Chapter 3 Chapter Two Controversy on the Long March

After the Long March, the "Supreme Trio" Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai were busy directing the war, leaving the "Central Team Trio" Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang aside.The specific environment at the beginning of the Long March provided the three of King Mauro with the opportunity to exchange views frequently.The topic naturally focused on the main reason why the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign could not be broken.Luo told Mao Wang about the various disputes with Bogu from the Fujian Incident to the Guangchang Battle.Mao compared the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" with the experience of the previous victories in counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression", and carefully analyzed the mistakes of Li De and Bogu's military leadership in adopting a purely defensive line and negating the tactics of mobile warfare.The casual conversations and full discussions along the way made Mauro closer emotionally, and their thoughts and viewpoints became more consistent.As for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", both Luo and Wang accepted Mao's point of view and realized that it was mainly subjective and was caused by strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership.

The collective of the "Central Team of Three" and their conversations after the departure of the Long March are of special significance to the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference and the realization of a historical turning point for the Communist Party of China.American journalist Harrison Salisbury devoted a chapter to this in his book "The Long March: The Unheard Story".With Western wit and humor, he proposed a title for this chapter: "The Conspiracy on the Stretcher".Zhang Wentian also attaches great importance to the role of the "central team trio".However, when summarizing this period of history, he adopted philosophical language with the depth and wisdom of the Orientals.He wrote: At the start of the Long March, "He (referring to Mao Zedong) asked me to live with him and Comrade Wang Jiaxiang - thus forming a trio of 'Central Team' headed by Comrade Mao Zedong against the leadership of Li De and Bogu , laid down the material basis for the great victory of the Zunyi Conference."

When the Red Army's Western Expedition began, it seemed like a big move, wishing to remove all the "family property" in the base area.From the machine tools of the arsenal to the freshly manufactured shells, from the machines for printing banknotes and newspapers to desks and chairs, from generators and radio stations to bundles of wires, not to mention the various documents, archives and gold and silver treasures of the central treasury up.The transport team organized with packers and pickers stretched for several miles.All field troops have become cover teams, slow to move and passively beaten.

Crossing the enemy's first, second, and third blockade lines, it went smoothly because the Cantonese army signed an armistice agreement with the "Southern King" Chen Jitang.But at the end of November 1934, when it broke through the enemy's fourth blockade line along the Xiangjiang River, it encountered fierce resistance.The Red Army suffered heavy losses, which dropped sharply from more than 80,000 people during the breakout to more than 30,000 people.At this time, the Red Army on the western expedition had lost the opportunity to arrive in western Hunan to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps, and fell into a predicament. The "Supreme Trio" almost lost its ability to command in the face of such serious setbacks.Bogu was helpless, and sometimes he pointed a pistol at his head and gestured.Li De, the military adviser, lost his temper. Not only did he not admit his mistake, but he also attributed the fiasco of the Xiangjiang Battle to his failure to implement his decision in time, thinking that differences of opinion delayed the opportunity for combat.

Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang felt that they could no longer remain silent about the wrong leadership of the central government. From December 4th to 6th, 1934, the Central Red Army crossed the vast old mountain boundary at the junction of Hunan and Guangxi, that is, Yuecheng Ridge, one of the Five Ridges, and entered the Miao-inhabited area.The troops temporarily got rid of the pursuing enemy. Zhang Wentian, together with Mao and Wang, began to criticize the mistakes of the central military command.In the words of Zhang Wentian in the future, "The struggle against Li De and Bogu began in the Politburo until the Zunyi Conference."

Zhou Enlai later recalled: "From the junction of Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, Chairman Mao, Jiaxiang, and Luo Fu criticized the military line and held meetings and debates along the way. From Laoshanjie to Liping, the debate was particularly fierce in Liping." Bogu also said: "During the Long March, Chairman Mao rose up against wrong leadership, from the Shonan debate to the Zunyi Conference." Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang’s criticisms of Li De and Bogu first focused on the mistakes in the military command of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and the Western Expedition to break out of the encirclement.They pointed out that the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was due to strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership.The Red Army should have used the experience of the previous four anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns to adopt the policy of decisive battle defense, concentrating superior forces, selecting the enemy's weak points, destroying part or most of the enemy in mobile warfare, and defeating the enemy one by one; however, Li De and others denied These successful experiences, adopt the method of simple defense, short assault, and positional warfare.At the beginning, "attack on all fronts" was implemented, but it changed to "defense on all fronts" under the enemy's advance, which made the enemy's strategy and tactics of protracted warfare and fortressism succeed.They criticized that the breakout from the Soviet area turned into a panic escape, and the western expedition turned into a move-like action, avoiding battles all the way, and not taking the initiative to fight back against the isolated and tired enemy.

