Chapter 2 Chapter 1 Walking on the Long March with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiayang

On the evening of October 10, 1934, Zhang Wentian (commonly known as Luo Fu at the time), together with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, set off from Meikeng in Ruijin to Yudu, the capital of southern Jiangxi Province, and prepared to cross the Yudu River for a strategic transfer. At that time, the term "Long March" did not exist, let alone a journey as long as 25,000 li.At that time, the Red Army was heading west, and its initial goal was to reach western Hunan to join He Long and Xiao Ke's Red Second and Sixth Army Corps. Therefore, I called this strategic shifting military operation the "Western Expedition" from the very beginning.

When the Long March started, according to the opinion of the "Supreme Trio" composed of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and others had to be dispersed among the various field armies.After discussing with Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian raised objections, and Bogu agreed with Mao and Zhang's opinion and let them stay in the headquarters.Mao Zedong invited Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang to march all the way and camp together.In this way, Mao, Luo, and Wang walked together and naturally formed a "group of three".In order to distinguish it from the "Supreme Trio", it is called the "Central Team Trio".

The "Central Team Trio" is not an official organization.Among the three members, Mao and Wang, one was sick and the other was injured.Mao Zedong's falciparum malaria had just stopped, and he was weak and bloodless, unable to walk.Wang Jiaxiang was wounded by an enemy plane during the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", and he still had shrapnel in his stomach.Both of them were on stretchers.Zhang Wentian was in better health, and basically marched on horseback.They acted with the second column of the Military Commission (code-named "Red Badge" column).This column is composed of the Party Central Committee and central government agencies, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Health, the Red Army University, and the Second Bureau of the Military Commission.

It was no accident that Mao and Luo walked together when the Long March started.There are two main factors that make them come together: one is the deepening of Boluo's contradictions, and the other is the development of Mauro's cooperation. In the winter of 1932, after the provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved from Shanghai to Ruijin, in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggle and actual work in the Central Soviet Area, the "Boluo Contradictions" (that is, the contradictions between the two main leaders of the Central Committee, Bo Gu and Luo Fu) deepened. As a sign, the central "Left" leading group has cracks and has begun to divide; and with the development of "Mao-Luo cooperation" as a mark, Mao Zedong's correct line, which was attacked and excluded by the "Left" leading group, has been proved to be Correctly, Mao and Luo have reached an agreement in the contradictions and struggles with the "Left" errors, and established a comrade-in-arms friendship.

In the autumn and winter of 1932, Zhang Wentian was in Shanghai to accept the lessons of the "Left" error in practice, and he had already started the transformation from implementing the "Left" line to opposing the "Left" line.After arriving in the Central Soviet Area, Zhang Wentian gradually broke free from the shackles of the "Left" from his ideological understanding of the principles and policies to the strategic line.This difficult transformation process is also the process of the emergence, development, and deepening of differences and contradictions between Bo Gu, the main central leader who committed the "Left" error.The so-called "Bolo contradiction" had a great influence during the important historical transition period.

In the autumn of 1931, Wang Ming went to Moscow, and Bogu took over as the head of the provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.During this period, Zhang Wentian, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, worked with Bogu. Although the work style was not exactly the same, and it was inevitable that they had different opinions on some specific issues, politically, the revolutionary goals were the same, and they were promoting Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism. On the one hand, for quite a period of time, there was no difference in principle, and the relationship between the two can be said to be close and united.

With the passage of time, Zhang Wentian gradually realized the danger of "Left" in practice, and realized that "Left" deviation would also become the biggest obstacle to the progress of the revolution, and the side against "Left" deviation began to grow.But Bogu didn't wake up in time. That being the case, there will inevitably be political differences and conflicts between the two leaders on important guidelines and policies. The political differences between Boluo first arose in the understanding of the "three conditions for the common resistance against Japan", that is, the understanding of the change in the strategy of the united front.

On January 17, 1933, when Japanese imperialism continued to expand its aggression, occupied Shanhaiguan, and invaded North China, the CCP delegation to the Communist International issued a declaration in the name of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, proposing: Under the three conditions of immediately stopping the attack on the Soviet area, guaranteeing the democratic rights of the people, and arming the people, we are willing to enter into an agreement with any army to fight together.It has aroused widespread attention and strong repercussions at home and abroad.However, Bo Gu understood the declaration of the Three Conditions of Joint Anti-Japanese War from the fixed formula of the lower-level united front and the Comintern's "left" against the middle forces, and believed that our declaration was only for the masses, only for the soldiers, or at most Said to the junior officers of the Kuomintang army.As for the senior officers of the Kuomintang, they will never accept our conditions, nor will we negotiate any conditions with them or conclude any combat agreements with them for joint operations.The proposal in the manifesto is just a propaganda slogan, which is used to expose the rumors and slanders of the Kuomintang.Zhang Wentian accepted the education of the facts of the Songhu Anti-Japanese War, began to understand the changes in domestic class relations under the Japanese invasion, and corrected the "Left" strategy of the Kuomintang's 19th Route Army officers after the "January 28th" Incident Therefore, his understanding of entering into a common combat agreement with any armed forces against Japan under the three conditions is quite different from that of Bogu.He believes: "The three conditions are propaganda and a call to action", not only to the soldiers at the bottom and the masses of workers and peasants, but also "to the officers at the top".Zhang Wentian argued with Bogu about how to understand the "Three Conditions for Joint Anti-Japanese War".Bo Gu did not adopt Zhang Wentian's opinion. Therefore, after the "Manifesto" was issued, the Soviet government and the Red Army did not take any initiative, and in the eight or nine months after the "Manifesto" was issued, they did not conclude an anti-Japanese war agreement with any Kuomintang troops.

