Chapter 11 6. Nikita Khrushchev-2

Mrs. Nixon and I have received some warm welcomes on our visits around the world over the years, such as in Tokyo in 1953, Bucharest in 1963, Madrid in 1971 and Cairo in 1974, but nothing close to the one we received that day in Warsaw. A strong and spontaneous welcome.An estimated 250,000 people filled the sidewalks and into the middle of the street, blocking the progress of convoys time and time again.Some shouted, some sang, many wept. Thousands threw bouquets into my car, Mrs. Nixon's, and even into the cars of the accompanying journalists.A few journalists who defied the crowd were told, "This time, we paid for the bouquets ourselves." The Polish government declared a holiday on the day of Khrushchev's visit and drove children and government workers to Caravans pass by and buy bouquets to toss on "spontaneous" welcome occasions.Many people saved the flowers for the day we arrived.As our convoy crawled through the streets of Warsaw, the crowd chanted "NiechZyje!" - "Long live America!" and sang "Stolat" - long life to you!

Given this experience, it did not come as a surprise to me that millions of Poles all rose up against communism in 1980.There has never been a system of government that has controlled other countries and has succeeded, let alone won the approval of the peoples of these countries. The extremely moving reception that day in Warsaw reinforced my long-held beliefs about the problems of Communist-controlled Eastern European countries.However, however much we sympathize with them, we must be careful not to encourage the people of oppressed countries to provoke this kind of armed repression that Khrushchev imposed on the Hungarian people in 1956.At the same time, we should constantly strive to keep the channels of communication open with the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and we should be careful not to make any faint hope of extinguishing them--to one day be freed from the communist oppression with which they are so burdened ——This kind of thing comes.John Foster Dulles said a few months before his death: "Communism stands firm for evil, let us stand firm for right."

After lunch at the dacha, I called Khrushchev together and had a few private talks with him.We discussed the letter he had received from President Eisenhower inviting him to visit the United States.I told him that we wanted him to be greeted with courtesy, which he could guarantee if some progress could be made in the deadlocked Berlin talks in Geneva.Khrushchev was indifferent and noncommittal, while Gromyko in Geneva remained as uncompromising as ever. Eisenhower's decision to invite the leader of the Communist world to visit the United States caused a storm of controversy.Hardline conservatives and Americans of Eastern European descent strongly opposed his visit.They believed that the visit would weaken the anti-communist will of the American people by giving the Soviet Union the illusion of moral equality.I disagree with this view.As long as Americans are naturally trustworthy and friendly, their anti-communist sentiments will not be sapped just because communist leaders wave to Americans in convoys in convertibles.

I believe that the visit is a wise and safe idea, provided that it does not induce a kind of euphoria in people's psychology.For example, many people thought that if we kept showing Khrushchev our peaceful intentions, the Soviet leaders would loosen some of their rigidity and resolve the outstanding issues between East and West. Some in the press, and even some in the government, are so naive as to think that if Eisenhower showed respect to Khrushchev, gave Khrushchev a generous treatment, and did the latter's job with the charisma for which he was famous, he would be doing the job of solving our problems. Real progress can be made on fundamental differences between the two countries.

I don't agree with this attitude. Based on my experience, I think that Khrushchev would have misunderstood such excessive friendliness as a sign of weakness.I don't expect any major progress in resolving fundamental differences.It was crucial for Eisenhower to impress Khrushchev as a polite and reasonable master, as well as a strong leader who could not be pushed around at will. In my opinion, Khrushchev's visit should first and foremost have the effect of educating him.He knew that America was powerful militarily and economically.But his ideology told him that multiple injustices afflicted and drained capitalist society.What Khrushchev received were second-hand materials submitted by his assistants.The material tended to reinforce the perception that his assistants often reported to him what he wanted to hear, rather than giving him what he needed to know.In fact, Khrushchev steadfastly believed in an outdated image of capitalism drawn by Karl Marx a hundred years earlier, which was fundamentally wrong even then.Khrushchev kept repeating the lie about the ugliness and weakness of a free society, but, because the lie was repeated so many times, in fact even he himself believed it.

I think that Khrushchev's misconceptions will be completely corrected through his visit to the United States.He will come to appreciate the fundamental strength of the country and the will of its people. "When Khrushchev arrived in Washington in September 1959, he became the first Soviet leader in Russian history to set foot on American soil.He was fully aware of the significance of this event.But he was even more puzzled by the slight deviation from the protocol I had seen other visiting dignitaries receive.He interpreted the deviation from the official schedule as an attack on his country's honor.He is a very easily provoked person.If others do not stimulate him, he will become excited himself.

A few days before his arrival, I gave an extemporaneous speech to the effect that the Soviets had sent three lunar satellites to the moon, not one as they claimed, due to a string of misses , had to try again.Khrushchev heard about this speech and decided to take it as a sign that his visit to the United States was unsuccessful.During his visit he announced that he would: "Put your hands on the Bible" which I did not mean, and challenged me to do the same if I really thought what I said was accurate Similar swear.He also attacked my speech on Soviet-American relations, which I covered in a speech I gave at the American Dental Association convention.He ignored the speeches I gave at the American Legion and the American Legion.The two organizations are about to issue a statement condemning Khrushchev's visit.They reconsidered only after I emphasized to them the importance of giving Khrushchev a polite welcome.

When Eisenhower invited me to the first meeting of the summit in the Oval Office of the Palace, Khrushchev shook my hand without smiling.He referred to our debate in Moscow with biting irony.Eisenhower said he saw the short film shown on television brought from Moscow and thought it showed mutual restraint and mutual courtesy.He tried to calm the other party down with these words. Khrushchev then complained about my opposition to the visit and said I was doing my best to undermine his welcome, pointing to my latest speech as proof.He said, "Because of my reading of that speech, upon my arrival here I was surprised to find that the American people welcomed me with tolerance and apparent friendliness. In the Soviet Union, if I had spoken in advance against visitors, there would have been no A welcoming ceremony of this nature." I reminded him of the biting attacks he had made on me in his speech upon my arrival in Moscow.Khrushchev claimed that my speech was more provocative than anyone else's.Eisenhower and I gestured to each other that things would be better if we were left alone, and I immediately made an excuse and left.

When we arranged for Khrushchev to visit various parts of the United States, I felt that it was necessary to have such an escort who could respond effectively when Khrushchev was bound to launch a straight and clumsy attack on our policy.Eisenhower enthusiastically endorsed my recommendation: our ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, was the most qualified man for the job.He was a skilled diplomatic spokesman, with self-restraint in the East-West debate at the United Nations, and he was high enough to represent Eisenhower as an official escort.Lodge accomplished this task very effectively.Almost everywhere he went, he was required to thwart Khrushchev's arrogance and arrogance. He fought back fiercely but was polite.

