Chapter 27 Section 3 Chiang Kai-shek and "January 28"

Although Chiang Kai-shek resigned from the field again, his political actions continued. Being in his hometown in Fenghua did not hinder the remote control of the Nanjing regime.Before he left Beijing, he appointed his confidant Gu Zhutong as the chairman of Jiangsu Province, Lu Diping as the chairman of Zhejiang Province, and Xiong Shihui as the chairman of Jiangxi Province as quickly as possible. , Kang Ze and others actively organized the Fuxing Society to consolidate the spy forces.Tang Zong also revealed that Jiang ordered the formation of a "Ten-member Liaison Group", also known as the "Ten-member Group", at the beginning of his resignation, which was distributed all over the country. (See "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 28) In order to come back as soon as possible, he had to rely on Wang Jingwei and his reorganization faction in the Kuomintang, so he invited Wang to Hangzhou for a meeting.

The Wangs and their entourage arrived in Hangzhou on January 16, 1932, and had an in-depth discussion with Jiang behind closed doors that night. The next day, the newspaper only revealed that "the meeting was very harmonious", which was not as good as the content, but the harmony was true. On that day, Jiang and Wang jointly called Hu Hanmin , Promoting him to enter Beijing has already sent the harbinger of cooperation between Jiang and Wang.On the 18th of the first month, Sun Ke, the Premier of the Executive Committee, He Yingqin and others flew to Hangzhou. Zhang Renjie and Zhang Ji hosted a banquet in Yanxia Cave, and Jiang Wang attended the banquet at the same time. It was very pleasant.This group of Kuomintang officials had a meeting after the banquet and decided to enter Beijing together.Lin Sen and Sun Ke were obviously having a hard time coping in Nanking, especially with diplomatic and financial problems.

Jiang, Wang and others returned to Nanjing on January 22, and held an emergency meeting the next day.Two days later, Sun Ke voluntarily announced his resignation, and Wang Jingwei succeeded him as the executive president on January 28. He also decided to set up a military committee and appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, He Yingqin, Zhu Peide, and Li Zongren as five members of the Standing Committee.On March 6, the Kuomintang held the Central Political Council and formally appointed Chiang Kai-shek as the chairman of the Military Commission.Since then, Generalissimo Chiang has become synonymous with the supreme leader, and gradually returned to the situation of one-man military dictatorship.When Ning and Guangdong broke up, Guangdong's efforts to insist on Jiang's resignation and remove the commander-in-chief in order to seize his military power were completely in vain.Not only did Chiang come back quickly, but he also regained military power, only changing his title, changing from Commander-in-Chief to Chairman Chiang.

Jiang and Wang cooperated and each got what he needed.Jiang was forced to resign due to the split between Ning and Guangdong, and pulling Wang to cooperate to isolate Guangdong was also a means of division.At the same time, Jiang had offended Hu Hanmin, and he needed the veteran Kuomintang to carry the sedan chair.Wang's reorganization faction and Guangdong also have ideological conflicts and power struggles, and it is not difficult to be divided.As for Wang himself, no matter whether his motivation is to go to the country together or to share the political spoils, after years of exile, he finally has the opportunity to take power, so it is naturally difficult to refuse.

The Nanjing government that Jiang Wang cooperated with immediately ran into the "January 28th Incident".This incident, in the annals of the Kuomintang, "not only demonstrated the spirit of our army's sacrifice and indomitable spirit, but also strengthened the will of the nation to resist the war, and also changed the international audio-visual experience." (Taiwan Edition High School History Textbook Chapter 32) In fact, this In the first battle, it appeared in the case of skillful "disobedience" against Chiang Kai-shek.Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei were by no means the first fighters in the Anti-Japanese War. Their established policy was to "safety the inside first and then fight the outside world."When they came to power, they criticized Sun Ke's government, Chen Youren, for being too tough on Japan's policy. The so-called toughness was nothing more than a "peaceful severance of diplomatic relations" with Japan.Chen Youren also criticized Chiang Kai-shek's policy of compromising with Japan, saying: "I dare to tell the people of the country that if Chiang's negative policy goes further, it will be difficult to guarantee that he will not accept the demands of the Japanese."

It was the 19th Route Army guarding Beijing and Shanghai who really "disobeyed orders" and resisted Japan.The predecessor of this army was the Fourth Regiment of the First Division of the Guangdong Army, headed by Chen Mingshu.In 1930, the Nineteenth Route Army was formed. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, commander Cai Tingkai, commander Dai Ji, division commander Shen Guanghan, Mao Weishou, and Qu Shounian. long.The troops of the Chen family were transferred from Jiangxi to the Beijing-Shanghai area during the negotiations between Ning and Guangdong to discuss the issue of the reunification of the Kuomintang, and served as a garrison for both Ning and Guangdong.The Guangzhou side did not trust Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops, and everyone was afraid that he would use troops to hijack the representatives who went north.Therefore, the garrison of Beijing and Shanghai by the Nineteenth Route Army is logical.Even so, Chiang Kai-shek was still worried, because the Nineteenth Route Army was not his direct army, so it was naturally difficult for him to absolutely cooperate with his policies.One of the most important is Chiang Kai-shek's pro-Japanese policy.In the September 18th Incident in 1931, Chiang Kai-shek secretly ordered no resistance, and lost the Northeast. Now the 19th Route Army is stationed in Beijing and Shanghai, getting in the way, of course.Therefore, it will be a matter of time before the Nineteenth Route Army is transferred.

