Chapter 11 9 The Changing Self

howard.Buffett, Warren's oldest son, considers his father the second smartest person he has ever known.The wisest, in his opinion, was his father's West Coast philosopher friend Charlie.Munger.For writer Maury.To Bernstein, Munger was a true enigma, an eccentric thinker who always kept you at arm's length.Munger is Buffett's sounding board.Munger -- only Munger -- Buffett would let him into his tent.The two have a special symbiotic relationship, and like a happy marriage, they have a predestined chance.Edwin who had helped arrange for the two to meet.Dr. Davis was impressed by their similar demeanor and resourcefulness.Buffett's daughter thinks they're like "clones," walking the same steps and even looking a bit alike.

Buffett always has a cheerful demeanor, but his L.A. partner is stern.He's less polished than Buffett and never foolish, often too lazy to say goodbye, and fond of getting up from his chair and disappearing as soon as he's reached a conclusion about his business. Munger was so suspicious of his people that Buffett nicknamed him "The Terrible Inhuman."In fact, this offers a little clue as to what makes Munger unique.His approach to life—especially his approach as an investor—was to ask what could go wrong.He always likes to quote the geometer Karl.Jacobi's words "transforming, always transforming".And so, at a school graduation, Munger's "sermon" isn't about the qualities that lead to happiness, but about the qualities that necessarily lead to tragic lives.

Buffett has used Munger as his lawyer in many acquisitions.Munger owns a small share of the Davisfield retail stores that Buffett controls.Yet their occupations are separate from each other. Since the 1960s, Munger has run Weller Munger & Co., an investment partnership in a conveniently plumbed office on the floor of the Pacific Stock Exchange.This structure is very suitable for Munger's mind, because it fully shows Munger's disdain for the group of posturing corporate bosses.Even more ingeniously, Munger placed the secretary in a single room in the back, while he and his partner worked in the open front room.

Before an hour had passed, Munger would yell at the secretary again: "Put me on Warren!" Munger's partner, Ella.Marshall felt that Buffett was training Munger, and Munger also wanted to be Buffett's partner.But oddly enough, their professional connection was purely accidental.Each of them independently bought a stock called Blue Chip Stamp in the Los Angeles company.Buffett bought some for himself and some for Berkshire.By the early 1970s, Buffett was the largest owner of blue-chip stocks, while Munger was second. Blue chip companies are a faded American relic.It charges a fee from the supermarkets that distribute its coupons, and then exchanges these coupons for "free" ovens, lawn chairs, and the like.Of course Buffett has no interest in ovens, all he is interested in is money.

The secret to the attractiveness of a blue chip company is that it can collect cash immediately but repay the fund in installments over a long period of time.Because these coupons are often stuffed in a drawer and forgotten.During this time, the blue chip company is free to use the outstanding giro cheques.For Buffett, blue chip is nothing more than an unregulated insurance company. Its "profits"—that is, those coupons sold to retailers—are in the amount of $120 million a year, so Buffett has an additional currency reserve in Berkshire. source.He and Munger joined the blue-chip board, took over the investment committee, and started putting the outstanding cheques to work.

It's a dangerous game for Buffett, with an investor running two parts of his fund working for a competing and potentially conflicting owner.But strangely, since Buffett is so protective of his reputation, this never happened to him, and he and his friends are having a good time buying cheap stocks together.When Buffett was in California occasionally, they would laugh together about picking stocks, making it sound like a piece of cake. One example is with Originating Capital Fund, which is a closed-end mutual fund, also in Los Angeles.The seed capital fund was funded by Fred.Carl, an investment company manager, established it in 1968.After Carr retired in the early 1970s, its stock plummeted.Indeed, it had fallen as far as any other stock.Although the asset value of the original capital fund is 18 US dollars per share, his price is only 9 US dollars.Blue chips have a 20% share in the fund.In this way, Buffett and Munger circled back to speculation, but by this time the other owners had walked away.

