Chapter 37 Huang Qiuyun suddenly heard the news that the wind had "turned"

While Da Ming was flourishing, Mao Zedong was closely watching the situation in China, carefully reading various newspapers and internal briefings every day. Mao Zedong attached great importance to the use of the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep".According to his article "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War": "When it came to the first counter-campaign against 'encirclement and suppression' in the Jiangxi base area, the policy of 'luting the enemy to go deep' was put forward, and it was successfully applied."① Since then, Mao Zedong has skillfully used the policy of "luting the enemy to go deep" and won battles again and again.

Mao Zedong once vividly quoted the example in the book to illustrate the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep": "Who knows, when two boxers are right, the clever boxer often backs down a step, while the fool is aggressive and uses all his skills at the beginning, but the result is often defeated by the backer. "Instructor Hong wanted to beat Lin Chong at Chai Jin's house, and he called 'come', 'come', 'come' several times, but Lin Chong, who retreated, saw the weakness of Instructor Hong, and kicked Instructor Hong over." ① In fact, there are many examples of this kind of "luting the enemy to go deep", and Guan Yunchang's "dragging knife strategy" was also based on the same idea as Lin Chong.

However, Mao Zedong theoretically developed the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep". When Mao Zedong implemented "luting the enemy to go deep", the first step was "strategic retreat".He pointed out: "The entire function of a strategic retreat is to switch to a counteroffensive." After finding a suitable opportunity, Mao Zedong implemented the second step, Japan's "strategic counter-offensive". When Mao Zedong fought against Chiang Kai-shek, he used the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep" very well. When Mao Zedong fought against Indian Prime Minister Nehru, he first let the Indian army cross the McMahon Line and enter the hinterland of Tibet, China, and then surrounded and wiped it out in one fell swoop. He also used the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep".

In 1957, Mao Zedong also used the strategy of "luting the enemy to go deep".Mao Zedong repeatedly called "come", "come", "come", and the "rightists" shouted loudly in the sound of "come".All the "rightists" don't know what the trick is. Although there are some people who feel it vaguely, even Ge Peiqi said at the symposium on June 5, 1957: "Friends say, don't talk too much, it's not good to talk too much. Some people say, don't try to talk fast today, but be careful that someone will spank your ass tomorrow. I think, if the wind is good, no one will spank you. Somebody's coming for a spanking."

When I interviewed Ge Peiqi, I asked him who the "someone" was?He shook his head, sighed and said, "Oh, I can't remember!" However, there was one person with a good memory, who was almost classified as a "rightist" and drank enough of the bitter water of history.Although more than 30 years have passed, in his long memoirs, he clearly stated the time in 1957 when he first learned that Mao Zedong was going to launch a "strategic counter-offensive". He is the writer Huang Qiuyun. I remember, in the summer of 1978, I met him at Zhonghua Bookstore in Beijing.At that time, he had just stepped out of the shadow of history, wearing a white sweater, waving a cattail fan, and was busy revising the large ancient Chinese dictionary "Ciyuan".

I asked him an interesting question: "There have always been only Chun Yun and Xia Yun. Why do you call him 'Qiu Yun'?" He laughed and replied: "I was not a writer, but a professional soldier. It was very late, until the 1950s, that I started to write. Others sow grass in spring, but I do it in autumn - others have harvested there , I just started weeding grass, so it is called 'Qiu Yun', which means that I started very late." At that time, I didn't pay attention to what he meant by "professional soldiers". At the end of 1984, when I was in Beijing to attend the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Writers Association, I met him and chatted with him.Only then did I know that he is a member of the Communist Party of China with deep qualifications, and he is somewhat similar to Ge Peiqi.

He was admitted to the Chinese Department of Tsinghua University in Peking in 1935, actively participated in the "December 19th Movement", and joined the Communist Party of China the following year. After that, like Ge Peiqi, he went to work in the Eighth Route Army and became a "professional soldier".Like Ge Peiqi, he also works underground. Not long ago, he told me, he wrote his memoirs about his service in the military.As soon as it was published, Japan immediately paid attention to it. Japanese newspapers called it "the first memoir of the CCP's KGB".

He also said that he was recently participating in writing the memoirs of the "December 9th Movement".He wrote 100,000 characters, Wei Junyi wrote 100,000 characters.It is scheduled to be published before the fiftieth anniversary of the "12.9 Movement" on December 9, 1985.However, he is used to writing literary works, and he is not used to writing serious texts of this kind of party history.He likes to write some lively and interesting vignettes, all of which have been deleted.Wei Junyi used to be a reporter, so he is used to writing like this. He revealed to me that he has also completed a long memoir from the 1930s to the present.However, he said: "I'm afraid I can't publish it during my lifetime, let's publish it after my death!"

Perhaps it was luck that his long memoir, which was originally "published after death", was actually printed before his death.This is "The Wind and Rain Years" published by the People's Literature Publishing House in 1988. It was in "The Wind and Rain" that he revealed the important political information he received from Shao Quanlin, vice chairman and party secretary of the Chinese Writers Association, on the evening of May 18, 1957—the wind had "turned": "While we were talking vigorously, the phone on the table rang, and Shao Quanlin hurried over to answer the phone. Within two minutes, his face turned pale, his wrists trembled, his expression flustered and gloomy, and he just agreed repeatedly: 'Yes! Hmm!' he said at last, 'Understood. Alright! I'll be right there.' I looked at my watch, and it was already twenty past nine. There must have been some unexpected and important event, and an emergency meeting was called. Meeting. He put down the phone, and said without thinking: "Zhou Yang's call, uh, transfer it!" As for how to transfer it, he didn't say, so I naturally couldn't ask. After a long silence, he He also told me: "Don't tell anyone about our conversation tonight when you go back! Don't take any measures for the time being, such as withdrawing some manuscripts. This will arouse suspicion."... Returning to the next morning When the editorial department asked, I realized that this issue of "Literary Learning" had already been signed and printed, and was in the process of being bound. It was a big mistake and could not be undone. If I had known the news of the "transfer" two or three days earlier, it would be like "Stirring" Articles like "Where" will never be published. However, I managed to extract a few sharply worded essays from "Ta Kung Pao" (which was still published in Beijing at the time) and "Guangming Daily", which relieved me a little. A little 'crime'... Alas! If only I had known the news of this 'transfer' earlier! I could have saved a lot of people...

"In hindsight, everyone has it. The most valuable thing is in advance. However, political foresight is often not entirely due to keen observation and careful analysis, but accurate and timely Information. For example, the word 'Zhuan', even if I am a 'little Zhuge', I couldn't think of it before the evening of May 18th. It was only because of a phone call that I heard by chance that I got an 'epiphany'. " Today, "May 18" is regarded as a "good luck" day, because "May 18" is a homonym for "I want to send", so many shops choose this day to open, and how many men and women choose this day to get married.However, May 18th in 1957 was so unlucky for Huang Qiuyun.

Huang Qiuyun also wrote: "This 'sudden brake' measure may have been brewing for a while, and it was not decided until mid-May. Senior cadres at the level of Zhou Yang (he was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department in charge of literature and art) at the earliest It was not until later in mid-May that he got to know the news, and I believe he informed Shao Quanlin without a day's delay after he knew it. Shao Quanlin hinted to me that night (May 18). In this way, according to Huang Qiuyun's judgment, Mao Zedong's decision to carry out the "anti-rightist movement" was communicated to cadres at the level of Zhou Yang on May 18.