhaustion of soldiers and horses, the Fourth Red Army rushed to the battle and suffered heavy casualties.In order to break out of the siege, He Tingying, the representative of the Red 28th Regiment, was seriously injured. A few days later, he was attacked by the enemy while marching at night.

After the Fourth Red Army left Dayu, it turned to the "three south" areas (Quannan, Longnan, Dingnan) and guerrillaized Anyuan, Xunwu and other places.Unexpectedly, in the battle of Xunwuxiang Mountain, they fought against Liu Shiyi's troops. Because the 28th regiment and the military headquarters were in front, the 31st regiment had not followed up. Several leaders of the military headquarters were besieged by the enemy, and Chen Yi was caught. Recognized by the enemy.He survived after knocking down two enemies.During the Battle of Xiangshan, Wu Ruolan, chief of the Women's Movement Section of the Fourth Red Army and Zhu De's wife, was injured in his leg to cover the transfer of the army headquarters, and unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy.After being tortured, she remained steadfast and unyielding, and was killed by the enemy in Ganzhou Weifu on February 12 at the age of 23.

The continuous defeat of the troops and the loss of soldiers and generals made Mao Zedong and Zhu De feel very confused and painful.Because they always wanted to get rid of the enemy's pursuit, it was impossible for the troops to take root and carry out mass work. The masses in southern Jiangxi failed to mobilize for a while, and the Red Army was in a very passive position like a fish in shallow water.Thankfully, although the troops were in trouble, not a single one fled, much less mutinied.In order to reverse the situation, Mao Zedong and Zhu De led their troops into Ruijin. On February 10, which was the first day of the Lunar New Year, the troops came to Ruijin Dabaidi.At this time, Liu Shiyi, the Jiangxi enemy, was still chasing after him.In order to get rid of chasing the enemy and boost morale, Mao Zedong and Zhu De decided to take advantage of the favorable terrain of Dabaidi to beat Liu Shiyi's troops.After the deployment was complete, the troops entered the position, and at around 2 pm, the enemy Liu Shiyi entered the Red Army's ambush circle.The fighting continued into the evening, and the two sides were still in a state of confrontation.The next day, the Red Army launched a fierce offensive, fought the enemy bravely, and finally defeated the enemy. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, they won a complete victory and wiped out the besieged enemies.More than 1,500 enemies were wiped out during the service, and more than 800 people under Xiao Zhiping and Zhong Huan, the head and deputy commanders of the enemy's regiment, were captured alive (Xiao and Zhong were mixed into the captive group and released).

The victory in Dabaidi greatly inspired the morale of the army and won the initiative. It was the first victory of the Fourth Red Army since it moved to southern Jiangxi.The enemy Li Wenbin's troops heard that Liu Shiyi's troops had suffered a disastrous defeat, so they did not dare to pursue rashly.Since then, the Fourth Red Army has gained a firm foothold in southern Jiangxi. Later, in order to break the siege of Jinggang, the Fourth Red Army sent troops to Ningdu, and then raised its flag eastward, entering the Donggu area of ​​Ji'an.On February 20 of that year, the Fourth Red Army and the Jiangxi Red Second and Fourth Regiments led by Li Wenlin, Zeng Bingchun, and Duan Qifeng, who were active in the Donggu area, successfully joined forces in Donggu Luokeng.

"There is Jinggang Mountain on the top, and Donggu Mountain on the bottom." Donggu is the center of another red base area in western Jiangxi formed in April 1928.After the Red Fourth Army joined forces with the Red Second and Fourth Regiment Donggu, a grand celebration meeting was held.At the celebration meeting, Mao Zedong highly praised the achievements of the Donggu base led by Li Wenlin and others, saying that the Fourth Red Army is an "iron army" and the second and fourth regiments of the Red Army are "steel troops". The whole of China must be liberated.At the meeting, Zhu De spoke highly of the significance of the joining forces of the two armies, and said jokingly that the Kuomintang reactionaries shouted to defeat "Zhu Mao" every day, but "Zhu Mao" fought more and more, and now you have become "Zhu Mao".After joining forces, the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army donated 4,000 yuan in silver and a large number of bullets to the Fourth Red Army, and placed more than 300 wounded and sick for the Fourth Red Army; the Fourth Red Army presented 4 machine guns and 1 mortar to the Fourth Red Army. The second and fourth regiments, and a group of cadres such as Mao Zetan were left behind to strengthen the work in the Donggu base area.

