Chapter 15 The Eighth Route Army's specialty

At the Luochuan Conference, everyone agreed on issues such as upholding the Party’s leadership over the Red Army, upholding the principle of independent command, insisting on conducting guerrilla warfare in the mountains, insisting that the Red Army must mobilize the masses, arm the masses, and organize mass guerrilla warfare. However, they have different understandings of the Red Army's combat policy. Mao Zedong's intention was very clear. The Red Army's operations were mainly guerrilla warfare. Although it also mentioned destroying enemy corps under favorable conditions, it was mainly the former.Whether it's planting willows, or old hens laying eggs, let's talk about it when we are full, it means that we must first develop our strength before we have the capital to fight the Japanese army.Mao Zedong thought very deeply and far.

Zhang Wentian agreed with Mao Zedong's opinion.He believes that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, and it cannot be used up alone, but the main thing is to mobilize the masses. In the military, it is to launch a vast guerrilla war.The center is to support the protracted war in North China, focusing on winning the Taihang Mountains and the areas east of them.In terms of combat, it is mainly guerrilla warfare. In general, we should do it if we make money, and quit if we don’t make money. It is to preserve our strength and expand our strength as much as possible. But at that time, many people wanted to go to the front line as soon as possible and fight a few vigorous battles. They always felt that fighting guerrilla warfare was not enough, and they didn't look like national heroes.Many people proposed to fight mobile warfare, or mobile guerrilla warfare, or guerrilla mobile warfare.

Ren Bishi advocated "concentrating forces to eliminate the enemy under favorable conditions without losing the opportunity", so the Red Army's course of action is still "independent guerrilla warfare in mountain movements". Based on his analysis of the situation, Zhou Enlai believed that "moving guerrilla warfare is better", and advocated that "in our area, we should deploy guerrilla warfare behind the enemy's rear and concentrate our forces to destroy the enemy when necessary." Liu Bocheng also believed that the operational policy should be "moving guerrilla warfare".

In Peng Dehuai's view, "the possibility of mobile warfare has been reduced," but "guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare are inseparable." As for Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s favorite general, according to Nie Rongzhen’s recollection and analysis, his thinking is still stuck on the experience of fighting the Kuomintang army. He felt that during the civil war, we could wipe out the Kuomintang army with whole divisions. What does the Japanese invading army have? amazing!His estimate of the power of Japanese imperialism was too low. Due to the tense battle and the critical situation in Shanxi, the army was eager to start, and there was no time to fully discuss the operational policy and clearly define it in concept. The Eighth Route Army's operational policy was left to practice to verify and improve.

In mid-September, the Japanese army advanced to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi Province, in two routes: one was to attack Yanmen North Pass from Datong, and the other was to attack Pingxing Pass from Yu County and Guangling West.The forward all the way back has approached Lingqiu.Yan Xishan, who was in charge of commanding the second war zone, was in a hurry. He planned to concentrate his forces to fight the Japanese invaders at Yanmen Pass, Pingxing Pass, and Shahe. Order the 115th Division to rush into Pingxingguan, cooperate with friendly forces, and flank the enemy who invaded Pingxingguan.

The situation was critical, and the Eighth Route Army began to mobilize without waiting for the reorganization to be ready. 30,000 brave athletes quickly left northern Shaanxi. Pingxingguan is a dangerous pass at the junction of Hebei and Shanxi, and it is an important pass at the southern end of the Inner Great Wall.From the mountain pass in the east of Pingxingguan to Henan Town in the east of Lingqiu County is a narrow valley road running southwest and northeast, and the only way to Pingxingguan is in the middle.The terrain here is dangerous, the cliff is several feet high, steep as a cut, the top of the cliff is gentle, and the weeds are overgrown. It is an ideal place to ambush and wipe out the enemy.The head of the 115th Division wanted to use this place to block the enemy.

After the division commander Lin Biao arrived at the front line, he reported to the central government the current action plan of the 115th Division. He planned to use the 343rd Brigade to concentrate on fighting at Pingxingguan and prepare to attack the enemy's left rear. Mao Zedong in Yan'an was very anxious when he learned of this situation. On the 16th, he called Lin Biao and said: "Our army should adhere to the established policy and use guerrilla warfare to cooperate with friendly forces. This policy was decided in Beijing with Jiang He. Zhou Peng was in front of Jin and Yan. decided, basically do not waver in this policy.”