Second, about the understanding and policy of capitalist economy. This is yet another point of disagreement between Bolo.First, Bo Gu published "On the Economic Policy of the Soviet Regime at the Present Stage". This article first published the first and second parts, contained in the 8th issue of "Struggle" (April 15, 1933).Repeat the characteristics of the Communist International that the Chinese revolution is anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-bourgeois.Bo Gu believes that the current Chinese revolution must not only "oppose the remnants of feudalism, the warlord system, and the imperialists, but at the same time carry out a ruthless struggle against the Chinese national bourgeoisie." This is one of the characteristics of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.Bogut advocated that the basic point of the capitalist policy is "restriction", "systematic restriction of capitalist exploitation in the middle of developing the Soviet economy and in the midst of considerable tolerance of capitalist development".Zhang Wentian discussed the idea of ​​"using" private capital to develop the Soviet economy in his articles such as "On the Future of Soviet Economic Development", "May Day and the Review of the Implementation of the Labor Law", and "Class Struggle under the Soviet Power", and proposed Capitalism should be allowed to develop and adopt policies of exploitation, restriction, competition, and struggle.Obviously, it is very different from taking capitalism as the object of "opposition" and adopting a policy of "systematic restriction".Bo Gu severely criticized Zhang Wentian's views in the third part of "On the Economic Policy of the Soviet Power at the Present Stage" published later.Bo Gu emphasized: "The bourgeoisie will become our only and most important enemy at present, so the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie is not allowed."He believed that for capitalists, "it is not a 'compromise' policy, but a resolute development of class struggle"; in addition to eliminating their resistance and limiting their exploitation, they should be "forced" to work for the Soviets.Without naming names, Bogu accused Zhang Wentian of "concessions" and "compromise" policies as "opportunistic" policies, and even believed that this "surrender sentiment towards capitalists" was the "main danger" in the current labor movement in the Soviet area. Against this danger with "resolute and relentless fire."

Third, the greater disagreement between Boluo occurred before and after the "Fujian Incident" about the alliance with the 19th Route Army and how to deal with the "Fujian Incident". In June and July of 1933, Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of the opportunity of Japan's suspension of its invasion of the south after the signing of the "Tanggu Agreement" to sit in Lushan Mountain, dispatch troops and generals, and deploy the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Area.At this time, the Red Front Army carried out the "long-term telegram" of the interim Central Committee. On June 13, 1963, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called Zhu De and Zhou Enlai to convey the instructions on the summer military plan issued in the name of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formulated by the General Military Adviser of the Far East Bureau of the Communist International. Electricity.The telegram is very long, so it is called "long telegram".The shortcoming of this telegram criticizing the Red Front Army's previous military operations is that the main force is concentrated in a single combat unit, that is, the Front Army, which makes it impossible to coordinate operations from all sides. This restricts the main force, so that it cannot "forcefully strike" the northern forces. The enemy is Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops.In order to win in the two strategic directions of Fujian and Jiangxi at the same time, it is proposed to draw some troops from the Red Front Army to form the Eastern Army and conduct separate operations.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasized the need to "effectively implement this combat plan", and proposed that the Third Red Army should be the backbone of the Eastern Army to fight in Fujian, and the First and Fifth Red Army would fight in Fuhe and Ganjiang as planned.The erroneous instructions of the Communist Party of China implemented "two fists to hit people", divided into the Central Army and the Eastern Army to counter the fifth "encirclement and suppression", in an attempt to seek victory in two strategic directions at the same time.From July to September, the Eastern Army led by Peng Dehuai developed smoothly in the battle against the 19th Route Army.After the battle of Liancheng, he immediately marched into northern Fujian, winning every battle, forming a tendency to advance into Fuzhou.The Nineteenth Route Army was caught in a dilemma.Cai Tingkai and other generals of the Nineteenth Route Army originally had deep conflicts with Chiang Kai-shek. Under this situation, following the persuasion of a group of progressive people around them, they decided to change the policy of "suppressing the Communist Party, resisting Japan, and opposing Chiang" to "uniting the Communist Party, opposing Chiang, and resisting Japan." policy.In response to the Communist Party of China's Declaration of Three Conditions for Joint Anti-Japanese War, they took the initiative to send representatives secretly to the Red Army's garrison to discuss the truce and anti-Chiang issues.

