Chapter 12 Chapter 11 Failure in August and the Battle of Huangyangjie

During the struggle in Jinggangshan, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee was under the dual leadership of the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees of the Communist Party of China. Major political policies had to be consulted with the provincial committees of the two provinces. Only when one of the two parties nodded their approval could they be considered legal and could be implemented. . For this reason, Mao Zedong reported to the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees of the Communist Party of China many times, stating his plan to establish a red regime in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains centered on Ninggang.According to the report written by Mao Zedong to the Central Committee in Yongxin on May 2, 1928 in the name of the Secretary of the Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army: “The distance between the borders of the two provinces is only more than ten miles. The party’s organizational activities are developing every day. However, since Comrade Zhou Lu (representative of the Hunan Special Committee) came to Ningkang in March to cancel the front committee, he lost the center and went his own way, causing unhealthy phenomena. Last December The former committee suggested organizing a border special committee. The Hunan Provincial Party Committee and the Central Committee had better send another competent comrade to be the secretary. In fact, it is difficult for Comrade Mao to work part-time in the army... Now after the letter from Ji'an, everyone agrees to send the special committee What do you think of the organization of the committee? Listen to my brother's office. The organization must be the organization. With Ninggang as the center, the establishment of the Luoxiao Mountains regime, the strength of the party, and the military power to create a solid revolutionary base in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. 〉One of. Comrade Mao et al. have repeatedly put it on the record. It was transferred from the Hunan Provincial Committee to the Central Committee from the Hunan Special Committee. It has been a long time since they were approved to refute it. Occasionally, in the letter from the Anyuan Municipal Committee, there are words that the Hunan Provincial Committee has approved. , but not expressly stated by the Provincial Party Committee.”

What is the attitude of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee towards Mao Zedong's plan to establish a regime in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains centered on Ninggang?Judging from the existing historical documents, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee clearly expressed its consent. The "Letter from the Hunan Provincial Party Committee" contained in the first issue of 1928 gave instructions to the Maoist Ministry: "The troops of the brother's office have moved thousands of miles for several months, and urgently need a considerable period of rest and reorganization. As usual, the struggle for cities and ponds is uncertain. , is completely bandit-style rogue behavior, and it is extremely necessary to correct it. At present, we should be active and go deeper into the struggle in western Jiangxi and Chaling, forming a separate regime for the masses and making it a military base camp. Therefore, the income of the current base areas is in fact It is extremely necessary. However, the establishment of this military base camp must be based on the mobilization of the masses. In our opinion, at present, Ningkang should be used as the military base camp of the brother office, and it should also be in contact with Chaling in the west of Jiangxi and east of Hunan!" It can be seen that The Hunan Provincial Party Committee gave a clear and expressive reply to the report submitted by Mao Zedong and the Border Party.

Also, on June 19, 1928, the "Letter from the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Special Committee of the Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces of the Communist Party of China and the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army" also stated: "The provincial party committee fully agrees with the plan to use the Luoxiao Mountains as the base. The letter also instructed in the same way. The brother office should actively develop riots in the counties around the Luoxiao Mountains in accordance with the above-mentioned instructions, resulting in a separatist regime with workers and peasants as the main force."

These two letters from the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that they "fully agree" with the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee's plan to "create a political power in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains with Ninggang as its base camp." important positive effect.However, this concept of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee is not firm, nor is it firm in its idea of ​​establishing the Jinggangshan base area.Therefore, one week after the instruction letter was issued, that is, on June 26, 1928, the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China changed its view and sent representatives Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming to the border to order the Fourth Red Army to leave the base camp and "immediately Develop towards southern Hunan", "leave 200 guns behind", the main force "blaze a bloody road, develop towards Zixing, Leiyang, Yongxing, and Chenzhou in southern Hunan", "create the rural separatism of the four counties, and encircle Hengyang Situation” and must be “immediately implemented without hesitation”, claiming that this is an “absolutely correct” policy.In the instruction letter, the Provincial Party Committee also requested that "Zedong must set out with the army", and specially "send Comrade Du Xiujing to be the inspector of the Provincial Party Committee" and "send Comrade Yang Kaiming as the Secretary of the Special Committee" in order to change the Hunan-Jiangxi border special committee. Leaders, urging the implementation of the instructions of the provincial party committee.

Mao Zedong, the Border Special Committee, and the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army did not understand and were very embarrassed by the mandatory and strong instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee.Therefore, Mao Zedong said: "The Hunan Provincial Party Committee has changed its position three times in a few weeks between June and July. The first time Yuan Desheng came to agree with the regime plan for the middle Luoxiao Mountains. The second time Du Xiu Jing and Yang Kaiming came, advocating that the Red Army should not hesitate to develop towards southern Hunan, leaving only 200 guns to guard the border with the Red Guards, and said that this is an "absolutely correct" policy. The third time Yuan Desheng came again, only ten days apart This time, the letter, apart from scolding us a lot, advocated that the Red Army go to the east of Hunan, and said it was an "absolutely correct" policy, and asked us to "not hesitate." We accepted such rigid instructions, If you don't follow, you will be close to disobedience, if you follow, you will know that you have failed, which is really not good." Mao Zedong: "The Struggle in Jinggangshan".

Therefore, when the second letter arrived, a fierce and delicate struggle arose between the Special Border Committee, the Military Committee, and the representatives of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee. Should the Fourth Red Army stay in the base camp and persist in the struggle, or should they follow the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee to send troops to southern Hunan?At this critical moment related to the survival of the Red Army and the base area, Mao Zedong held a joint meeting of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee, the Fourth Red Army Military Committee, and the Yongxin County Committee in the chamber of commerce in Yongxin County on the evening of June 30.Attending the meeting were Zhu De, commander of the Fourth Army, Chen Yi, secretary of the Military Commission, Wang Erzhuo, chief of staff and head of the 28th Regiment, Hu Shaohai, head of the 29th Regiment, Gong Chu, representative of the regiment party, and Zhu Yunqing, head of the 31st Regiment. , He Tingying, representative of the Youth League Party; Wan Xixian, Tan Zhenlin, members of the Special Committee; Liu Zhen, Wang Huai, Liu Zuoshu, He Minxue, He Zizhen, etc. of the Yongxin County Party Committee. Yuan Desheng and Du Xiujing, representatives of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee who arrived in Yongxin at the same time on June 30, also attended the meeting.A total of about 20 people. "Memories of Comrade He Minxue", "Memories of Comrade Long Kaifu".Internal interview materials.

