Chapter 10 Chapter 9 Seeking a Leap Forward

1957-1965 Deng Xiaoping was at the center of events for a full decade, from his promotion in September 1956 until the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution" in 1966.His position as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and party general secretary—under the Central Committee—placed him in this position, which was also due to his personality.One of his biggest characteristics is that he always devotes himself to work with full energy, finds problems and solves them immediately.He was not one to bide his time, as Zhou Enlai sometimes was; nor, like Chen Yun, to withdraw his proposals when they were criticized or rejected.When he cannot achieve his goal through persuasion, or concludes that persuasion cannot be effective, he will cut it first and then play it, or even stop it. During the "Cultural Revolution", in addition to criticizing Deng Xiaoping's political views, Mao Zedong also severely criticized his style of handling affairs.

As general secretary, Deng was the chief executive of the Communist Party and, through the party, all other state institutions (although the leadership of the party over the military was mainly exercised by Mao Zedong alone).Deng operates an institution called the Secretariat.The members of the Secretariat were well equipped from the outset.It was even stronger by May 1958, when, in addition to Deng himself and his deputy, Peng Zhen, three Politburo members joined the Secretariat.And, over time, it took over power from a number of other institutions, both inside and outside the party.During the "Great Leap Forward", it took over the main responsibility for formulating and implementing economic planning from the State Council, the highest organ of government, because, in a sense, it was able to organize and mobilize mass movements that the State Council could not; and when the state needed It continued to use this authority when it took emergency actions to get rid of the bad influence of the "Great Leap Forward". Later, when Mao bypassed other members of the Politburo Standing Committee except Lin Biao to formulate various policies without authorization, the Secretariat made many of its own decision. It took over much of the work normally supposed to be done by the Politburo and its Standing Committee, as these agencies could only issue documents in the name of the Central Committee, and only with Mao's personal approval. With Peng Zhen's strong support Deng held most of the authority and work; Mao later criticized Deng Xiaoping for establishing an "independent kingdom", which was not an exaggeration. (Sic.--Annotation)

From 1958 to 1962, Chinese politics were plagued by chaos and the disastrous aftermath of the "Great Leap Forward", which Mao Zedong intended to put China on a path of rapid economic development.Among the previous major movements launched by Mao, the "Great Leap Forward" is unique.Mao did not intend for this campaign to deprive any class of social property or status, nor did he intend to purify or consolidate the party through this campaign.Yet it killed and wrought more disaster than any other movement. The "Great Leap Forward" started after the completion of the first five-year plan in December 1957.To some extent, the five-year national economic plan has indeed been developed smoothly.China's industrial base has been developed, and the growth rate of industrial output has been greatly improved (and exceeded the set target), with an average annual growth rate of nearly 20%.Thousands of miles of rail lines were added to the national rail network.However, other developments have been disappointing.Growth in agricultural production, in particular, has been low (and below target) at 4%.This affected the development of light industry and faced the party with two choices: either control the growth of the rural population to meet the needs of the rapidly growing urban population; or control the growth of the urban population to ensure the normal life of the rural population.As a result, both have to be controlled.

In the spring of 1956, party leaders unanimously decided that the Second Five-Year Plan should differ from the First Five-Year Plan in terms of the order and method of agriculture.Mao himself expressed this opinion in a long speech at an enlarged Politburo meeting.He proposed that the proportion of investment in agriculture and light industry should be increased; the provincial and local governments should be given more power to make investment and other economic decisions; new factory.He said that the facts proved that the Soviet Union's development model was not suitable for China's national conditions and needs, and he even criticized the Soviet Union's "shortcomings and mistakes" in using this model.But he did not say that this model is wrong, or that the planning system in this model is fundamentally wrong.However, within the next eighteen months he made a decision that China should completely abandon the Soviet model and adopt a new development strategy based entirely on a different view of human nature and using completely different methods to utilize resources and set goals.

What is the reason behind this change?Was it just some change in Mao's mood, or did his temperament change?The way Mao behaved around the winter of late 1957 and early 1958 made people feel that he had completely changed at this time. He was almost completely caught in the impulse for quick success and exaggeration, completely disregarding the constraints of "objective conditions".But there is no definite evidence for this, so we can only point to a few factors that did have an influence on him. One factor is that all the established goals and long-term plans before 1955 were completed several years ahead of schedule, and the collectivization of agriculture and the nationalization of industry and commerce were realized.In Mao's view, this proved (and proved again) that everything can be achieved through mass movement and courage.It also paved the way for his vision of making full use of the power of the masses of the people, previously fettered by feudal and capitalist "exploitation."Therefore, in the winter and spring of 1955-1956, he proposed that the scale and speed of China's industrialization, the scale and speed of science, culture, education, health and other undertakings should be increased and accelerated, and it could no longer be done in the way envisaged in the past. up.This triggered a vigorous mass movement.But it also created something that hindered development, fueling inflation and massive chaos and destruction. In April 1956, Zhou Enlai proposed to Mao that the movement should be stopped immediately.Mao agreed, but he was very reluctant and dissatisfied with it; thereafter, under Zhou Enlai's behest, the People's Daily published a series of editorials criticizing this impatience and describing it as a A kind of "adventure".It also strengthened Mao's determination to prove that he was more right than the cowardly and timid people around him.

Another factor is the behavior of intellectuals during the blooming period.Their behavior has been restrained.But Mao did not see it that way, asserting that many of them were hostile to socialism, to the party leadership, and to himself.This aggravates his (already considerable) prejudice against them.After thinking about it, he again believes that the success of any major undertaking should have three factors: the leader's motivation, the leader's understanding and the ideological consensus between the two.He began to speak of intellectuals in an outrageous, contemptuous tone, saying that it was unreasonable to say that China could not achieve rapid economic development without intellectuals.As early as July 1957, when the period of contention had just ended, he declared: Intellectuals are the gentlemen hired by the working class and laborers. You teach their children, but you don’t listen to the master’s words. You have to teach you that If you want to teach stereotyped essays, Confucianism, or capitalism...the working class...you will be fired. ①The third factor is that in 1957, the Soviet Union successfully sent an artificial earth satellite into the sky and launched a long-range ballistic missile.This made Mao believe that world socialism had caught up with capitalism, and it was time for socialist China to start developing.Paradoxically, it was also the achievements of the Soviet Union that prompted Mao to break with the Soviet model, and by the autumn of 1957 Mao's desire for this was already very strong.

