Chapter 15 2. Li De and Bo Gu went to the front line in person, "defending the enemy from outside the country"

The front line is tense day by day, and the "independent house" in Ruijin Shazhouba has become extremely busy. Li De, the owner of the "independent house" and a foreign consultant, couldn't sit still anymore. In 1914, when the First World War broke out, Li Decai was a soldier in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.Two years later, Li De was captured by the Russian army in battle and sent to Siberia.After the outbreak of the October Revolution, Li De joined the Red Army and started his revolutionary career.In the fierce battle, Li De fought bravely and was promoted to chief of staff of the cavalry regiment.

In 1919, Li De became a member of the German Communist Party and participated in barricades in Munich.He was arrested twice. In 1924, he was engaged in intelligence work in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. In the spring of 1929, Li De was sent to study at the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1932, when he graduated, he received an order from the Executive Committee of the Communist International: to go to China and serve as an adviser under the general military adviser Stern.So Li Dehuai took the Austrian passport, boarded the train, crossed Siberia, and arrived in Shanghai via the northeast.

There are probably three reasons why Li De was selected to be sent to China: First, he had experience in barricade warfare, while the Wang Ming line, who ruled the entire Communist Party of China at that time, was pursuing "the theory of the center of the city" and "capturing cities", and there was a great need for "barricade warfare". "Expert" guidance; second, he can speak Russian and English.It is convenient to work in China; the third is that he has experience in underground work. In fact, when Li De was sent to Jiangxi from Shanghai, his mission was just to be a consultant with little power.But as soon as he arrived in Ruijin, Bo Gu gave up his general power because he didn't understand military affairs, which made him the "superior emperor" over the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the Red Army headquarters.

Li De later returned to Germany. In 1973, he wrote the book "China Chronicle", which comprehensively reviewed his experience in China.Li De said in "China Chronicle": I agree to go to the Soviet area, but I put forward one condition, and ask the Executive Committee of the Communist International to issue a corresponding instruction.Ewart and Bogut therefore sent several telegrams to Moscow. In the spring of 1933, they received an affirmative answer, to the effect that: I am at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as an advisor without directing power.Other orders and directions were not given to me.Due to technical reasons, my trip is postponed until autumn...

That is to say, Li De was a "consultant with no directing authority" and had to accept the leadership of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.However, as soon as Li De arrived in Ruijin, Bogu and Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) had a long talk with him, and then put aside the instructions of the Communist International.Li De recalled in "China Chronicle": That night, we also planned the scope of our work, and we agreed that I would be in charge of military strategy, campaign tactical leadership, training, and organizational issues of troops and logistics.

Bo Gu worshiped Li De as a god, but Li De didn't understand the strategy and tactics suitable for China's national conditions at all. He only had the experience of the First World War. According to Wu Xiuquan, Li De's translator, the working procedure of Li De's staff was: no matter day or night, as long as a telegram came from the front, it would be sent to the "independent house" quickly.First, the staff translated it into Russian, and checked the geographical position against the map according to the telegram, drew a simplified map and sent it to Li De.After he reviewed and put forward corresponding suggestions, the staff translated them into Chinese and sent them to Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the Military Commission, who would discuss Li De's suggestions at the Military Commission or Politburo meetings and put them into practice.

Bogu was the general secretary at the time, but he knew nothing about the military, so he handed over the military command to Li De.Li De had the support of Bogu as the general secretary of the Central Committee, and Bogu had Li De from the Communist International as a military adviser, and the two supported each other. Not long after Li De came to the "independent house", he won an "elegant title", "the conductor on the map". He circled around the big map in the living room all day long, smoking a cigarette while drawing with red and blue pencils, and then using a ruler to measure the distance and determine the marching progress of the troops.He even laid down a map of where a machine gun should be placed, and where a mortar should be placed.

As everyone knows, the maps he used were all "supplied" by the Kuomintang troops, and many of them were inaccurate! Li De is an "expert in barricade warfare".He has given lectures in military academies such as the Red Army University, the First Step School of the Red Army, the Second Step School, and the Special Science School.The content of the lectures are all the tactics of the regular army fighting positional warfare.This is his specialty, and he has practical experience in barricade warfare, as well as the regulations of the Moscow Frunze Military Academy.After meeting Li De, Snow wrote down his feelings in "Westward Journey": "Li De is undoubtedly a military strategist and tactician with personal talents." The Kuomintang generals in Nanjing saw some of Li De's analysis and they When writing about tactics, he admitted with admiration: "Unexpectedly, Li De accurately predicted every step of this huge offensive."