More than 20 staunch men sat around the table.The venue was filled with smoke and the atmosphere was very depressing.At this time, it was midsummer in the south, and many people were sweating profusely. At the meeting, Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, first conveyed the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee on June 26.Du Xiujing explained the "reason" why the provincial party committee decided to develop to southern Hunan: because the central government listed the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi as the center of the national revolution, Hunan was the center of the four provinces, and southern Hunan was the center of the Hunan revolution. center of.As long as the situation in Hunan as a whole develops rapidly, it can promote the general outbreak of revolution throughout the country.

This is obviously an overestimation of the revolutionary situation and our own strength, and an underestimation of the enemy's power in Hunan. It is a blindly optimistic and very harmful "Left" view.After listening, everyone made speeches and expressed their views. Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang Erzhuo, etc. all believed that the main force of the Fourth Army went to southern Hunan, and the more than 200 guns left behind could hardly undertake the task of defending the border, and the base area would repeat the mistakes of the "March failure".Therefore, the main force of the Fourth Army should not go to southern Hunan, but should continue to work on the border and create a regime in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains with Ningkang as the center.They asked the Hunan Provincial Party Committee to reconsider and withdraw the order.

Du Xiujing and Yuan Desheng emphasized: This is the decision of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, and subordinates should obey their superiors and carry out orders without hesitation. Mao Zedong rationally stated the reasons why the main force of the Fourth Army could not go to southern Hunan. He believed that going to southern Hunan would have all kinds of disadvantages and no advantages: First, the enemy is still in a temporary stable period, and the enemy in Hunan is powerful. "The tiger fell into Pingyang and was bullied by dogs"; second, the Fourth Army had just settled down in accordance with the last instruction of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, went deep into the agrarian revolution, and vigorously publicized the masses. The masses in all counties have risen and cannot leave the border; China’s economy is bankrupt, and it is not as easy to raise funds as it is at the border; fourth, there are too many wounded and sick, and relocation will cause people’s uneasiness; According to the shortcomings of the solid foundation in the central area; sixth, Ningkang has a good terrain, and as long as the policy is appropriate, it is absolutely possible to wage a long-term struggle with the enemy.Therefore, Mao Zedong proposed to draft a report in the name of the Military Commission of the Fourth Army and the Border Special Committee, explaining the reasons why the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee could not be implemented, and asked the Provincial Party Committee to reconsider.

Mao Zedong's opinions and suggestions won the support of the vast majority of the participants. Du Xiujing and Yuan Desheng saw that the comrades on the border agreed and were quite firm, so they had to agree with the meeting's proposition.Therefore, the joint meeting finally decided: the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee will not be implemented, and the Fourth Army will continue to stay on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi for activities, go deep into the counties, and establish a solid base. The struggle of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yi and others against the erroneous ideas of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee at the Yongxin Joint Conference fully demonstrated the principled stand and revolutionary style of the Chinese Communists who adhere to the truth and seek truth from facts.

On the fifth day after the Yongxin Joint Meeting, that is, on July 4, Mao Zedong sat alone in front of an oil lamp in the Yongxin Chamber of Commerce, and on behalf of the Border Special Committee and the Fourth Army Military Commission drafted a statement to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee stating that the Fourth Red Army would not go to southern Hunan. report, suggesting that the Provincial Party Committee retract the order.This was the first time in the party that a lower level blatantly resisted the decision of the higher level provincial party committee; therefore, Mao Zedong appeared to be extra cautious.This kind of "disobedience" report must pay attention to strategy, pay attention to proportion, think carefully, and use pen carefully.He wrote: Hunan Provincial Party Committee: Comrades Yuan and Du arrived in Yongxin at the same time on June 30, and they were informed of the provincial party committee circular and the Central Committee's resolution on Hunan work. The instructions in the two letters of the Provincial Party Committee were quite different. The former asked us to continue to build the government in the counties in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains as military bases, without changing the instructions of the Central Committee and the Provincial Party Committee a month ago.The latter asked us to rush to southern Hunan after the attack on Yongxin to avoid the enemy's "suppression" and solve economic difficulties.After Yang Chisheng was defeated here on June 23, most of the Fourth Army had come to Yongxin to go guerrilla to Lianhua, Anfu, and the southwestern tip of Ji'an, raising funds and launching riots.That is to say, on the night of June 30, the Special Committee, the Military Committee, and the Yongxin County Committee held a joint meeting to discuss the letter from the provincial party committee. Comrades Yuan and Du both attended, and it was decided that the Fourth Army should continue to do in-depth mass work in the counties