Munger represented the blue chips on the board of the original capital fund and made drastic adjustments to any dissatisfaction.Once, when he was reviewing the bond portfolio, he found that the seed capital fund would have some bonds that were below the safety rating.He bluntly said to the portfolio manager: "This is indeed an excellent and enviable list of Baa-rated bonds, but for the original capital fund, I don't want anything other than A-rated bonds." Might have found a better agent than him1 — especially since Buffett himself is so bad at dealing with such conundrums. In 1971, Buffett and Munger faced a kind of "good business" - encountered a good opportunity with potential - the kind of "good idea" that Munger preferred, different from the kind of Ben.Cheap stocks of the Graham type.Robert.Flaherty, an investment advisor to a blue-chip firm, learned that See's, California's leading chocolate chain, was up for sale.William, a decision maker at a blue chip company.Ramsay is also very interested in buying it.William came to Flaherty's office, and the two called Buffett, who was at home in Omaha, to tell the story.

"Hey, Bob," Buffett said, "the candy business! I don't think we want to be in the candy business." As soon as the voice fell, he hung up the phone. After hearing his words on the receiver, Ramsay paced the room distraughtly, waiting to get back on Buffett's call.Every minute passed so long.In a panic, the secretary misdialed to Buffett's office, but no one answered. After three or four minutes of touching, they finally found him.Before they could talk, Buffett said, "I'm looking at the numbers. Well, I'm willing to pay for it." These "numbers" tell Buffett that chocolate lovers in California are willing to pay a little more for See's highly acclaimed candy. Small, Buffett and Munger decided that the purchase price could not be higher than 25 million US dollars, so the negotiation ran aground.But this time, Buffett made a common mistake.

Investors often assume that book value can estimate or at least give an indication of what a company is "worth."In fact, these two expressions are two completely different concepts.Book value equals the amount of capital that has gone into the business plus any retained profits.What investors care about is how much value can be extracted from the company in the future, which is the key to determining the company's "value" (also called "intrinsic value"). Suppose for a moment that a new company invests exactly the same in candy production equipment, stores, and inventory as See's, but produces a brand of candy that is little known, so that the upstart is more profitable than See's. The ability is much lower, and its value is bound to be much smaller.Since book value does not reflect intangible assets such as brands, its role as a marker of value is meaningless for a company like See's.

But Buffett and Munger were very lucky, and See's called back and agreed to a price of 25 million-this is also the largest investment Buffett has ever made.As if all of a sudden, Buffett's empire included candy, textiles, retailing, insurance, banking, publishing, and coupons. Buffett's strategy is to compartmentalize them all as if each division were his only child.Wearing his See's hat, he used to work his way into the crowd for a class on sugar futures. In his letter to See's President Chuck.In Huggins' letter, it can be seen how Buffett explored all kinds of details amazingly.

My hesitant intention is to accept the price for Sunday, December 29th.I'm thinking 20■-30■ a pound...if sugar futures keep falling like they did the other day, I'm inclined to hold off on buying until we get a reaction to refined sugar. Buffett kept pushing Hudgens to strengthen the reputation of the See's brand.Interestingly, Buffett's unsuitability to be a gourmet has inspired him to understand what the company really "sells". Maybe 8 acres of vineyards in France are the best grapes in the world, but I always suspect that 99% of them are spoken and only 1% of them are drunk. He has since turned his attention to the coupon industry.As discount supermarkets took business away from