The main slogans of the "Great Leap Forward" were "politics in command" and "walk on two legs". "Politics in command expresses Mao's belief that spiritual or non-material stimulation in the economic field can also produce the same remarkable effects as in political campaigns. Facts in the economic field have proved him wrong. But this slogan can Used to oppose those who pursue material prosperity too much. Simply put, if the use of non-material incentives to achieve prosperity, then such prosperity has no value in existence. Further, the achievement of prosperity may weaken socialism even in the process of achieving prosperity, people have been calling for the realization of socialist values. Material prosperity cannot be regarded as absolute good, or completely good. This will eventually lead to the belief that wealth and virtue are incompatible , Poverty is glorious.

Mao himself never endorsed this view.But in the later period of the "Cultural Revolution", this view was used by some radicals who were close to his wife Jiang Qing, perhaps Jiang Qing himself wanted to use it.One of the most famous quotes about this point of view is that a late socialist train is better than a punctual capitalist train.This is a point of view that Deng Xiaoping hated very much. "Walking on two legs" refers to the joint development of capital-intensive high-tech industrial sectors in cities and labor-intensive low-tech sectors (including industry and agriculture) in rural areas.This is not without reason.There are indeed a large number of unused and being used resources in the countryside, including some relatively simple industrial technologies. If they can be used rationally, the specialties of these areas will definitely be brought into play.However, later facts proved that the use of these resources was very irrational.One of the mistakes is to make farmers and their family members do off-farm labor when the fields are busy.Another mistake was the creation of industrial projects beyond the technical capabilities of the farmers.Both cost farmers dearly.

The constitution of the "Great Leap Forward" is a document consisting of a set of creeds and several resolutions, which were jointly negotiated and made at the party conference held outside Beijing in January and February 1958.The document is collectively referred to as the "Sixty Rules on Working Methods".It included many different issues, such as Mao's new theory of the nature of revolution, the transfer of responsibility for managing the national economy from the government to the party, the decentralization of resource allocation from the center to the provinces, the introduction of new planning methods and advanced agricultural production methods.The passage on revolution shows how far Mao himself has departed from orthodox Marxism. He believed that the completion of socialist transformation—the elimination of private ownership of land and capital—was the completion of the socialist revolution.It also reflected his impetuousness in the events of 1956 and 1957, as he said: Our revolutions are one after another.Beginning with the seizure of power across the country in 1949, followed by the anti-feudal land reform, agricultural cooperatives began as soon as the land reform was completed, ...the three major socialist transformations (agriculture, industry, and commerce) ... were basically completed in 1956 .Then, last year, a socialist revolution was carried out on the political and ideological fronts... Now a technological revolution is coming. ②The paragraph on the economic plan shows that it has completely broken the past plan.Economic development plans were replaced by plans for two sets of production targets for major products, drawn up by agencies at the central and local levels.When formulating plans, the central government has two accounts, one is a plan that must be completed, and the other is a plan that is expected to be completed.There are also two accounts in the local area.The first book of the local area is the second book of the central government, which is inevitable in the local area.According to this method, the final production targets of factories, mines and agricultural cooperatives will be several times higher than the national production targets set by the central government for their industries.Soon after the new plan was tried out, it brought various drawbacks.At the lowest level, it drives local cadres to demand so much from workers and peasants that they become increasingly weary and frustrated.At the middle level, it fostered exaggeration, and there was a wide gap between what cadres reported as output and what was actually done.At the center, it gave the leadership a completely wrong impression of the state of the country's economy.Politically, the new approach is aimed at strengthening the "leader-mass ties."In its implementation, however, it had exactly the opposite effect; it created several uneducated, uneducated, and uneducated people between Mao and his colleagues in the center and the workers and peasants who toiled in the factories and fields. The timid and fearful cadre class.

One of the biggest institutional innovations of the "Great Leap Forward" was the people's commune. In the winter of 1957 and 1958, agricultural production cooperatives gathered together to provide sufficient labor for the large-scale construction of canals, dams, and other water conservancy projects, and the people's communes originated from this.Concentration led to consolidation; consolidation led to a new level of administration; and the creation of this level transferred to it responsibilities that had hitherto been dispersed among cooperatives and local government departments.At this time, those activists who had been active during the agricultural collectivization movement two and a half years ago immediately started to act again-by the end of 1958, more than 99% of the peasant households had joined the cooperatives.