In Donggu, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and others heard the news that Jinggangshan had fallen.Mao Zedong, Zhu De and the soldiers of the Red Army were deeply saddened.In view of the fact that the Jiangxi enemy Li Wenbin's department was approaching Donggu, and Jin Handing's department was also attacking Donggu, so the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army decided to change the original policy of open separatism in a fixed area to a variable and constant change. The guerrilla policy of "fighting in circles" led the Fourth Red Army to move south along the borders of Fujian and Jiangxi to hold back the "pursuit" of the enemy.

After a week's rest in Donggu, the Fourth Red Army left Donggu on February 25 to attack southern Jiangxi and western Fujian.The second and fourth regiments of the Red Army went to Xingguo and other places for guerrilla warfare. After joining forces in Donggu, Chen Yi once wrote a poem: Since then, the Fourth Red Army passed through Yongfeng, Ningdu, Guangchang, and then turned to Ruijin Rentian, setting off a new revolutionary storm in the vast areas of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. After Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan led the Fifth Red Army to break out of the encirclement, they braved the wind and snow and rushed towards southern Jiangxi.

Where is the Fourth Red Army?No one knows, so we have to search while walking.The Fifth Red Army passed through Zuo'an, passed Shangyu, Yue Chongyi, crossed Zhangshui, and arrived near Dayu New City on February 9, 1929.At this time, it is Lunar New Year's Eve.At this time, the Fourth Red Army was in Dabaidi in Ruijin. When the Fifth Red Army was camping in a village near Dayu New City, the Jiangxi enemy Liu Shiyi heard the news and attacked Dayu from Chongyi.When the Fifth Red Army heard the gunshots, they assembled in an emergency, set off overnight, and moved in the direction of Xinfeng.After that, they passed through the borders of Anyuan and Huichang, and marched towards Yudu, searching for the Fourth Red Army.

On March 7th of that year, with the cooperation of Yudu Party organizations and local armed forces, the Fifth Red Army captured Yudu County in one fell swoop and wiped out a regular battalion defending the enemy.This was the first victory of the Fifth Red Army since its withdrawal from Jinggangshan.However, due to the battle all the way, the troops were seriously downsized. The Fifth Red Army took the capital lightly, which made Liu Shiyi terrified, and had to divide his troops to deal with the Fifth Red Army.When Liu Shiyi's troops came to Yudu, Peng Dehuai commanded the troops to cross the Yudu River and retreat to the Xiaomi area in the south of the city.When the Fifth Red Army camped in Xiaomi, it was attacked by the enemy again, and the party representative Teng Daiyuan and chief of staff Deng Ping were injured.For this reason, Peng Dehuai decided to place the wounded and sick such as Teng and Deng in the Xiaomi area to recuperate, and led the troops to disperse everywhere, mobilize the masses, replenish troops, and raise supplies; The army entered and occupied Anyuan County, wiped out the reactionary armed forces in the city, and seized a large amount of military supplies.

