Chapter 14 "We just want to plant willows and let the old hen lay eggs"

The Eighth Route Army's deployment to fight against Japan was different from previous domestic revolutionary wars. It formed an alliance with the Kuomintang army to deal with a powerful national enemy. What to do after leaving the army and what strategy to fight against Japan urgently needs to be determined.Is it to follow the Kuomintang's command completely, or is it independent?Should we concentrate our forces to fight mobile warfare, or disperse them to fight guerrilla warfare?Is it based on combat, or on the establishment of base areas?These are relatively vague among the anti-Japanese soldiers who have only one passion.

Mao Zedong had been thinking about this issue for a long time.He is considering a strategic policy that is practical and most in line with the interests of the party and the nation.This policy can not only ensure the effective resistance of the Eighth Route Army against Japan, but also develop and strengthen itself.After the start of the all-out war of resistance, the Kuomintang army, numbering in the tens of thousands, was pushed onto the frontal battlefield and assumed the strategic task of frontal resistance.Obviously, the Communist army, which numbered only 30,000 to 40,000, could not play much role in the frontal battlefield, and fighting regular battles was not the specialty of the Red Army.Therefore, when Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Ye Jianying and others discussed the reorganization of the Red Army with the Kuomintang, on August 1, 1937, Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian called Zhou Enlai and others, and for the first time clearly put forward the combat principles of the Red Army, believing that the Red Army must Adhere to "execute independent and decentralized guerrilla warfare under the overall strategic policy, rather than positional warfare or centralized warfare."

On August 4th, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ye Jianying were preparing to go to Nanjing to attend the National Defense Conference. Mao Zedong and others telegraphed them to make the following requests to the Kuomintang regarding the Red Army's participation in the war: (1) The entire Anti-Japanese War was a combination of regular warfare and guerrilla warfare. The troops should be used appropriately according to the terrain conditions and the development of the battle situation. In order to adapt to the nature of guerrilla warfare, in principle, they should be used separately rather than in a concentrated manner." Centered at the junction of the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Jinsui and Sui, the enemy carried out flank guerrilla warfare toward the westward advance of Pingsui Road and the southward advance of Pinghan Road." ) "Launching the people's armed self-defense war is the central link to ensure the victory of the army, and this policy is a sure way to lose."

These four principles supplemented the Red Army’s operational principles put forward on August 1. Among them, the idea of ​​mobilizing the masses to carry out “armed self-defense warfare” was of great significance to the development of independent guerrilla warfare, and it was also an important content that formed the later people’s war thought. On August 10, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Xuefeng, the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stationed in Shanxi. In mountain warfare, we will not fight on the plains, and it is better to achieve independent command under the overall strategic deployment.

Zhou Enlai and others negotiated based on the above-mentioned principles, and finally Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin agreed that the Eighth Route Army would act as a strategic guerrilla detachment, carry out the combat tasks of only conducting flank warfare, not frontal warfare, assisting friendly forces, disrupting and restraining most of the enemy, and destroying a part of the enemy. So far, Mao Zedong's preliminary guerrilla warfare policy has been approved by the Kuomintang commander, and he has obtained the power to command the Eighth Route Army to conduct independent guerrilla warfare.

In order to unify the understanding of the generals of the Red Army, on August 8, Zhang Wentian called Peng Dehuai and Ren Bishi in Yunyang, telling them that a meeting of the Politburo would be held before the departure of the Red Army to discuss combat issues, and the location would be in Fengjia Village, Luochuan. Luochuan, at that time, was the place where the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Kuomintang jurisdiction were handed over. It was 90 kilometers away from Yan'an City in the north and more than 10 kilometers away from the Kuomintang jurisdiction in the south.The Politburo meeting was chosen to be held in Luochuan mainly to facilitate the participation of the Red Army generals who were being reorganized.

On the 22nd, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo was held in Luochuan, mainly to discuss and formulate the CCP's strategic tasks and basic policies in the War of Resistance. At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a report, clearly stating that the basic tasks of the Red Army are: (1) Establish anti-Japanese base areas; (2) contain and destroy the enemy; (3) cooperate with friendly forces in combat; (4) preserve and expand the Red Army; (5) strive for leadership in the national revolutionary war. In order to accomplish the basic tasks of the Red Army, Mao Zedong pointed out, "Our policy can only be independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains—including destroying enemy corps under favorable conditions and developing guerrilla warfare on the plains—but focusing on the mountains."