After the trip, Lodge told me that Khrushchev was "the Harry Doloman of the Soviet Union."Both of them are simple minded, straightforward and rude people.I'm sure neither of them would have appreciated the comparison.Lodge believes that Khrushchev received a real education during his tours across the United States.He told me that when the Soviet leader saw the tens of thousands of worker cars in the parking lots of factories in California and the enormous productivity of the cornfields in Iowa, his mouth gaped open. After traveling around the United States, Khrushchev and Eisenhower went to Camp David to try to reach some agreement on bilateral issues after much discussion.Eisenhower asked me to attend the first plenary of the negotiations in Aspen Lodge's living room.It was clear that Khrushchev had no intention of making a deal and immediately targeted me.

Looking me straight in the eye, he said that many members of the Eisenhower administration wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union, but some wanted to stick to a policy of confrontation.His constant staring at me was unmistakable, but he gave me no reason to react.Therefore, Eisenhower interjected that he believed his administration was consistent with regard to current foreign policy. "Khrushchev's uniquely Russian sense of inferiority and his sense of aggression made him feel that his honor was constantly being contemptuous, and that no one else meant it at all.At the luncheon after the plenum, I tried to liven up the conversation by asking Khrushchev what his hobbies were.He said he liked swimming in the Black Sea, or hunting in the countryside.Eisenhower said he liked to go fishing and play golf, but he found it difficult to get rid of the situation of being constantly interrupted by the phone.After listening to the translation, Khrushchev got angry again at a sentence and said, "There are also many telephones in the Soviet Union. In fact, we will soon have more than the United States." Vinsenhower realized that his guest really I can't help laughing. After lunch, Eisenhower and I agreed that I should go back to Washington in the hope that he and Khrushchev might have a constructive meeting in my absence.The president did his best to win over the Soviet leader with his common sense and infectious charisma.But Khrushchev's swagger over the Soviet Union's recent success in space exploration galvanized Eisenhower even more than it did at the negotiating table.At this time, Eisenhower ended his talks with Khrushchev, clearly realizing that all the toasts, banquets, and friendly diplomatic conversations in the world would not make Khrushchev take a step back from his rock-solid position.However, Khrushchev at least realized that Eisenhower, who appeared friendly on the surface, was actually an iron man in his bones. The last time I saw Khrushchev was at his farewell banquet at the Soviet embassy shortly before his return home.I told him that I believed his visit went well, that he was received with great courtesy and a very warm welcome.He snapped back at me, "If my interview goes well, it's not because you want it to go well. I got reports that you want this visit to fail. " I felt there must be some purpose behind his constant combative mannerisms.Khrushchev knew that the 1960 presidential election was approaching and that I might intend to run as a candidate.He was visibly annoyed at my rising popularity after the "kitchen debate".His method of fighting back in this way is to show off his eloquence. "First, he was trying to undermine the authority of the Eisenhower administration. He was right in inferring that he could destroy mine by destroying the authority of the Eisenhower administration. He must have inferred that if the American people believed that their president was If progress can be made, then it is considered the best choice for the President to determine his successor. If the President appears incompetent in this regard, the American people will abandon me. When his army shot down the American U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960, He made the Paris Conference of the Four Powers fail because of it, and shamelessly used this event to try to make Eisenhower look bad in public. It is obviously in his interest to embarrass the United States. However, he will not let go of an opportunity to undermine his opponent's entry into the election. One might argue that Khrushchev was genuinely outraged by the violation of Soviet airspace.But, aside from the U-2 incident, I don't recall a time when he took on such prudish hypocrisy that the USSR did not spy. At a luncheon at his dacha in 1959, he whispered to me that he had obtained a copy of: "American War Operations Plan" and that he suspected that