After crossing the old mountain boundary, the most important issue that was debated along the way during the march was still the issue of the Red Army's strategic course of action that needed to be resolved urgently.Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang pointed out that Li De and Bogu insisted that only when they arrived in western Hunan and joined the Second and Sixth Army Corps could they put down their luggage and fight to destroy the enemy. This policy was wrong. When the Red Army troops advanced to the Xiangxi passage area, they received information that Chiang Kai-shek had already seen through the strategic intention of the Central Red Army to go to Xiangxi, and assembled forces five or six times as powerful as the Red Army in Hongjiang, Zangjiang, Hunan, Shiqian, Tongren, and Songtao, Guizhou. In terms of strength, four lines of defense were set up to form a big pocket, waiting for the Red Army to drill.Under such circumstances, Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on the policy of joining up with the Second and Sixth Army Corps in western Hunan.In their order to the heads of the various corps on December 9, they reiterated that "the general direction of progress must not be changed", and they insisted on drilling into this pocket.After Zhang Wentian learned of this important change in the battle situation, he immediately found Mao Zedong, told Mao the enemy's deployment, and discussed countermeasures to save the crisis.Together with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian proposed to Zhou Enlai: On the way to Xiangxi, Lao Jiang had set up heavy troops. The original opportunity for the Central Red Army to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps in Xiangxi had been lost. Guizhou base.

On December 11, 1934, the Red Army captured Xi Town, the county seat of Tongdao County, Hunan Province. On December 12th, an emergency meeting of the central leaders—the channel meeting—was held at Gongcheng Academy in Xianxi Township to discuss the direction of the Red Army's actions. Regardless of the changed situation that was not conducive to the Red Army, Li De still mechanically wanted to advance to the area where the Second and Sixth Army Corps were located.Li De proposed: whether it is possible to let those enemy troops who are chasing us on the parallel line or rushing to the strategic point to the west overtake us, and we ourselves will turn to the north behind them and establish contact with the Second Army.Relying on the base of the Second Army, together with the troops of He Long and Xiao Ke, we can attack the enemy in a wide area and create a large Soviet area in the triangle bordering the three provinces of Hunan, Guizhou and Sichuan.The "flight meeting" he mentioned here before reaching Liping refers to the "channel meeting".This is actually throwing themselves into a trap, sending more than 30,000 Red Army troops into the tiger's mouth.

At the meeting, Mao Zedong first resolutely opposed Li De's policy and suggested marching to Guizhou.This suggestion was originally proposed by Mao after discussing it with King Luo. Of course, Zhang Wentian firmly supported it, emphasizing that he should change his course of action according to the changed situation.Zhou Enlai also supported the march to Guizhou.The Bo Guzuo meeting concluded: It seems that we can only follow Comrade Mao Zedong's proposal and give up the plan to go to Xiangxi.At 19:30 that night, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order for the Red Army to enter Guizhou on the 13th.However, after the meeting, Li De still insisted on his own opinion, denied the decision of the majority, and ordered the armies to continue to act according to the policy of joining the second and sixth armies.After debate, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued another order on the 14th, ordering the Red Army to capture Liping and Jinping, Guizhou, and open up a way forward.

On December 15, 1934, the Red Army captured Liping.Where is the Red Army going?This issue of strategic direction is once again brought up on the agenda with great urgency. On December 18, in Liping City, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.At the meeting, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong and Li De had a heated argument.Regarding the Liping meeting, Li De said: "I did not attend because of a high fever." Zhou Enlai spoke at the meeting of the Supervisory Committee of the Communist International in 1940 to examine Li De, affirming that Li De attended the Liping meeting and argued with Mao Zedong.Bogu did not support Li De's point of view.

