Chapter 30 Section 6 A single spark gradually starts a prairie fire

In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly violently purgeed the party against the Communist Party. The CCP was caught off guard, and almost all of them were exterminated. It was difficult for the survivors to find a safe place to live.Unexpectedly, there was a Mao Zedong in the Communist Party. He did not follow the rules and started a peasant revolution. On August 1 of the same year, he formed the Red Army and first developed a revolutionary base in Jinggangshan.This is undoubtedly a small spark, and it will take time to gradually start a prairie fire.Chiang Kai-shek inadvertently provided Xinghuo with the time needed to start a prairie fire.So in the spring of 1929, when the war between Jiang and Guangxi broke out, Mao Zedong happily filled out "Qing Ping Le":

The situation changed suddenly, and the warlords resumed fighting.Sprinkling to the world is all resentment, and it reappears in a pillow.The red flag jumped across the Tingjiang River and went straight down to Longyan and Shanghang.It's really busy to clean up the Jin Ou and divide the fields! Mao Ci made it very clear that the war between the Kuomintang warlords enabled him to take the opportunity to "go straight to Longyan and Shanghang" and carry out the rural revolution of "dividing the fields and land".By the time Chiang Kai-shek had finished fighting the Central Plains War and the four major armies of the Kuomintang had fought against each other, "banditry was already rampant", and it was no longer a spark.The Red Army has been active in the five provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Anhui.

At the end of 1930, Chiang finalized the "Outline of the "Bandit Suppression" Plan for Connecting the Three Provinces of Henan, Hubei and Anhui", and ordered his confidant Jiangxi Provincial Chairman Lu Diping to regain Ji'an and clean up the upper and lower reaches of the Ganjiang River within a time limit.Then on December 2, they called Lu Diping in Nanchang, He Chengjun in Hankou, and He Jian in Changsha, asking them to strictly supervise the "bandit suppression" plan, and to recover the lost ground within one and a half months.On the 5th of the same month, in the name of the Chairman of the National Government, he published the "Report to the People Who Wrongly Joined the "Bandit Party" of the Communist Party" and launched a propaganda war.Then departed from Nanjing and arrived in Nanchang on the 9th, held a military meeting to "suppress bandits", set up a battalion of the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force, and planned to besiege Zhu De and Mao Zedong's base areas in southern Jiangxi.This military operation is known as the first encirclement and suppression in history.

The encirclement and suppression forces were divided into three groups. The main force was the Ninth Route Army led by Lu Diping, chairman of Jiangxi Province (under the jurisdiction of five divisions and an independent brigade), responsible for "encirclement and suppression", that is, to encircle the Red Army bases and then gather and wipe them out.Zhu Shaoliang led the Sixth Route Army (under the jurisdiction of four divisions and an independent brigade) to cooperate with the Lu army in the East.Jiang Guangnai led the 19th Route Army (three divisions and one brigade under its jurisdiction), and entered Jiangxi from Guangdong.The Nineteenth Route Army had not yet concentrated, and Chiang Kai-shek had already designated the attack on December 16.The Lu Army's Zhang Huizan Division advanced from Jishui and Yongfeng from the right, and arrived in Donggu on the 20th. However, the Red Army had already withdrawn, and it happened to be heavy fog, so they mistaken the Lu Army's Gong Bingfan Division, which arrived at about the same time, as an enemy. army, and fought fiercely for four hours.Gong Bingfan acted freely in a rage, Zhang Huizhan did not contact him, and marched directly towards Longgang, like a blind man riding a blind horse, going back and forth. Less than six miles away from Longgang, he was blocked by an ambush, and the entire army was wiped out , Zhang Huizan was also captured alive.When Lu Diping heard the news of the defeat, he sent a telegram to order Tan Daoyuan's division to move closer to the Sixth Route Army and enter the source, but encountered the Red Army on December 31, and lost more than half of it.On the third day, when we arrived in Dongshao, the exhausted army was defeated by the crossfire of fire nets. Tan Daoyuan fled to Yihuang in the north and fled to Fuzhou. It was already January 5, 1931. A telegram:

Professional teacher Jiang (three days) met Zhu, Mao, Peng, and Huang in Dongshao in the morning, all known as the Eighth Army. Casualties were particularly heavy among junior officers and soldiers, and the fighting was fiercer than ever before.The soldiers of the entourage were either captured or injured, and they were exhausted, and they were hardly spared.In addition to relocating the officers and soldiers who broke out to Fuzhou for consolidation, all losses can be checked and reported in detail. Master Mao Bingwen of Zhu Shaoliang's army on the left heard the news of the defeat, and he did not want to go deep alone, so he withdrew his troops.However, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to "take advantage of the time when the bandits and communists are proud to move out", and ordered Zhu Shaoliang and Jiang Guangnai's two armies to "suppress the Red Army's nest in Longgang, and do not retreat because of this, so as to create a bandit atmosphere." (Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Lu Diping on the 3rd of the first month) However, the morale was so low that it was irreparable, so we had to temporarily stop the troops.Jiang Yuan intended to take advantage of the great victory over Yu Wei in the Central Plains, and a month and a half would be enough to wipe out the bandits in the mountains and fields. Unexpectedly, Zhang Huizhan was defeated and captured. Wanfa, the Red Army used this to launch a strategic offensive and expand its territory, and the Soviet area was further expanded.Mao Zedong happily filled out another "Fisherman's Pride":