our spies had also obtained Soviet plans, and he even joked about espionage. He was introduced to CIA Director Allen Dulles during a White House dinner honoring Khrushchev in 1959.Khrushchev said sarcastically, "I read the report you also read." Then he suggested that our two countries should establish a joint intelligence network in order to save money. "That way we don't have to pay twice for the same information." I couldn't resist the temptation to introduce the Soviet leader to Edgar Hoover.Upon hearing about Hoover, Khrushchev squinted at him and said, "I think we all recognize a few." His persistent attitude toward me also played a role.He was sure that the press, hearing of our confrontation, would soon publish many stories about "Khrushchev didn't like Nixon."These legends produced the expected results.Shortly before the election, Secretary of State Christian Herter's wife urged me to try to do something about it.She said her friends were talking about voting for JFK because he could "get along with Khrushchev" and I couldn't get along with him.After the election, Khrushchev publicly boasted to journalists that he had done everything he could to keep me out of the election.Years later, he even claimed to have told Kennedy, "We made you president." "Is Khrushchev's strategy real? Helping Kennedy? Hurting me? That's just speculation."But, in an election like that of 1960, a few votes can have a considerable impact on the outcome of the election.Nearly all observers agree that Khrushchev's actions did not help me? Of course, he did not intend to help me. "Khrushchev's foreign policy may be as subtle as his meddling in American political life, or as bold as a Soviet armored division going forward without looking back.His goal of world conquest remained steadfast and constantly inspired by his Russian heritage and communist ideology.As Condra Adenauer said to me, there is no doubt that Zhang Chengfu will rule the world.But he doesn't want war, a world where cities are reduced to ruins and bones. "Khrushchev has swaggered around under the banner of the "Peace Office", but it is often questionable if he does not sincerely demand peace.charles.Ambassador Pollan once told me that after the Geneva Conference in 1959, many American officials believed that his desire for peace was sincere, which was very wrong.I asked if this meant that Khrushchev did not want peace. "That's not the problem," he replied. "Khrushchev wanted the whole world, but knew the consequences of modern warfare as well as we do. He wanted to achieve his goals without war. In that sense, He wants peace. The mistake is that he sincerely wants peace. We are idealists, they are materialists." Pointing to the cup of coffee in front of him, he added, "Don't you say that Khrushchev The husband or any other communist is as sincere as this coffee mug is. He wants peace not because he sincerely wants peace, but because he believes that his goal of world conquest can be greatly advanced without war at this time. After my last meeting with John Foster Dulles, four days before he died of cancer, there was a full explanation of Khrushchev's "Peace Place" theory.As I prepared to visit the Soviet Union in 1959, I visited Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital and sought his advice.I told him that some people were urging me to try to convince Khrushchev that we had no ambitions for the Soviet Union and that we sincerely wanted peace.I asked which issue he thought I should emphasize to Khrushchev in particular. "Climbing account hire uV Huan Pa tricks  sigh Tu Shao Zai 卮 卮 Zhen U 獯 Wei   neon Ben Huan milling ぁH slow worm ? said: "There is no need to convince Khrushchev of our good intentions. He Knowing that we are not aggressors and not a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. He knows us. But all he needs to know is that we know him too. When he says he wants to compete peacefully, what he really means is to make a difference in our world The contest between the two systems was launched here, not in his world. The peaceful coexistence he preached symbolized peace in the communist world and endless quarrels and conflicts in the non-communist world." I have probably never heard another commentary that captures the essence of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" so sharply.In the free world, he is keen to play the game of power politics, but he believes that such games are absolutely forbidden among countries in the Communist Party group.The rules of Khrushchev's game are fundamentally unfair, but unfortunately he has the military muscle to enforce such a self-declared rule. "Khrushchev's pretentious and deliberately exaggerated statements can only cover up, but cannot hide the general sense of insecurity.However, that feeling of belittling oneself is also unique to the Russians, and there are such precedents as early as the time of Peter the Great.Peter the Great opened Russia to Europe only to show that his homeland was in fact centuries behind in every field.The Russians have been trying to catch up since then. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told me before my visit to the Soviet Union that Khrushchev was proud to show off Russia's national treasures, especially the jewels and gold left over from successive tsars.Macmillan felt that Khrushchev was desperate to be "admitted into the club," that is, to be recognized and respected as a world power on the basis of his own qualifications, not the mighty Soviet military power he wielded characters.We agree that as long as he agrees to play by the rules, he should be admitted into the "club" Khrushchev and his successor Brezhnev have come a long way to make Russia a truly European country.Stalin rarely left the Soviet Union, while Khrushchev traveled around the world during his eleven years in power. ? The country visited as many as 52 times.Stalin was an Asian despot looking east, while Khrushchev and Brezhnev both looked west.When Brezhnev discussed China with me, he often approached me and whispered like a close friend: "We Europeans should unite and jointly build a barrier against potential Chinese aggression." In my opinion, the reason why Khrushchev aroused so much interest in the West.It is related to his high respect for the economic achievements of the West.He also understands that without economic success, conquering the world would be nothing.But while he wanted to achieve the economic success of the West, he also insisted on maintaining the policy of the Communist Party.When he tried to absorb Western economic concepts and apply them to the rigid Soviet ideological system, he discovered that the two were simply incompatible.He wanted to achieve the achievements of the West without being influenced by its ideas.In the end, both ends fail. "Khrushchev's political career ended unexpectedly.This abrupt stepping down fits nicely with his personal style.Shortly before the launch of the three-person spacecraft at the Baikonur Cosmos Center on October 1, 1964, Zhang Chengfu spoke with the three astronauts on the phone, wishing them a safe journey and telling them that he would give them Prepare for a spectacular welcome ceremony.After Khrushchev hung up, Leonid Brezhnev also called the crew and wished them a safe journey.For one of Khrushchev's men, this action was unprecedented. During the flight, Khrushchev spoke to the spaceship Verscode by radiotelephone.He cut off his conversation with strangely prophetic words, saying: "Comrade Mikoyan is here. He literally pulled the phone out of my hand. I don't think I can stop him." The three space pilots passed seven days When the flight returned to land, Zhang Xiaoshi was notable for not being present at the celebration. He has been ousted from office, living the retirement life of an out-of-favor politician, and forgotten. His colleagues wanted to depose him for two reasons.First, even though almost all of these colleagues had credited him with their accomplishments, there was growing dissatisfaction with his erratic and unpredictable way of governing the country.Whenever Stalin implemented a dramatic new policy, he wiped out those who had supported the old policy.Khrushchev's purges were not as severe as those he assisted Stalin in carrying out.Party bureaucrats may lose their posts, but they rarely lose their heads.Robert Conquest, an expert on the Soviet Union, said: "In the end, he attracted the resentment of his subordinates and did not use sufficient terror to punish them. What a fatal mistake!" Second, Russia is simply ashamed of him.His clown speech and behavior and his rudeness to foreign guests made the ruling group sometimes laugh and laugh, and sometimes happy.However, Russians always want to be recognized on the international stage because of deep-seated inferiority complex.Khrushchev, as several Soviet officials hinted to me during the summit meeting, had undermined their prestige.On hearing the news that Khrushchev had been ousted, one Soviet diplomat said, thank God, that idiot was cleared.He made a fool of us before the whole world. "Khrushchev went from being the leader of the second most powerful country in the world to what the Soviets called "the common people."He lived forever under house arrest, confined to an unrecognizable apartment or a modest country house, except for occasional trips in a car under close surveillance.For many leaders, the days after stepping down were difficult, but for Khrushchev, they were life and death.In public? Meetings, it