The commune existed for a total of twenty-five years.During this time, they have undergone several substantial changes.Judging from the original form of the communes, they actually lasted less than three years, and they were Mao's favorite form of organization.The reason why the people's communes catered to Mao's wishes to the greatest extent was not so much because he liked the decentralization of power in administration, but rather because he preferred that this level of organization could mobilize the broadest masses at the grassroots level.The commune's mandate is broad, covering political, economic, cultural and military activities.This also catered to Mao's dislike of specialization.The commune tended to organize collective life and collective labor, encouraging all commune members to eat in the commune cafeteria, and encouraging wives to send their children to nursery schools when they went out to work in the fields.The commune equally distributes the income of its members through various activities and through production brigades and production teams.It was also very much to Mao's liking, since he saw averaging as a way to eliminate the zealous pursuit of self-interest, and because he firmly believed that it also opened the way for the communist principle of "distribution according to need." The "Great Leap Forward" was officially launched at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in May 1958.Like the first meeting of the Eighth National Congress held 20 months ago, Liu Shaoqi gave the main report at this meeting.His earlier reports were cautious; his present one is hasty and unrealistic.At the first meeting of the Eighth National Congress, Mao himself only spoke once, and it was very brief.At this meeting, Mao spoke no less than five times, and he was extremely excited, which also excited his audience.He criticized Stalin for his apathetic and bureaucratic attitude towards development, and declared that the present task of the whole party was to "uncover the cover, to break the superstition (referring to the possibility of overcoming difficulties) and to allow the enthusiasm and creativity of the working people to explode come out".At the end of the meeting, a general line of building socialism with "more, faster, better, and less costly" was passed. After the meeting, thousands of representatives returned to their jobs with confidence, firmly believing that the key to their career success or failure depends on them. With what enthusiasm and effective means have this general line been put into practice. In the following six months, the country's 700 million people were in the midst of extreme fanaticism.Movement after movement.First, the People's Commune was established, and then this auspicious saying spread: Communism is close at hand.In this "communist style", many communes have implemented a free supply system - members don't need money for meals, and eat with an open stomach.In response to Mao's call in January 1958 to strive to achieve the same value of industrial output as that of agriculture in the countryside in the next few years, the communes built or expanded thousands of small factories and workshops, and remodeled or remodeled them. Machines and equipment designed in-house as far as possible to assemble them.Finally, when there was a shortage of steel in the countryside to supply these factories with enough steel, the communes began producing their own steel. (There is an error here. Large-scale steelmaking is to pursue steel output.--Annotation) The Great Iron and Steel Movement was the climax of the "Great Leap Forward". By the end of 1958, hundreds of thousands of small iron furnaces and small blast furnaces had been built in rural areas of China.Some communes have as many as dozens.It is estimated that about 60 million people participated in this movement. They either worked in the mines, or transported coal in the coal mines, or operated small iron furnaces and small blast furnaces.Under the tremendous pressure from the superiors, many commune members were forced to take out their kettles and iron pans, and remove all other metal utensils in their homes.However, because this movement was carried out during the autumn harvest season in North China, it led to a shortage of field labor during the busy farming season. As a result, some crops were left unharvested in the fields.This practice did not produce useful steel; and since the technology necessary to produce durable iron—not to mention steel—was not available in the countryside, it took millions of hours to produce It's just millions of tons of worthless scrap iron. Nevertheless, the grain output in 1958 still reached 200 million tons, which was the best harvest year in Chinese history.However, Mao and his colleagues concluded that there was still more to be produced, based on provincial reports of substantial increases in grain production. In August, Tan Zhenlin, head of