on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi. Build a strong base.With this base area, and then advance to Hunan and Jiangxi, wherever the Red Army goes, the separatists will be consolidated and will not be easily wiped out by the enemy. Based on the speeches made at the joint meeting, the actual situation in the base areas, and the comparison of enemy forces in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, Mao Zedong rationally stated the significance of building a political power in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains and the main reasons why the Fourth Army did not go to southern Hunan. Dense and thoughtful. He cited six reasons: (1) In the Fourth Army itself, many people are accustomed to the life of bandits and do not like to live in a place where they do arduous mass struggle work, which is full of the legacy of the Red Army's adventures.In the past month, they have been cleaned up in many ways, and at the same time the people in Yongxin and Ningkang counties have become popular, so they gradually gave up and realized that the policy of the central and provincial party committees last time advocating the construction of Ningkang base camp was correct.If it is changed immediately now, and the Fourth Army is re-entering the road of migration and wandering, the transformation of the Fourth Army will be even more difficult.The previous letter from the Provincial Party Committee pointed out that the Fourth Army had fought for thousands of miles and was close to bandits, so they had to choose places to rest in order to reform.This meaning is very correct, and it is being followed and implemented, and it is not appropriate to change it rashly. (2) In terms of the enemy's situation, the enemy in Hunan Province is very tough, thick and powerful, not as easy to attack as the enemy in Jiangxi.The Jiangxi enemy was defeated by me four times in a row, their courage was broken, and affected by my release of prisoners, the morale of the army was shaken.Only Wang Jun's 7th Division is considered capable of fighting. The first division and the first regiment are stationed in Pingxiang, and the second regiment is stationed in Jiujiang and Nanchang.This is not the case with the enemy in Hunan. They fought against me more than five or six times, and they were only able to repel a small part of them, while the enemy suffered no damage and remained stubborn.Therefore, in order to avoid a tough battle plan, it is not appropriate to attack Hunan Province at this time, and the reversal will deepen the enemy's siege, which may lead to the destruction of the entire army.Now the enemy army in southern Hunan consists of two divisions of the Guangxi lineage, the 21st army, one army of Xiang Chengjie (three thousand guns), one division of Xu Kexiang, and one army of Wu Shang. The enemy force is seven or eight times greater than that of western Jiangxi.Our army can win Xiang and Xu, but it will never win Wu and Gui.As soon as our army left, we were immediately surrounded by Wu, Gui, Xiang, and Xu, and there was a danger that Li would be wiped out. The Provincial Party Committee did not seem to have considered this point. Here, Mao Zedong unceremoniously and persuasively criticized the subjective assumptions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in a tactful tone. Mao Zedong went on to write: (3) Ningkang can become the military headquarters, that is, the mountain is large and dangerous, the road leads to two provinces, the victory can be defended, the defeat can be escaped, and the enemy can never surround us. With the base of the masses, we can really fight the enemy for a long time.If you leave Ninggang easily at this moment, "the tiger falls in Pingyang and is bullied by dogs", the Fourth Army will be very dangerous. Because the Fourth Red Army left the Ningkang base camp, it really led to the "August failure", which shows Mao Zedong's foresight.But at the time, I was worried that my superiors would accuse me of conservatism, so I changed my style of writing: (4) This proposition is by no means a conservative concept.In the past, there were riots all over the country, and all parts of the country were prosperous for a while. Once the enemy counterattacked, it would be like washing a river with water, and it would be completely defeated.All of this does not seek to consolidate the foundation, but only seeks the cause of great momentum.We are trying our best to rectify this disease at the moment, building a strong base camp for the military and at the same time laying a solid foundation for the future of the uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces.Now we are working hard in Yongxin and Ningkang, making progress day by day, and advancing to Lianhua, Anfu, and the southwestern tip of Ji'an, deepening the agrarian revolution, creating local armed forces, and with some efforts, the enemy will attack again, and we are quite sure of victory. (5) From an economic point of view, with such a large number of troops in the Fourth Army, it is necessary to save 700 yuan in cash every day.In addition to being burned and killed in various counties in southern Hunan, the economy was bankrupt and the local tyrants were wiped out.Since Zhu Bu arrived in Leiyang in February, he has not been able to raise a single penny, and has only relied on selling tobacco for a living.It is absolutely impossible to go to southern Shonen to solve economic problems at this moment.The only way to truly solve the current economic problems is in the border areas of Hunan and Jiangxi. (6) If the number of wounded soldiers has increased to five hundred, the morale of the army will be disintegrated if they want to rush to southern Hunan, and it is impossible not to go. This is also one of the most difficult problems. Mao Zedong laid out his reasons and finally clarified the position of the joint meeting: According to the above six practical reasons, before the outbreak of the new warlord war, it is still impossible to leave Ning, Yong, and Lian to go to southern Hunan.Once the foundation here is a bit solid and there is an opportunity outside, the four armies can send out tea, you, wine, and liquor to participate