Regarding this period of history, Peng Dehuai recorded in "Reminiscences of the Past": "In order to avoid being destroyed, we led the six or seven hundred people who were housed, plus more than a thousand people who were wounded, disabled, sick, and weak, from the cliffs in the abdomen of Jinggang Mountain. Breaking out to the south, I was ambushed by the enemy again in Zuo'an. After breaking through the siege, I broke out of the enemy's heavy siege after days and nights of hard work (at that time, the plight of starvation and hunger was indescribable). However, the enemy continued to pursue, block, attack, As a side attack, our army passed Chongyi, Anyuan, Huichang and other counties, and arrived in the Liantang and Dongcun areas of Xingguo in about a month, where we found the local Party organization and the Second Regiment. Under the cover, he had a better understanding of the enemy's situation, and got two days of rest. During this long-distance battle march, there were only more than 300 people left in the department, so he deeply realized the importance of the base area. After a little rest, the White Army Liu Shiyi's troops They pursued and occupied Liantang. Our army broke away from the white army's pursuit by night, and rushed to Yudu City, and wiped out a battalion of Liu Brigade's remaining troops and a total of more than ten people from the militia group. When Liu Brigade returned to rescue, I moved again Captured Anyuan County, and wiped out hundreds of militia members in the city. At that time, they were still preparing to return to Jinggangshan to restore the Hunan-Jiangxi border base area, and found documents in the reactionary county office in Anyuan County to learn the news that the Fourth Red Army had captured Changting. Cooperating with the Fourth Red Army’s actions, our army marched northward to occupy Ruijin (Teng Yudu was injured and recuperated). At this time, the Fifth Red Army’s troops grew from more than 300 people to more than 700 people.” In this way, the Fifth Red Army immediately entered Ruijin County from Anyuan via Huichang.While carrying out mass work, while training the troops, the camera got in touch with the Fourth Red Army. The Fourth Red Army entered Changting in western Fujian in early March. On March 14th, he fought against the enemy Guo Fengming in Changling Village, and won a great victory. More than 2,000 enemies were captured, and Guo Fengming, an indigenous warlord in western Fujian, was killed, and then Tingzhou City was occupied.In Tingzhou, the Red Fourth Army supplemented a large amount of military supplies, and carried out a division of troops near Tingzhou for more than half a month, reorganized the organizational system of the Red Fourth Army, organized the troops into three columns, and then returned to Jiangxi South. On April 1, the Fourth Red Army returned to Ruijin and joined the Fifth Red Army in Ruijin.The reunion of the two armies was filled with joy.Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Peng Dehuai and other leaders of the two armies also felt gratified that the Fourth Red Army and the Fifth Red Army would meet in southern Jiangxi. On April 3, 1929, in Ruijin, the Front Committee received the "Letter from the Central Committee to Comrades Runzhi and Yujie and to the Special Committee of the Hunan-Jiangxi Frontier", that is, the "Letter from February". The letter from the central government was sent on February 7.The letter from the Central Committee introduced the current international and domestic situation to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army, deliberately emphasized the importance of urban work, and made a relatively pessimistic estimate of the future of the Red Army in the countryside.The letter pointed out that the Fourth Red Army must be divided into small units, "scattered into the villages on the Hunan and Jiangxi borders to carry out and deepen the agrarian revolution" in order to "avoid the concentration of the enemy's targets and facilitate the supply and persistence"; and proposed that Zhu De and Mao Zedong " Leave the army", "come to the central government quickly", say something like "convinced that Comrades Zhu and Mao must leave the army at present", "after the two comrades have received a decision from the central committee", "should resolutely leave the army and come to the central government immediately". Mao Zedong believed that "the spirit of the Central Committee's letter in February is not good", and did not take seriously the pessimistic arguments in the Central Committee's letter.To this end, a special meeting of the Front Committee was held to discuss the letter from the Central Committee.Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan and others all attended the meeting. The vast majority of comrades on the front committee deeply felt the same way and disagreed with Zhu and Mao leaving the army. According to the opinions of the majority of comrades at the meeting of the Front Committee, on April 5, Mao Zedong wrote a reply letter to the Central Committee on behalf of the Front Committee.The letter stated clearly: "The central government's assessment of the objective situation and subjective forces in this letter is too pessimistic. We feel that the party made a huge mistake of putschism in the past, but now it has a tendency to liquidationism in some places. The central government asked us to divide our troops into small groups and disperse them to the countryside. Zhu and Mao left the army to hide their big targets. The two factions of Jiangxi and Guangxi are fighting for Jiangxi, and at the same time, western Fujian and western Zhejiang. Expand the number of the Red Army in the three provinces, resulting in the separation of the masses, and complete this plan within a period of one year." In the reply letter of the Front Committee, based on the personal experience of the Fourth Red Army, it explained the dangers of guerrilla division and pointed out: "A company or battalion is used as a unit to act alone, disperse in the countryside, use guerrilla tactics to mobilize the masses, and avoid targets. It was planned and implemented many times before it failed.” Therefore, the Front Committee believes: “The worse the environment is, the more concentrated the troops must be, and the more determined the leaders must fight, in order to be able to deal with the enemy. Only in a good environment can we Divide troops into guerrilla attacks." The reply letter of the Front Committee also emphasized: "The development of rural struggles, the establishment of red political power in small areas, the creation and expansion of the Red Army, especially the main conditions for helping urban struggles and promoting the rise of the revolutionary tide." "Abandoning urban struggles is a mistake." , but we are afraid of the development of peasant power, thinking that it will surpass the power of the workers and be harmful to the revolution... We are also wrong in thinking." In the reply letter, the former committee also reported to the Central Committee its plan to win Jiangxi and also western Fujian and western Zhejiang in one year. Finally, starting from a high degree of organizational discipline, Mao Zedong proposed that if Zhu and Mao were to leave the army, the central government should send Liu Bocheng and Yun Daiying to replace them, so as to facilitate work.He wrote: "If the central government needs Zhu and Mao to change jobs due to other matters, I hope they will send capable people. In our opinion, Comrade Liu Bocheng can be in the military, and Comrade Yun Daiying can be in the party and politics. If the two can be dispatched Come on, it's better than us." This reply letter from the Front Committee was approved by most of the members of the Front Committee.Peng Dehuai also wrote a letter to the central government on April 4, expressing similar views. Later, after the Central Committee received this letter, with the efforts of Zhou Enlai, they did not insist on the original proposal, so Zhu and Mao did not leave the Fourth Red Army.It can be seen that the opinions of the former committee's reply to the letter have had an impact on the central government. On April 8, the Fourth Red Army and the Fifth Red Army marched to the capital. On the 11th, another enlarged meeting of the Front Committee was held in Yudu.At the meeting, Peng Dehuai earnestly and resolutely proposed that the Fifth Red Army should fight back to Jinggangshan to restore the base area.Mao Zedong and the former committee agreed with Peng Dehuai's opinion.After the meeting, the Fifth Red Army returned to Jinggangshan, and the Fourth Red Army divided its forces in southern Jiangxi.From then on, the Fourth Red Army and the Fifth Red Army became horns of each other and started a new struggle. Since Zhu and Mao's Red Army attacked southern Jiangxi, with the deepening of the struggle, the differences between the proletarian and non-proletarian ideologies within the Party of the Fourth Red Army became more and more clear, and the party building in the Red Army was facing a severe situation. In late June 1929, in order to sum up the struggle experience of the Fourth Army over the past half a year after it left the mountain, and solve the problem of party and Red Army construction, the Front Committee of the Fourth Army held the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army Party in Lunmingtang, Longyan, West Fujian.Due to the influence of the "February Letter" from the Central Committee at this party congress, and the fact that the Red Army was in its infancy, the understanding of many issues was very inconsistent, and the leadership of the former committee failed to achieve unity, so some disputes arose. The main issues of debate before the "Seventh National Congress" are: 1. Regarding the Party's leadership over the military.During the Jinggangshan period, party representatives were set up in the Red Army, the branch was established on the company, and the party's leadership principles for the army were determined.However, in the context of frequent wars, some cadres with old military awareness and habitual forces felt constrained and expressed dissatisfaction, believing that "the power of the party representatives is too great" and that "the work of the Military Commission has been replaced by the front committee." The idea of ​​"military leadership in politics" and the slogan of "command externally". 