Li De's tragedy is that he did not learn guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare courses at the Frunze Military Academy, and after he arrived in China, he knew little about China's national conditions, people's conditions, and military conditions. Since the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, the "commander on the map" has not brought himself and Bogu the kind of victory that he had hoped for.On the contrary, in the battles of saltpeter, Zixi Bridge, Huwan, Daxiongguan, Qiujiaai, Jigong Mountain, Fengxiang Peak, etc., the tactics of "short assault" and "fortress against fortress" used by the Red Army were in front of Jiang's fortress. Appears weak and weak, so unable to withstand confrontation.Over the past few months, under the guidance of the "new tactical principles", the Red Army has never fought like Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai in the first, second, third, and fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" wars. The enemy has one division or two divisions, and they are all direct descendants and elites.Xunkou's great victory, although it made people really excited for a while, but it only ate up a brigade, and the good dream never came again.

The new tactical principles promoted by Li De and Bo Gu have withstood the test of practice on the battlefield where you live and die, and the artillery is in full swing, allowing the Red Army to learn a bloody lesson at the cost of their lives.People gradually became dissatisfied and suspicious of foreign tactics such as "hitting people with two fists", "fort to fort" and "short assault". In December 1933, during the Tuancun battle in the east of Lichuan City, Peng Dehuai's Third Red Army fought alone because the main forces of the First and Third Red Army were not concentrated and the troops were divided into battles. A good fighter for a division.For this reason, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De called Xiang Ying, the head of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in the rear, and said: "Yesterday's battle in the regiment village, if the first and third armies would fight together, the result will not be the same."