Wan Mushuang was in full bloom in the sky, and the heavenly soldiers were furious.Fog filled Longgang and the thousands of peaks were dark, calling out in unison, Zhang Huizan was caught in the front.Two hundred thousand troops re-entered Jiangxi, and the wind and smoke billowed for half a day.Arouse tens of millions of workers and peasants to work together, and don't mess around with red flags under the mountain. The unlucky teacher Zhang Huizan was included in Mao Zedong's poems, which can be described as immortal, but his death was indeed miserable.He worked for Chiang Kai-shek, went to Jiangxi to suppress bandits, found anyone who was going to be a member of the Red Army, ransacked his family, burned his house, and burned and killed You Lie in Donggu, so that the people were so angry that he was sentenced to death in a public trial.The head was cut off, nailed to a large plaque in Zhang's ancestral hall, and a small white flag was placed beside it, and a letter was written "Zhang Huizan's head is given to Lu Diping". After Chiang Kai-shek heard the news, he exclaimed, "Hoohoo Shihou, the soul is back!" Lu Diping was even more terrified and lost his fighting spirit. Are you snickering?" (see Chiang Kai-shek's reply to Lu Diping's telegram) Then Lu was transferred to Zhejiang, and He Yingqin was appointed to take over the vacancy of the director of the Nanchang camp, and deployed the second encirclement and suppression campaign.

This time the troop strength has doubled. In addition to the original Sixth and Nineteenth Route Army, the Fifth Route Army commanded by Wang Jinyu, the Twenty-sixth Route Army commanded by Sun Lianzhong, and five divisions directly under the battalion and three air teams.Both Wang Jinyu and Sun Lianzhong were surrendered generals and belonged to Chiang Kai-shek's miscellaneous troops. Chiang encouraged them to fight in Jiangxi with official positions and bonuses.Jiang had already learned the power of guerrilla warfare and did not dare to take it lightly. In addition to the military, he paid attention to the cooperation of the party and the government to blockade the Soviet area, seek the cooperation of the common people, strengthen the armed forces of the local teams, and carry out village clearing to destroy the red worker and peasant organizations, etc.The offensive order was issued on April 1, 1931.Wang Jinyu's Fifth Route Army immediately invaded Donggu, but after entering the Soviet area, there was no one left. Hidden guerrillas fired guns and demonstrated.On May 16th, Wang Jinyu's Gongbing Fan division was ambushed in Donggu, causing many casualties.The commander-in-chief fled to Ji'an in a hurry and reported the bad news to He Yingqin in Nanchang and Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing respectively.On the one hand, Jiang ordered Gong Bingfan to go to Beijing for an interview, and on the other hand, he strictly ordered Wang Jinyu and others to immediately counterattack Donggu without delay, "Don't be slightly affected by the public teacher, so as to avoid the tricks of the red bandits. This time our army is very strong in encirclement and suppression. Even if one part fails and the bandits break through a little bit, it will just enable our main forces to attack the bandit army's flanks, thinking of it as an opportunity to wipe them out." (Chiang Kai-shek's May 17, 1931 telegram) But on the battlefield Development did not follow Jiang's orders, and the Forty-Seventh Division led by Wang Jinyu also failed. They retreated to Shuinan and merged with a regiment of Grandmaster Guo Hua.But Guo Shi heard that the entire army of the Gongbingfan Division was destroyed, and he was already under psychological pressure, and he had no intention of fighting. When he retreated to Baisha, he was chased by the Red Army and suffered heavy losses.As for the Wang Jun Hao Mengling's division deployed in Fujita, after knowing the Red Army's strategy of defeating each one, not only did not obey Jiang's order, "advance but never retreat", but retreated to Yongfeng.Wang Jinyu's Fifth Route Army was defeated.The 26th Route Army under the command of Sun Lianzhong marched southward from Yihuang and Le'an respectively on April 1st. When Chiang Kai-shek received the order to reinforce Donggu, he sent his subordinate Gao Shuxun division via Zhongcun to go straight to the south. Fujita, however, because Hao Mengling's division retreated before the battle, was surrounded by the Red Army in a narrow valley on May 23, and lost two regiments. yellow.On the one hand, Sun asked Nakamura for his defeat, but on the other hand, he lied about the reason for returning to the division, saying that he had learned that the Red Army was approaching Nanchang, and returned to the division for the sake of the overall situation.He Yingqin, the owner of the Nanchang camp, believed it to be true, and actually praised it.