2. On the issue of democratic centralism.Some comrades think that the party representatives are a "patriarchal system". After a long time of democracy, the party representatives have the final say.Advocates of "bottom-up democracy", no matter how big or small, it must be discussed by the lower level, and then the higher level will make a decision, otherwise it is undemocratic. 3. On the issue of fighting against the remnants of warlordism.Some people believed that "it is not good to lead the army without beating or scolding", "the drums of the Town God's Temple will be dusted if they are not beaten for three days", advocated that "soldiers take obedience as their bounden duty", and proposed to abolish the "Soldiers Committee". 4. Regarding the establishment of base areas.Some comrades with a purely military viewpoint neglected the fundamental task of the Red Army's war, and were unwilling to do arduous mass work and build a solid base area, but were keen on "traveling across the state", "recruiting troops and buying horses", "drinking with big bowls and eating with big pieces" "meat" life of a bandit. The focus of this debate later focused on the issue of whether to establish a military commission. During the Jinggangshan period, there was a military commission, and Mao Zedong, Chen Yi, and Zhu De all served as secretaries of the military commission. In January 1929, after Zhu and Mao's Red Army descended from the mountain, in order to cope with the dangerous situation and reduce the number of levels, at the meeting of the front committee of Luo Fuzhang in Xunwuxiang Mountain, the Military Commission was once abolished, and the front committee was under the command. On the eve of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, disagreements arose on the issue of whether to set up a military commission again. At the "Hulei Conference" in Yongding at the end of May, debates began. On the issue of the establishment of the military commission, centralization or decentralization, Zhu, There were disagreements between Mao and Liu Angong, Lin Biao, etc., who argued fiercely and expanded the contradictions. On June 8, the Fourth Red Army held an enlarged meeting of the Front Committee after conquering Shanghang Baisha, and discussed again whether to establish a military committee.Liu Angong, secretary of the Provisional Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army at the time, strongly advocated the establishment of a military commission, accusing "the party has too much control" and "too much power in the front committee", and Mao Zedong was "patriarchal system", "secretary dictatorship", "self-created principles", "Disobedience to the Central Committee" and so on.Lin Biao, then commander of the First Column of the Fourth Red Army, sent a letter to Mao Zedong a few hours before the meeting, accusing Zhu De of having "feudal relations", "warlord style", and "politician methods", etc., so as to provoke the relationship between Mao Zedong and Zhu De . At the "White Sand Conference", Mao Zedong put forward four written opinions, advocating centralization of power, opposing "decentralization of power", and maintaining the direct leadership of the former committee over the Red Army.But Mao Zedong's correct opinion failed to reach a consensus among the leadership.At the meeting, the two opinions became more and more contentious.Mao Zedong felt that "there is no life and no death", and angrily proposed to resign as the former secretary of the party committee.The meeting finally adopted Mao Zedong's correct proposition by an absolute majority of 36 votes to 5 votes, but agreed to Mao's resignation as the former party secretary, and designated Chen Yi as the temporary former party secretary.In the middle of the night, Lin Biao asked Jiang Hua, the secretary of the former committee, to forward a letter to Mao Zedong, expressing his disapproval of Mao Zedong's leaving the former committee, and hoped that he would be determined to correct the mistakes in the party. On June 14, according to the decision of the former committee, Mao Zedong wrote a long article in the form of a reply letter to Lin Biao, stating his views on issues of controversy within the entire army. In the letter, Mao Zedong summarized the debates within the Fourth Red Army into 14 issues, criticized the erroneous ideas within the party, analyzed the reasons for the debates within the party, and explained the reasons for "resigning from the former party secretary".Mao Zedong believed that the disputes within the Fourth Red Army were not personal and temporary issues, but "historical knots", "the last struggle of wrong ideological lines", and "serious political line issues".The words are heavy, but the general orientation is correct.The thoughts expressed in this letter were the basis for the formation of the resolutions of the Ninth National Congress of the Fourth Red Army, namely the Gutian Conference. On June 15, based on the opinions of the former committee, Zhu De