in the general riot in Hunan Province.At this time, we should try our best to communicate with Shonan, so as to echo each other and serve as horns for each other. Please ask the Provincial Party Committee to re-discuss the above opinion. Based on the current situation, make a new decision. This is for the best prayer!A detailed report on the army and localities will be submitted later. Mao Zedong's letter to Chen Yan is courageous, insightful, reasonable and restrained, eloquent and unique in ingenuity.However, he didn't expect that someone would turn a deaf ear and go his own way.As a result, the Red Army and the people in the base areas paid a heavy price. On the third day of Mao Zedong's letter to Chen Yan, the enemy's situation has undergone major changes.As Mao Zedong expected, the Eighth Army of Wushang, the enemy of Hunan, followed the agreement of the enemy forces in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces to "suppress" the Jinggangshan base area on July 7, and took advantage of the opportunity of our Fourth Red Army's main force to be far away in Yongxin and Ninggang. , launched an attack. On July 4, Wu Shang invaded Ningkang from Chaling and Ling counties with the first and second divisions.Ning Gang was suddenly surrounded by swords and swords.Long Chaoqing, Secretary of the Ninggang County Party Committee, and Yuan Wencai, head of the 32nd Red Regiment, led the 32nd Regiment, the Ninggang Red Guards and the Riot Team together to form a multi-line iron network in Mucun, Heqiao, and Longshi. Harassment from all sides, strong walls and clear fields, stop the enemy.However, a thirty-two regiment and local armed forces are not opponents of the two divisions of the enemy's regular army after all. On July 9, the enemy broke through the defense line of Long City and advanced towards Xincheng, intending to join Hu Wendou Department of the Sixth Army of the Jiangxi Army and Yang Chisheng Department of the Ninth Division of the Jiangxi Army, and attack Zhu Mao's Red Army in the north and south of Yongxin. Mao Zedong, who was in Yongxin, received an urgent report from Ninggang. The military situation is urgent.The main force of the 28th, 29th, and 31st regiments of the Red Army was called and hurried back to Yongxin to meet the enemy. The Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army immediately decided: the 28th and 29th regiments will return to Ninggang to relieve the crisis, and the 31st regiment will stop the Jiangxi enemy from Ji'an in Yongxin.Unexpectedly, our army made a slow move, and the 28th and 29th regiments were unable to attack from the middle road, and passed the Hunan enemy on the wrong road at Yongxin Xinyuanzui.When the Hunan enemy heard that our main force had returned, they hurried towards Lianhua for fear of losing something.Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Wang Erzhuo immediately made a decision, and led their troops to march westward, attacking the old nests of the Hunan enemy - Lingxian and Chaling, forcing the enemy to return to the rear and give up the "meeting and suppression". On July 12, the Red 28th and 29th regiments conquered Ling County. The Hunan enemy was really scared, and on the 14th they rushed through Yongxin and returned to Chaling.The Hunan enemy had just retreated, and the Jiangxi enemy Wang Jun, 5 regiments from Jin Handing, and 6 regiments from Hu Wendou, a total of 11 regiments entered Yongxin. After Zhu De led the Red Army brigade to conquer Ling County, he planned to attack Chaling again.But at this time, the Hunan enemy had retreated to Chaling, and the Jiangxi enemy had gathered in Yongxin again, and the 31st Regiment was facing a serious threat.Therefore, Zhu De, Chen Yi and others decided to lead the Red Army brigade back to Ninggang to reinforce Yongxin. However, there are unpredictable circumstances.When the Red Army Brigade entered Ling County, an unexpected change happened. On the evening of July 12, under the pretext that the Hunan Provincial Party Committee had ordered the Fourth Army to go to southern Hunan, without telling the Military Commission and superior officers, the Red 29th Regiment convened a soldiers committee privately and decided to go to southern Hunan on the 13th!Moreover, "find someone to lead the way in private, and the time to dispatch is determined." After Zhu De and Chen Yi heard the news, they asked Hu Shaohai, the head of the 29th regiment, and Gong Chu, the party representative, to inquire about the situation, and immediately instructed them to step up their work overnight to stop such unorganized and undisciplined incidents from happening.Moreover, he wrote a letter to Mao Zedong overnight and sent someone to send Yongxin urgently. The Red Twenty-Nine Regiment is composed of the Yizhang Agricultural Army in southern Hunan.It has been nearly half a year since the "New Year's End Riot" in 1928, and many people have strong homesickness.After the Yongxin joint meeting, when they learned that the Hunan Provincial Party Committee wanted the Fourth Army to go to southern Hunan, their joy turned into a frenzy. Driven by the local concept, a serious accident occurred on the evening of the 12th when the Soldiers Committee of the 29th Regiment privately decided to return to their hometown. On the 13th, Wang Erzhuo and Hu Shaohai conveyed to the 28th and 29th regiments the Military Commission's order to return the Red Army brigade to Yongxin for reinforcements.On this day, the army lost its former glory, lazy, and morale was low.The 29th Regiment was still very emotional about returning to southern Hunan, while the officers and soldiers of the 28th Regiment were unwilling to return to Yongxin, and proposed to go to southern Jiangxi. A lack of morale in the army is a taboo for military strategists.In this regard, Zhu De, Chen Yi and others all found it very difficult.When he was anxious, Mao Zedong sent Fei Ma, secretary of the Chaling County Party Committee, to Ling County.In the letter, Mao Zedong insisted on the attitude of the Yongxin Joint Conference, and asked Zhu De and Chen Yi to persuade the troops not to go to southern Hunan and insist on the border struggle. Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Wang Erzhuo all agreed with Mao Zedong's proposition.In order to persuade the troops, Zhu De spoke to the troops outside the Mingquan Academy in Ling County.He said: "Brothers, Committee Member Mao has sent someone from Yongxin to send us a message on a flying horse! Now Yongxin is in a hurry, we have to return to Yongxin! As for southern Hunan, we are going, but we can't go now. The 29th Regiment Comrades want to 'fight back to their hometown' to see, this kind of mood is understandable. But Yizhang, Chenzhou enemy situation is unknown, do not know how many enemies there are. Our revolution is a national revolution. We are not attacking the local tyrants. The local tyrants in one county, we want to attack the local tyrants of the whole country! We want to eliminate the reactionaries, not just the reactionaries in any province or county, but the reactionaries in the whole country!" The regiment officers and soldiers couldn't listen.There was another long commotion at the venue, "Comrade Zhu De can't do it three times and four times", the soldiers of the 29th regiment still shouted "We can command ourselves" and "Go back to our hometown". "The comrades in charge of the army at the time felt that it was very difficult. Later, after a thousand words of explanation, they said that they would go back temporarily to relieve the crisis in Jinggang, and it would not be too late to return to southern Hunan. They reluctantly drove the army out. Miandu (from the territory of Ling County to Ninggang Road), it took only 30 miles in a day, and the soldiers were downcast, as if they couldn't make it, and they were in groups of three or four, with chaotic footsteps and a lack of morale." Yang Kemin: "On the Hunan and Jiangxi Borders A Comprehensive Report on the Situation in the Soviet Areas". Zhu De and Chen Yi felt that the situation was serious.The 29th regiment's local concept is too serious!But it is really embarrassing for the soldiers not to be intimidating. On the 15th, Zhu De and Chen Yi presided over an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission in Miandu, Ling County, to do persuasion work.Du Xiujing, a representative of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee who acted with the army, not only did not come out to work, but "demonstrated his flames" and encouraged the 29th regiment to go to southern Hunan.With the two opinions arguing endlessly, Chen Yi had no choice but to propose sending someone back to Ninggang to ask Mao Zedong for instructions before making a decision.Du Xiujing immediately volunteered to go to Ninggang.When the meeting was adjourned, Gong Chu actually said to Du Xiujing: "Wait for you for a day, if you don't come, we will leave!" Protagonist", to the point of being disorganized and dizzy! It was not a coincidence.When Du Xiu rushed to Ninggang Maoping via Pegasus, Mao Zedong went to Yongxin.Du Xiujing only saw Yang Kaiming, Secretary of the Border Special Committee.After Yang Kaiming heard this, without hesitation, he stated, "It's decided, let's go! I'll tell him where Lao Mao is." So, Du Xiujing rushed back to Miandu, Ling County overnight.Seeing him coming back, the soldiers asked him one after another, "Will you go?" Du Xiu raised his hand, "Go!" Zhu De, Chen Yi and others heard about it, and knew that it would be useless to dissuade them.In order to conform to the morale of the army, to prevent the Red Army from splitting and going to extremes, and at the same time worried that the 29th Regiment would go deep alone and be defeated by the enemy, it was agreed to let the 28th Regiment go together to attack southern Shonan.This was a decision made in the specific environment of sudden changes at that time. On July 17, the Red Army Brigade set off from Miandu, Ling County, and ventured into southern Hunan. After the Red Army Brigade left Miandu, the 29th Regiment was eager to return home, marching like flying, traveling more than 100 miles a day, and walked to Shuikou to camp in one breath. The twenty-eighth regiment pursued closely.The 28th Regiment was a Nanchang uprising force. They didn't want to go to southern Hunan, but they didn't want to go to Yongxin either. They proposed to go to southern Jiangxi.Today, under the orders of Commander Zhu De and the Military Commission, he went to southern Hunan to protect the 29th regiment.They felt that the performance of the 29th Regiment in insisting on returning to southern Shonan was a bit abnormal. They said that they only traveled 30 miles a day when they went back to reinforce Yongxin, and they said that they only traveled 130 miles a day when they returned to southern Shonan. Hearing the news that the Red Army Brigade had left the border to go to southern Hunan, Mao Zedong felt that the situation was serious.He immediately wrote another long letter and sent people to chase after him, trying to bring the Red Army back.The messenger did not catch up with the Red Army until they reached Shuikou.After Zhu De, Chen Yi and others read the letter, another company-level cadre meeting was held in Shuikou.The meeting was presided over by Du Xiujing, and Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang Erzhuo, He Changgong, Hu Shaohai, Gong Chu and others all attended.The theme of the meeting was still the issue of returning to the border or going to southern Shonan. At the meeting, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang Erzhuo, etc. still defended Mao Zedong's opinion and advocated returning to the border, but Du Xiujing, Gong Chu, etc. insisted on going to southern Hunan.Wang Erzhuo was so angry that he contradicted Du Xiujing, and Du Xiujing retorted: "Did you listen to the provincial committee, or did the provincial committee listen to you?!" His tone was so tough that the meeting broke up unhappy. Early the next morning, the 29th Regiment was still moving towards southern Shonan, and the 28th Regiment followed up.Because after the Miandu meeting, Du Xiujing had gone to the border special committee for instructions, and Yang Kaiming, the secretary of the special committee, had approved it. Moreover, Du Xiujing was a representative of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, and