Zhu Shaoliang's Sixth Route Army led three divisions, starting from Nanfeng, and occupied Guangchang on May 10. However, after detecting that the other two friendly troops were repelled, only one division was left to guard Guangchang, and the rest retreated to Nanfeng.The remaining Master Hu Zuyu was attacked on May 27th, and Master Hu was seriously injured and died.The Red Army took advantage of the victory to pursue and cut off the connection between Zhu Jun between Nanfeng and Jianning.And defeated a regiment of Zhu Jun Liu and Ding Division in Jianning, Fujian.On May 30, the entire Zhu army retreated.So Zhu, Sun, and Wang's three Route Army were all defeated, and the 19th Route Army stationed in Xingguo actually stood still.

Chiang Kai-shek encircled and suppressed Zhu Mao's 30,000 Red Army with seven times as many troops, and was defeated and defeated by Mao Zedong. This once again exposed Chiang Kai-shek's military incompetence, "one move by one move, and the whole game was lost", and highlighted Mao Zedong's military genius.It is to destroy one's own prestige and greatly increase the morale of others.When Chiang Kai-shek held a military meeting in Nanchang on June 21, he scolded the generals for their incompetence and even cried bitterly on the spot.In order to "oppose the Second Great Encirclement and Suppression", Mao Zedong filled out another "Fisherman's Pride", which is quite realistic:

The clouds on the top of Baiyun Mountain are about to stand, the voices at the bottom of Baiyun Mountain are urgent, and the dead trees and rotten plants work together.The guns are pressing, and the parachutist enters the sky with his own weight.Fifteen days after driving seven hundred miles, the rivers of Gansu were vast and the mountains of Fujian were green, and thousands of troops were swept away like a mat.Some people weep, how can they sigh for the camp every step of the way! Chiang Kai-shek originally wanted to annihilate the Red Army in one fell swoop, but in the end it boosted Zhu Mao's military prestige, greatly improved Mao's reputation in the Communist Party, and the strength of the Red Army increased significantly.Although there were tens of thousands of casualties, there were tens of thousands of captives, countless guns and ammunition, and medicines and telegraph equipment that were extremely rare in the Soviet area.How could Chiang Kai-shek be reconciled, but he couldn't wait to plan the third encirclement and suppression campaign, and decided to "conquer in person", calling Zhu Shaoliang and Sun Lianzhong as early as June 7, saying that he would go to Jiangxi to supervise the division ten days later, "I will be able to live and die with my brothers." And it is said that "once you listen to Zhongzheng's order, you will be able to turn the crisis into safety" and so on.Sure enough, he arrived in Nanchang on June 20, and held a military meeting immediately. He appointed himself the commander-in-chief of the encirclement and suppression army, and He Yingqin was the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, stationed in Nanchang, and planned by foreign military advisers.He Yingqin is also the commander-in-chief of the left-wing group army; he directly commands the two attacking armies and two legions.Chen Mingshu was invited to personally command the 19th Route Army and the commander-in-chief of the right-wing group army, including the four divisions assigned to him by Chiang Kai-shek, with a total force of 300,000 troops, which was more than 100,000 than last time, ten times that of the Red Army.Its momentum is so great, it can be seen that if it is determined to win, Chiang Kai-shek vowed, "If you don't win a complete victory, you will not return to Nanjing if you die." Red Army base areas, and then gradually wipe them out." He also officially signed the "Order for the Third Encirclement and Suppression Operation" on July 1, 1931. (See Yan Ruping and Zheng Zemin's Biography of Chiang Kai-shek, pages 201-202)

After the combat order was issued, the seven divisions of He Yingqin's left-wing army took the lead in attacking, marching from Nancheng and Nanfeng to Guangchang and Ningdu in an attempt to capture the main force of the Red Army, but failed.Chen Cheng, the commander-in-chief of the first marching army on the left wing, and Zhao Guantao, the second marching army, searched everywhere and were exhausted.It turns out that Zhu Mao's army moved westward from Nanfeng and Jianning along Wuyi Mountain through Changting, Ruijin, and Yudu, and came to a large circle of "thousand-mile Huishi". area.At this time, the third attacking army led by Shangguan Yunxiang, the right-wing army, arrived at Longgang from Yongfeng, and met Chen Cheng, who could not find the main force of the Red Army. Thinking that the Red Army had already fled, Chen Cheng continued to march towards Donggu, and Shangguan went west to Liantang. go ahead.On August 3, three divisions of the First Army of Cai Tingkai on the right arrived at Chongxian, one division of Jiang Dingwen of the Fourth Army on the left advanced to Xingguo, and two divisions of Chen Cheng on