On February 7, 1934, when Zhou Enlai talked about the fortress warfare and positional warfare currently practiced by the Red Army, he emphasized: "Our main form of combat is still mobile warfare," "We oppose purely defensive routes, and we want to carry out mobile defense." "It is most certain to eliminate the enemy from mobile warfare." On February 10, 1934, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen called the Military Commission and proposed using mobile warfare to destroy the enemy. On April 1, Peng Dehuai sent a letter to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, requesting a change in current tactics. On April 30, Lin Biao wrote to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission again on issues such as tactics and command. However, Li De, who held the real power of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, did not listen to the suggestions of the leaders of the Red Army and the generals in the front. He insisted on commanding the Red Army and the war according to his own military experience and "foreign dogma".He didn't believe that his strategy and tactics would be wrong at all. He wanted to go to the front line in person, and at Guangchang, the gate of the Soviet area, concentrate nine divisions of the main force of the Red Army to fight a decisive battle with eleven divisions of the enemy. Give it a shot. Upon hearing this, Bo Gu praised it greatly and asked the Military Commission to set up another "temporary headquarters".At the same time, he decided to personally accompany the foreign consultants to the front line of Guangchang. Guangchang is located in the south of Lichuan and the north of Ningdu.The county seat is located on the left bank of the Xujiang River surrounded by mountains. It is the northern gate of the Central Soviet Area and a battleground for military strategists.When the Red Army held it, it "defended the enemy from outside the gate of the country"; when the Jiang army occupied it, it opened the door to Ruijin, the hinterland of the Central Soviet Area.During the second and third "encirclement and suppression campaigns", Jiang Jun once captured Guangchang, but was soon recovered by the Red Army. Guangchang and Jianning, as two strategically important places in the Soviet area, Li De had personally inspected them. At the end of November 1933, Bo Gu and Li De came to Jianning, Fujian, where Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were headquartered for the Red Army, in order to directly control the military command of the front.The purpose of this trip to the front, according to Li De's own words, is to "discuss with Zhou Enlai and Zhu De the issue of military strategy and tactics", and then solve "the ambiguity and misunderstanding in the cooperation between the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the front command headquarters." The problem".In fact, the real situation is far less pleasant than what Li De said. When Li De recalled this trip to Jianning, he wrote: My opinion is that the former enemy headquarters should be under the leadership of the Revolutionary Military Commission and implement the resolutions and orders of the Revolutionary Military Commission.But I soon discovered that this was not the case.The former enemy headquarters acted completely according to its own judgment, at least in the mobilization of the Central Red Army.The former enemy command relied on its comparative knowledge of the changing military situation, because it had all the means of reconnaissance by radio technology, and all the power to obtain supplementary information through agents and scouts.Therefore, the General Staff Headquarters, as an organ of the Military Council, is actually only the operational leadership organ of the independent and local forces, and an organizational structure for recruiting troops, supplying supplies, and training soldiers.Such a division of the top military leadership into two parts made it difficult for all military operations to be consistent, and further promoted the phenomenon of guerrillaism, and made it easier for Mao Zedong to provoke disputes and profit from them. As soon as he returned from Jianning, Li De suggested and agreed with Bo Gu, the front headquarters was cancelled, and Bo and Li directly issued orders to the various ministries of the Red Army through the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in Ruijin.Zhou Enlai and Zhu De also had to return to Ruijin. After the collapse of the Nineteenth Route Army, Chiang Kai-shek once again concentrated his troops on the border of the Soviet area. At the beginning of February 1934, Li De went to the northern line to inspect again and arrived in Guangchang.This time in Guangchang, Li De personally instilled his strategies and tactics to the generals of the Red First, Fifth, and Ninth Army Corps. The two trips to the front line prompted Li De to make up his mind: Jianning and Guangchang are both strategic places and must be firmly defended.Therefore, fortifications should be built in the Guangchang area in order to prevent the enemy's main attacking troops from continuing to attack the heart of our Soviet area on the road that is easiest for the enemy and most dangerous for us, and to ensure that when our troops launch an assault on the east and west banks of the Xujiang River. Cross the river safely. In early April, the Chen Cheng Department of the enemy North Route Army and the Jiang Dingwen Department of the East Route Army successively entered the line from Kangdu Xicheng Bridge to Taining in the south of Lichuan. On April 10, the enemy concentrated eleven divisions to attack Guangchang. Among them, the eleventh, fourteenth, sixty-seventh, ninety-fourth, and ninety-eighth divisions formed the Hexi column and attacked along the Fu River; the fifth, sixth, seventy-ninth, and ninth divisions The sixteenth, ninety-sixth and other five divisions formed the Hedong column and attacked along the east bank of the Fuhe River, and the 42nd Division of the reserve team followed up in Hexi.The enemy attacked the front for about five kilometers, using the tactics of advancing to the west when the east was blocked, and advancing to the east when the west was blocked, alternately building blockhouses and advancing. From the saltpetre battle at the beginning of the war to Guangchang, Chen Cheng gradually realized that the Red Army was completely different this time. He called Chiang Kai-shek and said that the Red Army had begun to fight regular and positional warfare with him. Chiang Kai-shek's biggest headache was the Red Army's mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare.He was full of confidence in fighting regular battles and positional battles, and he couldn't help but feel overjoyed.He said to the senior staff of the Nanchang camp: "The Red Army wants to compete with me in regular warfare, so that's not good? Give me all the heavy artillery!" Ever since, Jiang Jun's direct lineage was equipped with a large number of German-made Bufu-style mountain guns on the northern and eastern fronts, especially Chen Cheng's troops. To fight regular warfare and positional warfare, weapons and equipment play a decisive role to some extent.So in the Battle of Guangchang, what was the comparison of the weapons and equipment and troops of the two sides? According to the statistics of the Red Army General Headquarters in 1934: the First Red Army had about 16,000 people, 10,000 rifles and 300 machine guns; the Third Red Army had about 15,000 people, 9,000 rifles and 300 machine guns , 30 pursuit guns; the Red Fifth Army has about 10,000 people, 7,000 rifles and 150 machine guns; the Red Ninth Army has about 9,000 people, 7,000 rifles and 150 machine guns.In terms of ammunition, each soldier is issued with one to two grenades, 70 to 100 bullets, 300 to 400 bullets for machine guns, and about 3,000 shells. This is the strength and equipment of the Guangchang garrison—the nine divisions of the Red Army: a total of more than 40,000 men, 35,000 rifles, 900 machine guns, and 30 cannons. For Chen Chengjun, each infantry company is equipped with three