also wrote an article in the form of replying to Lin Biao, putting forward three opinions different from Mao Zedong. When the two sides were in dispute and Zhu Mao had different opinions, after the Fourth Red Army attacked Longyan three times, the Front Committee held the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army Party on June 22, trying to solve the problem in the form of a meeting. The "Seventh National Congress" was presided over by Chen Yi, the secretary of the interim former party committee.Starting from the cause of the party and focusing on unity, he carried out the necessary mediation work.He said humorously: "There is a state of Jin and a state of Chu. You two big countries are fighting every day. It is really difficult for me, the state of Zheng, to be in the middle. I am between Jin and Chu, and between the two big countries. I still hope that you Unity on both sides.” The "Seventh National Congress" was only open for one day.As a result of the debate, it was decided not to set up a military committee and to strengthen the work of the front committee.The meeting passed the "Resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army - Issues of Inner-Party Controversy and Division of Troops".When the General Assembly finally elected the Secretary of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army, Mao Zedong lost the election.Chen Yi was elected secretary of the former party committee.In addition to Zhu and Mao Fudong designated by the Central Committee, the members of the former committee elected Chen Yi, Lin Biao, Liu Angong, Wu Zhonghao, and Fu Baicui, together with the troops directly under the Fourth Army and the first, second, third and fourth columns, a total of 13 soldiers were elected to form the front committee. It was decided to appoint Chen Yi as the secretary. This decision was submitted to the central government for approval, and he was responsible for starting work before the approval.” The "Seventh National Congress" had a major and subtle impact on the history of the Chinese Communist Party. After the "Seventh National Congress", Mao Zedong left the leadership position of the former committee and went to Jiaoyang in western Fujian to recuperate from his illness and guide the work of the special committee in western Fujian.Chen Yi went to Shanghai to participate in the military meeting and reported to the central government. In late September 1929, during the Fourth Red Army's attack on Central Fujian and Dongjiang, the "Eight National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army was held in Taizhong Temple, Shanghang County, presided over by Zhu De, acting former party secretary. The "Eighth National Congress" was held for three days, but no positive results were achieved.But there is also a good side, which is to promote the awakening of some people.After the meeting, many comrades in the Red Army (such as Peng You, Guo Huaruo, etc.) wrote letters asking Mao Zedong to return to the front committee to lead the work, and Zhu De also agreed.However, Mao Zedong was unable to return to the Fourth Army for reinstatement due to the lack of instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the decision of the former committee meeting. During Chen Yi's stay in Shanghai, he reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China the revolutionary struggle of the Fourth Red Army in the past two years and the disputes over different opinions at the "Seventh National Congress". He carefully listened to and studied Chen Yi's report, and expressed his support for Mao Zedong's return to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army to preside over the work.The Central Committee decided to form a three-person team with Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, and Chen Yi to deal with the Zhu and Mao issues with full authority. In the name of the Central Committee, on September 28, they wrote the "Instruction Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army" and handed it to Chen Yi. Bring it back to unify the guiding ideology of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army. The most important, core, and crucial decision in the Central Committee's "September Letter" is: "Mao should still be the secretary of the former party committee." After Chen Yi returned, he conveyed the spirit of the Central Committee's September letter in Shanghang Guanzhuang, and Zhu De expressed his support.Therefore, Zhu and Chen sent a letter to Mao Zedong, who was recuperating in Jiaoyang, Shanghang, asking him to return to the Fourth Army immediately to preside over the work of the front committee.Mao Zedong happily arrived in Tingzhou on November 26 and took office as the former secretary of the Fourth Red Army. On December 28, Mao Zedong hosted the "Ninth National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army Party in Gutian. Thanks to the guidance of the Central Committee’s letter in September, Mao Zedong’s correct leadership, and the concerted efforts of Zhu De, Chen Yi, etc., the “Ninth National Congress” of the Fourth Red Army Party was held smoothly and successfully, and