At this time, in order to prevent the Japanese Kwantung Army from focusing on the Northeast, the Japanese Navy also sent four warships to Shanghai to demonstrate, and sailed into the Yangtze River to shoot at the Jiangyin Fortress.Then the warships were assembled in Hankou to hold an armed exercise of the Marine Corps.At the same time, since October 12, 1931, the Japanese expatriates in Shanghai have held resident meetings and demonstrations one after another, asking the Japanese government to quickly and decisively resolve all outstanding cases between China and Japan, and to stop the anti-Japanese movement in China.Japanese ronin even took the opportunity to tear down anti-Japanese slogans in Chinese shops along Beisichuan Road in Shanghai, and even beat passers-by.Japanese sailors also wounded Chinese workers in Pudong, Shanghai.On November 2, the "Jiangjiang River Basin Japanese United Conference" appeared in Shanghai. More than 3,000 Japanese expatriates resolved at the meeting: "Japan must resolutely punish the violent China." January 18, 1932 On the 20th, five Japanese monks were injured, and more than 2,000 Japanese expatriates. On the 20th, they used the pretext of petitioning the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai and the Marine Corps. At the same time, they destroyed Chinese shops and beat passers-by in the Zhabei area.These situations are exactly the same as the Kwantung Army's method of "protecting overseas Chinese" by marching troops to the northeast under the guise of petitions from Japanese expatriates in Heilongjiang.

After the Japanese monk was beaten, the Shanghai Municipal Government immediately ordered the Public Security Bureau to arrest the murderer and bring him to justice within a time limit.But at dawn on January 21, Japanese ronin set fire to the towel factory of Sanyou Industrial Co.On January 22, the Japanese Navy sent additional warships to Shanghai.On January 23, Japanese newspapers circulated a warning: the Japanese Fleet Commander and the Japanese Overseas Chinese declared that they demanded that the Chinese government stop the anti-Japanese movement immediately and disband all anti-Japanese groups, otherwise they can act freely.

Now that the Japanese have run amok, Cai Tingkai, the commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, sent a telegram to the Central Committee on January 23, saying: "It is reported that the Japanese Navy and Marine Corps forced me to accept unbearable conditions, and I heard that the general will take Resolutely deal with it. The rank is a measure of the country's personality. If the bandits invade, they will definitely resist near Shanghai, even if they sacrifice the entire army, it will not be a concern!"——The Nineteenth Route Army's determination to resist Japan is obviously in line with Chiang Kai-shek everywhere Kneeling political discord against Japan.Therefore, he decided to transfer the Nineteenth Route Army immediately, and surrendered to the Japanese, agreeing to the four conditions of an apology, compensation, and disbandment of the anti-Japanese group.However, although the four conditions were agreed, the Japanese still went to war.

The reason was that the conditions offered by the Japanese were already extremely harsh, and even though Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government kowtowed and bowed to the Japanese, the Japanese still refused to give up, which was beyond Chiang Kai-shek's expectations.Chiang Kai-shek said in his diary on January 29: "I heard that yesterday's consular request for Shanghai Day was recognized by our side and he was satisfied. He also said that he would withdraw troops in the evening. Why would there be a conflict at midnight?" ("Important in the Republic of China." The Preliminary Compilation of Historical Materials——The Period of the War of Resistance against Japan” (1) Recorded from the confidential archives of the Presidential Palace), lamenting that he was betrayed by the Japanese after giving in!

Chiang Kai-shek was originally determined to transfer the Nineteenth Route Army, and planned to "replace the defense of the Nineteenth Route Army with the Sixth Military Police Regiment, so that the non-combat military police can buffer it, so as to ensure that the Chinese and Japanese armies do not conflict."However, due to the impatience of the Japanese, they suddenly invaded Zhabei on the night of the 28th, "first attacking the Chinese police, and then attacking the official Chinese army."The Nineteenth Route Army had no time to move away, and just rose to "resist Japanese aggression." (Refer to Gu Weijun's "Comment on the Chinese Government's Peace Policy at the Beginning of Hudong") Although Chiang Kai-shek's transfer of the Sixth Gendarmerie Regiment was a step late, the skillful "disobedience" of the Nineteenth Route Army also produced unexpected results.The Sixth Gendarmerie Regiment arrived at Zhenru at noon on January 28. In fact, Cai Tingkai, commander of the 19th Route Army, was in Zhenru. The order to resist across the board that night came from the Zhenru command post. On January 29th, "The Nineteenth Route Army Powered the Japanese Army's Invasion of the Territory" was issued. The full text is as follows: Urgent.Title summary public mirror: The violent sun occupied the three eastern provinces of our country, the territory changed color, and the nation was on the verge of death.Recently, murders and arson were committed in Shanghai, and rogues came out everywhere, despicable and violent actions in the world, everywhere.But the gunboats came one after another, and all the marines landed, and at twelve o'clock on the twenty-eighth night, they openly invaded our defense line and challenged me in Zhabei, Shanghai.Guangnai and others belong to the