the left arrived at Futian, where they confronted the main force of the Red Army on the east bank of the Ganjiang River.Zhu Mao sent a disguised main force to retreat to Wan'an, but Chiang Kai-shek's reconnaissance plane mistook it for the real one, and ordered Chen Cheng to go west and rush towards Wan'an, so that Zhao Guantao and Jiang Dingwen marched to Liangkou, intending to wipe out the main force of the Red Army on the banks of the Ganjiang River.However, Zhu Mao's 30,000 main force did not move westward. After adjusting the tiger away from the mountain, he came to Liantang at noon on the 6th, and waited for Guan Yunxiang, the third right-wing road, to come and cast a trap.When the division brigade under the jurisdiction of Shangguan returned to Liangcun and marched towards Liantang, it really got into the "pocket" of the Red Army and was ambushed. One brigade was wiped out, and the brigade commander Tan Zijun was killed in battle.The brigade commander Zhang Luanshao in Liangcun was shot dead, and a regiment was wiped out. More than 3,000 people were captured, and even more guns and horses were captured.After that, Zhu Mao ordered an army to pretend to attack Longgang, and actually led the main force to advance eastward, surrounded Huangpi, and confronted Mao Bingwen's division of Zhu Shaoliang's third left-wing army.At noon on the 7th, Peng Dehuai of the Third Red Army and Lin Biao of the Fourth Red Army braved the heavy rain to attack Huangpi with concentrated firepower.In mid-August, Zhu Mao led away Wei Lihuang, Zhao Guantao, and Chen Cheng with the 12th Red Army, allowing the main force of the Red Army to rest in the Baishi and Fengbian areas and wait for work at leisure.At the beginning of September of that year, there was a change in Guangdong and Guangxi, and soldiers pointed at Hengyang. Zhu Mao took the opportunity to wipe out one of Jiang Dingwen's brigades in Laoyingpan, and defeated Cai Tingkai's regiment in Gaoxingxu and one division in Fangshiling.And the September 18th Incident, Chiang Kai-shek had to accept defeat and ended.This campaign mobilized 300,000 people, entered the Soviet area in southern Jiangxi, ran thousands of miles, and spent more than 40 days in circles. Not only did they fail to capture the main force of the Red Army, but they also lost troops.What's more, Chiang Kai-shek personally supervised the division, and boasted that "the task of suppressing bandits can be completed within about a month" (see Jiang's telegram to Fujian Provincial Chairman Yang Shuzhuang on July 19, 1931), and "it is expected that all of them can be wiped out this month." (See Chiang Kai-shek's "Bandit Suppression Manifesto" on July 23 of the same year) It turned out to be such a disastrous defeat. What shame is there?Although Huang Gonglue, the commander of the Red Army, was killed by a plane and about 6,000 soldiers were killed or injured, the Red Army gained a lot. In addition to obtaining a large number of personnel and weapons, the Central Soviet Area expanded into 21 counties in southern Jiangxi and Fujian. The western territory, with an area of ​​50,000 square kilometers and a population of about 2.5 million, has become a localized prairie fire.Suppressing "bandits" turned into fanning the flames, and the more fanned the flames, the bigger the fire. After September 18th, Chiang Kai-shek refused to fight against Japan, but continued the civil war. The name was "to fight against the outside world, we must first settle down at home."Naturally, it aroused public indignation and party disputes, forcing Chiang to step down for the second time.After his comeback, he obtained the Songhu armistice agreement, still raised the banner of "to fight against the outside world, we must first settle the inside" (see "National News Weekly", Volume 9, Issue 20), and actively organized the fourth encirclement and suppression campaign, which was larger in scale and wider in scope. It is wider, but the difficulty is also increased by 10%. Chiang Kai-shek must forcibly suppress the "bandits" in the anti-Japanese fury all over the country! A total of to also. Although Chiang Kai-shek continued to call the Communists "bandits", he did not dare to underestimate them. He actually regarded the tens of thousands of the Red Army as a major enemy and mobilized hundreds of thousands of people.In order to meet the huge military expenses, it also borrowed 12 million dollars in wheat loans from the U.S. government.This time, he decided to take a defensive approach to the Central Soviet Area in southern Jiangxi. On May 23, 1932, he became the "Commander-in-Chief of Bandit Suppression in the Three Provinces of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui" and wanted to eradicate the CCP's revolutionary bases in these three provinces first. .He took Wuhan as the general headquarters, divided into the left, middle, and right armies, and he also served as the central army. He took Liu Zhi as his deputy, He Chengjun commanded the left army, Li Jishen, the deputy commander in chief, also served as the right army, and Wang as his deputy.In terms of strategy, the