Chapter 149 "Curve to save the country"

The allies were skeptical about the reliability of Dai Li's secret agents during the war, especially after the Juntong colluded with Wang Jingwei's puppet secret police.At that time, this kind of collusion was considered to be the strategy of the KMT intelligence agency's "curve to save the country", that is, on the one hand, it openly cooperated with the enemy's intelligence agency, and on the other hand, it secretly infiltrated thousands of low-level double agents into the Japanese and puppet spy organizations. According to data from mainland China, this curve policy was secretly adopted by Chiang Kai-shek and Dai Li, sometime between March 30, 1940, when Wang Jingwei officially became the chairman of the unified puppet government, and January 1941, the Southern Anhui Incident.

One of the key figures in implementing the "curve to save the country" policy is Cheng Kexiang, the leader of the Nanjing Intelligence Group of the Military Command. In the autumn of 1939, when Wang Jingwei's "Peace Party" was negotiating with Yosaaki Kagesa, Colonel Inukai Ken, and members of the Japanese Secret Service Plum Blossom Society in the fortified residence at Lane 1136, Yuyuan Road, Shanghai, Cheng Kexiang began Foreshadowed the relationship with Zhou Fohai (General Secretary of the Political Committee, and later served as Minister of Finance and Minister of Police in the Wang Puppet Government) and his brother-in-law Yang Xinghua (later Director of the General Affairs Department of the Wang Puppet Ministry of Finance).Through these connections, Cheng Kexiang successfully promoted Zhou Fohai's confidant Luo Junqiang (later the chief of Wang's pseudo-tax police, the governor of Wang's pseudo-Anhui Province, and later the Minister of Justice of Nanjing), Xiong Jiandong (later Wang's pseudo-tax police) Deputy head of the regiment) defected to Dai Li.Cheng also persuaded Zhou Fohai to hire Peng Shengmu (deputy head of the Military Command's Nanjing Intelligence Group) as his confidential secretary, so that Cheng Kexiang could learn about the most confidential negotiations between Wang Jingwei and his Japanese masters.When the Wang puppet government was established in Nanjing on March 29, 1940, Peng Shengmu was appointed as a consultant to the Ministry of Finance and continued to provide the most confidential internal economic intelligence to the military.

Needless to say, these intricate relationships allowed for a degree of intelligence exchange between the two sides, which confirmed the allies' suspicions that Dai Li was secretly dealing with Japanese intelligence agencies. As a result, the Kuomintang authorities were kept in the dark about the most confidential information in the war, namely the "extreme code" and "purple code" that had been deciphered by the United States and Britain.Moreover, as one of the top four at the Cairo Conference, China's status declined, and it was the same at the Tehran Conference where the heads of state of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union gathered.

General Dunovan, who became President Roosevelt's adviser on the situation in Yugoslavia, experienced the "China problem" for the first time at the Cairo Conference.Chennault and General Stilwell also weighed the pros and cons of this "friendship project" at the meeting. In late October 1943, Roosevelt had ordered Dunovan to collect political intelligence in areas controlled by the Communist Party.On the eve of the Cairo meeting, Dunovin outlined the Chinese intelligence situation to the President, arguing that "unless we operate completely independently of the Chinese and our other allies, our American intelligence operations cannot be carried out." Roosevelt agreed This view, and authorized Deng Nuowen to tell Commander-in-Chief Chiang: "We must be allowed to act independently."