soldiers. They only know that legitimate defense and defending the country are their bounden duty. They can't give up every inch of land and grass. They resist for the sake of saving the country and the species. The personality of a soldier.This thing, this ambition, is the quality of the sky and the world, and the spirit of the ancestors of Yan and Huang is in the sky, and the actual form depends on it.Jiang Guangnai, commander-in-chief of the 19th Route Army, Cai Tingkai, commander of the 19th Army, and Dai Ji, commander of the Songhu Garrison, knocked.Yan Ziyin. (Central Weekly Issue 191, February 1, 1932) Japan originally claimed to "occupy Shanghai in four days", but the resistance of the Nineteenth Route Army caused the Japanese to suffer.There are many Chinese and foreign reports about the bloody battle of the 19th Route Army against Japan, but the one with the most historical perspective is Zhang Binglin's "Book 19th Route Army's Fighting Against Japan".This article has an important point, that is, when Japan invaded, "the Privy Council hesitated and did not respond." This obviously refers to the ambiguous attitude of the Nanjing Central Committee.Zhang Binglin's point of view is more clearly stated in another article "The Cemetery List of the Dead of the Nineteenth Route Army" (Volume 5 of "Sequel to Taiyan Wenlu").He said that Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai "couldn't wait for their orders, so they led 20,000 troops to attack." He clearly meant that the Nineteenth Route Army's resistance against Japan was not ordered by the Central Committee.Just because it won the victory because it was not ordered by the central government, the central government was very shameless.The most terrible point is that the actions of the Nineteenth Route Army proved that Chiang Kai-shek's policy was a big mistake.Even his mentor Wu Jingheng had to secretly admit this kind of mistake. He had a confidential letter to He Yingqin, admitting that the policy of "non-resistance" to "reserve vitality and strength" was actually a "dream" and a "catastrophe". It has arrived", "If we want to be safe, but people don't agree." Because the truth is so, it is the right way to "follow the 19th Route Army's tactics of the Communist Party's daily division" to understand with the Japanese. ——It can be seen that even the people who were relegated from Chiang Kai-shek's division were inspired by the 19th Route Army and did not agree with what Chiang Kai-shek did. At the beginning of the January 28th Incident, Dai Ji, one of the heads of the 19th Route Army, Songhu Garrison Commander, sent a telegram to the Central Committee, saying: "Except for the swearing-in resistance of the supervisory department, I respectfully pray for the speedy dispatch of the Beijing-Shanghai Police Department." Allied troops from Shanghai, Shanghai and Hangzhou come to Shanghai for reinforcements, so don’t let them go too far.” At that time, Yu Jishi's troops of the 88th Division were stationed in Hangzhou.Yu Jishi was from the first phase of Whampoa, he was from Fenghua, Zhejiang, and he was the nephew of Yu Feipeng, a close confidant of Chiang Kai-shek.These multiple backgrounds are the best candidates for direct descendants.In fact, he was also the earliest to emerge in the first phase of Whampoa. It was Yu Jishi who first offered to support the 19th Route Army.According to the report "Xu Mian, Commander of the Eighty-eighth Division of Chiang Kai-shek's Rehabilitation Committee Yu Jishi, Commander Yu Jishi Called Shanghai Reinforcement Telegram" on February 1, 1932 ("Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China - Period of Anti-Japanese War" (Preface (1)) From the Confidential Archives of the Presidential Palace), Yu Jishi sent a telegram from Hangzhou to the effect: "The case in Shanghai is serious. The 19th Route Army won the battle, and I fear it won't last long. Can you transfer our division to Shanghai for reinforcements? Ask for advice." Chiang Kai-shek replied Said: "China has arrived in Henan with the government and colleagues today. Your teacher is in action. After listening to Minister He's order, such as transporting to Shanghai to fight, Wu hopes to be brave and self-reliant to protect honor. Zhongzheng. East." From this telegram, we can see that we want to The "reinforcement" of the 19th Route Army from Shanghai was initiated by Yu Jishi.Yu Jishi took the initiative to submit the telegram on the fourth day after the January 28th Incident. At that time, the task of the 88th Division was to "garrison Jiangsu and Zhejiang to defend the capital", and it was the closest to Shanghai.According to Yu Jishi's "Reminiscences of Eighty Idle Time" and "Army's Eighty-Eighth Division——An Overview of the "January 28th" Songhu Anti-Japanese War": On January 28, the Japanese army attacked Songhu with about 6,000 marines supported by naval guns.At this time, the 19th Army (Commander Cai Tingkai) of the 19th Route Army took the lead with its 78th Division stationed in Songhu, the 61st Division stationed in Beijing and the 60th Division stationed in Suzhou and Changzhou. Afterwards, Shanghai was reinforced one after another, and the war began.At that time, the 88th Division under the remaining command was stationed in Hangzhou. On January 30, the Central Committee sent a telegram to order our division to gather in Suzhou before February 5; Ten days ago, they assembled in the area south of Nanxiang. The 87th Division Division, Sun Yuanliang's Brigade, and the Military Academy Teaching Corps also assembled in the suburbs of Shanghai within a limited time limit; the central government also appointed Zhang Zhizhong as the commander of the Fifth Army and the 87th Division , under the command of the 87th Division and the 88th Division