slogan of "seven points in politics and three points in military affairs" was put forward, that is, the local government should strictly implement the law of Baojia and Liansi; in terms of tactics, "first eliminate the bandits in central Hubei and western Hubei, and then suppress Henan and Anhui." Telegram to Zhu Peide and Li Jishen on June 8, 1932) Commander-in-Chief Chiang arrived in Wuhan on June 28 for deployment. On July 2, he summoned members of the Hubei Provincial Government and asked them to pay attention to their responsibility to defend the territory.The next day, the gentry from Hubei were summoned for advice.On July 12, he personally presided over the meeting of the county magistrates of the whole province, and gave a long lecture, "I hope that Hubei can wipe out the red bandits in the near future and become a model province in the future." To "kill the red bandits", we must pay attention to the strength of the local people ( This point was probably taught to him by foreign advisers), and the spirit of following Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi (this point is definitely his own). (See "Secret Records of President Chiang", page 199) The military operations for this encirclement and suppression began in succession in early July 1932.First, hundreds of thousands of troops attacked the border area of ​​the three provinces of Hubei, Henan and Anhui. In the battle of Qiliping, Jiang sent a telegram to Wang Jun on August 20, saying: "According to the confessions of the prisoners and bandits, almost seven or eight out of ten were lost, which is unreliable. According to an officer of Jiang Jun captured by the Red Fourth Army, six regiment leaders of the Kuomintang were killed in this battle, and more than 120 casualties (see "General History of the New Democratic Revolution in China" edited by Li Xin et al., Vol. 1998), it can be said that both sides suffered casualties. However, the Fourth Red Army under the command of Zhang Guotao was indeed preparing to retreat after the Qiliping War, and led its main force into Sichuan via Henan and Shaanxi in October. After the main force withdrew, the Red Army in the Honghu District was also forced to retreat. He fought in northern Xiangbei, southern Henan, and southern Shaanxi, occupied the border areas of Hunan and Hubei, and then moved to eastern Guizhou to fight guerrillas. Chiang Kai-shek was very satisfied with this battle. He not only drove away the Red Army, but also lifted the siege of Wuhan by the Soviet area. He was happy They changed the name of Xinji County to Jingfu (Liu Zhi) County, and Jinjiazhai to (Wei) Lihuang County, and reported the results of the battle to the Chairman of the State Council Lin Sen on September 22, saying: Now that the Jinjiazhai has been conquered, it is not difficult to wipe out the red bandits on the north bank of the Yangtze River.I came to Lushan to prepare to wipe out the bandits in Jiangxi, hoping to calm down as soon as possible, as a condolence. (See Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China——The Period of Anti-Japanese War against Japan (2), page 388) The so-called "Jiangxi remnant bandits", that is, the central Soviet area in southern Jiangxi, this is Chiang Kai-shek's next step.The headquarters of this campaign is still located in Nanchang.Before the launch, political "clearance and suppression" had been carried out, such as building roads, building bunkers, setting up Baojia, blocking the Soviet area, and so on.The military operations for encirclement and suppression were divided into Chen Cheng in the middle, Cai Tingkai in the left, and Yu Hanmou in the right.At this time, Chiang Kai-shek was under increasing pressure to resist Japan, but Japan refused to slow down and pressed forward step by step, which made him more eager to "eliminate the remnants" as soon as possible.In his logic, "suppressing bandits" became a prerequisite for resisting Japan. (See "President Chiang's Secret Records", page 1001) Under active promotion, Chen Cheng led the main central route army to attack on January 1, 1933. The northern Jiangxi army committed crimes from the south, and the left route army was responsible for clearing out northern Fujian. , the Right Route Army is responsible for clearing and suppressing the borders of the three provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi and Guangdong.Chiang himself went from Nanjing to Nanchang to supervise the order. On January 30, he held a military conference on "suppression of bandits".However, Japan had captured Shanhaiguan on January 3, threatening Jehol, and the anti-Japanese sentiment became more intense. Many Kuomintang officers and soldiers wanted to go north to fight against Japan, so that the morale of the "bandit suppression" was particularly low.And Chen Cheng's main force suffered serious setbacks in Huangpi at the end of February and early March. The "History of the Bandit Suppression War" compiled by the Kuomintang stated that "two days of fierce fighting, both sides suffered heavy losses", covering up the truth of the disastrous defeat.Let us look at Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to Chen Cheng on March 4th, and we will see the clue: During this campaign of our army, unfortunately, the 52nd and 59th divisions were attacked in Gugang and Huoyuanheng, and the division commander was martyred. This is something that our army has never done before, its sincerity is enough to frighten ghosts and gods, move the world and chill the courage of bandits.Chung Cheng recited the sad news, filled with grief and indignation.Since then, in addition to my public enmity, I have added personal hatred to the Red Army.Only by stepping on the bloodstains of my dead martyrs, fighting for righteousness and courage, and killing all the red bandits, can I avenge the hatred of our army's officers and soldiers, and pay this infinite pain for my fallen martyrs, so as to preserve our army's generosity With a tragic history, a glorious history of sacrificing one's life for benevolence, and seeing death as one's home, there is high hope for the completion of the mission of saving the people of Jiangxi, implementing the Three People's Principles, and laying the foundation for the revolution.In addition to finding out the names of the officers and soldiers who died in battle and submitting a separate case for posthumous gifts, I will first issue a pension of 50,000 yuan to our casualties to comfort the spirits and reward special meritorious service. ((Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China - Period of Anti-Japanese War) Preface (2), p. 390) This telegram seems to be written by Chen Bulei, but the truth of the fiasco has been revealed.In fact, not only the 52nd and 59th Divisions, but also the 11th Division, Chen Cheng's vanguard, was ambushed in the Perak Mountain area. On the night of March 21, the division commander was injured and the entire line collapsed, which shocked Chen Cheng and angered him. endlessly. In view of the fact that the "suppression of bandits" was not going well, and the Japanese occupation of Rehe shocked the whole country, Chiang Kai-shek had to return to Nanjing on March 26 and handed over the task of "suppression of bandits" in Jiangxi to He Jian. (See Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to He Jian on March 27, 1933, see the same book, p. 39-) After Chiang returned to Beijing, Wang Jingwei was reinstated as the presidency of the administration, and actively compromised with Japan, but the Japanese army continued to invade. The Tanggu Agreement was not reached until May 31.The only purpose of making compromises is to stabilize the Japanese invaders so that they can concentrate on "suppressing bandits".In fact, the deployment of "suppressing bandits" has never stopped. On April 4th, Chiang went to Nanchang to supervise the suppression. On April 6th, the fifth round of encirclement and suppression began. "Success is benevolence", and the Red Army was regarded as a "confidant's trouble", while the Japanese invaders were "sick skin diseases"! From May 13th to 17th, he personally presided over the Nanchang political training class.In the summer of that year, the "Army Officer Training Corps" was established in Lushan, with Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the regiment and Chen Cheng as the deputy head of the regiment. By the autumn of that year, the number of trainees had reached more than 7,500.The content of the training is all related to "suppressing bandits", such as "Suppressing Bandits Handbook", "Training Essentials for Suppressing Bandits", "Popular Organization", "Political Work in Wartime" and so on.Jiang Ming said, "We must practice the skills of fighting the Red Bandit to eliminate the Red Bandit." He even said: "The Red Bandit is a beast. Our bandit suppression is to exterminate this beast, and we must save all the people in the bandit area and turn them into human beings. "(Chiang Kai-shek's "The Meaning of Suppressing Bandits and the Principles of Being a Man") coupled with anti-communist education and the promotion of four-dimensional and eight-virtue arguments, to advocate "unified will", "one government, one commander, and one order".On the one hand, the trainee officers are required not to "steal life and fear death" in order to work for him; on the other hand, the lofty ambition of "there is no second sun" is no longer concealed. Chiang Kai-shek held the "Five Provinces Suppressing Bandits Military Conference" in Nanchang in August, declaring that "suppressing bandits" is the life and death of the whole party and the whole country.In September, the "Outline of Bandit Suppression Tactics" was formulated to complete the military deployment in the southeast, northwest and four directions: Gu Zhutong on the North Road was stationed in Fuzhou, with 38 divisions under his jurisdiction, which were arranged in the south of Nanchang; One division and three brigades were deployed on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi; Chen Jitang was stationed in Shaoguan on the South Road, and he had eleven divisions and one brigade under his jurisdiction, and they were deployed between Guangdong and Jiangxi; On the front line of