stores that didn't use coupons, and customers increasingly felt disadvantaged by patronizing them, he also talked to blue-chip companies about how to explain that insight. With a touch of self-analysis, he admits that marketing is not his forte. The problem now is that I think like an accountant or an actuary.My response was to explain all the facts to the customer, and do all the math, and then show her how good she was buying our coupon.I think I can convince a bunch of mathematicians, actuaries, securities analysts, even accountants... but not housewives. Buffett deposited another 45 million from Berkshire's capital source and invested it in bank stocks. For this reason, he has remained unharmed in this dangerous game so far.He invests on behalf of three companies, Berkshire, Blue Chip and Davisfield, each of which has its own independent shareholder group, and he also shoulders the responsibility of running each company well.In which of the three pockets should he put The Washington Post?Where should the See's Candy Company be located?Buffett is careful to try to be as fair as possible, but even so, conflicts of interest are inevitable.It is indeed very difficult to arrange this matter, and it is also very out of Buffett's character.Besides, as long as something gets complicated, securities inspectors will follow you confidently. In this shocking game, a broker offered Buffett stock in Wescoberg, Pasadena, California.The company has a certain amount of savings and loans.Buffett knew Wesco, and he'd read its annual report every year since the mid-1960s—as did the thousands of reserves and loan statements he'd read.Wesco shares are trading in the market for only a dozen dollars ① yuan, which is less than half of its book value. Buffett and Munger checked, and Munger also thought that Wesco's shares were very cheap, so the blue chip company bought 8% of its shares.It was the summer of 1972, and Wesco Finance was still a small company with only $2 million in investments; but by January 1973, it announced that it was going to partner with another savings and loan business in San Francisco, California.Barbara Finance Corporation merged. Buffett and Munger immediately came to the same conclusion: "Wesco is going to drop the store. As part of the merger, holders of Wesco stock will exchange their undervalued shares for St.Barbara's stock, which seemed overvalued.To quote Buffett: I saw the terms and couldn't believe them, and I told Munger the announced terms, and he found them equally unbelievable.But it is indeed written in black and white.Jones' market card. Munger wanted to buy more shares in Wesco, hoping to prevent the merger.Because mergers are decided based on shareholder votes, Buffett is not a person who can endure occasional losses and restrain himself."It would be a mistake to be miserable about it," he said. Yet Munger stuck to his guns.Over the next six weeks, blue chips bought up every single stock that came up, gradually accumulating 20 percent of the total number of shares. Still, they couldn't stop the merger, and now the blue chip company is too deep.As Munger said, they are like mice caught in a mousetrap and have given up their desire for cheese. In February, Munger gave Wesco President Lewis. R. Vincenti made a phone call. Munger's choice of words and sentences seems very strange.He said the blue chips had been buying shares "in order to create an atmosphere" in which Vincenti and other Wesco directors would not feel any "moral obligation" to pursue the merger. But Vincenti insisted on implementing the original plan.He found that blue-chip companies could vote against themselves at will and persuade other shareholders to do the same.In Munger's view, the behavior of this populist was simply vulgar.He had been a man of great esteem, confident that there was no problem which could not be resolved between these two men.He declared that he liked the way Wesco was run.And especially Vincenti is the same type of guy as Buffett and Munger.In fact, Munger has repeatedly said that if Vincenti asked him in person and the two talked face-to-face, blue-chip companies would stop buying