Chapter 4 4. The Military Commission was reorganized, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De lost power

In January 1933, Bo Gu, Luo Fu and others entered the Central Soviet Area from Shanghai.Bogu, who had always monopolized power and was used to giving orders, once he arrived in Ruijin, he took all the party, government and military power in the Central Soviet Area into his own hands. Before the temporary central government moved into Ruijin, the highest leading authority in the Central Soviet Area was the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China. On October 17, 1930, the meeting of the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to establish the Central Bureau of the Central Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China in the Central Soviet Area. Wu Zhenpeng, Yu Fei, and two local people formed the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, with Zhou Enlai as secretary.Zhou Enlai did not arrive, and Xiang Ying served as acting secretary.

In mid-April 1931, the central delegation Ren Bishi, Wang Jiaxiang, and Gu Zuolin arrived in the Central Soviet Area, Xiang Ying was dismissed, and Mao Zedong served as acting secretary. At the end of 1931, Zhou Enlai went from Shanghai to Ruijin and officially took office as Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area.Because Zhou Enlai led the Red Army to fight in the front for a long time, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area was actually presided over by Ren Bishi and Xiang Ying. Shortly after the Provisional Central Committee moved into the Central Soviet Area, a meeting of members of the Provisional Central Committee and the Soviet Area Central Bureau was held in Ruijin.Bogu suggested that the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area be merged and renamed the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China. Secretary, Liu Shaoqi is the chairman of the Central Executive Bureau of the ACFTU Soviet Area.

Bogu knew very well that in the Soviet region where war was the primary task, military power was very important. Without military power and the army, everything would be impossible to talk about.In the past, military power was in the hands of Mao Zedong, who controlled tens of thousands of troops, which was very disobedient.The central government said to go to the left, but Mao Zedong preferred to go to the right; the central government wanted to actively attack the central cities, but Mao Zedong wanted to pull the army into the ravines to fight guerrilla warfare. Why?The army is in hand. Since ancient times, there has been a saying that "the general is outside, and the emperor's fate is not accepted".

At the Ningdu meeting, Mao Zedong was lifted from military power. Bogu and the Central Bureau thought that the army should be obedient.Unexpectedly, Zhou Enlai had mastered the military power, and he also learned from Mao Zedong.Originally, the policy of Mif, the representative of the Communist International, was to "refuse Qu to stay in Zhou".That is, in the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Zhou Enlai was given a place - "slap his ass, not drive him away". I didn't expect Zhou Enlai to be so uncooperative, and he was always against the instructions of the Central Committee and the Central Bureau.Bogu called for the anti-Luo Ming line, Zhang Wentian wrote an article proposing against the "Luo Ming line in the army", but Zhou Enlai, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in June, said in front of Bogu and Zhang Wentian that "there is no Luo Ming in the Red Army." Line", almost in the same tone as Mao Zedong's speech at the meeting.At the meeting, Mao Zedong attempted to overturn the verdict, saying that the Ningdu meeting in October 1932 was wrong, that the attack on Ganzhou was wrong, and that "active offensives" should not be carried out.Bogu Mingming affirmed the Ningdu meeting on behalf of the Central Committee, but Zhou Enlai wringed it out, saying that Mao Zedong should be allowed to stay on the front line and that Mao Zedong's military command role should be played.Zhou Enlai sang the opposite tune, out of harmony with the central line.