the Party’s Rural Work Department, said at a working conference that grain production might have reached more than 300 million tons. In December, the Central Committee announced that grain production had reached 375 million tons, a figure that was almost Twice as many as in 1957. During the winter of late 1958-early 1959, Mao and his colleagues had become aware that there was strong discontent in the countryside, and that the "Great Leap Forward" prevented many goods from being delivered to consumers, or that It was useless, so they began to adjust some of the policies they had introduced earlier.At a work conference held in February and March 1959, Mao himself criticized the phenomenon of excessively equal peasant incomes, many communes appropriating other people's labor without compensation, and the premature withdrawal of loans to communes by the state banking system.He also consulted Chen Yun, who had long wanted to make major changes to the development strategy, and also expressed his belief that organizational mobilization cannot be the driving force for economic growth.Chen Yun proposed that the target of steel production in 1959 should be reduced from 30 million tons to 13 million tons, and advocated that the national economy should be regarded as "a game of chess".He pointed out that encouraging localities or provinces to be self-sufficient in various products can only limit rather than expand the development of the entire national economy. Even so, Mao and others did not reverse several of the decisions they had taken in 1958 when they had falsely reported a bumper harvest.The most important decision was to stipulate that on the basis of the huge total grain output in 1958, the country's total grain output in 1959 should be increased; the total sown area should be reduced.And in this reduced sown area, the proportion of land area planted with cereals should be correspondingly reduced.It was these decisions that made the Great Leap Forward a disaster.By the end of 1958, farmers had worked continuously for two summers and more than one winter without a break, and the fertile land had been destroyed on a large scale due to unreasonable dense planting and deep plowing.What should be done at this time is to reduce the burden on the peasants and use the land rationally. Mao agrees with both, but these requirements have not been met.From the official documents that have been published, it is not clear what Deng said or did in 1958 (his anthology does not include any of his speeches during this period).However, these documents fully show that he is on Mao's side, and he also agrees with the "Great Leap Forward" method. However, Deng's tone was not exactly the same as Mao's.He did not use the hyperbolic language of Mao (or Liu), nor did he say much about putting politics in command or revitalizing ideology and social influence, which Mao regarded as an important goal of this leap forward.He also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of small iron stoves and clay blast furnaces in rural areas.During his visit to the countryside in October, he said that they should introduce technology.At a special meeting called at the end of 1958 on Mao's instructions to discuss labor remuneration and material incentives, he made clear his opposition to free supplies. In 1959, Deng's role changed.He became a collaborator of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. At this time, Zhou and Chen were both committed to formulating steel production targets according to the actual conditions of industry and agriculture (this is already a well-known high target that cannot be achieved).A meeting of the secretariat was held to hear reports on the role of the communes, and another meeting was called to revisit the indicators of steel production.The second meeting issued an instruction to the Central Finance and Economics Group, a small special committee formed by senior party members when Mao decided to reappoint Chen Yun.Since some of its members were older than Deng, it appears that the function of the secretariat itself changed accordingly, becoming a committee informally run by Zhou Enlai, the most senior member of the Central Finance and Economics Group.Whatever the nature of this committee, the central government had already begun to control the serious consequences of the Great Leap Forward, and Deng himself began to have a close working relationship with Zhou and Chen. In the year 1959, the party leadership reunited and worked hard to stop the growing crisis in the countryside and prevent the entire national economy from sinking into depression.It went well at first.But the subsequent clashes between Mao and Peng Dehuai, who had served as defense minister since 1954, broke the unity and solidarity within the party and created an atmosphere in which anyone who gave advice would be persecuted. Peng was a forthright and forthright man, well-respected among his