light machine guns, including German-made automatic rifles, Czech-style light machine guns, and French-made Hotkiss light machine guns. Nine rifles, the platoon company commander is equipped with a 20-gun fast and slow machine gun made in Germany.Chiang Kai-shek also assigned the First Artillery Regiment and the Fifth Artillery Regiment directly under the Ministry of Political Affairs to the "encirclement and suppression" troops in units of battalions or companies.These two regiments are equipped with Bufu-style seven-five-mountain guns purchased from Germany. This gun is equipped with a full range of observation equipment and has a maximum range of nine kilometers. The shells are reloaded and can adapt to various Target shooting, hit accuracy is excellent.In addition, Chiang Kai-shek transferred Song Ziwen's mortar battalion under the Tax Police Headquarters of the Ministry of Finance to the front line to participate in the battle.This kind of gun is a French-made Bayi caliber and is equipped with a sight, which is more sophisticated than the Eighty-two mortar used by Jiang Jun with a drop-ball ruler. Chen Cheng participated in the battle of Guangchang, with nearly 120,000 people in eleven divisions, equipped with a large number of mountain artillery, field artillery, mortars, and dozens of aircraft for air superiority.In terms of strength and equipment, it has an absolute advantage compared with the Red Army. In such an extremely disparate positional confrontation, the Red Army is undoubtedly at a considerable disadvantage.Mao Zedong tried his best to oppose this kind of attrition warfare, and satirized it as "beggars and dragon kings". However, it is impossible for Mao Zedong's advice to change the determination of Li De and Bogu. On both sides of the Xujiang River, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Red Army Corps returned from the Jianning front line and the 23rd Division mobilized from Longgang, in conjunction with the Red Ninth Army Corps, the former garrison in Guangchang, launched repeated attacks on Chen Cheng's troops. Extremely but extremely tenacious short assault. At the beginning of the battle, the enemy's Hedong column launched a fierce attack on the positions of Daluoshan and Yanfuzhang. The Red Army resisted desperately, blocking the enemy's attack.Taking advantage of the opportunity of the Red Army's main force to concentrate on the east bank of the Fuhe River, the enemy's Hexi Column broke through the defensive position of the Ninth Army Corps of the Red Army, and occupied Ganzhu, an important outskirt of Guangchang, on April 14. On the 19th, the enemy's Hedong Column on the east bank occupied the Daluoshan and Yanfuzhang positions again.At dusk that day, the Red Army launched a counterattack against the enemy at Daluo Mountain. They rushed and fought repeatedly, but failed to stop the enemy's attack and were forced to retreat. At dusk the next day, Bogu and Li De arrived at Toupi, Guangchang.Bo and Li arrived at the same time, as well as Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and Gu Zuolin, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and acting director of the General Political Department of the Red Army. Gu Zuolin was originally the secretary of the Fujian-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee. Because Wang Jiaxiang was seriously injured in the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, he was hospitalized for a long time, so Bogu asked him to act as Wang Jiaxiang's deputy.This time on the front line, there is a new title: Director of the Political Department of the Field Command.The commander of the Field Command is Zhu De, and the political commissar of the Field Command is concurrently served by Bogu himself.In fact, Zhu De can no longer play much role, it is just a foil, and Li De has actually become the real commander-in-chief. On April 21, the day after Bo and Li arrived, in the names of Bo Gu, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhu De, Chairman of the Military Commission, and Gu Zuolin, Acting Director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, they issued the "Political Order to Defend Guangchang" by the Central Committee, the Military Commission, and the General Political Department. The Order states: (1) The enemy has tried to use all means to occupy the Soviet Guangchang. (2) Our combat mission is to defend Guangchang with all our strength.In order to accomplish this glorious task, all fighters, commanders, and political workers should exert maximum tension and efforts. Our firm, resolute, and heroic battles will not only be able to defend Red Guangchang, but may also wipe out a large number of enemies and finally Smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression". (3) Our fulcrum garrison is the backbone of our battle order. They should unwaveringly support under enemy artillery fire and aerial bombardment, so as to use disciplined firepower and brave counter-assaults to wipe out the enemy's vital forces . (4) Our assault forces should strive to approach covertly (crawling, running, taking advantage of blind spots, etc.), so as to avoid unnecessary casualties under enemy fire and carry out sudden attacks out of enemy's surprise.When attacking, one should disregard all firepower, advance courageously, and destroy the enemy resolutely and ruthlessly. (5) Combatants, commanders and political workers should bear in mind that revolutionary warfare is the highest form of class struggle, and that they are hesitant and timid about any wavering, let alone individual enemy spies who infiltrate them, and their counter-revolutionary actions in battle should be maximized. Vigilance is eliminated.In battle, everyone should be compared with the most advanced fighters. (6) Commanders and political workers should be in their own troops without exception, and should not be separated from or lag behind their own troops.They should set an example to combatants not only with personal bravery but especially with correct tactical actions.Under the leadership of them and previous combatants, our troops should continue and enhance the glorious tradition of our Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, marching to great victories holding high the glorious red banner. Long live victory! On the same day, the Field Command issued two "Arrangement for Destroying the Enemy and Advance to Guangchang" and "Arrangement for Defending Guangchang" with an "urgent" telegram. At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the People's Committee of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet issued the "Letter of Instructions to Field Parties and Soviets." The "Instruction Letter" stated: The decisive battle against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" has entered a more intense critical moment of victory and defeat. The workers, peasants and toiling masses of the entire Soviet area, under the leadership of the party and the Soviet, enthusiastically participated in the struggle against imperialism. In the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression" war, the central area is actively mobilizing model young pioneers to go to the front to cooperate with our heroic Red Army.You are at the forefront of this fierce decisive battle, shouldering the greatest and most glorious mission in history just like the Red Army of Workers and Peasants.Your heroic fighting was one of the decisive factors in crushing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression".The responsibility to fight for "defending Guangchang", "defending Jianning", "defending Huichang", and "defending and developing the entire Soviet area" is placed on your shoulders. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission's "Battle News" and the Soviet Central Government's "Red China" published editorials and put forward slogans: "Fight to defend Guangchang, this is to fight to defend the Chinese revolution", "Victory or death"... Chiang Kai-shek is determined to win Guangchang, and Li De is desperate to defend Guangchang.A desperate bloody battle of unprecedented scale kicked off.