Earlier, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai, asking him to "emphasize explaining our army's basic principle of 'independent mountain guerrilla warfare' in Shanxi, Hebei, and Nanjing, and obtain their thorough understanding and consent." On the 17th, Mao Zedong called Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi, Lin Biao and others, emphasizing: "The Red Army is a detachment at this time and cannot play a decisive role in decisive battles. But if deployed properly, it can support guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi) decisive role." Around the 20th, Lin Biao proposed another idea, advocating temporarily concentrating all of the 115th Division and taking advantage of the favorable terrain in Shanxi to wipe out part of the advancing Japanese army and win a battle so as to enhance the prestige of the Communist Party and the Red Army and inspire the confidence of the people of the whole country in the war of resistance.Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi and others at the front also had similar ideas.

Mao Zedong also recognized this.In a telegram in September, it stated: "It is an excellent time to take advantage of the new arrival of the Red Army to boost its strength and the camera to change its approach." Subsequently, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Yan Xishan coordinated the Eighth Route Army's action plan: the 115th Division flanked the Japanese at Pingxing Pass and cooperated with friendly forces; the 120th Division was active in northwest Shanxi, waiting to flank and attack the enemy at Yanmen Pass. Mao Zedong expressed his views on Yan Xishan's decisive battle in Shahe, saying that "Yan Xishan is now in the contradiction that if he does not fight a war, he will not be able to answer the Shanxi people, and if he wants to fight a war, he will not be sure. His contradiction cannot be resolved. of".Yan may be forced to hold a decisive battle, "However, the general trend will not last long. Regardless of the outcome of the decisive battle, Taiyuan and the whole of North China are in dire straits."

Under such circumstances, "today the Red Army does not play any decisive role in the issue of decisive battles, but has a special skill of its own, in which it can definitely play a decisive role, and this is truly independent mountain guerrilla warfare (not mobile warfare). To carry out such a policy, it is necessary to have strategically strong troops on the enemy's flanks, it is necessary to focus on creating base areas to mobilize the masses, and it is necessary to disperse forces instead of focusing on concentrating on fighting. "Only doing mass work in a dispersed manner is the only way to decisively defeat the enemy and aid the friendly army. Concentrating on fighting is currently fruitless."