he tried his best to insist on the provincial Party committee's opinion of "developing towards southern Hunan". Today, the brigade is far away from the Jinggangshan base area, and the 28th regiment has no choice but to follow the 29th regiment and march towards southern Hunan. The confusion of the 28th regiment can be imagined; as the leader of the first army, Zhu De has more troubles and hidden worries. Because Zhu De knew that the enemy army stationed in Chenzhou, an important town in southern Hunan, was Fan Shisheng's Sixteenth Army.He was worried about the exchange of fire between the Fourth Army and the Fan Department.Zhu De and Fan Shisheng were classmates at the Yunnan Lecture Hall, and later joined the anti-Yuan Huguo army led by Cai E. Although they had different beliefs and had their own agendas, they had a close personal relationship.After the failure of the main force of the Nanchang Uprising in Chaoshan, Zhu De led the rest of the Nanchang Uprising to fight thousands of miles away. In times of crisis, he received sincere help from Fan Shisheng.Fan Shisheng provided Zhu Bu with military supplies such as ammunition, equipment and military pay, and Zhu Bu was able to tide over the difficulties.Later, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Guangdong Provincial Government Chairman Li Jishen to deal with Zhu Bu, and Fan Shisheng secretly disclosed the news to Zhu De to let Zhu De lead his troops out of danger, and also donated tens of thousands of yuan in cash to Zhu Bu as military pay. The army turned to Shaoguan and arrived in southern Hunan.Now that the Red Army brigade is heading to southern Hunan, will the target of the attack be the former friendly army Fan Shisheng?If not, that's good. If so, wouldn't it be a bad name for being dishonest and ungrateful? Du Xiujing didn't know about this relationship, but Chen Yi and Wang Erzhuo knew about it, and so did the officers and soldiers of the 28th Regiment who had been funded by Fan Shisheng.How could this not confuse Zhu De and the officers and soldiers of the 28th regiment! The main force of the Red Army was forced to march towards Chenzhou. Chenzhou is an important town in southern Hunan. It is the resident of the Kuomintang agency and a transportation hub for the three provinces of Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi. "From Ling County to Chenzhou, it was really like returning home like an arrow, like a bitter daughter-in-law returning to her mother's house after a long absence, her feet are very hard, and three steps are alternated with two steps." On July 23, the Red Army Brigade came to Chenzhou outside the city. Yashiping. On the 24th, the second day after the troops arrived in Yashiping, early in the morning, the officers and soldiers of the Red 29th Regiment did not know whether they were eager for revenge or wanted to take the lead. They did not even investigate and study the enemy's situation, so they began to attack.Originally, Hu Shaohai, the head of the 29th Red Regiment, intended to wait for Commander Zhu and the others to arrive before taking action, but Du Xiujing said sternly: "What are you waiting for! What kind of life is there!" When the upper and lower ends were hot, Hu Shaohai couldn't control it, so he had to give an attack order.By the time Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Wang Erzhuo arrived at Yashiping, the battle had already begun. After fighting for a while, I realized that Fan Shisheng's troops were stationed in Chenzhou, a supplementary regiment of the 46th Division of the 16th Army. what to do?Zhu De recalled what Fan Shisheng said when he parted with Fan Shisheng in Rucheng: "Brother Yukai, let's go to say goodbye, so that we can cherish ourselves. When we meet in the future, if you don't hit me, I won't hit you either!" Zhu De hesitated.Immediately, he said to Du Xiujing and Hu Shaohai: "Fan Shisheng's troops are friendly troops. They helped us in the past and formed a united front with us. They cannot fight." At this time, Du Xiujing, who had no strategic concept or united front thinking, said: "It has already started, let's fight!" In front of this powerful representative of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Zhu De was in a dilemma.If you fight, I'm sorry for Fan Shisheng and the friendly army; if you don't fight, it will be difficult to persuade Du Xiujing and the officers and soldiers of the 29th regiment.After weighing again and again, out of consideration for implementing the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and for the benefit of the Red Army, he went against his will. A battle that should not have been fought has begun.The deployment at that time was: the 29th Regiment aimed to attack Yashi Bridge, and the 28th Regiment aimed to attack Suxian Bridge. Each of them was full of energy and launched a fierce attack on Chenzhou City. Unexpectedly, a catastrophe happened, and the Red Army was defeated in southern Shonan! Zhang Hao, commander of the 46th Division of the 16th Army of the Kuomintang Army stationed in Chenzhou, was stunned by the sudden attack of the Red Army.He knew that the troops that came to attack were Zhu De's Fourth Red Army, and he also knew the relationship between Zhu and Fan Shisheng and the Old Testament. So the supplementary regiment was ordered to retreat. The supplementary regiment retreated without a fight.The 29th regiment didn't know the inside story, and thought it was defending the enemy and fighting cowardly, so they attacked more bravely.For a moment, the bullets rained down, covering the sky and the earth, and the soldiers of the supplementary regiment fell one by one. The brave attack of the 29th Regiment made Zhang Hao very angry. He wanted to ask Shi Sheng to set an example, so Fan went to Guangzhou again.Faced with the requests of his subordinates and the casualties of soldiers, this young and staunch division commander immediately ordered the four regiments stationed at Suxianqiao to advance from the north of the city to the county. At this time, the Red 29th Regiment had already invaded Chenzhou. "Although the 29th Regiment has fewer guns in the Fourth Army, its combat capability is quite strong, and its party is better, but this time the party has completely lost its effect." After entering the city, the soldiers ran around frantically, and many of them He left the fighting group privately, went to the street to get a haircut and eat.In the evening, the enemy army began to counterattack, and the 29th regiment was attacked from the front and back, and the situation was very critical. Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Wang Erzhuo heard the news and urgently ordered the Red 28th Regiment to rush to reinforce, blocking the enemy's counterattack from the direction of Suxianqiao to the county.The fighting was fierce, and the Red Army suffered heavy casualties.Facing an enemy several times larger than mine, it would be a disadvantage to stand firm, so Zhu De and others issued an order to retreat to Zixing while fighting. When the Red Army Brigade retreated to the Dongjiang River in Chenzhou, after counting the number of people, there were only more than 100 people left in the 29th Regiment's team of more than 1,000 people, and the organizational system was abolished.Only Hu Shaohai and Gong Chu brought back ten or twenty correspondents and a few people from the secret service company, and a company led by Xiao Ke (sixty or seventy people) was a little more fully organized.The 28th regiment also suffered some losses, but the basic team is intact and the organizational system is sound. The Red Twenty-Nine Regiment collapsed, and almost the entire regiment was wiped out.Seeing this situation, Hu Shaohai, the head of the regiment, shed tears of pain, but Gong Chu, the party representative, didn't think so.It was later learned that when the Red 29th Regiment broke out from the city, some of them ran freely to Yizhang's hometown, but were wiped out by the bandit Hu Fengzhang in Lechang; some were scattered in Chenzhou and Yizhang, "unknown". . Regarding this period of history, Xiao Ke, who witnessed it, recalled: "Chenzhou was captured on July 24. The 28th Regiment lived in the north of the city, and the 29th Regiment lived in the south of the city. Near dusk, Fan Shisheng's troops counterattacked from the north and fought against the 28th Regiment. The 29th Regiment When they heard the gunshots, they headed south. The young and old, with luggage and food loads, ran around in the army. After walking for two or three miles, the team still stopped. I think the situation is wrong. The 28th regiment is fighting, and the 29th regiment is fighting. Why didn't the regiment go for reinforcements, but ran south instead? It didn't look like a march. Therefore, I told our company to sit down and not move around. This company is relatively neat, and only scattered. The 28th regiment in the north is still fighting. I I think the military department did not order to go to Yizhang. It was because they heard gunshots from the north and ran southward with great blindness. I thought that I would go south to go home. I took this company and walked back. It was 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening Zhong, the 28th Regiment was retreating on the way to the east, so we followed the 28th Regiment to the east. The next day, we retreated to Dongjiang in Chenzhou. Hu Shaohai, the head of the 29th Regiment, also came with the order platoon Because the team was out of control, there were more than 1,000 people in the regiment when we went to southern Shonan, but only about 100 people came back one after another. Hu Shaohai only brought a dozen or so correspondents and a part of the secret service company plus some service personnel. My company has six Seventy people and 45 guns. In this way, the rest of the 29th Regiment only has a total of more than 100 people and 80 or 90 guns. The rest went in the direction of Yizhang, and it was heard that they all collapsed." In the battle of Chenzhou, our army "won first and then lost, and withdrew from the battle" and suffered heavy losses.The Red Twenty-Nine Regiment has since ceased to exist.This incident is known as the "August Failure" in history. While the main force of the Red Army was defeated in southern Hunan, the border suffered great losses. In early August, due to the expedition of the main force of the Red Army to southern Hunan, the Jiangxi enemy launched a fierce attack on the Jinggangshan base area relying on strong military strength and sophisticated weapons.In this severe situation, in order to preserve its strength, the 31st Red Regiment had to retreat to the Xiaojiang Mountains in Yongxin.For a while, the Jiangxi enemy occupied Yongxin one after another, and then occupied Lianhua and Ningkang. The scope of the base area rapidly narrowed. Wannian Mountain in Lianhua, Qingshigang District and Dayuan District in Ling County, and Xiaowujing District in Suichuan.The county towns and plain areas on the border are completely enemy-occupied. After the regular enemy army invaded the base areas, the security teams, door-to-door regiments, and Jingwei regiments in various counties continued to act as accomplices, and they carried out wild revenge on the revolutionary masses in the base areas.At this time, most of the border party organizations and the red regime collapsed, and various mass organizations were severely damaged.Under the enemy's coercion, rich peasants and opportunists in the party "turned against the water" one after another, hung up their white belts, fell to the side of the landlords and gentry, and even led the white army to burn and kill.The local tyrants and evil gentry from all over the country and the "home return group" seized the opportunity to counterattack and recapture the fields that the farmers had already allocated. The phenomenon of "farmers planting the fields and landlords cutting the grain" appeared, and the entire border was shrouded in a haze, which was extremely terrifying. In Yongxin, Long Jingquan, the local tyrant of Yongxin and the captain of the security team, led a large group of white bandits to attack from Yongxin County to Tianzhen, and then from Litian Town to Nancheng to the pond. Villages, such as Tangbian, Dawu, Yangzaoxia, Xinlingbei, etc., were burned into a sea of ​​flames.In one place by the pond alone, 48 houses and 11 ancestral halls were burnt down, and many old, weak, sick and disabled people who could not be transferred in time were brutally killed. Ninggang suffered an unprecedented disaster.Because Ninggang was the base camp of the Red Army and the heart of the base area, the enemy's retaliation, burning and killing of Ninggang was particularly fierce.The Kuomintang army in Hunan entered Ninggang from Ling County and burned down more than 80 houses in Mu Village and Shangzhai; More than half of the houses were burned; the ancient city of Xiyuan Village, a small mountain village with more than 30 families, was burned to the ground by the enemy, and more than 130 people were killed, and more than 40 people were killed; more than 20 families in Maoping Getengping were all burned down.