shares. This seemed to Vincenti the most eccentric.He couldn't understand that Munger would be so persistent and fond of morality in normal business transactions. However, this also reflects the difference between Munger and others. He is a person who adheres to the old-fashioned school ethics.He never tried to quote Benjamin.Franklin's statement, but he thinks Franklin's maxim is more valuable than anything taught in any business school. Regardless of whether he is in the business world or not, Munger abides by the etiquette that a gentleman should have. He persistently walks his own path, but takes little praise or criticism from the final result.When the doctor performed an extremely botched cataract operation on him, which caused his vision loss, he admitted without complaint that there was a 10% chance of this happening, and he became enthusiastic about studying ophthalmology. In his private life, Munger has been quite proactive, and he was instrumental in setting up an abortion clinic in Los Angeles following the Bellows abortion case.Being Goode.Volunteer President of Samarintan Hospital, he has completely reorganized the hospital's mission and expert groups, except that he also bullies the doctors, just as he once bullied his trustees at the local Planned Parenthood campaign.Buffett comes across as approachable, while ① Book value is a useful measure for most banks.Because bank assets consist of loans and other financial assets, the analogy is Intangible assets such as licenses are usually of lesser importance. The Republican Munger seemed to have a high position and a heavy responsibility. He rushed into the conference room and searched for some messy stories to tell, as if he was a one-eyed philosopher and king wearing scary-shaped glasses that magnified several times. "Charlie is very funny and very cocky," says one member of Buffett's inner circle. He himself is one of them." Munger always joked about building a Munger "dynasty," and when he divorced his first wife -- the "First Lady" -- he began reading obituaries, hoping to pay for his imaginary offspring. Find a widow with qualities he recognizes, he and his "Second Lady" have raised 8 little Munger kings and dames. Quite unlike his Omaha partners, he lived a rich life, fishing for trout, pike, and Atlantic salmon in the river and various wild pools; Hosting the party, especially when he's down a glass of wine.Ella.Marshall recalled that at a party in Bel-Air, Munger was alone with a loud, upside-down monologue, saying some weird things, and Munger thought it was very interesting.When the host asked Marshall, "Can you shut up Charlie? No one else can talk." Once, Otis, a close friend of Munger's, woke up in the middle of the night on a fishing trip and found Munger sitting and studying a book carefully with a very secretive look on his face.Another time, when Buffett and Marshall went on an expedition to the Australian rainforest, their jeep turned around in the jungle, but Munger had been reading an extremely obscure paleontological book.Later in the evening, Munger told his companions what he had read. "Under a clear, deep blue sky, he tells us how dinosaurs evolved into birds." Marshall recalled. People, including Buffett's friends, were intimidated by Munger's speech on black holes and Einstein, and they stopped mentioning his dismissive attitude.Once, Buffett's friend Roxanne.Brandt said the only hospital in Los Angeles she knew of was Cedar.Munger immediately shot her back, saying, "That's because you're Jewish." Munger sits in his armchair like a formidable psychologist and, above all, behaves like a student. He sees the culprit behind many phenomena, such as: People tend to appear powerless to change their opinions, which is what he calls "first conclusion bias": That's why an organization always begs for the promise of the public.hell!This is also the reason a family organization always holds a wedding anniversary. This is why Munger's insight has had a great impact on Buffett.Yet it was Buffett, not Munger, who was able to use these understandings in a more natural way.Buffett is indeed a great man who can overcome