satisfactory expected results were achieved.The conference unified the thinking and understanding, and unanimously passed the "Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army of the Communist Party of China" (that is, the resolution of the Gutian Conference).A part of the resolution, "On Correcting Wrong Thoughts in the Party" drafted by Mao Zedong, is the core content of the resolution.In the resolution, Mao Zedong criticized various non-proletarian ideas such as purely military views, bandit thinking, mercenary thinking, warlord remnant thinking, cliqueism, individualism, non-organizational thinking, absolute egalitarianism, and extreme democratization that existed in the Red Army. The measures and methods of "carrying out correct line education" have been introduced, which has brought a new look to the spiritual outlook of the party and the Red Army. The resolution of the Gutian Conference is a programmatic document for the construction of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army.Mao Zedong used the principles of Marxist party building, combined with the reality of the base areas, to discuss the fundamental issue of how to maintain the party's proletarian vanguard nature in the context of rural guerrilla warfare, and analyzed the manifestations, causes and causes of various erroneous ideas in the party and the army. The correction method practically solved the problem of "ideological party building" of the proletarian party that was too late to solve during the Jinggangshan struggle, thus initially forming the party building theory of the Communist Party of China with Chinese characteristics. At the same time, it also fully shows that Mao Zedong's party building thought has been basically formed.As Deng Xiaoping said: "It was Comrade Mao Zedong who developed Lenin's theory of party building most completely. During the Jinggangshan period, that is, the period when the Red Army was founded, Comrade Mao Zedong's party building ideas were very clear. Let's take a look at the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army You can understand the resolution.” Since then, the Fourth Red Army has entered a new period of development. After the Gutian meeting, Mao Zedong published a famous intra-party newsletter - "A single spark can start a prairie fire".The matter was triggered by Lin Biao's letter. Under the influence of the pessimistic trend of the "February Letter" of the Central Committee and the long-term and difficult war environment of the Red Army, a right-leaning erroneous thinking represented by Lin Biao (the commander of the Red First Column at the time) appeared in the party and the Red Army.Lin Biao and others only hoped to use the "mobile guerrilla method" to expand political influence, but were unwilling to do the hard work of building a red regime.This erroneous idea of ​​"rogueism" was prominently expressed in a letter from Lin Biao to Mao Zedong. At the end of 1929, when the enemy's three-province "suppression" became more and more popular and began to invade Liancheng, Yongding, Shanghang, Longyan and other places, Lin Biao, the commander of the first column of the Fourth Red Army, wrote a "New Year's Congratulatory Letter" to Mao Zedong.In the letter, he advocated the adoption of a "relatively mobile guerrilla method" to "expand political influence", and was full of doubts about the former committee and Mao Zedong's establishment of more than 20 county bases in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian and the strategic plan of "struggling for Jiangxi in one year". Think that "the climax of the Chinese revolution may not come soon", and so on. After receiving Lin Biao's congratulatory letter, Mao Zedong aroused deep thought.He believed that Lin Biao's letter represented a trend of thought, and felt "the need to explain this issue."Therefore, he decided to reply a letter to help him change his mind, so as to educate the whole army.But due to time constraints, no pen was written.After the Gutian meeting, there was a gap, so on January 5, 1930, Mao Zedong wrote a long intra-Party newsletter "Evaluation of the current situation and the problem of the Red Army's actions" in Laifang, Gutian, western Fujian (that is, "A single spark can start a prairie fire "One article), reply to Lin Biao. Mao Zedong wrote: "Comrade Lin Biao: It's been a few days since the New Year, and I haven't answered your letter. One is because I am busy with some things, and the other is because I have to write something for you. Search my dry mind, I haven't come up with anything. Now I have something in mind. Although I don't know if it is suitable for your situation, but my material is an important issue in the current struggle. Even if it is not suitable for your individual situation, it is still It is an urgent question, so I bring it up. What question do I want to ask? It is the assessment of the current situation and the accompanying question of our actions. I used to feel it, and I still feel it. You The evaluation of the current situation is relatively pessimistic. Your view was most obvious at the meeting in Ruijin on the evening of May 18 last