It is hard for Bogu to imagine that Zhou Enlai has stayed abroad, eaten foreign bread, visited the hometowns of Marx and Lenin, served as the head of the delegation to the Communist International, and has been engaged in urban riots for a long time. Synchronize.But how come when I arrived in the Soviet area, I was assimilated by Mao Zedong, who had no Marxism at all, and talked about Mao Zedong's military line with great interest, and followed suit?Bogu was worried about Zhou Enlai, especially worried about the military power in his hands.In the fourth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", Zhou Enlai sang against the Central Bureau, but he won the battle, and he fought quite beautifully.The invincible Chiang Kai-shek lamented in his handbook to his beloved general Chen Cheng: "This loss is extremely tragic, and it is the only pain I have ever experienced in my life! The general is weak, and his life is in danger, and his heart aches when he thinks about it, and he shudders..." For a while, Zhou Enlai's name, in the Red Army, in and outside the Soviet area, is at its peak.What's more, he still has so many subordinates of the Nanchang Uprising and students of the Whampoa Military Academy!In order to prevent the emergence of Mao Zedong's second, Bogu must grasp the military power, and he must personally grasp it.

On May 8, 1933, according to the suggestion of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China headed by Bogu, the 41st Standing Committee of the People's Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic decided to move the Central Revolutionary Military Commission from the front to Ruijin, adding Xiang Ying and Bogu As a member, when Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, commanded operations in the front, Xiang Ying served as acting chairman. In this way, the military operations in the Central Soviet Area will be directly issued by the Provisional Central Committee in Ruijin, directing everything.

Zhou Enlai knew very well that in the Central Committee's decision on May 8, Bogu wanted to control the military power and control the front lines from the rear; the decision-making power for military operations in the front was completely in the hands of Bogu and others. Freezing three feet is definitely not a one-day cold.As early as the fourth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", Bo Gu and others felt that Zhou Enlai was disobedient and repeatedly disobeyed orders, so they took down Zhou Enlai and Zhu De and directly commanded the Central Red Army. On January 29, 1933, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanchang and personally served as the commander-in-chief of the "bandit suppression".The war is imminent.

The development of the situation no longer allowed the Red Army to argue about the operational policy. On February 3, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang jointly called the Central Bureau, saying that "continuous battles are coming soon", and asked the Central Bureau to only give "instructions in principle and guidelines" to the front. It should belong to the front." The Central Bureau did not budge.The next day the reply said: "Under the current situation where the enemy is defending strongholds, it is unavoidable to attack Jiancheng." According to the instructions of the Provisional Central Committee, "It is advisable to attack Nanfeng first in the current action." policy." And said firmly: "This new plan has been approved by the Central Bureau, please discuss it immediately and telegraph the specific deployment."

In this way, storming Nanfeng has become a rigid order that cannot be discussed but must be implemented. On February 7, Zhou Enlai had to propose a military deployment to attack Nanfeng to the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area.However, he stated: "The above-mentioned deployment is not rigid, and the enemy's terrain changes and needs to be used flexibly." On the same day, he telegraphed the Central Bureau again, saying: In order to seek opportunities to eliminate the enemy during the movement, it seems inappropriate to first attack those who have suffered too much damage. Combat strength, if the damage is too large and cannot be attacked, it will further demoralize.I ask you to consider it.

Zhou Enlai, together with Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang, also jointly called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, requesting that the Central Bureau and the Central Bureau should give them room for maneuver and due powers in front activities, but the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the Provisional Central Committee turned a deaf ear to it and insisted on ignoring it. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De had no choice but to lead the main force of the Red Front Army to march towards Nanfeng, and completed the siege of Nanfeng on the 12th, and launched a full-line attack in the evening. Chen Cheng, the commander-in-chief of the enemy's Central Route Army, responded immediately: on the one hand, he ordered the Eighth Division of the Nanfeng garrison to hold on to the city, and on the other hand, he ordered the three columns under him to quickly reinforce and divide into three directions, in an attempt to encircle the main force of the Red Army under the city of Nanfeng and annihilate them in one fell swoop. .