one's "first conclusion bias". In the case of Wesco, after Munger and Vincenti failed to negotiate, Buffett began to try to persuade those directors who had the ability to prevent the merger.Elizabeth.Peters was a San Francisco heiress and Wesco's largest shareholder.Peters' parents established a savings and loan business, and the company became a public company in the late 1950s.None of her brothers were up to the job, so the burden fell on her, and Peters, who was an English major, was sent to study business in the interests of the family.She found that: first, she could do quite well; second, Wesco provided a viable reference for her other pursuits.She has some other goals, including going to Napa Valley vineyards with quality trees and reading José's works. By the early 1970s, Wesco's performance was mediocre, and Peters wanted to give it some incentives, but the other directors got nothing, financial or otherwise.until St.After Barbara Finance put forward the acquisition conditions, although Peters realized that the conditions were very harsh, she hoped that the merger would spur the development of Wesco. Buffett sent Donald, the president of the blue chip company.Keppel went to speak to Peters once, but she stood firm in her support for the merger.Shortly after Keppel left, Buffett called again. He happily introduced himself to Peters and suggested that the two of them find a chance to talk. A few days later, Buffett and Peters were sitting together in a San Francisco airport lounge, and Buffett told her that he thought Wesco's stock was worth more.Barbara's offers much higher prices.While these are clichés Peters has heard many times from Keppel, they are even more convincing when they come from Buffett.For example, he spoke to her as if he were her partner, his money fused with her business. Peters insisted that something must be done to rekindle Wesco activity. Buffett said he would be willing to try. He talked about his relationship with other companies, which he called a partnership. to myself.His tone was calm, making people feel very reassured. Peters finally found herself willing to be a partner in the man who liked Buffett — and his style — and seemed to see a glimmer of hope. Only one question remained on Peters' mind. "Mr. Buffett, if I buy you, what if you get hit by a truck at the intersection? Who will save Wesco then?" Buffett said that he has a friend who is as capable as himself.He has put this person in charge of Berkshire, and if a similar "truck" incident occurs, the Buffett family's interests will also be preserved by him.He thinks it can be entrusted to himself and any one of him. When Buffett finished speaking, Peters had already made up his mind, so the merger finally came to naught. Buffett and Munger also began to feel a certain obligation to her and decided to increase their stake in Wesco.They could have bought the stock at a low price.Because normally, when there is a merger activity, the stock goes up.But due to the guaranteed repayment activities of deceitful investors in view of the failure of the deal, for which Buffett and Munger are directly responsible - it doesn't look like much.So they tell their brokers to be generous with their prices. Blue chips bid on Wesco at $17, the prevailing price before the deal fell through.While the move was unusual, according to Munger, "we made a decision at a moment of fantasy that this was the right path to go." The blue-chip company increased its share to 24.9%. Later, Wesco's stock fell along with the market, and the blue-chip company did a lot of equity acquisitions.In mid-1974, blue-chip companies owned the vast majority of total stock. (Peters remains one of the few major shareholders).It seems that the matter is not over yet, but what Buffett and Munger don't know is that their whereabouts have been followed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The first signs of disaster came in the fall of 1974, sparked in part by the tangled and rather irregular partnership between Buffett and Munger.Buffett and Munger have separate stakes in blue chip companies and Davisfield retail outlets, but Munger