Fujian and Jiangxi.Use the North Road as the main force to attack the Soviet area, the East Road cooperates and suppresses them, and the West Road and South Road prevent the enemy from fleeing so that they can gather again and destroy them.The entire military strength is no less than one million people, two hundred aircraft, and military advisers from Germany, Italy, and the United States participated in the planning, which can be described as "all out."No wonder Jiang called Xiong Shihui on September 10 and forwarded Jiang Dingwen and Wei Lihuang, saying: "This suppression of bandits is really related to the survival of the party, state and our army!" In view of the lessons learned from the previous four failures, this time Chiang Kai-shek listened to the advice of the German adviser, General von Seeckt, and adopted strict "tactics of guerrilla-partisan warfare" and was not in a hurry to rush forward. To enter the enemy's territory, first build a series of bunkers and roads, advance gradually, step by step, narrow the encirclement, fight steadily, compress the Soviet area, force the main force of the Red Army to fight a decisive battle, and then destroy it.According to this tactic, Chiang Kai-shek paid special attention to the construction of forts and blockhouses, and repeatedly emphasized in his telegrams: "If the blockade of the blockhouses is not completed for a day, the plan for attacking and suppressing will not be implemented for a day. I hope that according to the meaning of repeated telegrams, we will try our best to complete it as scheduled. Mistake!" (Chiang Kai-shek sent Xiong Shihuijing to Jiang Dingwen on September 10, 1933, Wei Lihuang sent a telegram) The fifth encirclement and suppression took place on October 17, 1933, and Chiang Kai-shek issued Order No. 213 After the troop action plan, it officially started. This battle has been fought for a whole year.Under the pressure of fierce bunker warfare and protracted warfare, and under the disparity in numbers, no matter how brave the Red Army is, it seems that it is inevitable to be doomed.However, the Red Army was in such a difficult situation, and unexpectedly reversed the mobile warfare of the past, avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, and smashed each one, and fought tough battles with the enemy's bunkers, just like hitting a stone with an egg.It turns out that at this time Mao Zedong was seized of military power, and the CCP was headed by Wang Ming, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and other so-called twenty-eight and a half Bolsheviks.Qin Bangxian became the general secretary at the age of twenty-six, but they had the great assistance of the Communist International and secretly sent a German military expert, Otto Braun, as an advisor.This man, with blue eyes and blond hair, was 1.8 meters tall and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. He arrived in Ruijin at the end of September 1933, on the eve of the Great War.The new leaders of the CCP look down on Mao Zedong, a country bumpkin, and trust Li De, a foreign adviser.Li De's style of play is "not to give up an inch of land in the Soviet area" and "defend the enemy outside the country". In October 1934, it was forced to decide to break out of the encirclement and make a strategic transfer. The Kuomintang called it fleeing, and the Communist Party called it the Long March. .On October 21, more than 86,000 members of the Central Red Army and government agencies marched from Ruijin, Yudu, and Changting to Xiangxi and began a long long march.On November 10, Chiang Kai-shek's army finally occupied Ruijin, Chidu. Chiang Kai-shek's opponents who lost the four "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were all Mao Zedong, but the opponent who won the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign was not Mao Zedong.If Mao was in command, would Chiang be able to succeed?Although Mao is familiar with Sun Tzu's Art of War, he is not a god. If there is no opportunity, no one can create miracles out of thin air.However, Li De, a foreign consultant, and the new leaders of the CCP have lost the opportunity to turn passive into active, and even turn defeat into victory.That was the Fujian Revolution that took place on November 20, 1933.The 19th Route Army that besieged the Red Army suddenly declared against Chiang Kai-shek and established a government in Fuzhou with Li Jishen as its chairman.Mao Zedong not only had insight into this machine, but also wrote a special letter to General Secretary Qin Bangxian, suggesting two points: 1. The Red Army and Cai Tingkai's troops united and cooperated with each other militarily to deal with Chiang Kai-shek's attack.2. In view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek has transferred all the 87th and 88th divisions stationed along the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou line to Fujian in order to suppress the Fujian incident, the Kuomintang's troops in the heartland areas behind Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui are very empty, and the main force of the Red Army has rushed to