The first representative who came to the front line of Yanping (now Nanping) to contact the Red Army was Zhang Wentian’s friend Wu Ming (Chen Gongpei) Guo Moruo when he was engaged in the New Culture Movement in Shanghai. Those who were willing to come to the apartment at that time were Zhang Wentian, Wu Ming, and Wang Fuquan. They seemed to be living in Minhoubeili at that time, and they came here almost every day.” Wu Ming, that is, Chen Gongpei (1901-1968), was born in Changsha, Hunan.Participated in the early party building activities of the Chinese Communist Party. In the autumn of 1920, he studied in France for a work-study program. In September 1921, 108 people including Li Lisan and Cai Hesen were repatriated for participating in the Lyon student movement. At the end of 1924, he entered the Whampoa Military Academy and was a graduate of the second batch.During the Northern Expedition, he worked in the Political Department of the Fourth Army and succeeded as Secretary of the Political Department of the Eleventh Army Division.Participated in the Nanchang Uprising.After the failure of the Chaoshan Uprising, he went to Shanghai via Hong Kong.Soon he announced his departure from the party.Later, he was Chen Mingshu's staff.After the founding of new China, he served as a counselor of the State Council.On the evening of September 22, 1933, Wu Ming met with Peng Dehuai at the headquarters of the Red Army in the Octagonal Building of Wangtai.He held talks with Peng Dehuai and Yuan Guoping the next day.Afterwards, Wu Ming accompanied Xu Minghong, secretary-general of the 19th Route Army, to Ruijin secretly in early October for formal negotiations. Boluo had a very different attitude towards negotiations with the Nineteenth Route Army.Bogu is very vigilant.He didn't refuse to negotiate, but he was full of doubts.He couldn't see the progress of the generals of the Nineteenth Route Army, and he always thought that their negotiation was probably a trick to seek temporary relief and wait for reinforcements.He only regarded the negotiations as a propaganda measure, and only wanted to expose the deception of the generals of the 19th Route Army through negotiations and enhance the prestige of the Communist Party and the Red Army.When representatives of the Nineteenth Route Army went to Ruijin for negotiations, Bogu did not meet with them.Zhang Wentian attached great importance to this negotiation, and believed that it was a concrete action to realize the Declaration of the Three Conditions of Joint Anti-Japanese War.If the talks go well, the truce with the 19th Route Army and further cooperation in the resistance against Japan will have a major positive impact on the smashing of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and on the entire anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese struggle.At that time, Zhang Wentian was one of the leaders in the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China who specifically guided the negotiations and signed contracts.Together with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Peng Dehuai, he warmly received Xu Minghong, the plenipotentiary representative of the 19th Route Army, and facilitated the smooth progress of the negotiations.Pan Xingjian (Han Nian), the plenipotentiary representative of the Red Army and the Soviet government who participated in the negotiations, was Zhang Wentian's right-hand man from the White Area to the Soviet Area.Negotiations went on for nearly a month, and on October 26, 1933, the plenipotentiaries of both parties initialed the "Preliminary Agreement on Anti-Japanese and Anti-Chiang".After initialing the preliminary agreement, the Soviet government appointed Pan Hannian as the permanent representative in Fuzhou, and went to Fujian together with Xu Minghong, Wu Ming and other negotiators from the 19th Route Army.On the morning of his departure, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Lin Boqu, Deng Fa and others went to see him off. On November 20, 1933, generals of the 19th Route Army Cai Tingkai, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, and some anti-Chiang forces in the Kuomintang, such as Li Jishen, launched the "Fujian Incident" and established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the People's Republic of China" (referred to as "Fujian People's Government"). On the 22nd, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Fujian People's Government, and the 19th Route Army formally signed an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang agreement.On the same day, Zhang Wentian published "The Manifesto on the Soviet Government and the Struggle against Opportunism" in the internal party publication "Struggle".Criticize the closed-door approach to the 19th Route Army and the Fujian People's Government.He pointed out that in the face of the national crisis in the whole country, "individual Kuomintang warlords may accept our declaration."We should "use this possibility" to "carry out the upper-level united front in some places" and "call on all truly patriotic elements in the reactionary camps to join us in fighting for the survival of the Chinese nation."He believes: "For such Kuomintang warlords, we are not afraid to conclude a combat agreement