colleagues in the military and the party. During the "Cultural Revolution", his self-report in prison showed that he was not a theoretician, but he was deeply concerned about improving the living conditions of China's 500 million peasants.He attached great importance to the discipline of the party and the army. At the same time, he also believed that senior party cadres should treat each other with sincerity and treat Mao with respect on an equal basis.His own relationship with Mao often had problems. He also had a dispute with Mao in 1959 over high-level policy, namely the nature of the armed forces.Mao wanted to strengthen the nuclear attack force, backed by a small ground armed force suitable for "people's war"; Also capable of nuclear war. Peng visited parts of rural China during the summer of 1958 and spring of 1959, and insisted on talking with farmers and local cadres.He concluded that the leap forward was leading to an economic catastrophe; and that local cadres were not telling the truth when they reported the situation to higher party leaders (or, like himself, visiting state leaders).But he has not spoken much about his inferences to other leaders or at party meetings. In May, he visited several Eastern European countries and met with Khrushchev in Moscow before returning to Beijing in mid-June. In early July, Peng Deng went to Lushan, a health resort in Jiangxi, to participate in the enlarged meeting of the Politburo held there. On the 14th, he wrote a long letter to Mao on the issue of the "Great Leap Forward".Of course he hoped that Mao would reply to the letter in person; or call him to talk.However, contrary to expectations, Mao did not do this. Instead, he printed and distributed his letter under the official title of "Peng Dehuai's Opinion Letter" to everyone attending the Lushan Conference, and then gave a very long and ironic speech. The letter described the letter as an unprincipled attack on himself and the party's central leadership.he stressed to his audience that they had participated in the formulation of the policies peng criticized; he himself offered to criticize most of them; but peng allowed him to speak at a party conference in the spring When he said nothing.He implied that Peng had colluded with Khrushchev, and asked all the members present to consider which side they should stand in the face of Peng's "opportunistic" attack. Peng has several active supporters, and they all made speeches at the preparatory meeting, and there are also many sympathizers.But once Mao raised the question of loyalty, only the two or three most senior party members were willing and able to wrestle Mao back from criticism.Yet they did not do so.As a result, Mao was able to change course as he wished at the subsequent meeting of the Central Committee, launched a general attack on Peng, and allowed the Central Committee to pass a resolution that put Peng and three others (including Luo, Mao's old opponent in Jiangxi) E) as a member of an "anti-Party group".Except for Zhu De, who has been the military leader for 25 years, none of the speakers defended Peng.Liu Shaoqi, who succeeded Mao as president just four months ago, had previously worked enthusiastically to stop Mao's "patriarchal" behavior, but (Deng Xiaoping used the term "patriarchal" in a 1980 conversation with Mao's attitude towards his colleagues.--Original note) Now his attacks on Peng are particularly fierce. Criticism of Peng ended at a meeting of the party's military committee in September.He came under fire from Lin Biao and others who said Peng was the head of a "military club" and fired him as defense minister.Although he retained his position as a member of the Politburo, he was not allowed to attend meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee shortly thereafter.His house in Zhongnanhai was taken back, and he was assigned an empty house in the wilderness instead. Lin Biao replaced Peng as defense minister, and soon began turning the military into a tool he could use to pursue his own political ambitions.He reorganized the army according to what he knew would do Mao's favor, and set about turning it into a bastion of revolutionary character. In the autumn of 1960, he persuaded the Military Commission and unanimously agreed that Mao's thoughts (individually) should become the curriculum for the military's political education; in 1962, he published and popularized the quotations from Mao's speeches and writings, which later became famous all over the world" Little Red Book".Mao's reaction to this was exactly what Lin expected. In December 1963, he called on the whole country to "learn from the Chinese People's Liberation Army"; in 1964, he instructed that the political department of the whole army should be formed according to the organizational system of government departments and party organizations.Thus, the traditional relationship between the party and the army based on the