This is the nick of time.The enemy's situation changed suddenly, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De resolutely made a decisive decision, and immediately changed the original military deployment without waiting for instructions from the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the Provisional Central Committee. On the evening of February 13, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and transferred to the Provisional Central Committee: Nanfeng's fortifications are dangerous, our army has not overcome the strong attack, and the casualties are relatively large, and the six enemy divisions have come to reinforce in three ways.Based on this situation, we changed the assault on Nanfeng into a feint attack, determined to destroy the reinforcements.Seek to eliminate the enemy's wings in the mobile battle expected to intervene, so as to eliminate them one by one. Beginning on the 14th, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De left a small number of troops to continue the feint attack on Nanfeng, and used a part of their troops to disguise the main force, and moved to the east in the direction of Lichuan, attracting the enemy's second and third columns; the main force was 40,000 to 50,000. Then they secretly withdrew to the Dongshao, Luokou, and Wucun areas in the southwest of Nanfeng to covertly assemble, waiting to wipe out the enemy. Under the correct command of Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was carried out in full accordance with the calculations of the frontline headquarters.The two battles of Huangpi and Caotaigang were quick and easy, and more than 28,000 people from nearly three enemy divisions were wiped out. The Red Army achieved brilliant results. The Red Army's first, second, and third counter-campaigns, commanded by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, won victory; in the fourth counter-campaign, commanded by Zhou Enlai and Zhu De also won victory.It can be said that the Red Army already has its own wise and outstanding commander.However, Bogu didn't take it seriously. He only believed in the Communist International and admired foreign military strategists.If he wants to pursue an active offensive line, he must rely on and rely on foreign advisers.Under Bogu's repeated urging, Wang Ming ran up and down Moscow, and the Communist International finally sent a general military adviser. His name is Manfred.Stern, or Fred for short.This person was General Kleber, who later became famous in the Spanish War. The general counsel set out from Europe, passed through the United States and Japan, and arrived in Shanghai, the temporary seat of the Central Committee, in the spring of 1933.The General Counsel lived in the secret contact point in Shanghai and did not go to the Central Soviet Area.Relying only on the instructions of the Communist International and the written report on the situation of the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area, the General Counsel immediately proposed an unrealistic plan that completely negated the past and was unconventional—"beating people with two fists."In a few days, I will report this to the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China in Ruijin. Bogu is a scholar, he doesn't know how to fight, and he doesn't understand the war under the special conditions in the Soviet area of ​​China at all.Receiving this telegram, I felt like I had found a treasure, and I couldn't help but feel overjoyed. Regardless of whether the military plan of the foreign adviser was feasible, I called Zhou Enlai and Zhu De in the name of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China, and conveyed the full text of the plan, ordering them to resolutely implement it. On June 13, 1933, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De received instructions from the Central Bureau at the front.This long telegram criticized the Red Front Army for "concentrating its main force in a single combat unit, that is, the Front Army, which cannot cooperate in operations from all aspects."Moreover, it was judged that Chiang Kai-shek had conflicts with the enemies in Fujian and Guangdong, and he was on the defensive in the northern part of the Central Soviet Area, which was not easy to attack. Therefore, he requested that the main force of the Red Army be divided into two parts to fight.This is the so-called "hitting with two fists". According to this telegram, part of the Red Army on the one hand formed the Eastern Army, and first went to western Fujian to fight against the enemy's 19th Route Army, then went north to fight against the enemy east of the Fuhe River, and finally attacked Fuzhou.The other part stayed in Yongfeng, Chongren, Yihuang, and Le'an areas to carry out coercive operations. After the Eastern Army made progress, it would go north to attack Fuzhou. The long telegram from the central government caused great repercussions among the generals in front.Zhou Enlai and Zhu De expressed that they could not accept it at all.Zhou Enlai said: "After the 'Four Antis', I fought the enemy twelve times, each time causing major casualties, and wiped out at least one regiment of the enemy. The combat areas in Fujian were barren and it was difficult to raise