with them to fight against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Our task here is not to close the door to show the purity of our proletariat, but to achieve the goal through this agreement." Further carry out the national revolutionary war", "We do not reject this compromise".He ridiculed "the 'Left' leaning infantiles who pretend to be high-minded and deny all possible compromises of this kind, often treat this kind of negotiation as a joke, or simply 'play tricks'".He sternly criticized: "This is nothing other than showing that they don't know anything about 'modern scientific socialism'." Zhang Wentian's idea of ​​"carrying out the upper-level united front" and his sharp criticism of the "left" childish people did not make them open the door. After the "Fujian Incident" broke out, they not only did not give strong support, did not promote unity, and actively cooperated, but instead exposed, criticized, and adopted strategies of slander, exclusion, and attack. When the "Fujian Incident" broke out, it was the time when the Central Soviet Area's anti-fifth "encirclement and suppression" war suffered major setbacks. The "Fujian Incident" created a big gap in Chiang Kai-shek's eastern front of the encirclement of the Central Soviet Area.If the Red Army and the Nineteenth Route Army could really unite, not only would Chiang Kai-shek's "encirclement and suppression" plan go bankrupt, but it could also pose a direct threat to the Nanjing government.Therefore, after the "Fujian Incident" broke out, Chiang had no choice but to change his original battle plan, and immediately dispatched nine divisions from the front line of the "encirclement and suppression" campaign to go to Fujian for the "crusade".This greatly dispersed the troops in the "encirclement and suppression" of the Central Soviet Area, disrupted Chiang's original military deployment, and provided an excellent opportunity for the Red Army to crush the fifth "encirclement and suppression".However, Bogu and Li De, a military adviser who had just arrived in the Central Soviet Area, did not take advantage of this opportunity. They did not cooperate directly with the 19th Route Army, fought for the initiative, and smashed the "encirclement and suppression". He also did not adopt the proposition of General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai, but faithfully implemented the instructions of the Communist International military delegation far away in Shanghai.Instead of commanding the Red Army to attack the "rebellious army" eastward, they moved towards the Ganjiang River to attack the enemy's fortress in the Yongfeng area, attempting to cross the Ganjiang River and advance to Nanchang.When Zhang Wentian learned of the transfer of the Red Army to the west, he immediately raised his "objection", arguing that the Red Army should be transferred to the east to assist the 19th Route Army.Zhang Wentian believed that only by adopting the policy of direct cooperation with the 19th Route Army in the military, could we not lose the opportunity to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's main force and smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" at this important moment.The Military Commission adopted Zhang Wentian's suggestion.However, it was too late to wait until this time to transfer the Red Army eastward.When the Red Army, under the command of Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun, arrived at the Fukou area of ​​Shaxian County on January 4, 1934, the "rebel army" had already entered the hinterland of Fujian, and the opportunity to "flank" was lost early, so they could only "follow".However, under the military pressure of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nineteenth Route Army split internally, and the Fujian People's Government was in decline. On January 9, 1934, the chief of staff of the 19th Route Army went to Ruijin for help. On January 13, the Fujian People's Government, which had lasted for 53 days, disintegrated. Fourth, the development of the "Boluo Contradiction" from a dark disagreement to a clear conflict was before the start of the Guangchang Battle and after the defeat. Guangchang is the northern gate of the Central Soviet Area, located on the left bank of the Xujiang River. In March 1934, the enemy concentrated 11 divisions and moved down from Jiajiang River on both sides of the Xujiang River, slowly advancing towards Guangchang as a fortress.Mao and Luo firmly opposed the organization of the Guangchang Campaign.Bo Gu and Li De decided to defend Guangchang with all their strength and "decisive battle" with the enemy.They mobilized the nine divisions of the Red Army's main force, and adopted the tactics of "concentration against concentration, fortress against fortress" and "short assault" tactics in an attempt to "defend the enemy from outside the country."From April 10th to 28th, the Red First, Third, and Ninth Army Corps conducted an 18-day defense of Guangchang.Relying on the superiority of the air force and artillery, the enemy advances towards Guangchang at an average speed of 2 kilometers per day.Although the Red Army troops who stood firm in Guangchang fought bravely and killed a large number of enemies, due to fundamental errors in war command