party's command of the "gun" was reversed.The military has moved into the party (and the government) and out of control at all levels of the party. Economically, the Lushan Conference gave the "Great Leap Forward" a new life.This was because Mao insisted on launching a nationwide campaign against "Right opportunism."The campaign soon turned into a purge of all party cadres who had been negative about Leap Forward or who had taken the lead in responding to Mao's own earlier call for caution and moderation.As a result, all cadres could no longer mention that they should stop appropriating labor for free, and that they should pay farmers according to the quantity and quality of their work. In early 1960, another campaign was launched to establish urban people's communes.The output target was not lowered but increased, and Mao also clearly declared that he supported the industrial management system in which the government was in command. In 1960, the Soviet Union decided to stop all forms of aid to China, which awakened Mao Zedong from his dream of the Great Leap Forward.Agree to implement a new general line, namely "adjustment, consolidation, enrichment, improvement", and allow criticism of those local cadres who forcibly occupy peasant labor without compensation.It wasn't until November 1960 that those CCP leaders who had long believed that the "Leap Forward" had led to a disaster were finally able to fundamentally correct the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, and Zhou Enlai issued twelve emergency instructions, which stipulated that the peasants were allowed to recover The way of life and work before the "leap forward". However, at this time, the countryside was suffering from severe famine. In 1959, the rural population was still able to keep 122 million tons of grain.By 1960, this figure had been reduced to 113 million tons, an average of only 150 kilograms of grain per person per year. The national urban population in 1960 was much smaller than it was in 1959, but incomes were also much lower - in fact the smallest year since 1949.The death rate of the rural population rose from 12.5‰ in 1958 to over 14‰ in 1959 and nearly 29‰ in 1960.While the death rate has risen, the birth rate has also dropped significantly. In 1960, the national death rate was significantly higher than the birth rate, and between 1950 and 1958, the national birth rate was two and a half times and three times the death rate.The famine lasted until 1961. The death toll from this famine—all due to starvation and disease—was far greater than any famine in China or any other country and region in the 20th century, and it killed far more people than the Soviet Union's agricultural co-operatives deaths from famines. In the early 1960s, the outside world learned from refugee reports that there was a severe food shortage in parts of China.But it was not until the early 1980s that the CCP finally released figures on births and death rates, as well as grain production and harvests during this period, allowing outsiders to understand the truth about the famine at that time.Even now, the Great Leap Forward and the famine are rarely mentioned in official documents, or even in novels and short stories. The "Cultural Revolution" produced a large number of scar literature; the "Great Leap Forward" had no similar works. Deng Xiaoping *did not attend the political meeting held in Lushan due to a leg injury (Deng broke his right leg while playing billiards in 1958, as can be seen from the photo. Until April 1961, he was walking with a cane. It can be seen that his recovery from the injury is very slow.--Original Note) Board meeting and Central Committee meeting.But he probably attended the meeting of the Military Commission (besides Mao, he was the only literati in the Military Commission) that finally convicted Peng Dehuai.Although he never had a particularly close relationship with Peng, he must have worried deeply about Peng's fate—and Mao's behavior.According to some published materials, his view of Mao is: he is an outstanding leader, but he is not absolutely free from mistakes.At this time, he was bravely ready to reiterate this point again. In a speech to party members in Tianjin in March 1960, he pointedly criticized the growing tendency among party members to attribute all their achievements to the application of Mao's ideas.He said that Mao Zedong Thought should not be separated from Marxism-Leninism, and Marxism-Leninism must not be forgotten.As the leader of the party, Mao is different from "general collective leadership members".But he is still a member of this collective leadership, and he must not be separated from this collective leadership.As for the consequences of the Lushan Conference, he later believed that it was very harmful: "This struggle (against Peng and his accomplices) seriously damaged the democratic life of the party from the center to the grassroots politically, and interrupted the corrective economics. The process of left-leaning mistakes made the mistakes last longer."