has no ties to Berkshire.So, when Buffett spends money from his blue chip pockets, it's cooperative, and when it comes to Berkshire—his front pocket—he's solitary. Intuitively, this inter-connected ownership relationship is confusing and prone to conflict and confusion (as shown on the right). As a first step toward unraveling this tangled relationship, Buffett and Munger announced the merger of Davisfield Retail into Berkshire.But the SEC and the Exchange Commission raised doubts and asked them a lot of questions. At first Munger thought maybe the SEC was delaying their progress because Buffett and himself were very "interesting" characters.In his mind, he had a strange picture: management scrutinizing a blue-chip company as if it were an extraordinary bug crawling through a microscope.But as the months passed, Munger grew restless.Writing to Charles.Rick Shosha - his and Buffett's lawyer at Munger's law firm In the letter from the teacher——, Munger seemed very dissatisfied, as if he was dealing with a civil servant in the traffic department. Hopefully everyone at the SEC will be content when I drop this thing, if not you guys should get me an answer ASAP and preferably call me directly so we can work out all the issues Problems can also enable our merger plan to be completed smoothly. Munger, however, had never read Kafka, and Rick Shosha sent a relatively benign letter to the SEC.In December, Munger received his fastest reply—although it was not what he expected.SEC Files Charges Against King Of Omaha: About Blue Chip Stamp Company, Berkshire.Hathaway, Warren.Buffett Inc. (sic), HO-784, etc., Buffett has been the target of a full scrutiny. It is possible that blue chips, Berkshire, and Buffett (sic) individually or in concert have increased some activity.Deception is performed directly or indirectly as a mechanism, scheme, or tactic in these operations.Or also include an untrue factual statement or omission of... These inquiries centered on whether the blue chips had ever manipulated Wesco's stock price, an allegation that was indeed a dilemma to resolve.In the SEC's executive branch, it was considered a big deal, and it quickly expanded into a full-blown investigation of everything Buffett had ever been involved in. During the investigation, Buffett shipped cartons of dossiers to Washington, his stockbroker's records, his letters to blue chip companies, every memo he had to Spinners and See's, and Buffett's bank, everything was sucked in by the "vacuum field" of the SEC.Werner, chief accountant at Berkshire.According to MacKenzie, "they finally found a rich man, so he decided that he must be a villain. " Despite Buffett's worries, he appeared calm.He is as calm and patient as he is in investing, whether or not his reputation is at stake.Munger, on the other hand, nearly suffered a stroke. Roderick.Hills, Munger's former legal partner, was serving as White House counsel at the time. When word got out during the investigation that Sears had been offered the job as SEC chairman, lawyers for Buffett and Munger called Sears and begged him to turn him down, saying that if he took the job, he would The SEC would be more than willing to stop, leading to even harsher treatment of them. "What's going on with you?" Sears asked.He was alluding to the investigation."No, it's all bullshit," Rick Shosha said, to which Sears looked dismissive.Munger called several times after that, each time accusing Sears of betraying Buffett when he needed him most.But Hills took the job anyway. In March 1975, Munger came to the SEC as a witness for two days. He arrogantly assured his interrogators that "if anything goes wrong, Warren and I will take full responsibility," as if this would end the matter. things like.He regarded it as a test of character, and often referred to the glory of attending various high-class parties. A young SEC lawyer wields his three-inch tongue and struggles to find his inside story.He hinted that Munger was involved in a conspiracy to sabotage the merger by short-selling shares of the Wesco stock plaintiffs.Munger protested, "That's not how we do business." He sounded rather shocked, as