Mao Zedong also said humorously in his unique language: "We just want to plant willows and let the old hen lay eggs. Based on ourselves, we will talk when we are full." The strategic policy of "independent mountain guerrilla warfare" proposed by Mao Zedong included the following three elements: One is "independence".This independence means a relatively independent command under the united front and the overall strategic policy. Mao Zedong's firm grasp of the issue of "independence and self-reliance" has a deep political background.The Kuomintang and the Communist Party united and cooperated to form a united front under the situation of national enemy invasion. In the united front, the Communist Party is a small party, and the Kuomintang is a large party, and it is the ruling party with a large number of troops.The two parties are friends in the anti-Japanese stance, but they are still enemies in class relations.Chiang Kai-shek never forgot to weaken and eliminate the Communist Party. He changed Sun Yat-sen's policy of "accommodating the Communist Party" into "dissolving the Communist Party" in an attempt to "dissolve" the Communist Party through the united front.Starting from the consultation and cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, during the negotiations, he turned the negotiations into "incorporation" for a while, and then proposed the establishment of the "National Revolutionary League".Later, he advocated that the reorganized Red Army should be directly led by the camp, and Zhu De and Mao Zedong should be invited to go abroad.He was unwilling to formulate a common political program for the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and he did not allow the organizational form of the united front.This shows that the Kuomintang has no intention of fundamentally improving the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but hopes to restrict, weaken, and dissolve the Communist Party through the united front.Moreover, in the "April 12" counter-revolutionary coup in 1927, the CCP suffered a sudden disaster. The profound lesson that people were knifed and I was fish was never forgotten by Mao Zedong. "The heart of defense against others is indispensable" in the united front.Therefore, Mao Zedong believed that adhering to the principle of independence is crucial. The Communist Party must insist on absolute leadership over the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and be able to independently mobilize and command its own troops; After the Eighth Route Army goes to the front line, it must have the freedom to mobilize the masses, establish base areas, organize its own troops, and implement strategic policies flexibly according to the enemy's situation.In this way, a certain limit of power of the Communist Party is maintained, which is more conducive to cooperation, consolidating the united front, and supporting the long-term war of resistance.

The second is "mountain".The mountainous area Mao Zedong mentioned meant first creating bases in the mountainous areas, relying on the mountainous areas to carry out guerrilla warfare, and then developing to the plains as appropriate. Why choose a mountain?The reason is that the mountainous terrain is complex and acts as a natural barrier, which is conducive to the concealment and maneuvering of the Eighth Route Army, but it is not conducive to the Japanese army's mechanized advantages.It is easy to establish a base here; it is easy to gain a foothold here; to carry out guerrilla warfare here, it is easy to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.

Chen Yi agreed with Mao Zedong's opinion very much. He once wrote a majestic poem "Books from the Taihang Mountains", praising the importance of the mountains and rivers of the Taihang Mountains! Shanxi is in the arms, and Hebei is on the left shoulder. Shandong has a panoramic view, and Henan shows the nose. The Great Wall and the desert serve as the apse, supporting Shaanxi and Gansu. What's more, when people are in harmony with the sky, the geographical advantage is closely related to offense and defense. Entrepreneurship does not depend on the base, I live in Taihang dream soul peace.

The third is "guerrilla warfare".Guerrilla warfare refers to dividing troops to mobilize the masses, concentrating them to destroy the enemy, and fleeing if they win or fleeing if they cannot win. Guerrilla warfare can be said to be the specialty of the Communist Party. Mao Zedong and Zhu De are both experts in guerrilla warfare.During the early days of the Red Army, Mao Zedong led the rest of the Autumn Harvest Uprising to Jinggangshan.In the Jinggang Mountains with a radius of 500 miles, he learned from Zhu Deaf, the king of the mountain, to circle the enemy among the high mountains, lead the enemy by the nose and cross the mountains. Exhausted from procrastination and dizzy, the Red Army looked for a favorable opportunity, concentrated its superior forces, and wiped out the enemies one by one.Relying on this tactic, the Red Army smashed the Kuomintang army's heavy encirclement and suppression again and again. Not only was the Red Army not wiped out, but it continued to grow.Now the Eighth Route Army is facing the same problems as the Red Army when it was first built: few people and poor weapons; but the enemy it faces is even stronger, the Japanese invading army armed to the teeth.Therefore, you can't confront the enemy head-on and fight for consumption. You can only use your own strengths and use favorable terrain to deal with the enemy. The enemy's transportation line caused the enemy to fall into a catastrophe. In this regard, Mao Zedong was full of confidence.Except for a part of the Eighth Route Army left behind to defend the border areas, the rest of the more than 30,000 Red Army backbones who had passed the test of the Long March all flew to the enemy's rear to mobilize and organize the masses of the people, and use the snowball method to develop the anti-Japanese forces. , put it in the flames of the people's war, and burn it alive!