to participate in the Songhu Battle, and both were under the unified command of Jiang Guangnai, commander-in-chief of the 19th Route Army. On the sixth day after Yu Jishi called Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Zhizhong also responded.According to February 6, "Minister He Yingqin sent Jiang Zhengzhong from Nanjing to ask Zhang Zhizhong to serve as the commander of the 87th Division and sent a telegram in the name of the commander of the army" (preface to "Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China - Period of Anti-Japanese War" ( 1) Recorded from the confidential archives of the Presidential Palace), He Yingqin reported to Chiang Kai-shek: "Brother Zhang Wenbai is facing the national crisis, and is willing to lead the army to serve the battlefield. Check whether the commander of the 87th Division is selecting personnel, and whether Wenbai can serve as the post, and additional rewards will be given. In the name of the army commander, let him command the 87th and 88th Divisions. Beg for instructions." Chiang Kai-shek replied: "The commander of the 87th Division will be succeeded by Zhang Wenbai, and the Central Committee agrees with it. Please appoint it immediately. Zhongzheng. Qi Yin." From this telegram, it can be seen that Zhang Zhizhong's initiative to "lead the army to serve the battlefield" to reinforce the 19th Route Army came from Zhang Zhizhong. (See Chapter 2, Section 4 of "The Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong") Since Yu Jishi and Zhang Zhizhong took the initiative to invite Ying, it can be seen that Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to send the Fifth Army to Shanghai out of passivity.Moreover, except for the Fifth Army, Chiang Kai-shek did not send any troops to Shanghai for support.The so-called solidarity with the Nineteenth Route Army was nothing more than "empty clamor" and "no thunder, no rain" because Jiang did not give orders, and no one's troops could go to the front line.If no reinforcements arrive, the real key lies not elsewhere but with Chiang Kai-shek! Even the fifth army sent is full of doubts. First of all, it was quite late for the Fifth Army to officially take over part of the Nineteenth Route Army's line of defense.According to the "Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong", he set off from the Heping Gate in Nanjing at 9:00 am on February 16, and "arrived at Nanxiang at noon, following the orders of Commander-in-Chief Jiang Guangnai. Xiang entered Xingzhen."February 17th is already 20 days after "January 28th". Under the principle of "military speed is precious", it is really a bit "delayed".The reasons for this may not even be fully understood by Zhang Zhizhong himself.A discerning person's view is: Chiang Kai-shek originally thought that the 19th Route Army could not resist Japan for so long. Since the resistance lasted for a long time, it was unexpected, so he had to send his own troops to "receive the oil spill" and fight for success. Stop the Nineteenth Route Army". "Li Zongren's Memoirs" Chapter 48 "Fuzhou People's Government and Guangzhou "June 1st Movement"" said: First, the 19th Route Army became famous in one fell swoop during the Battle of Songhu on "January 28th".Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai suddenly became national heroes and were admired by people all over the country.But the central government held back and gave in at this time.During the Songhu War, Mr. Jiang ordered Zhang Zhizhong to lead Yu Jishi and other troops of the Fifth Army to participate in the battle. On the surface, it was to cooperate in the resistance against Japan, but in fact it was used to monitor the 19th Route Army and prevent it from expanding the scope of the war.This incident made Jiang, Cai and other generals very angry. It turns out that the "article" is here! Moreover, according to what Yu Jishi heard in the appendix of "Jan. Trust, "Its intention is to prevent the withdrawal of the 19th Route Army to Nanjing" and so on.Due to his passive stance, Chiang Kai-shek didn't want to fight, and he didn't want to fail, so he had no choice but to send out the Fifth Army while the Nineteenth Route Army was fighting alone.According to Qiu Guozhen's "History of the Rise and Fall of the Nineteenth Route Army", it was widely rumored at that time that "the center is divided into two factions: one is the main combat faction, and the other is the anti-war faction. They want to take advantage of the expansion of the war situation to seize the central government; the anti-war faction is the central government officials. They are jealous of the 19th Route Army's reputation. Do not call in reinforcements."Chiang Kai-shek himself was guilty of being a thief, and of course he heard these people make excuses, so he repeated his intentions many times in his instructions to the Fifth Army.For example, "I hope that Comrades Jiang and Cai of the Nineteenth Route Army will work together in solidarity and struggle. You must earnestly obey the orders of Commander-in-Chief Jiang, and you must not be a little estranged" (February 16th). If the army joins the front line, it is definitely feared by the enemy, and it must also be slandered by the reactionaries. If it can always fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it is more than enough to show the strength of our national revolution. What is there? I hope that this intention will be conveyed to all the soldiers of the Fifth Army to unite and fight with our 19th Route Army, and no sacrifice will be spared." (February 18th) This kind of emphatic description of "there is no silver three hundred taels here" is extremely suspicious.What's more, many of Chiang Kai-shek's written instructions are superficially left for the good looks of history, but deep down there is often another set, and this other set is "not written."This feature is very noticeable. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek's temperament of "not my race, his heart must be different" made it impossible for him to "love the 19th Route Army very much" (Yu Jishi's words).According to the recollection of Chen Gongbo's "Bitter Laughter Records", Chapter 12 "The Battle of January 28 and the Government's Relocation to Luo", Chiang Kai-shek had "many complaints" against the Nineteenth Route Army: To be honest, neither side was very serious about the battle of January 28 in Shanghai, and there were rumors in Shanghai that Mr. Jiang really didn't want to fight, and it was only because the Nineteenth Route Army had started a war that he had to provide assistance. It is also weak. I also forgive Mr. Jiang for his reluctance to fight. At that time, he was fundamentally unprepared.I still remember that when I talked with Mr. Wang Jiangliang in the engineer's residence on the station hill in Puzhen, Mr. Jiang also said a lot of things to complain about the 19th Route Army.I explained that the Nineteenth Route Army had to fight, and that the war in Shanghai, I think, was a political battle, not a military one. At the end I said: "If Shanghai doesn't fight, I'm afraid it will lead to a civil war." "I'm not afraid of civil war." Mr. Jiang firmly maintained his opinion. Mr. Wang was afraid that I would violate the taboo of speaking bluntly again, and diverted other words. I remembered the foreword Mr. Wang warned me, so I remained silent. Just because Chiang Kai-shek didn't really want to support the 19th Route Army, once Chen Gongbo and the others went north to persuade Zhang Xueliang to send troops, Chiang Kai-shek put "poison".Chen Gongbo recalled: The battle in Shanghai lasted for one month and three days. The 19th Route Army retreated from Zhabei to Nanxiang because the Japanese army landed on the Liuhe River and felt threatened from the side. In the middle, Mr. Li Renchao and I went north to ask for reinforcements in an attempt to mobilize Zhang Hanqing. In order to contain the Japanese army, they want to create a situation of all-out war between the North and the South. Zhang Hanqing has received the name of Shenyang's non-resistance, and probably this time he must breathe out! Unexpectedly, when we arrived in Beiping, looking at the environment, it was like a plate of cold water poured down the spine, and the whole body was cold.When Ren Chao and I arrived in Beiping, someone told me that Zhang Hanqing would never go to war, and someone even secretly told me that Mr. Jiang had sent someone here a day earlier, saying that Ren Chao and I did not represent him. . We hang out with Zhang Hanqing for a few days, but it can be said that there is no result. Hanqing treated us like a guest of honor, and invited a dozen important people to accompany us for dinner as usual. Before leaving, he personally went to the station to see us off. It makes you puzzled like Monk Zhang Er.I had no choice but to find Mr. Li Shizeng, because some people said that Hanqing still listened to Mr. Li, or that Mr. Li could help us, and Mr. Shizeng! He talked a lot about philosophy and talked about many abstract nouns. It's far-fetched, let alone hope that he can talk to Han Qing. This journey is considered empty, let's go to Luoyang to hold the second plenary meeting of the central executive supervisor.This trip went through Baoding, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, and even the Forbidden City in Luoyang. After a five-day plenary meeting, I went to Shanxi to meet with Mr. Yan Baichuan again. There were no achievements in this trip, and I only represented the 19th Route Army. Donated 100,000 hand grenades to Mr. Yan. Chiang Kai-shek first sent someone to tell Zhang Xueliang that Chen Gongbo and Li Jishen were unrepresentative. Wasn't this intentional to demolish the situation?From this point of view, it is too late for him to hate the 19th Route Army! How can he "love it so much"? Not only does he hate the 19th Route Army, according to the "History of the Anti-Chiang Movement" published by the China Youth Military Society, Chiang Kai-shek even "hates the 19th Route Army"! Chapter 14 of the book says: Since the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War of the Nineteenth Route Army in Shanghai at the end of January, this war was originally what Jiang Wang wanted to avoid, so before the war, there was an act of forcing the Nineteenth Route Army to give way (the military police regiment had already arrived at the reception) part of the defense), but the Nineteenth Route Army actually prevented the Japanese from entering and occupying Zhabei before they were about to leave the defense.After the war broke out, Jiang Wang was first afraid of offending the Japanese (because he was afraid of the will of the sun to fall to the sun, when Jiang gave a speech in Fenghua, he once published the famous theory of national subjugation in three days, which led to Japan's attack on Shanghai); The army refused to obey orders (Because Chiang had ordered before the war that if he attacked in the future, he could not resist); the third was jealous of the sympathy and support of the people of the whole country (people at home and abroad sent money and donations, and they voluntarily helped); the fourth was shameful. I was dwarfed by myself (because the people's soldiers all hated Jiang Zhi for not daring to resist Japan).So from being afraid of the sun, he hated the 19th Route Army even more; from being ashamed, he became even more jealous of the 19th Route Army. Inspired by national concepts and patriotism, they voluntarily go to the war); the second step pretends to show assistance but