was clear that retirement was tormenting him.His amazing energy was gone; his eyes were dull.His voice became hoarse, and he didn't say a few words, but his voice was as small as a whisper, and gradually disappeared. During my private visit to Moscow in 1965, I once had dinner with two Soviet guides. A Canadian journalist suggested that I visit Khrushchev at his apartment, but my guide was expected to follow me at any time.I told them I was going to the bathroom.So my Canadian friend and I slipped out the back door and took a taxi to Khrushchev's humble apartment.When we arrived, we were stopped by two big, stout women.One of the women was carrying a bucket of water in one hand and a mop in the other, and I asked her if she could see Khrushchev.Through my friend who was translating for me, the woman replied, "He's not here. I don't know where he is." To her, Khrushchev might be on the moon with his lunar satellite. I left a handwritten note.The note said, I hope one day we will meet again.I guess he probably never got the note.A few years later, after his death in 1971, I learned that Khrushchev was told that I had intended to visit him, and that he regretted not being able to see me. "When Khrushchev and I were engaged in a lively "kitchen debate," I felt...someone bumped into me. At this moment, he pushed away from the crowd and went to find a seat by the railing that separated the kitchen from the aisle.I glanced at him as he listened intently to the debate. He only responded once to our debate.When Khrushchev shouted, "We too are giants," he nodded vigorously.I didn't pay much attention to him at the time.However, I later learned that this person's name was Leonid Brezhnev.Thirty years later, we meet again, but not just by chance, but at a summit meeting as the head of the most powerful nation in the world. Brezhnev greeted me in the same office where I first met Khrushchev.He was gracious when we shook hands.He had a square, broad face, and his cold blue eyes were expressionless, except for a forced, rather cautious smile.Like Khrushchev, he gestured for me to sit face to face with him at a long table on one side of the room.He then complained about our actions in Vietnam, but he only mentioned it perfunctorily.After his near-formal speech, he quickly warmed up again.He said it was necessary to develop a personal relationship between us, like that between Roosevelt and Stalin during World War II. I said that after studying the history of relations between leaders of allied nations, I found that differences between low-level officials in times of war were often ironed out by agreement at the summit level.I added, "That's the kind of relationship I'd like to have with the general secretary." "I'm just so happy," he replied, apparently cheerfully, "I'm totally ready for my part." Can't solve it either.He laughed heartily, slapped the palm of his hand on the table, and said, "If that's the case, we'll be stuck in papers all day!" It was a short meeting, and this kind of tone is not the same as the first meeting between Khrushchev and me. Brezhnev has become the fourth autocratic ruler of the Soviet Union. As president, I will hold three summit meetings with him.Born in 1906 in a working-class ghetto in Ukraine, Brezhnev was a teenager under Lenin; a rising Communist Party official during Stalin's purges; He is a trusted lieutenant general.He was not a visionary but an organizer: he was not a theorist but a technologist; enduring dominance. Brezhnev and his snarky predecessor have been interestingly studied by comparison.Khrushchev wore a shirt with plain cuffs and a poorly fitting suit, while Brezhnev wore a shirt with French cuffs and gold buttons to match his tailored silk suit: Khrushchev almost Always with his driver, sitting in the front seat of his car, while Brezhnev didn't bother to nod to his driver and sat on the comfortable sofa cushion in the back seat. Even when two people have the same hobbies, the way they approach them can be very different.For example, both men were fond of hunting, and Khrushchev loved every aspect of duck hunting, from the sound of the river gently lapping against the side of his boat to the sudden flock of birds taking off.Brezhnev told me he preferred to shoot wild boars, but he clearly lacked the athletic demeanor of his predecessor.Brezhnev just sat on the porch of his country house, waiting for his prey to break into a specific area baited with cornmeal, and with the help of binoculars shot the beast down. Hunting was not Brezhnev's only hobby.He has a keen interest in neat new inventions in technology, such as automatic doors and wonderful telephone stands.To illustrate the combination of discipline and leisure among the Russians, Brezhnev once showed me his wonderful new cigarette case, which contained a timer to prevent him from Smoke one after another.Every hour he would mechanically wipe out a prescribed cigarette and then close the pack.But after a few minutes, he would often reach into his coat pocket and enjoy a cigarette from the pack of regular cigarettes he carried with him, until the timer allowed him to smoke a second. Brezhnev, the leader of the world's first "workers' state", also likes to collect all kinds of high-end luxury cars produced in the capitalist world. When we flew to Camp David during the U.S.