if a priest had occasionally been a policeman instead of a missionary. In fact, the SEC suspected conspiracy.Specifically: Did the blue chip block the merger in order to take over Wesco? Questioner: Before February 26, how long did you and Buffett consider this approach (seeking control of Wesco)? Munger: As I said before, we put 98% of our energy into the business at hand, and we all believe in this truth: the work one talks about is the work at hand, and one should not worry about things that are vague in the distance. Regardless of Gary's deterrence, the lawyers went a step further to get to the heart of the matter, so why are blue chip companies paying more than necessary for Vesco? Questioner: Why would you pay more for something you can get for cheap? Munger: We hope to be on the road.Vincenti and Betty.The Peters have done it fairly and equally. Questioner: So what about your shareholders?Don't you want to be fair to them too? Munger: That's right.We are under no obligation to be fair to shareholders who ask us to do things that are inconsistent with overkill.Our thoughts and present.Like Franklin's - if you will - the most honest policy is the best policy... You look confused? Questioner: Indeed.Because it is my impression that business people always strive to maximize profits for the benefit of their companies and shareholders. Munger: Maybe we want to maximize profits over a longer period of time.And Luis if we wish.If Vincenti builds a harmonious and long-term working relationship, maybe this is just a private interest, just tilted to the level you take for granted. The topic of this conversation is with Buffett in San Francisco and Betty.Peters' talk is very similar, a long-term investment is not just a bet on stocks, it is a form of partnership.A large shareholder—that is, a partner—pays and also benefits.For Buffett, the word "partner" has a certain strong implication, implying a series of unspoken responsibilities and loyalty. Sincerity, just as he once felt to investors in Buffett Partnership. Modern portfolio managers view stocks in two dimensions, flashing on a screen and disappearing with the push of a button.Buffett and Munger need to play a bigger role, and they often talk about operating capital alone is not enough.Munger recalled: "I said to Warren, we don't want to be a smart, stingy money saver like wise man Russell." We don't want to leave only a blank blank in the memory of friends and family Paper. Still, SEC lawyers remain skeptical.It looked to them as if the blue-chip company had backed Wesco's stock—or "manipulated" it—in order to sell at a higher price.But since the blue-chip company has made no move to sell it, lawyers are mystified.So, they came to test Buffett again: Questioner: From a business point of view, wouldn't it be better to wait until the price drops to buy stocks at a cheap price! BUFFETT: That might be true in a single transaction, but I think if you look at the overall landscape of the blue chips, the folks at Wesco who feel like the shareholders are really being treated fairly ... I think the overall business reputation of the blue chips has never been Not as good as it is now. Questioner: What kind of responsibilities do you have to the shareholders of blue chip companies? Buffett: I also own a considerable amount of stocks, so this will also affect me. I am not completely spending other people's funds. Questioner: If you entered the market immediately after the merger fell through, and the stock price fell, you don't think that looks very good, right? Buffett: I think maybe some people will be quite outraged by this. Questioner: This reason is puzzling to me.As much as you think Wesco's management would be upset or angry... I mean why would you care about that, why would a blue chip company care about that, and why would Wesco's management care about that? Buffett: Wesco's management feels very important to us.Of course, you could say we have control, so it doesn't matter, but it actually matters.louis.Vincenti doesn't really want to work for us, he just likes working with us and I want to work with him, which is a good relationship.You