据宁冈当年的老苏区干部苏兰春、谢合斌、胡洪秀、凌登云、龙云芳等回忆统计，在“八月失败”中，宁冈被杀人数达942人，坐牢229人，随军外出113人，阵亡117人，损失枪支48支，土炮49门，鸟铳396支。国民党军和当地的反动武装、豪绅地主对宁冈人民实行焚烧政策外，还使用了吊打、火烙、水牢、灌辣椒水、坐老虎凳、蜘蛛上壁（四肢钉在墙上）、倒挂金钩、活割剖腹、挖心肝、点天灯（肚子上挖个洞，点灯烧）等十多种惨无人道的刑法。古城二区宣传委员谢冲波和东源乡干部邓海波，在“八月失败”前后去执行一项侦察任务，不幸被地方反动武装抓住，受尽敌人严刑拷打，至死拒不投降。敌人把他们押在新城西门外，割去他们的鼻子进行逼供。他俩痛骂敌人，敌人又割去他俩的耳朵、舌头，直至将他们活活折磨而死。 这样的例子在边界各县都有发生，惨不忍睹，不胜枚举。 红军主力在湘南的失败，边界的失陷与受难，再清楚不过地说明在统治阶级暂时稳定时期，必须注重根据地的创造与巩固，不能采取分兵冒进的政策。 对于边界的“八月失败”，当年的关键人物杜修经，在半个世纪之后曾写下沉痛的忏悔之言。他说：“正当革命事业向前发展的时候，我却破坏了这一事业，造成了井冈山斗争的'八月失败'，使年轻的红军损失一半，边界政权尽失，被杀之人，被焚之屋，难以数计，几毁中国革命的根基，其错误是非常严重的！半个多世纪后的今天，在人民革命战争胜利的凯歌声中，重忆'八月失败'的经过及其先后，我仍是内疚之深，寝食难安！”杜修经所言倒属恳切，自责之情溢于言表。 “八月失败”是井冈山斗争时期的一次重大挫折。 “八月失败”的发生，萧克认为是“上下错误倾向合流”的结果。这一观点很有见地，耐人寻味。 在此，我们不妨剖析、阐发一下“上下错误倾向合流”的主要史实： 1.上面的错误倾向。 Mainly manifested in: （1）省委有指令。1928年6月26日中共湖南省委给中共湘赣边特委的信中指令：“省委决定四军攻永新敌军后，立即向湘南发展”，要“毫不犹豫地立即执行”，“杀出一条血路，然后用全力向茶陵、攸县、酃县、安仁发展，以与湘东南暴动相联系”。这就为红军大队开往湘南提供了上级领导机关的政策依据和行动方针。 （2）杜修经的策动。杜修经为湖南省委特派巡视员、代表，在当时的情况下是举足轻重的人物。毛泽东在《井冈山的斗争》中说他“导扬其焰”，即“导扬第二十九团的错误意见”；朱德在1962年参观井冈山博物馆时说：“八月失败是湖南省委代表杜修经起主要作用”，这是有道理的。因为，（1）杜修经只知形式地、机械地执行湖南省委的命令，虽然他在6月30日的永新联席会议上也同意了与会同志不去湘南的共同主张，但是，数天之后“又坚持省委意见”，变卦了；（2）在7月15日在沔渡召开的军委扩大会上，杜修经不仅“重提执行湖南省委的决定”，而且认为攻打湘南“还是有利的”；（3）杜修经在主持水口连以上干部会议讨论毛泽东来信时，仍然认为红军大队回边界“不能解井冈之危”，去打郴州还可“围魏救赵”。当王尔琢反驳他时，他竟以势压人，指着王尔琢吼道：“是你听省委的，还是省委听你的？”（4）当7月24日红军大队兵临郴州时，杜修经下令红二十九团团长胡少海发起攻击，朱德赶到加以制止时，他坚持说：“已经打响了，就打吧！”这些都说明杜修经在冒进湘南的全过程中，起了关键作用，实在是“八月失败”的主要决策人物。 （3）杨开明的支持。杨开明是“八月失败”前夕由湖南省委派充湘赣边特委书记的。在分兵冒进湘南这一问题上，他是同意湖南省委主张的，支持杜修经的。当杜修经回来请示毛泽东和边界特委时，毛泽东不在，他却公然表态支持，说：“决定了，就走吧，老毛那里，我跟他说。”从而，使红军大队去湘南有了特委的认可。 2.下面的错误倾向。 Mainly manifested in: （1）二十九团官兵回乡心切。他们“因政治动摇，欲回湘南家乡，不受约束”，竟瞒着军委召开士兵委员会，擅自决定去湘南，连带路人、出动时间都决定了，在朱德、陈毅等的劝说下，仍一味坚持去湘南，甚至提出“我们自己指挥自己”，表现出无组织无纪律的严重错误倾向。 （2）龚楚充当了“回湘南的主角”。他是红二十九团的党代表，却使该团党组织失去作用。据当年的二十九团老战士回忆，二十九团从龙源口战斗换上步枪后，部队日渐滋长骄傲轻敌情绪，走起路来昂首挺胸。“这时刚好湖南省委派来了一个代表杜修经（当时不知其名），我听一营党代表李光中到我们一连说，省委代表要我们部队回湘南去。这一来，一传十，十传百，一下子整个二十九团都传开了，上至团长，下至士兵、伙夫，都喜欢得很。团长胡少海，宜章人，团党代表龚楚，广东人，他们也想回家，尤其是龚楚，他是回湘南的主角，告诉各营党代表，并要他们告诉各连士兵委员会的负责人，造成非回湘南不可的声势，整个二十九团产生动摇归家的念头，有时还出现不听指挥的现象。”这样就使，整个二十九团党组织完全失去作用。当杜修经回宁冈找毛泽东商议时，龚楚对杜说：“等你一天，你不来，我们就走了。”可见龚楚当时简直到了目无组织，头脑发昏的地步。由于身为团党代表的龚楚如此，二十九团党组织才拢不住人心，官兵的思想情绪和极端行为无法遏止。 （3）胡少海也有过失。胡少海是红二十九团团长，在冒进湘南的军事行动中，态度暧昧，实际上是支持错误意见的。“团长胡少海，宜章人……也想回家。”他在几次会议和重要场合，没有出面支持朱德、陈毅、王尔琢等人的正确主张，而是同杜修经、龚楚站在同一立场，致使团代表龚楚能为所欲为，杜修经有恃无恐。 （4）二十八团也不愿回永新增援。二十八团虽然是为了保护二十九团才跟着去了湘南，但二十八团却提出过要去赣南，也可见二十八团对建立根据地的思想根基也不深，客观上助长了二十九团的军事行动。 正因为如此，上、下错误倾向的作用，红军大队冒进湘南便成为一种必然，造成失控局面而失败。 “八月失败”事发前，“军委亦未能加以阻止”。此事如何评析呢？ 毛泽东在《井冈山的斗争》提及八月失败时曾写道：“杜修经导扬第二十九团的错误意见，军委亦未能加以阻止，大队遂于七月十七日由酃县出发，向郴州前进。” 这是前委书记毛泽东对军委的一个含蓄的批评。 当时的军委书记是陈毅。他和军长朱德一直跟随着红军大队。对二十九团的错误意见，他俩为什么“未能加以阻止”呢？对这个问题，过去史学界一直是讳莫如深的。在此，我们认为有必要客观、公允地加以评析。 我们认为，在红军主力冒进湘南的过程中，军委和朱德确实做了许多劝阻工作，但阻止不力。朱德、陈毅一直是赞成毛泽东建设罗霄山脉中段政权计划，不赞成湖南省委要求红四军“向湘南发展”的错误主张的。为此，在各种会议和场合中都做了大量的工作，进行了“千言万语的解释”，但“三劝四劝也不行”，劝阻无效。当红军大队在杜修经的鼓动、怂恿下进军湘南已成事实时，朱、陈为顺应军心，避免红军走向分裂和二十九团孤军作战为敌所算，被迫同意红军大队去湘南。这是在当时特定的环境和突发性变故中作出的决定。这种应变举措是可以理解的，不应看得过重。 我们持上述这种观点的主要史实依据有以下五点： 第一，在6月30日的永新联席会议上，朱德、陈毅是明确赞成毛泽东意见，反对冒进湘南的。 第二，当“异外的变故”发生时，二十九团士兵委员会私下开会，擅自决定出击湘南的消息一传出，军委立即采取了措施，进行了劝阻工作。杨克敏《关于湘赣边苏区情况的综合报告》中曾这样记载：“朱德率领二十八、二十九团去酃县，一致收拾酃县，本因再攻茶陵，时永新已到赣敌，故又拟折回宁冈去永应援，岂知发生了一异外的变故：二十九团到酃后，因该团系湖南宜章农民，因不察边界生活之苦，借湖南省委有令去湖南之命令……突然于12号晚士兵纷纷开士委会，一不通知官长及党代表，竟决定13号由酃去湘南，私自找好带路的人，出动的时间都决定了。军委（四军党的最高机关）得讯即召集军委扩大会、兵士代表会，多方面解释阻止，无效。后又由朱德召集士兵演讲亦无效，他们总是要去，他们说官长如果不允许他们去，他们就缴了枪单身去。后来经过千言万语的解释，说暂时回去解了井冈之危，再行回湘南不迟，勉强将军队开动。”可见，事发后，军委开了扩大会、兵士代表会，朱德作了演讲，“经过千言万语的解释”，做了劝阻工作，“多方面解释阻止”，但无效。 第三，部队回沔渡后，朱德、陈毅针对当时的状况又召开了军委扩大会，并派杜修经回宁冈请示毛泽东定夺军事行动。对此，杨克敏记载道：“军至沔渡后，二十九团士兵，仍要求回去。军委看了这种情形，觉得如果勉强留住他们，不能作战也是无用，15号在沔渡又开过一次扩大会……”杜修经也回忆：“7月中旬的一个晚上，在沔渡，军委为了近日部队行军纪律松弛，召开了一个团以上的干部会，由朱德、陈毅主持，何长工、王尔琢、龚楚、胡少海等同志都参加了。会上提出要到湘南去，重提执行湖南省委的决定。但只觉得这个决定没有毛泽东同志参加，应征求他的意见，（军委）让我去特委找毛泽东同志商议后再行动。”可见军委和朱德在此时仍是持审慎态度的。 第四，红军大队至酃县水口时，军委再次对进击湘南问题召开会议讨论。“军至水口（酃县）复决定准二十九团回湘南去，同时恐怕二十九团单独回去，孤军奋斗为敌所算，乃复决定二十八团同去湘南。”此可看出军委的决定事出无奈，从保护二十九团计，红军大队才去了湘南。 第五，兵败郴州后，在桂东前委扩大会议上，军委和朱德毅然决定红军大队随毛泽东回师井冈山。这个会议上总结了“八月失败”的经验教训，批评了杜修经的错误，决定红军大队重返井冈山，杜、龚两人留在湘南组织湘南特委，开展湘南工作。这时，杜修经提出：“是不是要陈毅同志也去（湘南）？”朱德听后大为恼火，说：“你硬是要把我们拉垮么？”这“硬要拉垮”几字，足见朱德的一贯态度。 因之，我们认为上述史实足可说明，军委和朱德在面临杜修经等三番五次将红军大队拉往湘南的过程中，是做了大量的劝阻工作的，只是劝阻不力无效而已。当然，“如果态度坚决，多做思想工作，说服干部战士，是可以挽回的。”如今，在研究井冈山斗争历史时，提出这个问题讨论，主要目的是为了弄清历史真相，总结经验教训，而不是深究个人的历史责任。 “八月失败”的原因是多方面的，根据毛泽东的分析和历史文献的记述，可以归纳以下三个方面： 1.湖南省委对客观形势的错误估量和对军事行动的盲动主义，是“八月失败”的根本原因。 毛泽东在《井冈山的斗争》中对此作了透彻的分析。他说：“各地许多小块红色区域的失败，不是客观上条件不具备，就是主观上策略有错误。至于策略之所以错误，全在未曾把统治阶级政权暂时稳定的时期和破裂的时期这两个不同的时期分别清楚。有些同志在统治阶级政权暂时稳定的时期，也主张分兵冒进，甚至主张只用赤卫队保卫大块地方，好像完全不知道敌人方面除了挨户团之外还有正式军队集中来打的一回事。在地方工作方面，则完全不注意建立中心区域的坚实的基础，不顾主观力量的可能，只图无限量的推广。他们的这种错误意见，就是今年八月湘赣边界失败以及同时红军第四军在湘南失败的根本原因。” 2.湖南省委代表的错误指令和导扬是“八月失败”的直接原因。 毛泽东认为，“湖南省委代表杜修经和省委派充边界特委书记的杨开明，乘力持异议的毛泽东、宛希先诸人远在永新的时候，不察当时的环境，不顾军委、特委、永新县委联席会议不同意湖南省委主张的决议，只知形式地执行湖南省委向湘南去的命令，附和红军第二十九团（成分是宜章农民）逃避斗争欲回家乡的情绪，因而招致边界和湘南两方面的失败。”毛泽东：《井冈山的斗争》。这个批评是十分中肯的。 3.当时红军大队本身存在着的不利因素和决策上的失误，也是“八月失败”的原因之一。 这些不利因素是：（1）红二十九团官兵动摇思家，失去战斗力；二十八团官兵虽不愿去湘南，但提出去赣南，也是右倾悲观情绪的表现，因而也影响了战斗力。（2）盛暑远征，兵力疲惫。（3）从酃县冒进数百里，同边界失去联系，成了孤军。（4）湘南的群众没有充分发动起来，使这次行动变成单纯的军事冒险。（5）因为不明了敌情，使错误意见占了上风。（6）准备工作做得不好，官兵不了解此次作战的意义，缺乏主动性和积极性。（7）党组织未能发挥作用，甚至完全失去了作用。因此，产生决策上的失误，导致“八月失败”。 从“八月失败”中，我们可以得出以下几点经验教训： 第一，要正确地估量形势，保持党组织的有力量和政策的不错误。正如毛泽东所说：“根据地建设还必须具备一个紧要的条件，这就是党的组织的有力量和他的政策的不错误。”毛泽东：《井冈山的斗争》。湖南省委错误指令的根源，就在于对形势的估量和政策上的失误。 第二，在敌人统治势力暂时稳定时期，不能分兵冒进，远离根据地。杨克敏在总结“八月失败”的经验教训时，曾谈及这一点。他说：“这次失败的经验是：（1）在统治阶级稳定之时，军力切不可分开，分兵则为敌各个击破。假如此次二十八、二十九团不去湘南，则决不致遭这样的损失，而边界也不致如此失败；（2）在统治阶级暂时稳定之时，割据的扩大必须采取节节推进的政策，而不宜采取舍近就远的突进政策；（3）割据区域的深入工作为保持割据的根本要图，切不可只图扩大，而忽略了既得胜利的深入工作巩固。”毛泽