and huge consumption of troops, they finally had to abandon Guangchang on April 28.The failure of the Guangchang Battle was the result of Li De and Bogu not accepting the correct propositions of Mao and Luo and pursuing a purely military defensive line. After the failure of the Guangchang Battle, at a meeting of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in mid-May, Zhang Wentian made a serious criticism, pointing out: It is wrong to fight the enemy to the death in the Guangchang Battle.This is a style of play that fights for consumption, causing the main force of the Red Army to suffer undue huge losses.Bo Gu did not admit his mistakes, but instead labeled Zhang Wentian as a rightist, saying that Zhang Wentian's accusation was an opportunistic ideology of Plekhanov's opposition to the Russian workers' armed uprising in 1905. Zhang Wentian has always been gentle and quiet. Faced with Bogu's accusations, he immediately refuted them, pointing out: Plekhanov blamed the party after the failure of the Russian workers' armed uprising in December 1905, saying that "there was no need to use weapons." Fundamentally opposed to armed uprisings, thinking that the workers can use peaceful means to win.Criticizing the Guangchang battle today is to say that it is wrong to fight the enemy to the death.The enemy has 30 to 40 planes in the sky bombarding in batches every day, and an artillery brigade on the ground bombards them with artillery, and their troops are much stronger than ours. Under such circumstances, how is it possible to rely on field fortifications to hold their positions?We should never simply defend and fight recklessly!We should preserve our main force and use other methods to defeat the enemy.What is the same with Plekhanov's fundamental opposition to armed insurrection?The more Zhang Wentian said, the more excited he became: Comrade Bogu called me Plekhanov and opportunism. This is slander!I insist that it is wrong to fight the enemy desperately in the Guangchang Campaign!In his speech, Zhang Wentian also criticized Bogu for using Li De too much, saying: We can't completely rely on Li De for our affairs in China, we need to have some ideas. At the meeting, the two of Bo Luo were so angry that they couldn't agree with each other, and the meeting couldn't go on, so they broke up unhappy.None of the other comrades present made a sound. In fact, most comrades in the Military Commission agreed with Luo Fu's opinion.It's just that it's inconvenient to publish on such occasions.Commander of the Three Army Corps Peng Dehuai once reprimanded Li De face-to-face after the battle of Guangchang as a "tactician who works on the map", saying that they ruined the base they had finally created, and that they were "a poor boy who sells his fields without pain!" Afterwards, Bo Gu had a conversation with Luo Fu, seeming to convey Li De's meaning, saying: "The things here still depend on the comrades who came back from Moscow." It means that Bo Luo and Luo Fu should not quarrel.Zhang Wentian had no intention of cuddling with the comrades who had returned from Moscow, and ignored this reminder.More importantly, Bogu and the others did not learn any lessons from the failure of the Guangchang Battle. They still insisted on tactics such as "short assault" and "dividing troops" in military operations. , Implementing a full-line defense, the Red Army was completely passive and beaten.Of course, the differences between Boluo cannot be narrowed or even bridged, not to mention that Bogu and the others are still pushing Luo Fu out of the organization! While the "Boluo contradiction" gradually deepened, and the relationship between Bogu and Luo Fu gradually alienated and even conflicted, the "Maolo" gradually approached each other, and even trusted each other and cooperated closely. The relationship between Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong can be traced back to the early 1920s. In December 1919, Zhang Wentian joined the Youth Progressive Organization "Junior Chinese Society". In January 1920, Mao Zedong also joined this organization.The news of the two of them joining the club was published together in Volume 1, Issue 8, which was published in February 1920.After that, the whereabouts of Mao and Zhang were disclosed in the Internet from time to time.From the relationship of members, they already knew each other.It's just that Mao Zedong was not very enthusiastic about the activities of the "Youth China Society", and Zhang Wentian went abroad from time to time, and the two never met in the 1920s. After Zhang Wentian returned to China from Moscow in February 1931, during his stay in Shanghai, he heard from time to time about the situation in the Central Soviet Area and Mao Zedong.At that time, from the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Central Political Bureau of the Soviet Area, Mao Zedong was not only disrespected, but also rejected and attacked.Zhang Wentian also adopted this attitude in his articles and meetings.On April 4, 1932, he wrote an editorial criticizing the so-called "opportunist wavering within the party" based on the spirit of the Central Committee meeting, denying Mao Zedong's strategy of "strengthening the wall and clearing the country" and "luting the enemy