This is a telegram on September 21, which shows that Mao Zedong has always disagreed with the idea that front-line commanders should concentrate their forces on a mobile war. But he also respected the opinions of the generals in front. In the telegram, he said that if you insist on concentrating your forces to fight a war, of course you can. . On September 24, Mao Zedong replied to Zhou, Zhu, Peng, and Ren, and finally decided: "Both the Lin division and Wang Zhen's department will be used in combat."The front and rear generals finally reached a consensus on the deployment of concentrating a part of the Eighth Route Army to flank the Japanese army at Pingxingguan and cooperate with friendly forces. On September 22, the 9th and 21st Brigades of the Fifth Division of Itagaki, which were known for their fierceness in the Japanese army, marched westward from Guangling and Lingqiu, and rushed towards the front line of Pingxingguan. On the evening of September 24, the main force of the 115th Division set off to the predetermined area in the torrential rain, set up ambush on the mountains on both sides of Pingxing Pass, and controlled the road from Lingqiu to Pingxing Pass.The rest of the troops were kept in reserve, ready to strike reinforcements. Just before dawn, the 21st Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Japanese Army, known as the "Flower of the Army", has about 4,000 people, led by 100 vehicles, with more than 200 carts and mules, horses and artillery teams in the middle, and a small number of cavalry in the rear. , driving swaggeringly from east to west. After entering China, the Japanese army had not encountered substantial resistance, and they thought they were invincible, but they didn't know that the Chinese troops on both sides of the mountain had sharpened their swords, and the Japanese army still entered the ambush circle arrogantly. At about 7 o'clock in the morning, Lin Biao gave an order: fight! In an instant, machine guns, rifles, and mountain artillery roared together, and streams of angry flames poured condescendingly on the Japanese army. Suffering from this sudden onslaught, the Japanese army suddenly panicked. Vehicles collided with vehicles, people crowded people, and a large number of Japanese soldiers fell to their deaths one after another. However, the Itagaki Division is a well-trained and very effective force after all, and it quickly organized a counterattack. The brave soldiers of the Eighth Route Army didn't give the enemy a chance at all. Like a tiger descending the mountain, they charged onto the highway and started hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.I saw gun stocks flying, sabers flashing, roars and explosions, all mixed together. During the battle, a Japanese plane suddenly appeared in the sky.However, because the Eighth Route Army was fighting hand-to-hand with the Japanese army and the two sides were fighting together, the enemy plane did not dare to drop bombs, so it could only circle a few times in the air, "buzzing" a few times, and then flew back. Fighting until noon, more than 1,000 Japanese troops blocked in the valley were all annihilated, and all their transport vehicles were destroyed.The reinforcements organized by Itagaki were blocked by the Independent Regiment and the Cavalry Battalion in the area north and east of Lingqiu. The 115th Division, an elite unit of the Communist Party that had not been wiped out by Chiang Kai-shek's million-strong army, broke the myth of "the imperial army is invincible" when it fought the first battle at Pingxingguan. underfoot.In the situation where the Kuomintang army in North China was collapsing again and again, the great victory at Pingxingguan was eye-catching. Congratulatory telegrams and letters flew like snowflakes to Yan'an and the Eighth Route Army headquarters in North China.Chiang Kai-shek, He Yingqin and other officials sent commendation telegrams full of praise. However, this campaign was not perfect.Before the start of the battle, Lin Biao originally wanted to take advantage of the dangerous terrain and create a shocking move at a small cost. Although the attack was successful, because the Eighth Route Army was fighting the Japanese invaders for the first time, it was inexperienced and not good at fighting in evacuated formations. And followed the practice during the Civil Revolutionary War, wanting to capture more enemies alive, everyone gathered together and shouted, "Old fellow, hand in your guns!"The Japanese army was extremely arrogant and powerful, and even if they were defeated or injured, they would fight to the end.Therefore, in the battle, although the Eighth Route Army eliminated more than 1,000 enemies, its own casualties were also very large, reaching more than 1,000 people.In the summary report, Lin Biao admitted: "The enemy is indeed capable of fighting." The Eighth Route Army reorganized from the Red Army is the seed of revolution. If we continue to fight like this, before the Japanese army is wiped out, I will lose all my money within 8 months.Moreover, the battle in the Pingxingguan area was originally deployed by Yan Xishan, the commander of the second war zone. However, some of his generals were afraid of the enemy and some wanted to preserve their strength. As a result, many surrounded enemies broke through and fled, which is embarrassing. .Moreover, Yan did not impose any punishment afterwards. These facts alerted the generals of the Eighth Route Army, and they realized Mao Zedong's good intentions in actual combat. In October, when Wei Lihuang took office to deploy the Xinkou Battle, and prepared to place the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army in a frontal battle, Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai went to the frontline headquarters to meet Wei and said: They do not agree to put all the troops on the front line. They did not agree to transfer the 129th Division to the front of the middle road to fight positional warfare, but advocated that they be moved back to the rear of the Japanese army to develop their strengths and find opportunities to attack the enemy. The victory of Pingxingguan also had a great influence on Mao Zedong.After the Eighth Route Army left the division for the first time, it concentrated a large force to carry out an ambush against the Japanese army and achieved success. While emphasizing guerrilla warfare, it also paid attention to concentrating troops to fight some mobile warfare. On September 27, the day after the Battle of Pingxingguan, Mao Zedong called Zhou, Zhu, Peng, and Ren: "The current Great Wall War of Resistance is temporary, and Yan Xishan must ask our army to cooperate with him in fighting one or two battles. If the army has better influence, it is of course possible to participate under really favorable conditions, but it must be considered that this is only a temporary situation in the campaign, and the fundamental policy is to win over the masses and organize guerrilla units among the masses. Carry out conditional concentrated operations." During the Battle of Xinkou, Mao Zedong, proceeding from the situation at the time, showed a positive attitude towards the Eighth Route Army's concentration of troops to fight under favorable conditions. The 115th Division, 120th Division, and 129th Division won successive battles. Among them, the 769th Regiment of the 129th Division attacked Yangmingbao Airport in Daixian County at night, blowing up all 24 planes and became famous far and wide. According to the experience of the War of Resistance in North China, Mao Zedong revised the formulation of the strategic policy of the Eighth Route Army. On October 25, he talked with the British reporter Bertrand and said: "The tactics adopted by the Eighth Route Army now, we call it independent guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare." Appropriate emphasis on mobile warfare is a major development of the party leaders' strategic policy against Japan, which has transformed our army's strategic policy into the basic framework of "basically guerrilla warfare, but mobile warfare under favorable conditions will not be relaxed." In mid-December, Mao Zedong pointed out at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee: The strategic policy of the Red Army is independent mountain guerrilla warfare, fighting mobile warfare under favorable conditions, and concentrating superior forces to destroy part of the enemy. Moreover, Mao Zedong believed that an annihilation war like Pingxingguan was feasible under the conditions of guerrilla warfare and belonged to the category of guerrilla strategy.This was reflected in a speech he gave on July 16, 1938 at the Eighth Route Army Remaining Corps.He said: "Some people say that guerrilla warfare like this has no reputation, not as famous as Taierzhuang. You must know that there are battles like Pingxingguan if you fight well." In short, the Pingxingguan Battle was a turning point for the perfection of the Eighth Route Army's guerrilla strategy.The perfection and scientific elaboration of this strategic policy not only has the outstanding contribution of Mao Zedong, but also contains the collective wisdom of the frontline commanders of the Eighth Route Army.It is precisely under the guidance of the correct strategic policy that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are invincible.