-Soviet summit in 1973, I congratulated him on his visit by presenting him with an official gift—a dark blue Lincoln Sasquatch.Insisting repeatedly on an immediate test drive, he jumped into the driver's seat and motioned for me to take the passenger seat.He cranked up the engine pedal and sped down the narrow road around Camp David.Brezhnev was in the habit of driving unimpeded on Moscow's streets reserved for dignitaries.I hate to imagine what would have happened if a Secret Service or a Navy jeep had rammed into that one-way street. At one point, there was a very steep slope on the road, on which there was a sign saying "Slow! Sharp turns are dangerous!".Even driving a golf vehicle on an incline like this, I feel the need to apply the brakes to keep the car from sliding down the road at the end of a sharp turn.Brezhnev was driving over fifty miles an hour as we drove up the slope.I reached out and said "slow down, slow down" to him, but he didn't care.When we reached the end, the rubber tires squealed as he slammed on the brakes and swerved around the corner. After our drive he said to me, "It's a very classy car. The brakes are good." I replied, "You're a very good driver. Turning the corner like that." I mused that diplomacy isn't always an easy and pleasant affair. Brezhnev was in favor of the good life and loved yachting, thoroughbred races and the company of beautiful women. When I approached Brezhnev's small dacha for our first meeting during the summit meeting at Camp David in 1973, a very attractive, athletic young woman was leaving. Brezhnev's interpreter introduced her to me as his chief masseuse.When I shook hands with her, I could smell the perfume she was wearing. It was called Abangui, a high-end French perfume, and it happened to be Mrs. Nixon's favorite perfume. Among the world's leaders, Brezhnev was not alone in his penchant for luxury and comfort.But he was the first Soviet leader to indulge without shame. In 1976, during a long conversation during my trip to China, the vice chairman of the National People's Congress babbled to me that the Soviets were not like the Chinese. , they are revisionists, because prominent people in politics and culture live privileged lives.He said: "From this point of view alone, party and government leaders, artists, scientists, etc. have become millionaires and act like millionaires-this is where the problem of the Soviet Union today lies." Although he did not fully state China's A case of social class division, but he was right to criticize the Soviets. Brezhnev and his colleagues have constituted a "new class" in every sense of the word-isolated and separated from ordinary Soviet citizens, throwing his concerns out of the blue.In fact, during my visits to the Soviet Union, I could not help thinking that the privileged strata of the Communist Party came closer to Marx's definition of a ruling class than any bunch of capitalists. A joke I once heard about Brezhnev perfectly illustrates this paradox.Once, he took his mother on a visit to his elegant country house.He proudly took her to see the writing screen, the gold and silverware, and the luxurious bedroom. She was surprised and turned to him and asked, "Leonid, it's all beautiful, but what if The communists are back, so what are you going to do?" In his private life, Brezhnev may be a "new tsar", but his foreign policy reverts to the expansionism of the old tsars.If he had been a leader of the old regime, he would have been called "Leonid the Great," a nickname given to him for extending Russia's influence around the world.在他的领导下，苏联和它的共产党盟国控制了南越、埔寨、老挝、埃塞俄比亚、南也门、安哥拉、莫桑比克，最近又控制了那个"决定亚洲命运的旋转式栅门"——阿富汗。另一个不祥之兆是，莫斯科正在扩大它在加勒比海和中美洲的共产党桥头堡。 当赫鲁晓夫从权力的宝座上跌落下来时，参加打牌的人可能已经更换，但这场赌博的性质丝毫没有改变。渤列日涅夫与赫鲁晓夫有同样的目标：增强苏联的力量，扩张苏联控制的地盘，并抓住每一个机会来输出共产主义。赫鲁晓夫是一位连骗带吓的大师，因为他必须是这号人。他手中几乎没有什么王牌。勃列日涅夫可以表现得亲切真诚些，因为通过大规模增强军事实力，他给自己分发了几张爱斯王牌。 在个人外交方面，赫鲁晓夫和勃列日涅夫与林·约翰逊相似。他们都不得不用某种实际动作来加强他们讲话的效果。 不管赫鲁晓夫走上前来吓唬我，还是企图戏谑般地狠狠地触我的肋骨，他的那种依靠动作来加强效果的外交总是咄逼人的?当勃列日涅夫伸出手来碰我手臂或抓住我的手臂时，他是想央求而不是威吓。但一旦这些较为和解的手段不能打动我时，他也会动武的。 勃列日涅夫给我最深的印象是，他在感情上是反复无常的。他一忽儿以十足的诚意谈到，深切地期望把和平遗留给子孙后代。过一会儿，他又非常明确地表示决心，他有权控制全世界其他国家的命运。 勃列日涅夫可以轻而易举地从友好一下子转到无情，这一点是很突出的。1972年，我们举行最高级会议时，他热情地陪同我方成员乘船游览莫斯科河。