Chapter 148 signals intelligence

However, other British intelligence units in the China-Burma-India theater, especially the director of military intelligence in Melbourne, were unwilling to share signals intelligence with Dai Li, fearing that the information would fall into the hands of the enemy. On June 11, 1943, the director of military intelligence expressed his suspicions to the British military attache in Chongqing, Machin.Then, on July 1, the War Department sent a report to Melbourne saying: "We are fully aware that it is not safe to give intelligence to the Chinese. India, McCann and we all understand that anything given to the Chinese will be in some way Way to finally get to the Japanese... McCann received the information and neither repeated it nor automatically handed it over to the Chinese. We gave him top secret information which we hope the Chinese would keep under any circumstances I don't know."

Six months later, the joint intelligence agency laid down a general policy: to give the Chinese only military intelligence that "directly contributes to their war of resistance against Japan."But the policy seems to be based entirely on suspicions fueled by racism. MI2 (Military Intelligence Two) acknowledged that "there is little concrete evidence that information given to the Chinese was ever leaked", adding: "However, based on knowledge of the psychology of the average Chinese, there is serious suspicion occur." On June 23, 1944, McCann sent a confidential telegram to the British War Department, saying that Zheng Jiemin, the Chinese military intelligence director, handed him a letter from He Yingqin to General Carton de Wiart, It is suggested that a joint office be established under Chinese leadership to exchange information on Japanese military deployments.This office also collects intelligence and disseminates radio intercepts, and also organizes SIS (Secret Intelligence Special Agents) and SOE (Special Operations Executive) personnel operating in the China theater.McCann explained to Zheng that the second combination was not feasible, but he did suggest the first project.However, this creates a problem, which is the role of Americans, and once they participate, they may bring their "deadly jealousy" into it.

The HQ in the Indian theater reminded the War Department that it had strongly opposed such intelligence consolidation in the past because it would give Chinese access to US and British signals intelligence systems.Given British military intelligence's suspicions that the Nationalist intelligence system was constantly leaking information to the Japanese, the joint office seemed like an extreme risk for both HQIT and Whitehall. However, Britain does not want to completely reject China.Whitehall's Joint Intelligence Committee decided that a blunt rejection of China would damage Sino-British relations, and accordingly proposed the establishment of a joint Sino-British intelligence-gathering agency, "which does not include military deployment."Once SACSEA (Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia) made it clear on 1 July 1944 that Britain was not prepared to share signals intelligence with the Chinese, the Chinese began to lose interest in cooperation.Nonetheless, SACSEA drafted an agreement to establish a Sino-British joint intelligence collection and exchange bureau in Chongqing, with the British side reporting to the British ambassador.

The Americans did not pay much attention to the news about this agreement. On August 3, General Bissell, the director of US military intelligence, told SACSEA that once such an agreement came into effect, "the US intelligence community will never be completely candid".He also said that it would be a mistake for Britain to take part in a half-hearted joint intelligence operation with the Chinese, especially since it might allow the KMT to use it to drive discord between the United States and Britain.Bissell insisted that the Chinese must not be allowed to see this charter.The next day, August 4, 1944, Britain acceded to the American request.Whitehall told SACSEA to inform China's military intelligence chief Zheng Jiemin (who was inspecting intelligence work in India at the time) that it was inappropriate to establish a new intelligence-gathering agency under the current war situation.Instead, the two sides should only further exchange intelligence on the basis of China's existing Sino-British intelligence cooperation.General Zheng received such a reply on August 22, "He did not show dissatisfaction after receiving this news."