supplies; besides, our army has already The risk of breaking the cooking!" Zhu De also said: "Concentrating superior forces is the most profound experience in our past wars, and we can't separate them!" On the day of receiving the long telegram, the frontline headquarters immediately held a meeting of leading cadres of each legion to discuss the telegram from the central government. Peng Dehuai said: "The First Army and the Third Army are two brothers. If you fight separately, you will lose the battle; if you fight together, you will often win the battle. Past experience has taught us this." Peng Dehuai opposed the central telegram. His most profound lesson was the battle of Ganzhou and later Shuikou.In the fight against Ganzhou, the First Army Corps did not fight. His Third Army Corps and Fifth Army Corps were extremely heroic, but their forces were not concentrated. Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Luo Ronghuan, Teng Daiyuan, Dong Zhentang, Zhu Rui, Luo Binghui, etc. all had personal experience, shared the same feelings with Peng, and all opposed the separation of the first and third armies. The conclusion of the meeting of the generals ahead: the central government's long telegram is subjective, wrong, and cannot be implemented. On June 18, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De jointly called the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China to raise different opinions on Changdian. He pointed out: "The First and Third Army Corps, the main force of the Front Army, should absolutely not be separated at present." On the same day, Zhou Enlai called Bogu and Xiang Ying separately, disagreeing with their groundless accusations against the front. Zhou Enlai said: "If we waited on the sidelines, it would be a mistake of course; but since the Huangpi War, every time we change the battle, there is indeed an opportunity to wait." Seeing the refusal to carry out the long telegram ahead, Bogu lost his temper, saying: "The central government's orders cannot be refused." On June 23, after Zhou Enlai received two consecutive telegrams of severe reprimand from the Central Bureau, he had no choice but to say: "Absolutely obey your orders and implement them immediately. I request to return to Rui (Jin) and his party during the transfer of troops, and face to face Chen disagrees, or hold a meeting of the Military Commission or the Central Bureau in Bosheng County (that is, Ningdu). Because many issues cannot be detailed in the telegram, many criticisms are not at all what we wanted (originally) to do.” The Central Bureau rejected it. On July 1, the Central Bureau, in the name of Xiang Ying, the acting chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, called Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan, Zhou Jianping, Xiao Jinguang, Ye Jianying, etc., and categorically issued the "Military Commission's Instructions on the Composition of the Eastern Army, Cadres and Command Relations." ", announcing the formation of the Eastern Army and the implementation of the plan of "beating people with two fists".The full text is as follows: Zhu, Zhou, Peng, Teng, Zhou, Xiao, Ye Bingzhuan Xiao, Shao, Zhou Zikun, Zeng Risan, Xue, Huang: In order to quickly establish and complete the combat area east of the Fuhe River, the Three Army Corps (The Sixth Division is temporarily absent), and the Nineteenth Division is a part of the Eastern Army. Peng Dehuai is also the commander of the Eastern Army, and Teng Daiyuan is also the political commissar. Peng and Teng commanded nearby, and Yuan Guoping was also the director of the Political Department of the Eastern Army.The Eastern Army is directly under the command of the First Army Zhu Zhou, and all ministries are expected to communicate by telegram. For a long time thereafter, Xiang Ying, the acting chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, actually ordered Peng, Teng, and Peng to report to Xiang Ying. Zhou Enlai, political commissar and general political commissar of the First Army, was also deprived of the right to connect and transmit telegrams. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De are useless, and they are even more idle.Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan, Zhou Zikun, Zeng Risan, etc. became more and more "at a loss for the entire deployment of their superiors." From mid-July to late September, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Bogu, Xiang Ying, etc. had a series of debates on the Eastern Army's expected combat policy, deployment and extension time, and expanded areas.Zhou and Zhu's proposals were dismissed and rejected again and again, and the contradictions with Bo and Xiang became more and more serious, making it difficult to communicate. At this moment, Otto, the long-awaited military advisor of the Communist International, Bogut.Braun (that is, Li De) arrived in Ruijin.Bogu seemed to see a savior.Ever since, the power to command the Red Army was handed over to the German. Li De, who is he?Li De, formerly known as Otto.Braun, a native of Munich, Germany, a member of the German Communist Party. He escaped from prison and fled to the Soviet Union in 1928. After graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1932, he was sent to