to go deeper" in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign On October 6, 1932, when the Standing Committee of the Politburo discussed the work in the Central Soviet Area, Bogu criticized "Zedong's views as conservative and retreating" and believed that "a resolute struggle should be carried out." Zhang Wentian also It is mentioned that "Zedong can be transferred back to the rear to do the work of the Soviet".This opinion is consistent with the decision made by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China in the Ningdu meeting in early October ("Comrade Mao Zedong returned to the rear to assume responsibility for the work of the central government").These erroneous claims and practices of Zhang Wentian were inevitable under the erroneous guidelines of "Left" adventurism at that time.However, at that time, he and Mao neither worked together nor had direct conflicts, and there was no rift in personal relations. Zhang Wentian met and got acquainted with Mao Zedong after he entered the Central Soviet Area in early 1933.At the beginning, Zhang Wentian didn't really understand Mao Zedong's thoughts and talents, and his relationship was normal.Soon, Zhang divided the management of government work, had more opportunities to contact Mao, and got to know Mao better, and gradually got close to him.As mentioned above, the two Maoluos had the same views on important issues such as the implementation of the "Three Conditions for Joint Anti-Japanese War", the signing of agreements and support with the 19th Route Army, and assistance to the Fujian People's Government, but they had major differences with Bogu and others. The historical opportunity for Mauro's cooperation was the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the subsequent personnel changes. The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in Ruijin in mid-January 1934, brought the mistakes of the "Left" line to a climax.After this plenary session, Zhang Wentian's position in the party has not changed much, but his actual work has undergone major changes.At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Zhang Wentian was by-elected as a member of the Central Committee, elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (also known as the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee), and director of the Central Party Newspaper Committee.After the plenary session, the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet was held. Zhang Wentian replaced Mao Zedong and was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic.From the surface alone, it seems that Zhang Wentian has been reused.However, Zhang Wentian, who is in the vortex of high-level contradictions in the party, has already "feeled more clearly" than before that this is an extremely clever "exclusion".When he later reviewed this period of history, he wrote: "Because of the development of these contradictions, Bogu began to exclude me. After the Fifth Plenary Session, I was sent to work in the central government, which was the specific step to exclude me from the central government." "Send me Assuming the position of the people's committee, for Comrades Li De and Bogu, it is a clever plan to 'kill two birds with one stone'. On the one hand, it can push me out from the central government, and on the other hand, it can push Comrade Mao Zedong out of the central government." In terms of action, Of course Zhang Wentian still obeys the decision of the Central Committee.In this way, from February 1934, Zhang Wentian's office and residence were moved from Guanyinshan, the seat of the Party Central Committee, to Shazhouba, where he worked with Mao Zedong, and his residence was close to each other. After Luo Fu became the chairman of the People's Committee, he did not follow the intention of Bogu and others to reject Mao Zedong.On the contrary, he adopted an attitude of cooperating with and respecting Mao Zedong.After Luo took office, he talked with Mao Chang several times and listened to Mao's opinions on handing over the work.When presiding over the meetings of the People's Committee, Mao is always invited to participate and guide.Economic work was originally managed by Mao. After Luo took over, Wu Liangping, the Minister of National Economy, was still asked to report and ask for instructions from Mao frequently; Mao still participated in the decision-making of major economic issues.In this way, the relationship between Mauro not only did not become tense, but became closer. From the following iconic events, we can clearly see the development process of "Mauro cooperation" and how close the relationship between Mauro and Maolo reached when the Long March started. ① Luo published Mao's investigation report and co-authored the book "How the District and Township Soviets Work" with Mao. From January to February 1934, Luo Fu serialized two rural investigation reports of Mao Zedong in six issues in the publication "Struggle" edited by him: "Soviet Work in Xingguo Changgang Township" and "Soviet Work in Shanghang Caixi Township" ".This is the first publication of Mao Zedong's two investigative reports.Not only that, Luo also imitated Mao's method and studied the work of grassroots Soviets. In April 1934, the book "How the District and