actually sits idly by and does not help (because the people are angry with Jiang for not helping, they have criticized him one after another, but they pretend to say that they have deployed troops, and the transportation is inconvenient and difficult to reach. ); in the third step, Wang Geng, a senior officer of the tax police regiment, was sent to collaborate with Japan and report the military situation, so that Japan dispatched troops to the bank of the Liuhe River to suppress the 19th Route Army! The "theory of national subjugation in three days" mentioned here comes from a speech delivered by Chiang Kai-shek on January 11, 1932 at the Memorial Week of Wuling School in Fenghua.The title of the speech was "The Northeast Issue and the Policy toward Japan", which mentioned why he did not declare war on Japan or break off diplomatic relations after the September 18th Incident.He said: Due to the weakness of China's national defense, the violent day can invade and occupy Liao and Kyrgyzstan provinces within 24 hours. All regions and the Yangtze River Basin were ravaged by the enemy within three days, and the country's political, military, transportation, and financial connections were cut off.Prime Minister Mr. Sun said: "If China breaks off diplomatic relations with Japan, Japan can fall to China within ten days." (Current Affairs News, Shanghai, January 21-23, 1932) It was very embarrassing to Chiang Kai-shek that just 17 days after he made this announcement, the 19th Route Army stood up to resist the Japanese and overthrew Chiang Kai-shek's defeatist lies! Because of the resistance of the 19th Route Army rather than non-resistance , not only proves that the Japanese cannot perish in China within three days, but also disproves the fundamental mistake of Chiang Kai-shek in ordering non-resistance in the September 18th Incident.It can be seen that the victory of the Nineteenth Route Army just contrasted with Chiang Kai-shek's missteps and failures. ——The Nineteenth Route Army deserves death for such a crime, can Aneng not be "hated"? The Nineteenth Route Army was "hated" in this way, and finally fell into "reinforcements from all walks of life could not arrive" and "was trapped in a situation of isolation and helplessness" (see Wang Zhaoming, Feng Yuxiang, Li Jishen, February 6, 1932, Zhu Peide and Chen Mingshu sent a telegram to the 19th Luo Army), so it can be imagined.In the following telegrams, you can see many articles in it: February 16th—the nineteenth day after the January 28th Incident, the Nineteenth Route Army sent a telegram to Chen Mingshu: "Our army has won consecutive battles, but it is not the main battle. The number of casualties has reached 2,000. The battle of Jijiaqiao, we know The enemy should not be underestimated. It is reported that the enemy has reached Shanghai with more than 30,000 troops, and there is no hope of peace talks. The enemy is only trying to occupy Jinzhou. The war is imminent, and the soldiers are precious. If the war in Shanghai is a big victory, it will be a turning point for the rejuvenation of our nation. If it is defeated, the future of the country will be ruined. Wan sincerely ask Jie Gong and Jing Zhiwu to dispatch the second and third divisions in the near future On the front line, prepare for urgent use, so that the enemy can be invincible first, and the enemy can be victorious. The troops in Jiangbei can smuggle across the upper and lower reaches of Pukou. Zhenjiang has a security team to maintain it. If not, it is advisable to conclude a peace negotiation quickly, without any hesitation." ——In this telegram, there are already words of "I sincerely request" Chiang Kai-shek's rescue. February 22nd—the twenty-fifth day after the "January 28th" Incident, Chen Mingshu sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek Yangchen: "Now carefully observe the frontline combat situation and affect the relationship between countries, according to Jiang, Cai and other opinions, absolutely It is not suitable to retreat, and because of the fierce fighting, it is impossible to draw troops back to do fortifications. It is decided to take the line from Nanxiang to Liuhe as the second defensive zone, and Wu Gongbing supervises the planning of fortifications. Come and work as a prayer. The two armies in the front work together to fight like brothers and sisters. There is no difference between the two armies, and they will surely display the greatest glory. He and Tan’s various ministries have come together and made no mistakes, and now the front line can achieve its goal no matter how sacrificed it is.” ——In this telegram, Chiang Kai-shek has been clearly told that the Nineteenth Route Army and the Fifth Army are getting along very well. ".He also asked Chiang Kai-shek to keep his promise, "please follow the preface" and send troops quickly. February 25th—the twenty-eighth day after the "January 28th" Incident, the 19th Route Army felt that the enemy troops were constantly being reinforced, but our troops were eager to see through. Not only did they arrive late, they arrived at Nanjing and Hangzhou , and refused to drive forward, already feeling like being let go of the pigeons.On this day, I received Chiang Kai-shek's Jingxu Telegram and Youyou Telegram. The former telegram said: "The front near Miaohang Town has been penetrated by the enemy. It is the weakness of our army. It is not suitable for the special tax police regiment (ancient regiment) to serve. Use the 61st Division to take over, to consolidate the front line and avoid being taken advantage of by the enemy." The latter telegram said: "The second decisive battle will be held on Yandong every day, and our reinforcements will not be able to until Yuri. To participate in the battle, we hope that within a few days, we