当我们泛舟漫游时，勃列日涅夫一面骄傲地指着速度计，一面开玩笑地不断用胳膊时轻轻推我，这时速度计显示出我们正以每小时九十公里的速度前进。 在这次令人愉快的游览之后，晚餐前勃列日涅夫让我们坐下来进行一次会谈。他不久前还打趣地拍拍我的背，而现在又开始愤怒地谴责我为结束越南战争所作出的努力，并指责我企图通过与中国建立新的关系来对他施加压力，那时我突然想起了杰基尔博士和海德先生。他这次出击仅仅是长时期攻击的第一手。连续三小时，勃列日涅夫、阿历克赛·柯西金、尼古拉·波德哥尔内恶狠狠地轮番对我进行责骂，犹如克格勃的审讯者轮流审问一名难以对付的嫌疑犯一样。 然而，会议刚结束一会儿，我们上了楼，在晚餐席间进行了一次十分亲切的谈话。我照例开了一个玩笑，我说，不能让基辛格喝得太多，因为过一会儿，他还要与葛罗米柯谈判。这句俏皮话把苏联领导人大大地逗乐了，他们纷纷前去，借各种名义强劝基辛格喝伏特加。看起来，似乎刚才楼下那次语言刻薄的唇枪舌战根本没有发生过一样。 勃列日涅夫象他同代的许多苏联领导人一样，在谈论战争所带来的苦难时，感情尤其冲动。第二次世界大战中，苏联牺牲了两千多万人，对那些苦难岁月是如此记忆犹新，好像这些日子在昨天才结束一样。 1972年我在电台和电视台向苏联人民发表讲话时，谈到一位十二岁小姑娘丹娘的故事，她在日记中挨个地记述了在列宁格勒被日期间，她家庭成员牺牲的情况。我最后说："让我们尽我们所能做的一切来确保每个孩子免遭丹娘所遭受的苦难。" 勃列日涅夫事后告诉我，我的结束语使他热泪盈眶。第二年，在圣克利门蒂我家里的一次私人宴会上，在向他祝酒时，我又重述了那一段话，那时，勃列日涅夫是满眶泪水。他从椅子上站起来，绕过餐桌，拥抱了我。 有一次，勃列日涅夫俯身对我说："我是一个易动感情的人，尤其是当我想起那些在战争中牺牲的人时，更是不由自己。"但是，人们不应把那种感情的流露当作是多愁善感。他的声音是有力而深沉的，这个声音散发出巨大的吸引力和个人的魄力。他做一些强有力的手势，常常从他的椅子上站起来，在房间里来回踱步。有一次他就这种习惯开玩笑地对我说："每次我站起来，我又作了一次让步。"他有时滔滔不绝，含糊不清，但他善于巧妙地把话题从他易遭抨击的地方扯开。勃列日涅夫完全可能象赫鲁晓夫那样强而有力、机灵、狡猾，毫不逊色。 1973年第二次最高级会议期间，有一天晚上，我们早已结束会议休息，因为勃列日涅夫说，与华盛顿三小时的时差给他带来不适。然而，几个小时后，一个特工人员带着基辛格的口信来到我的房间：勃列日涅夫要求会谈。我进行了一番安排，我们就在我楼上的书房中进行会谈。勃列日涅夫和葛罗米柯、苏联大使安纳托利·多勃雷宁鱼贯而入时，他大笑着说："总统先生，我睡不着。"我回答说，这倒是一个谈判的好机会，不会被人打断，也不会使人分心。 以后三个小时，勃列日涅夫在中东问题上不断地敲打我。 他坚持要求同我们一起，把一项解决办法强加给以色列人和阿拉伯人。他说，至少我们必须就一系列"原则"达成一致的看法，这些原则将指导一项解决办法，例如以色列军队从所有占领的领土上撤走，承认两国的疆界以及谋求这项解决办法的国际保证等等。 我回答说，争端的任何一方不会、也不应该接受一项强加给它的解决办法，相反，我们应该使双方开始会谈。我指出，如果我同意他的"原则"，那我将损害以色列的权利。我坚决认为，如果我们事先制定了有争论的原则，那双方将拒绝进行谈判——在这种情况下，原则将使他们的目的落空。 有一阵勃列日涅夫装出看手表和皱眉的样子。他说："可能我把你搞得十分疲倦了。但我们必须达成一种谅解。"他使人毫不怀疑，我们之间的协定必须大大有利于阿拉伯人。他大声地坚持说，没有这样一项解决办法，他将空手离开最高级会议，并不祥地暗示，他不能保证战争将不再卷上重来。他说："如果原则不明确，我们要避免军事形势的逆转是困难的。" 在这次半夜召开的会议上，他感情冲动到了极点，与第一次最高级会议期间我们在夏季别墅里就越南问题进行会谈时一样冲动。我仍然拒绝了他关于超级大国进行共管的建议，重申只有通过以色列入和阿拉伯人之间的直接谈判，才能取得一项持久的解决办法。在勃列日涅夫作了几乎一个半小时的独白之后，我为这次讨论收了场，我说，我们应该集中全力，争取在今年和平解决阿拉伯、以色列争端，因为"中东是一个最危急的地方"。 在整个讨论过程中，我决意保持冷静的态度，来对付勃列日涅夫的感情冲动。一种表面的能忍受痛苦和困难的自制能力，比装腔作势、故意夸大的言词更能给勃列日涅夫留下深刻的印象，这一点他与赫鲁晓夫是不同的。我们未能达成任何协议，因为我们都在向着不同的目标努力。直截了当他说，美国要和平，而苏联是要中东。但是，当我们的会谈破裂时，我感到我已给勃列日涅夫留下了深刻的印象，我们要承担对以色列的义务，并要通过谈判来寻求一项公正的解决办法。 四个月后，10月6日，我从以色列总理戈尔达·梅厄那里得到消息说，叙利亚和埃及正在最后以倒数时间计算方式来计算发动战争的时间。我立即回想起在那次最高级会议上，勃列日涅夫暗示了中东战争再次爆发的可能性，不知是否在那个时候，他已表示要支持阿拉伯人发动进攻。 美国和以色列的情报机构在进攻迫在眉睫之前，都一直没有发觉阿拉伯人的军事准备工作。其结果是以色列处于易受攻击的地位，尤其是因为发动侵略的那天，正是犹太教的赎罪日，那天是犹太人最神圣的节日，以色列的许多士兵正在度假。在战争的头几天，以色列蒙受了严酷的形势逆转，到第三天他们死亡的人数，比1967年整个战争中死亡的人数还要多。 几天之后，双方的武器和给养开始减少。当我们得到报告说，苏联人大规模地将物资空运到叙利亚和埃及时，我们已开始进行各种安排，恢复对以色列的供应。苏联人每天给他们的被保护者运送七百吨装备和给养。与此同时，我们的空运却发生问题，未能顺利进行。空运是在五角大楼搁浅的，关键性的时间都浪费在决定使用飞机数量及飞机型号等事项上了。基辛格告诉我、五角大楼只想派三架C一5A型军用运输机，以便在与叙利亚、埃及和苏联人的关系上少引起政治上的麻烦。我问他有多少架飞机可供使用，他回答说，约三十架。然后我告诉他："我将作出政治决定。派遣三十架飞机和派遣三架所带来的压力一样大，我们打算承受这种压力。"后来，又经过官僚机构的几次耽误之后，我告诉基辛格去转告五角大楼"把能飞的东西"一齐运会。次日，三十架C-130型运输机飞往以色列，一周之后，这次行动比1948年到1949年柏林那次空运的规模还要大。 在第一周战斗结束时，以色列人已转入进攻。在苏联期待阿拉伯人速胜的希望破灭之后，勃列日涅夫给我发了一封信，要求我派遣基辛格去莫斯科进行直接谈判。作为停火的建议，他们已草拟了一系列条件，以色列、埃及和叙利亚同意停火于10月21日生效。停火很快地就失效了，但三天之后，交战各方又同意了另一次停火。 然而，勃列日涅夫并来认输。12月24日，我们的情报机构获得一些令人大吃一惊的情况：苏联的七个空降师，约五万人，已处于戒备状态；八十五艘苏联船只，包括登陆艇和载有部队直升飞机的船只正在地中海待命，不久以后，埃及总统安瓦尔、萨达特公开要求勃列日涅夫和我派遣一支共同维持和平部队去中东，很明显，勃列日涅夫会支持这种计划的，因为这会给他一个机会，重建苏联在埃及的军事立脚点。不久，我们听到谣传说，苏联在联合国进行活动，要不结盟国家发起一项决议，要求在中东派遣一支美苏共同部队。 我给萨达特发去一信，警告他把大国的争夺引进这个动荡地区的危险性。几个小时以后，勃列日涅夫的信件也来了。他说，以色列仍违反停火，因此敦促我们和他一起派军事小组去这个地区。他要求立即答复，并说："我将直率他说，如果在这个问题上，你认为不可能与我们采取共同行动，那我们将面临这样一种局面：即必须立即考虑单方面采取必要措施的问题。 我们不能允许以色列方面采取武断专横的行为。"这封信对苏美关系可能构成为自十一年前古巴导弹危机以来最严重的威胁。 我吩咐白宫办公厅主任黑格将军和基辛格把我们主要的国家安全官员召集在一起，对这个几乎是含蓄的恫吓拟出一个坚显的答复。光言语是不会达到我们的目的的-我们需要行动。我的国家安全顾问们一致建议我们宣布美国所有的常规部队和核部队处于军事戒备状态，10月25日清晨，我们就这样做了。 当我们确信苏联人已获悉戒备的初步迹象之后，我给勃列日涅夫发了一封信，我说，前一晚我已研究了他的来信，但感到他关于派遣苏美军事部队去中东的建议难以接受。我否认发生过任何重大的违反停火的事件，并说，根据这种情况，我们把他"关于单方面采取行动的建议看成会涉及到难以估量后果的、最严重关切的事情"。我说，我随时准备同意派一些美国和苏联的人员去这个地区，但不是作为战斗部队。相反，这些人员可以包括在一支扩大的联合国部队中。然后，我以明确的语言提出了我们的论点："然而，你必须知道，我们在任何清况下都不会接受单方面的行动。" 那一天早晨的晚一些时候，从萨达特那里来了一封信，说他理解我们的立场，他将要求联合国提供一支国际维持和平部队。然后，勃列日涅夫来了一封信。现在他只要求派遣七十名个人"观察员"去中东。尽管这与他早先一封信中所说的军事小组大不相同，我还是再次表示坚决反对，建议应由联合国秘书长来决定停火观察员的人员组成。 这次戒备起了作用。勃列日涅夫没派遣任何军事人员会这个地区，这样，通过努力使这场冲突取得和平解决已成为可能。这次戒备取得成功有两个原因。第一，勃列日涅夫知道我们在核武器方面比苏联仍略占优势。第二，他知道我们决心维护我们的重大利益，并与我们的盟国站在一起，就象前一年我们在越南问题上所采取的决定性行动中所显示出来的那样。在圣克利门蒂午夜举行的会议上，我坚定地拒绝屈从于他在中东问题上的要求，这大大地增强了我在危机时间通过莫斯科-华盛顿热线所说的一番冷漠的话的分量。因此，在整个10月危机中，勃列日涅夫认识到他面临的是一个有可靠的军事力量、并有决心来使用这支军事力量的敌人，于是，他让步了。 当勃列日涅夫和我1974年再次会见时，他对以色列人表示不满，把造成中东紧张局势的责任推在以色列人身上。他也极力否认苏联人曾直接要求阿拉伯人发动1973年的一场战争。 从他断言的语调中，我感受到，他对我们在10月危机期间交换意见的口吻一直是那么强硬而感到痛苦。但他讲得很清楚，他不想在接近战争边缘的时刻再度冒险。 在外交方面，他总是一个现实主义者。正如多勃雷宁有一次告诉基辛格的那样，勃列日涅夫和苏联整个领导班子都有一个"神经痛处"：中国。看来，在勃列日涅夫用一种形式或另一种形式向我们提出呼吁，要我们与他一起组成一个反对他称之为"黄祸"的同盟之前，任何一次最高级会议都不是十全十美的。 在我们第二次最高级会议期间，我告诉他，我认为他对中国人的关切是过分夸大了。他们至少在二十年内不可能取得足够的核力量，以此来对苏联进行一场冒险的侵略。勃列日涅夫摇摇头，表示不同意，因此我问他，他认为中国变成一个核大国要多长时间。 他举起两只张开手指的手说："十年，十年之后他们的武器水平将相当于我们今天的水平。到那时，我们将更加先进，但我们必须使他们深刻地认识到，这种情况不可能继续下去。 1963年在我们的党代表大会期间，我记得毛泽东是如何说的：让四忆中国人死吧，还剩下三亿呢。这就是毛泽东的心理学。"勃列日涅夫然后暗示说，整个中国领导层在本能上是侵略性的，甚至在毛泽东去世以后仍然是侵略性的。 我们在三次最高级会议上签订了一些重要协议，包括1972年第一个限制反弹道导弹条约以及限制战略武器会谈第一阶段的第一个限制战略武器协定。