Township Soviets Work" marked "Co-authored by Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong" was published.This is a collection of Mao's "How the Township Soviets Work" and Lowe's "How the District Soviets Work".The publication of this book can be seen as a sign of "Mauro cooperation". ② On the issue of the Guangchang Battle, Mauro unanimously adopted an opposing attitude. As mentioned earlier, when Bo Gu and Li De were preparing to organize the Guangchang Battle, Luo Mao unanimously opposed it; after the failure of the Guangchang Battle, Bo Luo argued fiercely at the Military Commission, and Mao supported Luo.The disagreement or agreement on the issue of the Guangchang Campaign further deepened the "Boluo Contradictions", while the "Mauro Cooperation" took a step forward. ③The frank conversation between Mao and Luo at the "Yunshan Ancient Temple" before the Long March. After the enemy plane bombed Ruijin on August 1, 1934, Maoluo’s residence was moved to a small temple on Yunshi Mountain, "Yunshan Ancient Temple".The Mao family lived in one side room of the main room, and Luo's room was in the other side room.The two get along day and night, have a harmonious relationship, and care about each other in life. In September 1934, Mao Yudu suffered from falciparum malaria and had a high fever.The Gannan Provincial Party Committee called Luo Fu for help, and Luo immediately sent Fu Lianjun to Xingye for diagnosis and treatment. When the Long March set off, the fundamental reason why Luo and Mao were able to talk heart-to-heart was that they had relatively consistent views on many major issues and shared common experiences and feelings in party life. After the debate in the Military Commission after the failure of the Guangchang Battle, in early July 1934, Bo Gu and Li De adopted another deployment to "exclude" Luo Fu: sending Luo Fu to Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces for inspection work.In fact, before this, Xiang Ying (member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee) had made a long inspection tour in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces, and had just returned to Ruijin.There is absolutely no need to send another central leadership comrade there.The so-called "inspection" to Fujian and Jiangxi is entirely a pretext for Bogu and the others to remove Luo Fu from the government leadership position. Luo Fu obeyed the decision and went to Fujian and Jiangxi in early July.The patrol work lasted for forty or fifty days.Return to Ruijin until the end of August.At this time, Luo Fu has actually been deprived of the power to participate in the highest decision-making.The preparations for the Red Army's strategic transfer and the fate of all senior cadres have been decided by the "Top Three".In terms of organization and personnel, what Luo Fu has the power to do is to propose a list of mid-level cadres transferred by the central government with the army and submit it to the "Supreme Triumvirate" for approval.Qu Qiubai, who was the People's Commissar of Education at that time, was included in the list of senior cadres "retained" by the "Supreme Triumvirate".Qu Qiubai expressed his hope to "go" to Zhang Wentian, Chairman of the People's Committee.Zhang Wentian expressed deep sympathy, and immediately expressed his feelings to Bogu.Bogu had no room for negotiation at all, and insisted on keeping Qu Qiubai on the grounds of being sick.Luo Fu talked about this in his autobiography during the rectification movement in Yan'an, saying that he felt "in a powerless position" at that time and was "very dissatisfied." Luo Fu's feelings at this time have been smoldering in Mao Zedong's heart for many years.From the Southern Jiangxi Conference (1931) to the Ningdu Conference (1932), to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee (1934), Mao Zedong was repeatedly excluded.Mao's situation in the party at that time was much worse than that of Luo.It was already early October when Mao returned to Ruijin from Yudu. At this time, both Luo and Mao lived in the "Yunshan Ancient Temple".Seeing the defeat of the war against "encirclement and suppression", and now they have to leave this red land poured with blood and sweat, both of them are full of depression and resentment.One day, Luo and Mao sat on the stone bench under the Jue tree in front of their residence and chatted.Luo poured out his unhappiness and dissatisfaction to Mao.This frank conversation between Luo and Mao brought their relationship, on the eve of embarking on the Long March, into a brand new stage where they could be called comrades-in-arms. On the eve of the Long March, on September 29, 1934, "Red China", the official newspaper of the Chinese Soviet Central Government, published an editorial signed by Zhang Wentian titled "Everything to Defend the Soviet".Immediately after the editorial was published, the General Political Department of the Red Army issued a "political instruction", requiring the entire army to "carry out adequate propaganda and explanation work among the troops" regarding the upcoming military operation based on this editorial.In his 1936 article reviewing the Long March, "Before Departure," Dong Biwu called it "an editorial on the strategy of the Red Army."After reading