will try our best to save the frontline troops and deploy troops, that is, to gather the reserve troops in each area to about one-half of the total strength, so that we can face the battle well and not be temporarily exhausted, especially for the Liuhe side. The three regiments should be prepared for the most important, how to deploy, I look forward to the details." These are empty words.On the second day (February 26)—the twenty-ninth day after the "January 28th" Incident, the Nineteenth Route Army felt that there were two million troops in the country, but apart from the Fifth Army, Chiang Kai-shek actually No longer sending troops, I already know my end and situation.This kind of state of mind, from the Youchen Telegram sent to He Yingqin, Chen Mingshu and transferred to Chiang Kai-shek, has been beyond words: "Jiegong has a unitary path and both telegrams have been informed. First, the department has been fighting for ten days, and each division has more than a thousand casualties. It is wide, and there is a problem of weak troops everywhere. 2. In the battle of Yu Shimiao Township, the casualties were huge, so it was adjusted to the rear. Its defense line was replaced by Zhang Yan's brigade of Mao's division, and the troops were not enough to deploy. The enemy came to attack yesterday, and the officers and soldiers were not calm, so they were shaken. Zhang Yan's counterattack was successful, but the casualties exceeded a thousand, and the loss of the officers was particularly great. The main force is deployed in the second area of ​​the Dashen House, and the depth of the deployment is made. The focus of the battle for several days is also here. 4. The distribution of troops should be handled in accordance with the main points shown, but the enemy's reinforcements will continue, and our troops will be killed and wounded. Worry about your ears!"——In this telegram, it is already implicitly saying that you, Chiang Kai-shek, called twice, just "talking about equipment", and if you don't send reinforcements, empty talk is just worrying your ears, what's the use of it! February 27th—one month after the "January 28th" Incident, Chen Mingshu sent a telegram to Wang Zhaoming: "(Title omitted) must be translated by myself. One day, our 61st Division and the enemy's new 12th Division Fierce battles resulted in heavy casualties. Now our army is lonely, willing to die in the original position on the front line, and refuses to retreat. In addition to transferring two battalions to Huangdu to do fortifications, Shangguan Yun Xiangshi suddenly ordered two regiments to guard Zhenjiang, and one regiment to guard Beijing and return to the valley. Commander, why is there no trial? Dai Yue’s independent brigade has arrived in Hangzhou, and Chairman Lu is unwilling to be dispatched to participate in the battle, so he intends to go to beg for help, special news.” ——In this telegram, it has been clearly pointed out that the reinforcements are just for show, not at all Do not drive to the front. February 29th—the thirty-second day after the "January 28th" incident, Chen Mingshu sent Wang Zhaoming a frugal call: "Yesterday, I telegraphed the scriptures and learned from it. Aid, the central disease is not cured, can't go to Hangzhou, Dai Lu went to the aid, there is no hope! I just heard." He also sent a telegram to Jianyou: "The two electricity plans are up. I have been ill for many days. Brother Qingjun Ren came to talk about Mr. Jiang's day To be active, it is also said that Russia sent troops to the east and clashed with Japan. The situation is getting worse. The Japanese are eager to end the war in Shanghai. Our army can support the original line for many days. It will be of great benefit. Mr. Jiang also agrees. What a pity! I made a mistake because the Ministry of Military and Political Affairs did not mobilize troops, and I also made a mistake because the Ministry of Shangguan did not want to fight, but relied on my lone army's determination to die..." It was postponed to March 2 - the thirty-fifth day after the "January 28th" Incident One day, the Nineteenth Route Army finally issued a retreat call. (For the telegram, see Shanghai "Current Affairs News" in 1932.) On the second day (March 3), the Nineteenth Route Army joined forces with the Fifth Army to issue a more detailed telegram. (For the full text, see Shanghai's "Current Affairs News" on March 4, 1932.) In the two telegrams, the former mentioned "rear support is not enough", and the latter mentioned "relief is not enough". the real reason.This real reason has caused everyone to question Chiang Kai-shek.Some of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang in Shanghai called him and questioned him: "The Japanese have reinforced one after another, reaching tens of thousands of poor troops. Our side... has a total of only 30,000 or 40,000 people. Every battle is against the enemy. The danger was already anticipated.... Calling for help repeatedly, the voice was exhausted, so that the enemy took advantage of it.... Watching the 19th Route Army electrify, there was a saying that "the support will not continue". Whoever ordered it, the authorities must not live up to it Responsibility." The most interesting thing was that Chiang Kai-shek's elder brother was actually among the voices of criticism. Chiang Kai-shek's elder brother, Jiang Zhoukang, was named Jieqing and named Xihou.He and Chiang Kai-shek have the same father and mother.Zhang Minghao said in his article "Chiang Kai-shek at Xikou" that "although he was born as a gifted person, he is actually ignorant and incompetent. He is a complete idiot and a fool."But finally, with the help of his younger brother, he became the supervisor of Zhejiang Customs and a member of the Zhejiang Provincial Government. After