但是，勃列日涅夫和我都认为，我们之间逐步发展起来的个人关系与任何特殊条约同样重要。 通过相互了解，我们大大地减少了危害和平的危险，即估计错误，这是最危险的，也是最不为人们所认识的。 在核子时代，没有一个神志正常的领导人会有意地跨越两个超级大国之间战争边缘这条界线。但是，领导人不会见，不把他们的分歧摆出来，彼此不了解，那他们就会无意地冒险，互相把对方推向战争边缘——这并不是因为他们要战争，而是因为他们对什么行动将会挑起战争会估计错误。在历次会议上，勃列日涅夫和我都发现这一方和另一方所抱的决心都是等量齐观的。因此，在考验另一方之前，每一方都得再三思考。 很清楚，我们要在我们有争议的方面取得进展，那我们必须一起行动，并且相互尊重。这就是主要的理由。为什么我在当时以及现在都认为，如果我们要想少犯可能导致战争的估计错误，那么两个超级大国领导人之间每年举行最高级会议是必不可少的。 在过去的三十六年中，我有一个非比寻常的机会，即既对国际共产主义运动的战略进行了第一手材料的调查，又对共产党领导人进行了估量。 1947年，我目睹了共产党人利用遭受战争破坏的西欧所面临的各种痛苦。 同年，我协助国会进行了一次调查，揭露了共产党的间谍已钻进了美国政府的最高层。 五十年代，我看见几十万难民冒着生命危险，从东德、匈牙利、北越、北朝鲜以及共产党中国的共产党统治的压迫下逃出来。 1958年，尼克松夫人和我在委内瑞拉的加拉加斯遭到共产党领导下的一群暴徒的袭击，几乎丧了命。 七十年代初期，我和勃列日涅夫之间发展了一种个人关系，这种关系比自斯大林和罗斯福以来的任何一对苏美领导人之间的个人关系显得更为密切。 在苏联、中国、罗马尼亚、匈牙利、波兰、捷克和南斯拉夫访问期间，我看到了共产党人统治所带来的后果。我也收到了由其他人传给我的、对苏联所作所为的精辟见解，其中有些来自其他一些共产主义国家的领导人。 尽管这种经历是大量的，但我不敢假设我们对苏联每个方面的政策应该是什么样的政策。这些政策充其量也包含着大量的推测。在我写的《真正的战争》一书中，已详尽地叙述了我认为我们应采取的做法。 如果经验还没有使我们搞清楚我们应该做些什么的话，那末它在某些我们不应该做的方面确实给予了明确的指导。 在与苏联打交道时，我们不仅仅是在和一个大国打交道，说得更具体些，是在和相对来说较少的一部分人打交道、他们控制着这个大国。通过对赫鲁晓夫、勃列日涅夫以及可能成为他们的接班人的了解，我们可以更好地了解苏联对各种不同政策方案可能作出的反应。 在美国发生的辩论，看来经常是在两个极端之间摇摆不定，用意都是好的，都是从爱国出发的，而且都是把人们引导到错误道路上去的。 一方面是超鹰派。他们争辩说，因为苏联人撒谎、骗人，他们夺取能够夺取的一切，并下定决心要打败西方。因此，我们不应与他们打任何交道。他们争辩说，我们应增加我们的核能力，一直到我们占有无可争议的优势。他们断言，由于俄国人威胁我们，我们不应该与它进行文化交流，进行贸易，进行谈判。他们认为，如果我们遵循了这个方针，那么东方集团不牢靠的经济将不可避免地崩溃，随着经济的崩溃，共产党政权也将垮台。 另一个极端是超鸽派。他们争辩说，克里姆林宫领导人是年老、保守、谨小慎微的人，如果我们不威胁他们，他们将不会对我们构成任何威胁。超鸽派建议，如果我们树立一个榜样，单方面地减少我们的核能力，这样，苏联人将会跟着做，并利用那些资源来为他们的人民建立更加美好的生活。 这两种观点都没有击中目标。苏联人决不会允许美国重新取得核优势，作为极权主义国家的领导人，他们可以把他们所选择的任何一部分资源倾注在军备方面。采取拒绝谈判的手段来减少核战争的危险是轻率的。有人认为，孤立苏联会使它垮台，这种意见是不现实的，甚至会产生相反的效果。外部冲突有时会加强一个独裁的政权，而紧张局势的缓和有时却可能削弱这样一个政权。没有七十年代的缓和，允许波兰团结运动出现的局面是永远也不会形成的。 另一方面，把"你想人家怎样待你，你也要怎样待人"这条基督教的金科玉律应用在我们与苏联的交往上是极为幼稚的。卡特总统拘着最良好的意图，试图单方面采取克制，以期望苏联人会照着做。其结果是灾难性的。在他裁减美国军备生产计划时，苏联人却加速了他们的军备生产计划。其结果是，里根总统为了恢复核力量的平衡，不得不加强军备生产。 有两种缓和，强硬的和软弱的。强硬的缓和是建立在有效的威慑基础之上的。这种缓和鼓励苏联人进行谈判，因为苏联要进行侵略，花费的代价太高。与此相反，软弱的缓和使苏联人不愿去谈判，因为他们为进行扩张所付出的代价如此之低，而侵略所得的收益对他们却很有吸引力。 以实力为后盾，并使威慑成为可以信赖的强硬的缓和维护了和平。软弱的缓和，不是招致战争，就是招致在不发生战争情况下向敌人投降。我们需要缓和，但它必须是那种正确的缓和。 如果有些亭我们不能做，那也有些事我们可以做。由于绝望而放弃一切，并说因为我们不能做一切事情，因此我们就什么都不去做，这是愚蠢的。 苏联领导人是难以对付的、冷酷的、强硬的现实主义者，他们懂得国际力量这门算术。 就我们而言，首要的、必不可少的事情是必须维护西方的自由，并直截了当地对苏联领导人讲清楚，为了维护西方的自由，我们决心采取一切必要的措施。我们把这种决心表达得越清楚明白，那么他们对这种决心进行最后考验的可能性就越校这意味着恢复军事力量的平衡，这样我们就可以制止战争，防止在没有战争的情况下遭受失败。当美国在核武器方面享有优势时，这些力量都是有利于和平的。如果苏联人威胁要采取侵略行动，我们可以象1973年10月所做的那样，使我们的核部队实行戒备，那样敌人就会让步。但是，今天这种威吓将是不可靠的，因为在战术和战略陆基导弹方面，优势已转到苏联人方面。这种优势掌握在象苏联这样一个侵略国手中，就成为一种不祥的威胁。因此，为了和平的利益，我们必须花大量美元，这是恢复力量平衡所需要的。 苏联领导人想要军事优势，并要利用这种优势来统治世界。但是，如果我们使他们确信，我们将不让他们享有这种优势，那就存在一种真正的可能性，他们会就相互的军备限制甚至裁减军备问题进行认真的谈判。 今天，有许多人建议，双方应同意在目前的核武器水平上实行冻结，并说，这种作法将减少战争的危险性，促进军备控制。令人啼笑皆非的是，恰恰是事情的反面才是正确的。在冻结的情况下，苏联人将保持他们目前的有利条件，这将增加战争和核讹诈的可能性。冻结也将使达成任何军备控制协定的可能性化为乌有——这样一项协定将减少核武器的数目-，因为冻结将使苏联毫无愿望去进行谈判。克里姆林宫的人们可能年老多病，但他们并不是傻瓜。除非我们有什么东西可给，否则我们也不可能从他们那里得到任何东西。冻结的提?——作为打破僵局的一贴万应药，可以不费吹灰之力就达成——是空洞无物的。这个提案是建立在两个谬误的前提基础上的。第一个前提：我们总可以摆脱核时代的危险。但是，只要这些武器存在，这种危险仍然是很大的。即使双方同意把他们的核武库减少一半，每一方仍将有足够的火力把另一方和世界摧毁好几次。 第二个前提：军备和军备竞赛引起战争。这个论点是，如果我们要把世界从毁灭中拯救出来，我们必须停止军备竞赛。 但从历史上来看，并不是由于武器的存在才引起战争，恰恰相反，正是由于政治分歧未能解决，才有可能导致使用武器。武器是政治紧张局势带来的后果，而不是造成紧张局势的原因。 措词美好的裁军决议，没有一项能解决这些深刻的政治分歧。 我们不能脱核僵局，但我们必须学会与它共处。我们必须越过军备控制这个不会带来任何结果的问题，而把注意力集中在这个问题的核心上：美苏之间的根本分歧。我们必须在会议桌旁，而不是在战场上逐步寻求一个解决这些分歧的办法。 但是，在寻求之前，我们必须诱导苏联人进行谈判，只有在我们的力量足以使对方对我们的敌意感到害怕时，他们才会来谈判。勃列日涅夫了解这一点，即使他对此持反对的态度。我们必须使他和他的后继者清楚，我们也了解这一点。 我们也必须在那些与我们的利益有较为重大关系的世界其他地方反对苏联人的侵略性的冒险主义。我们不能充当世界警察，但我们也不能在苏联人和他们的代理人颠覆和攻击我们的盟国和朋友时袖手旁观。我们必须准备好，在世界遥远的地区显示我们的力量，以挫败苏联的挺进，因为那里正是决定世界命运的地方。 此外，该利用我们庞大的经济力量来对苏联在国际上的行动施加影响的时候到了。军事上，我们在某些方面可能处于落后的地位，但在经济上，我们拥有极大的有利条件。他们死乞百赖地要与我们进行贸易，假如我们把我们的贸易结构改动一下，使他们经不起经济压力的脆弱住扩大到最大限度，与此同时，缩小我们自己的脆弱性，那我们就可以通过贸易来施加影响。 勃列日涅夫和他的克里姆林宫的同僚们将会对他们需要做交易的建议加以嘲笑，但骨子里他们确实需要一场交易。我们应该让他们有机会来进行一场交易——但要有代价。一定要使他们懂得，如果他们继续在涉及我们利益的地区进行直接或间接的侵略，那么这场交易就将告吹。列宁曾说过，资本家将排着队来向苏维埃俄国出售绳索，而苏维埃俄国将要用这根绳素把资本家绞死。我们应该向他们出售绳索，但要以这样的方式出售，如果他们企图伸手来扩大他们的征服地，那绳索将捆住他们的手。 在遏制苏联力量的同时，我们必须并有可能迫使苏联统治的那部分世界的内部发生变化。要达到这个目的，不能象虔诚的教徒那样，成天空谈变化——勃列日涅夫及其一伙，以蔑视的态度，不理会这种泛泛空谈一而是给早已在活动的各种势力以更多的鼓励，来促使这种变化发生。 共产党世界将不会以某种突然发生的大变动方式而崩溃。 但是，它已发生了变化，而且将继续发生变化，我们可以加速这种变化。西方寄希望的正是这个变化过程。 有些人认为，通过和平演变的方式使共产党世界发生改革是毫无希望的，因此，对这种设想不予理睬，他们举起双手认输，并说，共产党世界将永远受人欢迎。他们忘记了它已经发生了多么大的变化。 英国的前任首相麦克米伦有一次提醒我说，从伊丽莎白一世女王统治时期到安挪女王统治时期，一百年过去了，伊丽莎自女王在她的顾问们失宠时，把他们的头都砍了，而安娜女王则慑于公众舆论，只能把她的失宠顾问们流放。他是在1958年，斯大林去世五年之后发表这番议论的，斯大林曾将数百万他真正的敌人和想象中的敌人处以死刑。当赫鲁晓夫对他的对手实行清洗时?他只能把他们发配到各剩勃列日涅夫只能把赫鲁晓夫送到莫斯科的?区。 变化的步伐是非常缓慢的，对一个象美国那样缺乏耐心的民族来说，这种变化显得尤其缓慢。我们必须有充分的耐心，承认缓慢的变化总比没有变化强，我们必须长期坚持这些政策，为了使缓慢的变化保持下去，这些政策有时是必要的。 人民与人民之间的接触、文化以及情况的交流，可能不一定象几位天真无知的、鼓吹这些活动的人所说的那样，会起那么大的作用，但这些活动确实起了作用；它们是这个渐进变化过程中重要的一部分。如果非战略物资的贸易，如同军备控制一样，与苏联在其他地区的行为联系在一起，那它也是越来越重要的一部分。贸易结构可以进行改造，这样，我们可以通过贸易施加影响——其结果是，通过贸易建立起来的相互依赖，可以对我们有利。思想本身也是一种力量，我们可以用强力来实现思想渗透。一位在波兰出生的教皇戏剧性地代表着宗教信仰可以集结的力量。我们最大的资本是共产主义在世界上行不通这个最明显不过的事实，这一点对铁幕两边也是一清二楚的。甚至连共产主义那些最卑下的辩护士，除了共产主义的凄惨后果外，现在也只能仅就共产主义是正确的这一点进行辩解了。 俄国人民是强大的，东欧国家的人民也是强大的。在东西方的争夺中，他们的力量将最终寄托在西方的