year. I know you believe that the revolutionary climax is inevitable, but you do not believe that the revolutionary climax will come quickly. Therefore, in terms of action, you do not agree with the one-year plan to win Jiangxi, but only for the guerrilla warfare in the three regions at the junction of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi. At the same time, you do not have a deep concept of establishing a red political power in the three regions, so there is no reason for this. The deepening and expansion of the red regime to promote the profound concept of the national revolutionary upsurge." In his letter, Mao Zedong not only sharply criticized Lin Biao and others for not having a profound concept of establishing a red political power, but actually put forward the important idea that the focus of the party's work should be placed on the countryside rather than on the cities, and brilliantly explained that the Chinese revolution was surrounded by the countryside. Theory of urban roads. (1) This intra-party newsletter fully demonstrates the extreme importance of establishing a red regime and expanding the red armed forces to the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong criticized the "city center theory" that existed in the Fourth Red Army at that time, and pointed out that the road of urban armed uprisings to seize central cities would not work in China.He believes: "Use a relatively light mobile guerrilla method to expand political influence, wait until the work of winning over the masses in all parts of the country is done well, or to a certain extent, and then there will be a national armed uprising, and then the strength of the Red Army will be added to it. , it became a nationwide revolution. Their nationwide, including all localities, first win over the masses and then establish a political power theory is not suitable for the actual situation of the Chinese revolution.” This kind of theory is actually a kind of walking The "City Center Theory" advocated by the state over the government.Therefore, Mao Zedong emphasized: "The establishment and development of the Red Army, guerrillas and red areas are the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China, and the inevitable result of the development of semi-colonial peasant struggle; It is the most important factor to promote the national revolutionary upsurge." Mao Zedong's fundamental idea of ​​emphasizing the red areas and peasant struggles is actually the idea of ​​"taking the village as the center".As Zhou Enlai later pointed out: Mao Zedong "did not until his letter to Lin Biao did he clearly point out the need to create red areas and implement armed separatism, thinking that this was the most important factor in promoting the national revolutionary upsurge, that is, to focus on the countryside." (2) This intra-party newsletter clearly puts forward the basic content of the theory of the red regime, namely the profound concept of the "trinity" of armed struggle, agrarian revolution and base area construction. In his letter, Mao Zedong criticized Lin Biao and others for their "rogue ideology" who "seem to think that it is futile to do the hard work of establishing a political power when the climax of the revolution is still far away, and hope to expand political influence with a relatively light mobile guerrilla method". ", affirming that "Zhu De, Mao Zedong's and Fang Zhimin's lines of base areas, planned construction of political power, in-depth agrarian revolution, and expansion of the people's armed forces... are undoubtedly correct."This is the basic idea of ​​the Chinese revolution, which takes armed struggle as the main form, the agrarian revolution as the basic content, and the rural revolutionary base areas as the important support. (3) This intra-party newsletter spoke highly of the great role played by the small red regime in the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong believed that "growth from the existence and development of the surrounding white areas" is not a "strange thing", but "the inevitable result of the struggle and development of semi-colonial rural areas".He profoundly pointed out: "This must be done in order to truly create the Red Army and become the main tool of the great revolution in the future. All in all, it must be done in this way to promote the climax of the revolution." The words 'A spark can start a prairie fire' are an appropriate description of the development of the current situation." Mao Zedong's thesis reveals the development trend and objective law of the Chinese revolution from a small red regime to a nationwide "Spark prairie fire". Therefore, Mao Zedong's letter to Lin Biao, which is the intra-party communication "A single spark can start a prairie fire", is a follow-up to "Why can China's red regime exist?" "After "The Struggle in Jinggang Mountains", Mao Zedong wrote another brilliant work of Marxism-Leninism on the theory of red regime. The publication of Mao Zedong's intra-party correspondence marked the basic formation of the theory of the Chinese revolutionary road to encircle the cities from the countryside.