this editorial, he and He Shuheng immediately realized that the Red Army was about to make a strategic shift.This editorial is actually the declaration and mobilization order of the Red Army on the Long March. It is a summary of Mao Zedong's military thought, and it marks that Zhang Wentian's thought has leapt to a new level-a more conscious understanding of the laws of the Chinese revolution, opposition to The height of the "left" leaning alignment.It clearly shows that Zhang Wentian has completely got rid of the shackles of "Left" errors, is completely in tune with and consistent with Mao Zedong's military thinking, and has come to the side of the correct line represented by Mao Zedong. The decision to shift the Red Army's strategy was made at the May meeting of the Central Secretariat chaired by Bo Gu after the failure of the Guangchang Battle.It was agreed shortly after reporting to the Comintern.The preparations for the strategic transfer were also actively carried out under the organizations of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Li Weihan.As Chen Yun said in his report to the Communist International, "First of all, before the main column of our army withdrew from the Central Soviet Area and marched westward, the party first sent some troops out of the Soviet Area and went deep into the enemy's rear. In particular, we sent the anti-Japanese advance team Red Seventh Army Advance towards Fujian and the Jiangxi-Fujian border area, so our troops inserted into the enemy's rear in the northeast direction." "Second action: Send troops from the Hunan-Kiangsi border area to Hunan." In addition, "replenish the main force of the Red Army Young soldiers. We have absorbed 30,000 volunteers to join the army”; “We have trained a group of basic cadres and the backbone of the army”; “We have raised 600,000 dans of food for the beginning of the Red Army’s western expedition”; “We have also stepped up production Ammunition, the production of ammunition has increased by six to thirty times. Soldiers have also been provided with special military uniforms, and necessary communication equipment has been raised.” After the central government decided to break through from southern Jiangxi, the negotiations between Pan Hannian, the representative of the Red Army, and the Cantonese army of "Southern King" Chen Jitang proceeded intensively, and progressed quite smoothly.The signing of the armistice agreement opened a channel for the Red Army to march west.The Central Bureau under the leadership of Bo Gu made intensive preparations for the huge strategic change of the breakout operation, but the military action plan was kept in a state of high secrecy until late September. Transfer explanations to unify the thinking of the whole party and the whole army. Due to the deepening of the "Boluo contradiction" and the development of the "Mauro cooperation", Zhang Wentian's understanding of the mistakes of "Left" adventurism after the defeat in the Guangchang Battle became more profound and more conscious."Anti-Petty Bourgeois Ultra-Leftism" written by him on June 24, 1934 is a sign that he basically broke free from the shackles of "Left" and consciously stood on the side of the correct line.In this article, Zhang Wentian has unequivocally "raised the extreme necessity of a resolute struggle against this 'ultra-leftism'".他指出，“如果不反对小资产阶级的'极左主义'与一时的狂放的革命性”，那么，同样地，“党的正确路线的执行是不可能的”。张闻天鲜明地批评“'左'倾总要比右倾好”的流行观点，指明“极左主义是机会主义另一种形式的表现”，“不要惧怕'左倾革命家'的威吓”。文章具体分析了“极左主义”在党内思想斗争中、在检举行动中、在对待地主富农的政策上、在经济政策中的种种表现和严重危害，激励大家拿出勇气，去反对“极左主义”。通过对闽赣的巡视调查，张闻天对“左”倾路线在军事策略方面的表现和危害有了进一步认识。 7月26日，他在闽赣战地委员会扩大会议上作报告，尖锐地批评博古、李德“分兵把口，困守堡垒的办法”，说将地方武装用来“死守堡垒，对于我们是致命的打击”。指出“这种公式必须立刻粉碎，我们的同志必须立刻从堡垒、从空机关走向群众”。认为闽赣党的第一任务是“武装广大群众，发展游击战争”。 长征出发前博古要他撰写一篇社论，正好给了他一个系统阐述在斗争实践中得到的新认识的机会。 张闻天在社论中回答了当时最迫切需要解决的问题：红军为什么要实行战略大转移？ 张闻天从总结反五次“围剿”的经验教训入手，批评了“左”倾的进攻路线。指出：“我们党的总的进攻路线，决不能解释成为只要采取进攻的斗争方式，就可使我们得到胜利。这种见解，实际上是把革命当作只是一种向上的、直线式的、不断胜利的行动，或是一次的、短时期的、在一个战线上的英勇的决斗和突击。这种对于革命的抽象的了解，必然会想出种种'抽象的公式'或'教条式的药方'来限制自己的活动，其结果是很明显的，或者是我们拿一种固定的斗争去束缚运动，或者是由于我们的成见与固执，放弃了其他斗争的领导。” 在此基础上，张闻天对“进攻路线”作出新的解释，说明依照当时的环境，不单采取进攻、反攻，就是采取“防御以至退却的斗争方式”，“一切这些斗争方式的运用，都是为了实现党的进攻路线。”这就在那时允许的范围内突破了只准讲进攻、不准谈退却的教条。张闻天又正面提出正确的方法论原则：“根据于每一具体环境的分析与了解，决定在当时何种斗争方式最为有利，并且跟随着环境的变化而变化我们的斗争方式。”据此，他分析了实践中运用的各种各样斗争方式，并以十分醒目的表述，肯定了放弃某些苏区与城市以便“缩短战线”，突破封锁“转移地区”，是在敌人优势兵力压迫、堡垒层层封锁之下可取的保存有生力量、争取战争胜利的方式，相当明确地预示了中央红军即将突围转移的战略意图。 张闻天还进而从中国革命的长期性和不平衡性这一中国革命基本问题的层次上，阐明应该怎样看待突围转移的战略决策。张闻天指出：“国内战争的战线是延长在全中国”，“这种国内战争是整个时期的长期的死战，而不是几天几月甚至几年完成的。在这种决战中，我们可以在某些区域得到空前的伟大的胜利，在有些区域则可遭受部分的挫折”。他自觉地运用这一带规律性的认识对第五次反“围剿”中“左”倾军事路线的发展轨迹作出概括，进行批评。并指出，一切机会主义者，由于不了解中国革命这一基本问题，取得某些胜利时，就会被“胜利冲昏头脑”，“放弃了继续不断的，坚持的，残酷的斗争”；一旦遇到阻碍或停滞，就会“悲观失望”，“失去了革命的信心和前途”，在“转移地区或缩短战线时”，就会“走到灰心绝望中去”。在这里，“'左'倾机会主义者同右倾机会主义者完全表现了他们相反的一致”，其症结就在于“看不到整个国内战争的实质。” 从以上毛洛关系发展的几件事情，特别是张闻天写的被称为“战略社论”的《一切为了保卫苏维埃》中可见，到长征前夕，张闻天的思想已经有了突飞猛进的发展变化。他对中国革命基本问题的认识，特别是对中国革命战争基本规律的认识，同毛泽东的认识已经非常接近以至基本一致。同六届五中全会断定中国存在着“直接革命形势”、第五次反“围剿”“即是争取中国革命完全胜利的斗争”等观点完全不同，他已经清醒地认识到中国的革命战争是“长期”的战争，不是在几年内就能够完全胜利的。用这样的战略思想武装全党全军，来指导中国革命，其意义是不可低估的。张闻天虽然还没有冲破“进攻路线”的外壳，但已经十分明确地在实际上否定了“左”倾军事路线进攻中的冒险主义，防御中的保守主义，退却中的逃跑主义，提出并阐明了灵活运用各种斗争方式，尤其是采取退却、缩短战线、转移地区的方式，以保存有生力量争取胜利的观点。对于主力红军的突围西征来说，这是到那时为止得到深刻表述的以毛泽东为代表的正确的指导思想。 总之，在踏上征途时，毛洛走在一起，不是偶然的。在同“左”倾错误领导共同斗争中达成的对中国革命战争战略、策略及其规律性认识的一致，建立起来的深厚的战友情谊，是他们在长征出发时走到一起的坚实基础。