③ As General Secretary, Deng must have also found it difficult to avoid Mao's struggle against "Right opportunism" or the Second Leap Forward.But he was not one of the leaders who gave major speeches to the two movements, and it can be seen from his speeches in Tianjin that he spent most of his time away from home in the spring of 1960.It is likely that Sino-Soviet relations also took up a lot of his time, and perhaps this provided an excuse for him to leave most of his domestic affairs to others.Deng must have attended several meetings Mao convened in January, February, and March 1960 to discuss how to deal with the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. The great controversy between China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s was unexpected inside and outside the communist world, and its influence continued to expand and spread throughout the world.It made the Treaty of Alliance between the two countries signed in 1950 a dead letter, it destroyed the "socialist camp", split the international communist movement, and broke the world balance of power at that time.It prompted Mao Zedong to make the decision to sever all ties with Soviet society, which had a lot to do with his later decision to plunge China into the "Cultural Revolution". The debate began in 1958, shortly after the relationship between the two countries and the two parties had passed through a historically good period. The Chinese drew two important conclusions from the riots in Poland and Hungary in 1956: Russia The dangers of de-Stalinization were recognized, and Moscow was wary of expressing sympathy for the communist parties, which were trying to break away from Moscow and gain a more independent status; Fostering "revisionism", which leads to outright counter-revolution, has the same consequences as Khrushchev's original thesis on the Stalin problem and the parliamentary path to power.Therefore, in 1957, Mao pointed out at a meeting of party leaders in Moscow to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution that both the socialist camp and the international communist movement needed a "head", and these two "heads" It is the Soviet Union and the Soviet Party. Mao also said that the Soviet Union successfully put two earth satellites—the earliest artificial earth satellite of the Soviet Union—into orbit and successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, which showed that the "east wind" had overwhelmed the "west wind."他主张，国际共产主义运动应当以中国共产党人在反对蒋介石的战争中所运用的在战略上藐视敌人，在战术上重视敌人的战略战术为榜样，决不向敌人屈服。他还谈到了核战争可能带来的后果。他宣称，人不会在这场战争中死绝的，一个勇敢的、新的共产主义世界将会在"帝国主义的废墟上"崛起。但他并没有预见到当中国面临苏联不友好的政治或军事态度时所应采取的行动。 俄国人一定感到毛有关核战争的观点使人感到不安。但他们已经决定，他们要满足中国人所提出的有关帮助他们建立制造和试验核武器设施的一切要求。10月中旬，在毛到达莫斯科之前，两国已在这里签署了一项秘密协定。这个协定按说一定会作出两国之间是信任和合作的关系这祥的承诺。但事实并非如此，它标志着两国两党之间的关系已经到了顶点，随后是走下坡路了。 不久，影响两国两党关系的台湾问题、印度问题和"大跃进"便出现了。在台湾问题上，中国的立场是十分鲜明的：台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中国有权用任何手段收复台湾。苏联无论是在公开场合还是在私下里都并没有反驳中国的这一立场。但赫鲁晓夫认为，假如存在着美国帮助国民党保卫台湾这样一个正式承诺，而对苏联来说，它与美国之间的关系又是至关重要的，那么中国至少应该事先告知俄国人他们在台湾海峡使用武力的意图。而这正是中国人所不愿意做的。他们并不想进一步扩大台湾问题在国际社会的影响。因而当中国人在1958年8月底对离大陆仅有几公里之遥的国民党驻守的岛屿金门展开猛烈的炮击，并进而攻击国民党的补给船只时，便出现了中苏关系以及中美关系的危机。不久，赫鲁晓夫在写给艾森豪威尔总统的信中说，对中华人民共和国的进攻就是进攻苏联，苏联将"忠于职责"，采取一切必要的手段来保卫中国。但他对毛的做法非常生气，因为他8月初曾在北京同毛有过一次长谈，当时毛对他即将开始的这场炮击只字未提。 印度之所以成为影响两国关系的一个问题，是因为当中印两国军队在靠近尼泊尔、锡金和不丹的东西段边界上发生冲突时，苏联却开始谋求加强同印度的密切联系。在东段边界，冲突是由1959年春西藏叛乱（和随后不久达赖喇嘛逃亡印度）后，难民和游击队在西藏和印度之间的活动引起的。在西段边界，发生冲突的原因是：中国在印度已宣布为己有并不时有印度的巡逻队出没的领土上修建了一条公路。中国在公开的声明中对苏联不(中印边界冲突的实际情况是，1959年，印度总理尼赫鲁向中国提出领土要求，同年8月25日，印度武装部队向我边防军开火，挑起武装冲突，并不断升级。三年后，挑起全面冲突。中国政府对印度的无理要求和军事侵犯，进行了有理有节的斗争，1962年10月22日，中国军队被迫进行自卫还击。11月22日，主动停火、后撤。此后，中印在边界问题上没有再发生冲突，--译注)站在中国一边的行为提出了抗议，并指出，苏联宣布中立事实上是为了取悦印度。赫鲁晓夫在1959年10月为庆祝中华人民共和国成立十周年访问北京时，他和他的东道主中国人为这个问题发生了争吵。四个月后，苏联党（不是苏联政府）在给中国党的一封信中说，中国的行为是"狭隘的民族主义态度"的表现。在这封信中，俄国人想让中国人做到，要使民族的利益服从于他们把自己视为监护人的国际利益。 这两个问题是任何两个主权国家都有可能提出的问题。而第三个问题--"大跃进"，则只有在具有共同的意识形态的两个国家间才可能提出来。无论是在意识形态上还是在政治上，俄国人都有充分的理由对"跃进"表示反感。因为它否定了苏联的发展模式，并进而声称，中国，这个只有三年社会主义建设史的国家要比苏联更快地进入共产主义，并很可能比苏联更快地实现共产主义。实际上，它给负责向中国运送商品的苏联经销商造成了巨大的压力，并且给正在中国工作的一千五百名苏联顾问和技术人员带来了几乎难以忍受的工作条件。 同样，俄国人，尤其是赫鲁晓夫的行为也十分粗暴和过火。从1958年秋起，赫鲁晓夫开始以轻蔑的口吻向到莫斯科访问的人、包括西方的来访者谈论"跃进"。1959年夏，他首先中止了1957年10月签署的军事技术协议，接着便开始公开批评"跃进"。所有这一切都是为了向中国人暗示，就像20年代和30年代的共产国际那样，赫鲁晓夫要惩罚中国党在政治上和思想上一意孤行的行为。更为重要的是，赫鲁晓夫第一次公开攻击"跃进"几乎与彭德怀在庐山写给毛的那封有关公社的信发生在同一天。毛由此断定，赫鲁晓夫和彭已串通起来，而且他已就中国的事务同资深的中国党的成员达成了一致行动。实际上，并没有这些阴谋串通的确切的证据，而且与一个外国人串通，这也不符合彭的性格。根据彭的回忆，他最初并没有想上庐山，他只是到庐山呆了一段时间以后才决定给毛写信。然而，毛这位这方面的老手必然会看出其他的问题；不久，官方的决议称，彭的干扰有力地支持了"赫鲁晓夫的修正主义集团"。 这些问题一出现，便再次引发了一场有关赫著晓夫在1956年"二十大"的讲话中就已经提出的一些原则问题的争论，中国人率先开始了争论。1960年4月，他们在列宁诞辰的那一天同时在《人民日报》和中央委员会的理论刊物《红旗》杂志上发表了四篇长篇评论文章，它们的中心思想暗含在第一篇文章的标题《列宁主义万岁》中，这就是：他们比俄国人更信仰列宁主义。他们谴责俄国人提出的关于和平共处、战争是可以避免的、非共产党国家的共产党有可能通过和平道路夺取政权的新主张，认为俄国人已完全背弃了列宁主义。这使俄国人处于了守势；他们不得不辩解说，自列宁的时代以来，世界已发生了变化，因而有必要对他的一些学说进行修正，但他们在精神上并没有放弃列宁主义。所以，事实是，中国人已经展开了进攻；苏联人在开始反攻前要为自己的行为作出解释。 