the "January 28th" incident, Chiang Kai-shek was unforgivable by the Chinese people, and Chiang Kai-shek was also implicated. He felt very disturbed and wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek to question him.Chiang Kai-shek then asked Wen Dan and Chen Bulei to write a reply letter on his behalf.According to the article in "Chen Bulei's Memoirs" in 1932: "At the end of March, Chiang Kai-shek called me to Nanjing. Seeing that the market conditions were sluggish, all government agencies had only offices in Beijing, and most of my acquaintances were not in Beijing. Drafted a reply to the elder brother Jieqing's letter (reply to the letter without sending reinforcements or increasing the army's blame, and then discarded and unpublished)." This "abandoned and unpublished" letter was actually published in "Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China" 49 years later. In the preface (1) of the first edition—the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, "Recorded from the Confidential Archives of the Presidential Palace", with the title "Letter from Chiang Kai-shek to his brother Jieqing in March of the 21st year of the Republic of China" as the title published.This letter can see many of Chiang Kai-shek's mentality and arguments at the time, and it is worth reading the full text: After receiving the telegram from Zun Zun, he was strictly supervised and punished. He recited it again and again, and sighed inexplicably. This time, in the battle of Songhu, my brother has become a house of resentment and gratitude. Changes, that is to say, the ineffective deployment of aid, the destruction and destruction of bones, and even the accusations of foreigners in labor and abroad, and the uneasiness of family members.I also heard that when my fellow countrymen gathered in Shanghai, there were some people who were passionate and unable to control themselves. My brother is not virtuous, and I can't forgive my friends. How can I ask for trust from the people of the country? Why do I care about the gains and losses of praise and reputation, so I would rather shegou endure the humiliation than confess with a word. Now I am asking Mingming, and I would like to explain it for my brother.Since the stormy day invaded Songhu, the central government has decided to move to Luoyang and actively defend itself. My brother, with the righteousness of robes, traveled across the country, vowed to live and die, and was willing to work hard to save the peril. Afterwards, the 19th Route Army fought bravely. All troops in Jiangsu and Zhejiang All those who can be dispatched will join in full, and casualties and losses can all be re-pressed. It is said that there is no reinforcements.That is to say, our Nineteenth Route Army reported the transfer of defense in winter by telegram. The so-called lack of support does not mean that the central government has no troops that can be adjusted, but that it is difficult to transport and there is no continuous reinforcement team. The meaning of the word is very clear. And the elder brother actually suspects the younger brother because of this, so what can the younger brother say?至就弟个人而言，自一中全会以后，虽复列名国府，备员军会，初不过多数委员中之一分子，军旅之事，发号施令，皆有一定之系统，绝不能越俎而代庖，弟既无名义，可以檄调军队，亦无权责，可以指挥军事，力之所及，亦唯以旧时袍泽之关系，曾共生死之感情，策励我将士秉中央之命而奋进，自上月二十三日敌军再度增兵以后，战局益趋严重，弟审度前线状况，综合各方情势，曾于二十五日电知蒋总指挥光鼐有“第二次敌军总攻击之期约在艳东各日，我军后方部队全已运来前线，其他非到鱼日后不能参加”等语告之，诚以后方输援诸多艰困，有非可形之于笔墨者，故不能不以加倍之辛苦勖勉于前方，亦不能不以实际之情况尽量相驰告。弟在此浃旬之间，匪日不焦心苦思，期尽力之所能及，二中全会集会洛阳，弟之所以留驻南京者，实对续到部队，可以随时敦促，俾得迅速增援不失时机也。二十九日幸有某部二团开到南京，略无休息，立时出动于前方，综计前后开动之部队，曾无一宵一夕之滞留，今讹言四起，若谓弟对增援迟速，有所抑阻于其间者，是则部队与战斗详报俱在，不难以事实证明也。语有之，流言止于智者，今之流言陆离光怪，乃发动于曾共患难，洞明实际局势之人，此弟所以不欲自白而又何怪于悠悠之众口也。两军作战，对于参加部队之番号以及调动配备之情况，例须严为隐秘，免为敌方所乘，故淞沪苦战匝月，所有部队皆置于蒋总指挥之下而行之，此后战局范围自须视形势而定，中央既有整个之策划，全国军人亦皆愿一致效死，前线之如何充实、后方之如何移动，只须俟将来战史与事实之证明，遑能执途人而告语。独惜我国人不察，往往以热情所激，多方诘难，若必欲迫令将所有虚实尽情揭布，使敌人共见共闻而后快者，而或者以不慊于个人之故，又从而播扬于其间，是则诬陷个人之事小，而使前方将士气沮之影响实莫大也。中正幼受庭闱之训，长承兄长之教，许身革命，义无反顾，当此国族艰危，唯有矢粉身碎骨之诚，尽对党对国之责，以期无愧于总理，无忝于所生，绝不辜负骨肉与亲知期望之殷，遥念疆场袍泽浴血奋斗，战区同胞牺牲残酷，诚何心再计一家之毁誉与荣辱，轨因未散布其区区，不尽欲言。 蒋介石这封信中，欲盖弥彰之处有五：第一，蒋介石说“后援不继”之意，不是“中央有可调之兵而不援”，乃是因“运输困难而乏续至之援队”。但是，事实上，全国有两百万军队都哪儿去了？“可调之兵”岂不大都被蒋介石调往江西去打内战了？这样造成京畿地区御外侮上的防务单薄，岂不正是蒋介石的责任？第二，蒋介石说“运输困难而乏续至之援队”，但从一月二十八日起，前后有一个多月的期间可供运输，可是部队却始终调不上来，这叫什么速度？此中有人“抑阻于其间”，岂不太明白了吗？第三，单从二月二十七日、二十九日陈铭枢致汪兆铭电文中，就明明看到上官云相师已经“忽奉令两团守镇江”、“不愿赴援”，则蒋介石所谓“某部二团开到南京，略无休息，立时出动于前方”之说，就与事实不符了。眼前的上官云相师尚且如此，天边的其他部队，更可想而知矣!第四，蒋介石说“军旅之事，发号施令，皆有一定之系统，绝不能越俎而代庖”云云，更是瞪着眼睛撒大谎。“指挥军事”的“权责”，早都被他一把抓了，他说他做不了主，又其谁能信呢？第五，蒋介石说调动部队，“须严为隐秘”，不能随便告诉路人。隐秘固然不错，但总要调到部队上前线才算啊!若根本没调，反以隐秘为护符，这就不对了。 大概连蒋介石自己都发现这封信的答辩未免太牵强好笑了，所以最后“弃置未发表”。但在半世纪后，我们就他的心态和巧辩来做解剖，还是有助于真相的揭发的，自不容我们放过也。 上海撤守以后，经过国际联盟等的斡旋，在三月四日停战，五月五日签订停战协定。中国代表是郭泰祺、戴戟、黄强；日本代表是重光葵、植田谦吉。外交部次长郭泰祺在三月二十五日发表谈话，虽说：“敢以人格担保，断不为丧权辱国之事，可请国民放心。”(天津《大公报》一九三二年二月二十六日)但是五月三日，抗日联合会的代表四十多人，还是冲了进去，打伤了郭泰祺。郭泰祺两天后裹伤签下协定。协定内容重点是： 一、确定停战。 二、中国军队暂驻现在地位。 三、日本军队撤至一二八以前地位。 四、设立共同委员会，布置日军撤退及华警接收事宜。 细究内容，却大有文章。所谓中国军队暂驻现在地位，就是中国军队不得恢复进驻淞沪，所谓日本军队撤至一二八以前地位，就是日本军队不撤出一二八以前在中国所占的领土。其为“丧权辱国之事”，一看便知。一九三二年五月五日，上海《时事新报》有这样的评论： ……敌军入寇，未能逐出国门，停止战争，犹待妥协条件，彼虽曲，我虽直，而彼则驻兵有地，撤军无期，我则人民徒遭绝大蹂躏，军警俱有明文束缚，如此协定，谓未屈服不可得也!谓未辱国丧权不可得也…… 国民主战而政府不战，国民激昂而政府卑怯，国民力援十九路军，而政府坐误戎机，国民纷纷组织义勇军，置身火线，而政府拥兵二百万，参战者不过四十分之一，国民反对议和而政府毅然签字，则一切责任，显然独在当局…… 但是，蒋介石是不管这些的。他悍然做下“丧权辱国之事”。不抗日的他，不但乘机当上了“蒋委员长”，连郭泰祺都升了官，当了驻英大使。 十九路军的参谋长黄强，是参与停战的代表之一。多年以后写《黄莫京将军自述》，有这样的追忆： 上海停战协定，双方已签字，在我十九路军的一方，其情绪之难过，只可拿故中央委员杨沧白先生诗一句：“回面应知有泪行”，才形容出来，不久这回面带泪行的十九路军奉命开赴闽省。(见《大成》第六十七期，一九七九年六月一日) 开到福建后，十九路军又被蒋介石用来做“内斗内行”的筹码，一九三三年一月六日，蔡廷锴因“榆关陷落，平津危急”，通电中央，表示愿意在“忍痛撤退，移师来闽”之后，“负弩前驱，为国效命”(《蔡廷锴愿负弩前驱为国效命电》，载南京《中央日报》，一九三三年一月八日)，可是蒋介石当然不肯。最后，十九路军以“闽变”被蒋介石解散，一个最能抗日的军队，一年前日本人辛苦消灭不了它，一年后却被蒋介石轻易消灭了。 是以把十九路军英勇抗日的事迹，记在蒋介石的账下，绝对是不虞之誉。恰恰相反，他联合汪精卫复出后，既定政策是“先安内再攘外”，特别想要剿灭江西的苏区。为此，他对日本侵略是绝对要妥协的，不肯还手的。阴错阳差的是，陈铭枢的十九路军，因宁粤之争而调往京沪，否则蒋介石绝不会让非嫡系军队卫戍京沪。如果是嫡系部队驻守，在蒋介石直接调配控制之下，绝对不会于一·二八有可歌可泣的英勇抗日，还不是会像九一八那样不抵抗了事!