know, if he thinks we're scumbags or something, the relationship can't exist, and it's not just based on how much he gets paid. It would seem unreasonable for a government agency to always accuse JP Morgan or Sr. of being too concerned about their own reputations. "Why do you care so much about this?" The question seemed unimaginable to Morgan's contemporaries.But in this era, something has been lost by everyone. Indeed, Buffett's conversation with the SEC feels like a century-old conversation, in which the agency and the lawyers it is used to dealing with define a company's affairs as a series of transactions, each of which is a separate , Today's partners may turn against each other tomorrow.巴菲特以建立关系的方式来做生意，显得更为长远。他对自己的规则十分执著，好像自己对自我定位有某种奇怪的偏爱一样。而可笑的是，这却为别人的怀疑提供了根源。 巴菲特有漏洞的事实更加剧了证交会的疑虑。他们已经找到了共谋者，现在只差罪证没找到了。自然而然地，他们想从巴菲特和芒格之间貌似神秘的联盟关系中找到这种罪证。 提问者：在蓝筹公司里是由谁来做投资决策的？ ① 芒格在1976 年将他的合伙人企业做了清算，在1962—1975 年期间，以复利计算的年增长率达到了20%. 芒格：通常是由巴菲特先生来做的，他一般事先和我商量一下，然后他在行动之前还会征得我的同意。 提问者：那么在巴菲特先生第一次购买下订单以后，他有没有告诉你他想继续买进韦斯科公司的股票呢？ 芒格：这种事情对于我们俩来说再自然不过了，因此我们通常没有必要告诉对方或一起讨论未来的打算都是些什么。 提问者：那你问他了吗？ 芒格：我没有必要这么做。我知道他脑子里都是怎么想的。 提问者：你自己是否觉得巴菲特先生是你的知己？ 这句不经意说出口的话顿时显得提问者不太坦率。证交会曾经从贝蒂。彼得斯那里打听到类似的语句。于是他们又来试探巴菲特。 提问者：你觉得他可以成为知己吗？ 巴菲特：这可取决于你谈的是哪个方面的问题。你也知道，我们在许多投资项目上意见分歧是很大的。而大多数决策中，我们能够保持一致。 提问者：自从你变得有几分投资哲学家气质以后，你确信自己在大多数投资问题上同样征求他的意见吗？ 巴菲特：不，不再是……我的意思是有点这势头。 提问者：好的，因此你们讨论一些有关投资学、哲学以及你所投资的项目等问题？ 巴菲特：确实如此。 提问者：所以大多数情况下，你基本上知道他在买进或卖出些什么，而他也知道你的做多做空状况吧？ 巴菲特：他知道我对什么东西有买卖的兴趣，我也知道他的兴趣所在。 至于他在某个特定时刻实际做了些什么，我并不十分清楚。 巴菲特一步步有条不紊地进行下去。他曾经多次非正式地拜访证交会，而且似乎有意要协助他的审问者，他很有耐心地对证交会的一位叫劳伦斯。塞德曼的律师解释蓝筹公司这个拼图游戏。在他们吃午饭的时候，巴菲特还对塞德曼谈起他在华盛顿的年青时代，他零碎地穿插进一些巴氏的哲学观点，很快塞德曼就不知不觉陷入了巴菲特编织的蛛网之中，和贝蒂。彼得斯当年的情形一样，塞德曼回忆说： 许多次，我和他围坐在桌子旁画圈，他说：“你这儿错了，它不属于这个公司，'或者'那个属于那边……”。我和他呆在一起的时间很多，他没有什么敌意，是一个可以相处的出色人物——即使我们是站在不同的立场上的。 对于现代的决策者来说，要是在没有律师陪伴的情况下走进证交会，并且和一个无足轻重的调查者谈起自己的案子——事实上这是给调查者提供信息——这一定是一件不可能发生乃至荒谬可笑的事情。即便他有这种念头，决策者的律师们都会提出抗议，并且无疑会限制他的这种举动。当代的精神总是处于犹豫之中，自发的行为早已让位于谨慎地墨守陈规，产生英雄的时代已经被一种对专门研究的崇尚所取代。我们再也没有伟人了，只有一些服服贴贴的小蚂蚁。 巴菲特至少要在某种程度上做个英雄。那是很久很久以前，当人们还愿意在没有律师的情况下活动的时候，他觉察到这些现代的辅助部队——不仅 仅是律师，还有政府公关人员，顾问以及无数其他的顾问——不光在发挥协助的作用，还在进行控制。这些都是他很厌恶的事情，不论成败与否，巴菲特都不会容忍其他任何人来为他安排日程。 除了他十足的个人魅力以外，人们对他的开诚布公也有很好的反应，同时也因为他从不争辩而放松了对他的戒备，巴菲特并没有直接反驳塞德曼而是扔还他一块烂泥。 “拉里，”巴菲特终于说道，“你以你的方法来看，你是对的；这里面确实有一些技术性的犯规行为。但如果你用我们的方法来看的话，就不是这个样子了。但我们并不是故意想去做错什么事情。如今，我们该如何解决它呢？” 这个案子在1975年里一直拖着。证交会又把渔网洒向另一个领域进行捕捞——原始资本基金，这是巴菲特和芒格控制的另一组基金。到现在为止，巴菲特已经被各种各样的混乱局面搞得“奄奄一息”了。如果恶梦一旦结束，他告诉证交会说，他渴望能简化他的事务： 我们希望拥有和现在一样，但少些混乱的企业。我确实不喜欢乱七八糟的局面。我们做的时候它显得很简单，而现在却远远不是那么简单了。 到12月份，巴菲特的律师R.里克绍沙恳求了结此案。他辩解说巴菲特没有做错什么事情不值得做这样细致的调查。他把巴菲特3年以来毫无瑕疵的准备个人税申报表的记录与林肯的圆木屋相提并论。 自从他14岁开始为送报纸挣的钱交税以来，就一直缴纳联邦收入所得税。30年积累起来可以有数百万美元了，并且他的平均误差还不超过200美元。 1976年时——调查已经进行了两年——证交会终于作出了处理。证交会正式指控蓝筹公司对韦斯科公司的购买不仅仅是一种投资，而正如它曾披露的一样，同时还为了阻止兼并（这也的确是事实）。它还宣称在3周时间内蓝筹公司曾人为地抬高韦斯科公司的市场价值。蓝筹公司同意以后不再有类似的举动，没有对罪行的确认或否定，而只是此类事情的一种惯常处理。对于证交会认为在蓝筹公司交易中受到伤害的韦斯科公司股东，它将支付115000美元。 证交会没有采取敌对巴菲特的行动。但几周以后，它又派他去参加一个蓝色缓带研讨会，研究公司报表披露实践的情况。也许，证交会以此来表明对巴菲特的赦免。可以毫不夸张地说，对于前两年一直处于被调查的地位的巴菲特来说，这种待遇已经是非同寻常了。 仿佛一个带着重新做人的热情的罪犯的巴菲特终于结束，也可以说是简化了这种“混乱”的局面。他把蓝筹公司在原始资本基金中的份额脱手出去（已经翻了两倍）。从此他不再以FMC资金管理者的旁观者身分出现了，他把韦斯科公司和蓝筹公司合并在了一起（他本来要买下整个韦斯科公司，但应贝蒂。彼得斯的要求，他只购进了80％）。经过两年的中断之后，他继续着手把戴维斯菲尔德商店兼并到伯克希尔公司中去。 令巴菲特高兴的是，兼并活动把他和芒格之间的联盟关系规范化了。为了换取他的戴维斯菲尔德股票，芒格在伯克希尔公司中投入了2％的股票， 同时，巴菲特还把他的好友任命为副主席。芒格继续留在洛杉矶迫求一种零散的利益，但对于自己在伯克希尔公司中的地位，他始终很谦虚。“从很大程度上来说，大多数点子都是沃伦出的。”他说道。然而对于像巴菲特这样一个偏狭的人，有聪明过人的芒格在远处观察战况，提出忠告是非常重要的。 兼并活动同样也使伯克希尔公司在蓝筹印花公司里占有了主要的份额。 实际上，巴菲特只剩下一个“口袋”了——那就是伯克希尔。Hathaway Company. 他没有任何别的投资组合，实质上也就是没有个人投资了。但是伯克希尔公司，这个被他从纺织行业的死亡地带里营救出来的企业，正是他的“个人投资”。 在最初10年中，巴菲特使伯克希尔公司的净价值从20美元/股升到了93美元/股。他对公司进行了彻底的改头换面。巴菲特自行收购了保险团体、银行，股票组合以及他在蓝筹公司，喜诗糖果公司和韦斯科公司中占有主要股份之后，公司原来的样子都荡然无存了。 要是另一位决策者就会重新命名公司来反映出这些变化——也许叫做伯克希尔。哈撒韦实业公司或是“伯克希尔实业”。但是巴菲特对这种调包没有兴趣。他喜欢现在的名字，它使人想起公司的起源历史，虽然他不是一个多愁善感的人，他还是叫肯。察思。从新贝德福德的档案堆里刨出昔日总裁们所作的记录，然后把它们都运到奥马哈来了。正如巴菲特对证交会解释的那样，他永远不会出售伯克希尔。 我就是喜欢它。我将为伯克希尔公司倾注我的余生。它是属于公众的，但现在它更像一家家族企业。 他说的不只是长期，而是他的余生。他的事业——某种意义上也就是他的生命——都决定聚到这个公司里去了。他做过的每一件事，每一项投资，都是在一幅永远画不完的油画上添加的一笔。没有任何人能从他手中抢走画笔，就像他当初从西伯格。斯坦顿手中抢来一样。70年代中期时，巴菲特拥有了43％的股票份额，而苏茜持有另外的3％。为了得到伯克希尔公司以及蓝筹公司的下属机构，巴菲特投入了1540万美元。这相当于每股伯克希尔股票价值为32.45美元，这也是巴菲特愿意注入的最大资金。对这幅油画的任何进一步的修饰——即伯克希尔股票价值的提高，以及巴菲特财商的增加——都将从每股32.45美元的投资中，以及他对这项投资所作的一切努力中源源不断地涌出。