Regarding the Liping Conference, Chen Yun made the following report to the leaders of the Communist International, from which we can see the intensity of the debate at the conference—— In Liping, there was a debate among the leaders, and it turned out that we finally corrected the mistakes we made.We distrust previous leaders who "led by a pencil."On the border of Hunan and Guangxi, the enemy has assembled four or five times as many troops as our army and is waiting in line, thinking that we will march along the route of the Red Sixth Army.The Guangxi army attacked our rear guard from the south.In addition, there are large forces chasing after them. The old leaders insisted on a straight-forward approach, thinking that the same must be done hereafter.We resolutely oppose it, pointing out that this plan can only help the enemy and will not bring any benefits to the Red Army or the Chinese revolution.The original leaders wanted to court-martial those who held such opinions.We replied: You leaders, not us, should be brought to court. Through fierce debate, the opinions of Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang were accepted by the Political Bureau meeting of the Liping Central Committee.The meeting made the "Decision on Strategic Policy", which denied the policy of Li De, Bo Gu and others to ask the Central Red Army to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps in western Hunan and establish a base area in western Hunan. Adopted the strategic policy proposed by King Mao Luo in the passage area and supported by Zhou Bo, and decided to establish a new base in the "Sichuan-Guizhou border area, the area that should initially be centered on Zunyi".The meeting also made another crucial decision: convening the Zunyi meeting—after arriving in the Zunyi area, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting to summarize the experience and lessons learned in military command since the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. After the Liping Conference, the Central Red Army continued to march westward, preparing to cross the Wujiang River to the north.Li De was very annoyed at the Liping Conference's denial of his opinion.On the way forward, Li De is still unwilling to give up his wrong strategic policy.Luo Fu was deeply worried about this.He realized that if Li De continued to hold the power of military command, it would be difficult to avoid wrong command.He began to think about changing the military leadership. On December 20, 1934, the Military Commission column arrived at Huangping, Guizhou.In a dense orange grove, the two stretchers of Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang put down to rest.It was late October in the lunar calendar, and it was late autumn in the south, and the green trees were covered with golden and orange-red oranges.The two of them lay head to head, talking about the situation, both worried. Wang asked Luo: Where is the final goal of the Red Army, the central government? Lowe said: "There wasn't a definite target.He also said: It seems impossible to fight this battle like this.Still want Comrade Mao Zedong to come out.Comrade Mao Zedong has a way of fighting, which is better than ours. Wang Jiaxiang called Zhang Wentian's idea to Peng Dehuai that night, and then told Mao Zedong. The news spread among Liu Bocheng and other generals, and everyone agreed that Mao Zedong should come out to command. Ten days later, on January 1, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in the Song family compound outside Houchang Town (Caotang), Weng'an County, Guizhou Province.The Houchang meeting criticized the erroneous idea that Wujiang should not establish a revolutionary base in the border areas of Sichuan and Guizhou, and that it should turn around and join the 2nd and 6th armies. policy decision”.On the subsequent march, Li De's command of the Red Army was stopped again. To sum up, from the first ten days of December 1934 when he passed Laoshanjie, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang and others fought actively to save the Party and the Red Army, marching towards victory step by step.The channel meeting laid the foundation for the transformation of the strategic policy, and the Liping meeting actually solved the most urgent problem of the direction of march at that time, and realized the task of "transferring troops" proposed by the channel meeting.This was the result of the "Central Three-member Regiment" criticizing and fighting against the wrong leadership of the "Supreme Three-member Regiment" after the defeat of the Xiangjiang Battle, and it was the first major victory achieved by Mao Zedong's military thought during the Long March.The Luo Wang Huangping Orange Grove Talk was a decisive preparation for the change of military leadership; the Houchang Conference resolutely implemented the strategic policy decided at the Liping Conference and consolidated the victory of the Liping Conference; Li De's military command was not only a major organizational victory, but also a sign that the Chinese Communist Party independently solved the problems it faced and broke free from the shackles of the Comintern.All of these have made ideological and organizational preparations for the convening of the Zunyi Conference.