China by the Communist International.He didn't understand China's national conditions at all, and he just transferred the rules in the textbooks and the experience of large-scale positional warfare in the First World War to the Central Soviet Area for enforcement.The comrades in Ruijin respected him because he was a military adviser sent by the Communist International, so he took over the power and gave orders.Wu Xiuquan, who served as Li De's translator, said in his memoirs: "Li De's arbitrariness replaced the collective leadership of the Military Commission." "Li De hid in the house alone and directed the battle with a map." It was caused by De's subjectivism and blind command, but he reprimanded and punished others at every turn, kept throwing temper tantrums and scolding others, and could not listen to objections at all." "At that time, the wrong leadership of the Central Committee and Li De's domineering style made him Became an authentic 'overlord'." Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that Zhou Enlai was in a difficult situation.While still at the front, he has been deprived of command of major military operations and can only make suggestions, which are often ignored. On November 20, 1933, the Fujian Incident broke out, and Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu and generals of the 19th Route Army raised the banner of opposing Chiang. On November 24, Zhou Enlai reported to the Central Bureau: Chiang Kai-shek's attack on Fujian will be from Zhejiang to Fujian as the main direction, and from Zixi and Guangze to Fujian as the auxiliary direction.It is suggested that the third and fifth red armies flank the troops attacking Fujian.Since Zhou Enlai no longer has the right to make decisions on such a large-scale military operation, he can only hope that the Central Bureau will make an early decision in the report. The Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China proceeded from the "Left" point of view, held a completely distrustful attitude towards the Fujian People's Government, and refused to provide support. On November 25, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an instruction to the Red Front Army saying: "We should not pay huge losses to fight this enemy army, or let the 19th Route Army fight the enemy for us." In this way, Zhou Enlai The proposal to support the Fujian Incident was shelved. On December 13, the Military Commission decided and telegraphed Zhou Enlai and Zhu De to cancel the plan to attack the enemy alone. The main force of the Red Army was transferred to the west, and the first and third armies formed the western army to attack the Yongfeng area without success The enemy's fortress line in the area, instead of going east to cooperate with the 19th Route Army. The fact that things have gotten to this point has actually made it impossible for Zhou Enlai to work normally at the front. On December 16, Zhou Enlai called Bogu and Xiang Ying, pointing out indignantly: Because the central government did not understand the actual situation on the front line, "the telegrams were repeatedly updated every day", which "made it very difficult for the troops to operate." Deployment and orders are fully authorized to avoid mistakes and lost opportunities." "Otherwise, please send us a telegram for camera processing." This telegram angered the Central Bureau even more.Therefore, Li De made a suggestion in the name of unifying the front and rear command, and the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China decided to cancel the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army General Command and the First Front Army Command. The former front headquarters was withdrawn to the rear and merged into the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission directly commanded the armies and independent divisions and regiments in the Central Soviet Area to fight. On December 20, Xiang Ying called Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, etc.: The Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to organize the units of the Red Front Army into the Eastern Army, the Central Army, and the Western Army, and the Front Army Command will return to Ruijin. On January 4, 1934, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De returned to Ruijin from the front. On February 3, Zhou Enlai was appointed vice chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. After that, Zhou Enlai was actually deprived of the command of the frontline troops, and only took on some technical organizational work.He did not attend many major issues, such as the preparations for the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee and the convening of the Second Congress of Soviets. At the Ningdu meeting, Mao Zedong lost his military power; when Li De came, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De lost their military power.Since then, the fate of more than 100,000 Central Red Army and millions of people in the Soviet Area has been in the hands of a person who does not understand military affairs and a foreign consultant. On the eve of the outbreak of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, the transfer of power from the Red Army planted the seeds of crisis for this "decisive battle".