1960年夏，在北京召开的工会会议和在布加勒斯特召开的罗马尼亚党的代表大会上，中国人和俄国人发生了冲突。在布加勒斯特，赫鲁晓夫对毛本人进行攻击，称他为"极左分子"和"左倾修正主义分子"，并把他同斯大林的自我中心主义相提并论，从而引起了中国代表团团长彭真的反击。这次交锋在第三国的代表当中引起了极大的恐慌，他们纷纷以各自党的名义向双方施加压力，敦促他们达成一个一致的协议。这一做法果然奏效，并最终确定，同年秋天在莫斯科召开三个会议：俄国人和中国人之间的双边会议，二十六国党代表会议和八十一国党的领导人的首脑会议。 在这三个会议上，邓小平一直都是中国的主要发言人。他的（许多）声明和讲话的原文一直没有公开发表。但从一些引文和参考资料中可以得知，他是坚决支持纪念列宁周年的文章中提出的那些观点的。他对和平共处的看法是，这只不过是社会主义和资本帝国主义间的武装停战而已；关于战争，他认为，发生新的世界战争的可能性不大（因为苏联拥有的核武器能够阻止美国发动或引起世界战争），但局部战争是不可避免的；关于社会主义的路线，他指出，资本主义国家和它们的殖民地必然要发生暴力革命。在实际策略上，他主张社会主义阵营一定要提高警惕，加强武装。他认为，对于社会主义阵营和个别的社会主义国家来说，积极支持民族解放运动才是正确的（和安全的），而鼓励阵营以外的共产党减少战斗力则是错误的。目前还不能以充分的书面材料证明，邓曾经在关于全球性的核战争可能会带来的后果问题上采用了毛的观点--即核战争最坏的结果是导致帝国主义的毁灭，而不是全人类的毁灭。从表面上来看，他很可能已经预感到，在为期八周的争论期间，要想回避这个问题是不容易做到的。而如果他真的提及这个问题，他一定会引用毛泽东的这个说法。在其他任何记录中，也没有看到过他曾在这个问题上支持过毛。看来，邓对毛关于核战争的看法是持怀疑态度的。 第三个会议最终形成了一个涵盖一切有争议的问题并由所有参加者一致同意并签署的宣言。用第一位研究中苏冲突并深刻剖析了这场冲突的西方学者唐纳德·赞格瑞尔教授的话来说，它实际上是俄国人的胜利④。它不但充满了所谓苏联的基本立场和观点，而且还是含糊不清和模棱两可的。只是由于从北京监督着这些活动的毛接受了中国代表团团长刘少奇的建议，才使这篇宣(他和朝鲜的金日成是唯一两个没有出席会议的共产党领袖。--译注)言得以顺利发表。当时摆在中国代表面前的有两种选择：妥协和破裂。然而，正如后来发生的事件所表明的那样，刘在宣言上签名绝没有使毛改变他的以下观点或判断，即赫鲁晓夫和苏联国内外的其他许多人已经变质为"现代修正主义分子"。 1963年7月，邓又一次，也是最后一次出访莫斯科。他率领一个小型的党的代表团同以苏斯洛夫--意识形态方面的专家--为首的苏联党代表团就莫斯科宣言中包含的一切理论问题再次举行会谈，而且自从1960年前后重新开始会谈以来，在关于态度问题上，一方总是认为另一方的行为是十分恶劣的。中国人特别在两个问题上对俄国人表示了不满：后者在1961年至1962年冬天期间允许五万多人从新疆逃亡到苏联境内，以及在1962年的中印边境战争前后，赫鲁晓夫对中国的态度公开进行批评。至于俄国人，他们对中国人公然把他们在1962年10月古巴导弹危机期间的行为先是说成"冒险主义"，后来又说成是投降主义的说法，也极为愤懑。在会谈开始前，双方各自发表长篇的文件和声明，充分地和有针对性地陈述了各自的立场和观点。这成为一个不祥的预兆。俄国人还明确表示，对于他们来说，同邓的代表团的会谈远没有同时在莫斯科同美国和英国进行的有关部分禁止核试验条约的谈判重要（实际上，这个会议的主题本身就是向中国的挑衅）。虽然赫鲁晓夫亲自为邓和他的代表团举行了宴会，但那是在会谈举行了五天而任何一方都没有改变自己的立场和观点之后。双方没有确定进一步会谈的日期。这就发出了破裂的信号，而且正如其结果所表明的，这标志着两党间长达二十六年的正式交往的结束。 在"文化大革命"期间，流传着一个故事，说毛否决了邓起草的这份中国人在会议前公布的文件，也许其中有一定的真实性。但即使是有的话，也并不意味着毛已不再信任邓了。毛经常对其他人起草的文件感到不满，而且如果他对给他留下很好印象的邓的能力有什么怀疑的话，他就不可能派邓去同苏斯洛夫或者是同赫鲁晓夫本人较量。无论如何，在这次事件后，他曾表示，对邓的表现感到满意。更为不寻常的是，他亲自到机场迎接返回北京的邓，随后，他又指定邓担任一个写作小组的组长。这个小组是为了准备写作关于这场论战的起因和经过的详细的、公开的报告而成立的。这个报告在1963年和1964年间分九个部分［简称"九评"］发表，而且颇具说服力。 在国内，从1961年到1965年，邓主要活跃在两个领域：制定经济恢复的计划，组织一场旨在处理在"大跃进"之后普遍存在于党内的腐败、缺乏纪律性和道德败坏等现象的运动。 恢复经济计划主要由四个人负责：刘少奇、周恩来、陈云和邓小平。它的主要内容是调整"大跃进"在制度上的大部分创新措施，以年度计划代替五年计划，把投资重点从重工业转向轻工业和农业（从而实行毛泽东在1956年春提出的一条最重要的建议）。 邓对其主要内容，尤其是在农业和工业方面作出了巨大贡献，但他主要扮演的是协调者的角色，似乎是他在安排每一项经济和教育活动的政策文件，这些文件都由党的一位资深的党员监督起草；他还协调为检查各项政策而成立的三个委员会的工作。 到1961年底，这些人和这三个委员会制定出了八个重要的政策文件和几套法规草案。毛召集了一系列的工作会议来讨论这些文件和草案，它们基本上都得到顺利通过。有一种说法是，毛批评了邓在视察了北京郊区的几个公社后起草的一套文件。还有一种说法是，他反对作为总书记的邓为会议所作的"准备"。不管怎样，反正(一种说法是，在毛还没来得及讨论它们之前，邓便按照会议议程通过了一个或更多的文件。--原注)毛对此非常气愤，且责问是哪个"皇帝"胆敢越过他的权力擅自作出这些安排的？然而，并没有让邓靠边站或让他作自我批评；毛一定对邓在短短几个月内领导几个特别机构制定了一套全面的长期规划所表现出的才能留下了深刻的印象。 这个规划几乎废除了"大跃进"的所有政策。在农村，虽然公社作为一级单位仍然存在，但它们的绝大部分权力却被剥夺了。主要的经济单位成为生产队，约有三十个农户组成（而在最初的公社里平均约有四千个农户）。土地所有权归生产队所有，生产队要负责其成员的管理工作，并负责付给他们报酬。以公社为基础的不受人们欢迎的收入上的平均化从此销声匿迹。个体农户又可以拥有一小片自留地。在一种已在全国的一部分地区十分普遍并以农业最终实现集体化道路为指南的政治体制之下，生产队可以同其成员就执行非农业的任务签订合约。到1965年，全国的粮食收成达一亿九干五百万吨，恢复到了发动"大跃进"前的1957年的水平。 在工业方面，放弃了毛在1960年所倡导的工业管理体制。薄一波起草了一个六十条的管理规划，邓把它变成了一个详细的法规，重新采用责任制和专门化管理，并重新确定了工资间的差别。削减了工业的投资比例，关闭了许多亏损的工厂。结果，数以百万的工人失业，他们离开城市到农村，或者是返回农村，大大减少政府供给城市的粮食的压力。工业进入不景气的状态比农业晚，最不景气的时候是1961年，但它的恢复却迅速得多。到1965年，绝大多数工业产品的产量是1957年的两倍多，并出现了一大批新的工业企业，由于石油产量的迅速提高，为这些企业提供了充分的原料，因而企业规模迅速扩大。 邓本人有关发展的观点在1958年和1962年间也发生了变化。最迟在1959年10月，他盛赞群众运动是一种最好的方法：我们的基本工作方法就是：领导和群众相结合，一切工作走群众路线，放手发动群众，有领导地展开轰轰烈烈的群众运动，把群众的智慧和意见集中起来，依靠群众的力量来贯彻执行党的方针政策……看不见群众的……积极性……总认为，群众的觉悟不够，群众运动是靠不住的……认为，在革命中固然需要群众运动，但是在建设中，那就是另外一回事了。这种看法……是错误的。 ⑤然而，1962年7月，他在共产主义青年团的一次代表大会上，又提出了一个不同的观点：生产关系究竟以什么形式为最好，恐怕要采取这样一种态度，就是哪种形式在哪个地方能够比较容易比较快地恢复和发展农业生产，就采取哪种形式；群众愿意采取哪种形式，就应该采取哪种形式，不合法的使它合法起来……刘伯承同志经常讲一句四川话："白猫、黑猫，只要捉住老鼠就是好猫"。这是说的打仗。我们之所以能够打败蒋介石，就是不讲老规矩，不按老路子打，一切看情况……现在看来，不论工业还是农业，非退一步不能前进。你不承认这个退？农业不是在退？公社不是在退？ ……第一步恢复粮食，第二步恢复经济作物，同时把农具和牲畜慢慢地恢复起来……过去我也讲过，我们的运动大多，统统是运动，而且统统是全国性的，看来这是搞不通的。 ⑥ 这个变化导致在他和毛之间产生了隔阂，毛一直认为，除了在社会主义"生产关系"下，"生产力"不会获得最好的发展。而且从1958年起他就主张，社会主义的生产关系已经超出国家和集体所有制的范围，扩展到了管理体制即吸收工人和农民参加管理，和奖赏制度即充分依靠非物质的刺激和平均分配报酬。在这两个问题上，邓同毛出现了分歧。 在重振党的士气问题上。邓也同毛的意见相左。他们都一致认为，一定要消除"大跃进"带来的消极影响和后果。但他们在关于产生这种消极影响的原因以及解决它的方法问题上却出现了分歧。毛认为，问题的根源在于许多党员严重缺乏社会主义的价值观；邓则认为，根源在于严重的政治和经济所带来的纪律涣散和士气低落。毛想通过让党的干部参加体力劳动和接受农民的批评，来教育他们。邓则认为，只有在地方干部接受了由上面派下来的工作组的调查，而且如果有必要的话还要受到惩处之后，农民才能发挥这一作用。他还认为，乡以上的干部在成为改造者之前，首先要加强自身的改造。 1963年5月，在农村发动了一场社会主义教育运动，这场运动是根据后来以《前十条》著称的一份文件的指示精神而发动起来的，《前十条》基本上反映了毛的观点。但很快就发现，地方党的干部并不愿意组建农民的组织来监督他们自己。因而书记处在9月间又发出了一个文件（《后十条》），把运动的重点从自下的改造转变为自上的改造。这时，毛似乎并没有抱怨什么。但他仍然把这场运动看成了进行社会主义价值观教育的必由之路，并热切地期待着农民组织将成为其主要机构的那一天的到来。 正在这时，刘少奇插手了。他的妻子王光美在天津附近的一个公社呆了五个月，刘本人也在河南的一个公社呆上了两周，他们两人都断定，大部分地方干部都已经腐化堕落，农民也好不了多少，所以绝不能依靠农民来纠正地方干部。刘因此便起草了第三个文件《后十条》修正草案，于1964年9月以中央委员会的名义发出。对领导者和被领导者的教育可能产生的结果，文件持悲观的看法，因此文件要求从城市派出大批工作队，对地方干部的恶习进行全面深入的调查，从而导致了对许多农村地区公社干部的详细调查，结果造成了对成千上万的干部的清洗。 《后十条》修正案仅实施了四个月的时间。经过1964年12月和1965年1月中央工作会议上一场激烈的辩论后，毛坚决主张它们应当由另外一个文件即《二十三条》来取代。这就又回到了《前十条》，增加了几段措词严厉的论述，即这场运动应当被看成是"社会主义和资本主义两条道路的斗争"，它的对象是"公社……甚至省级机关和中央部门中反对社会主义的人"。毛也因此发出了一个信号：他已经开始觉察出在他的同事当中出了修正主义分子和阶级敌人。 Notes: ①《毛泽东选集》第5卷，第453页。 ②《剑桥史》第15卷，第38－39页。 ③《中国共产党中央委员会关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》。 ④赞格瑞尔：《中苏论战》，第365页。 ⑤鲍威尔和费尔班克：《共产主义的中国，1955－1959》，第599页。 ⑥《邓小平文选》第一卷，第323－324页。