Zhejiang. Taking the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi regions as the center, they galloped across Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhu, Nanchang, and Fuzhou, transforming the strategic defense into a strategic offensive, threatening the enemy's key areas and forcing the troops attacking Jiangxi and Fujian to return This will not only support the Fujian People's Government, but also relieve the siege of the Central Soviet Area. (Quoted from Xin Ziling's "The Complete Biography of Mao Zedong", Volume 2, page 36) Coincidentally, according to Gu Zhutong, the commander-in-chief of the Northern Route Army quoted by Song Xilian, Chiang Kai-shek "would be most worried about the communist army fleeing from northern Fujian to Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu...the incident of the Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian, they were like The situation is very serious when the communist army is united, and the chairman of the general committee was unable to sleep peacefully for several nights because of this.” (Song Xilian's "General Eagle and Dog", Volume 1, p. 131) However, General Secretary Qin Bangxian and foreign adviser Li De ignored this, and sat and watched Chiang Kai-shek mobilize nine divisions to quell the Fujian Rebellion. After the Route Army broke through the Jiangxi Soviet Area, they were defeated one by one.From this point of view, if Mao Zedong had not been deprived of military power, I am afraid that Chiang Kai-shek would still have a big fall.However, in Li De's memoirs, although he admitted that the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign was planned by him, he believed that Chiang Kai-shek mobilized ten times as many troops, as well as 500 aircraft and 1,500 cannons. A big move in three aspects of the military.The implication is that failure is not a crime of war, and he does not take Mao's criticism seriously, and denounces Mao as a conspirator, obviously unwilling to bear the responsibility for military defeat. (See Braun, A Comintern Agent in China. p.40-41, 86-87, 99.101) However, since the Red Army was besieged to death, with its 80,000 men, how could they break through the siege and cross the Ganjiang River to the west?Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek deliberately opened the net and received local force during the pursuit and suppression, so as to "kill two birds with one stone".In fact, if you know a little about Jiang's eagerness to wipe out the "communist bandits", you will know that this is not true.The one who was really lenient was Chen Jitang, who guarded the south. The Southern King had no love for the Communist Party, but had conflicts with Chiang. He was afraid that Jiang would kill two birds with one stone, so he secretly "cooperated with the bandits." Going west has done a great favor to the Communist Party.Mao Zedong has words to prove it: The east is about to dawn, Mo Daojun will go early.People who have traveled all over Qingshan are not old, and the scenery here is unique. The peak outside Huichang City is directly connected to Dongming.The soldiers pointed to Nanyue, which is more lush. Over there, the flames of war raged, and Ruijin fell, but this side was able to borrow a way to go westward smoothly, and let go of a huge rock in my heart. Of course, "the scenery here is unique"! pass. In late September 1934, Chiang Kai-shek learned that the victory of the fifth encirclement campaign was in sight, and happily took Soong Meiling down to Mount Lushan in early October to visit Mount Hua, and visited Guisui, Chahar, Xi'an, Taiyuan, Bei On an equal footing, it did not occur to the Red Army, who had been weary for a long time, to run away.Although Jiang repeatedly sent telegrams to the generals, requesting to "try hard to intercept and pursue them" and "to gather and annihilate the bandits fleeing from the west in the area east of Hubei, so as not to let them slip through the net", he failed to accomplish all of them.He also personally went to Chongqing, Chengdu, Guiyang and other places to supervise the suppression, but it was of no avail; until September 1935, when he came down from the Emei Mountain Officer Training Corps, he knew that the pursuit and suppression had failed, and he sighed that "six years of hard work have not been accomplished"! However, an incomplete victory is not a real victory, and may even lead to future defeat.Although the Red Army of the Communist Party of China suffered a disastrous defeat, it was defeated but not collapsed, retreated without chaos, and overcame thousands of mountains and rivers, plateaus and grasslands. Instead, it created a true and magical Long March story, laying the foundation for the CCP to turn defeat into victory.An American scholar believes that the Long March has tempered the CCP’s iron discipline, guerrilla warfare ethics, getting rid of the control of the Communist International, and leading to Mao Zedong’s grasp of the highest power in the CCP (Wilson, The Long March, P. 292-317), which is very correct. If you ask What caused it?Could it be Chiang Kai-shek!