Chapter 20 Part II: Of the various accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue

PART TWO: OF THE DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE INTRODUCTION The various accounts that have been given of the nature of virtue, or of the dispositions of mind which constitute good and praiseworthy qualities, may be grouped into three types.A good temper of mind, according to some, consists not in any one affection, but in the proper control and domination of all our affections.These affections may be regarded as either good or evil, according to the object they pursue and the intensity with which they pursue it.Virtue, according to these authors, thus consists in propriety.

According to others, virtue consists in the deliberate pursuit of our own interest and happiness, or in the proper control and domination of those selfish passions which are the only object of pursuit.Thus, according to these authors, virtue consists in prudence. Other writers hold that virtue exists only in those affections whose object is to promote the happiness of others, and not in those affections whose object is to promote our own.Disinterested benevolence, therefore, is, according to them, the only motive which can stamp any action with the stamp of virtue. Obviously, the nature of virtue must either be indiscriminately attributed to people's various emotions that are properly controlled and guided; or it must be limited to a certain type or part of these emotions.Our affections are broadly divided into selfish and benevolent affections.If, therefore, the nature of virtue cannot be reduced indiscriminately to all human affections which are under proper control and dominion, it must be limited to those affections which have as immediate object their own private happiness, or to those affections which have as immediate object their own private happiness, or to those affections which have as their immediate object their own private happiness, or to those which have as their immediate object the private happiness of others. those feelings whose happiness is the immediate object.

Thus, if virtue does not consist in propriety, it must consist in prudence, or in benevolence.It is difficult to imagine any other account of the nature of virtue than these three.In what follows I shall endeavor to show how all other interpretations, which apparently differ from them, agree with them in one way or another in essence. CHAPTER I: On those systems which hold that virtue consists in propriety, according to Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, virtue consists in the propriety of conduct, or in the propriety of the affections, according to This emotion, we act upon the object that arouses it.

1. In Plato's system, the soul is regarded as something like a small state or body, which consists of three distinct functions or orders. The first is the judgment function.It is a function not only of determining what are suitable means to any end, but of determining which ends are desirable to pursue, and the degree to which we should value each accordingly.Plato properly calls this function reason, and regards it as (and should be) the guiding principle of all affections.It is evident that under this name he includes not only the function by which we judge truth and falsity, but also the function by which we judge the propriety or inappropriateness of wishes and affections.

Plato reduces the different passions and desires, the natural objects of this governing principle (and the natural objects most likely to rebel against their masters), into two distinct types or classes.The former consists of those passions based on pride and resentment, or on what the scholastics called the irritable side of the soul; namely, ambition, hatred, love of honor and fear of shame, fear of victory, superiority, desire for revenge, etc.; in short, all these passions are considered to derive from or signify temper or natural enthusiasm, which is usually metaphorized in our language.The second consists of those passions based on the love of pleasure, or on what the scholastics call the sensual side of the soul.It includes bodily desires of every kind, the love of comfort and security, and the satisfaction of all carnal desires.

Except when excited by one or the other of these two different passions, by unruly ambition and resentment, or by the constant allure of immediate comfort and pleasure, We seldom interrupt the plan of action which the above-mentioned guiding principles require of us, and which in all our calm moments have settled down as our most expedient pursuit of the object.But although these two passions can easily lead us astray, they are still considered a necessary part of human nature: the former has always been used to protect us from harm, to maintain our place in the world and dignity, which lead us to aspire to what is noble and respectable, and enable us to recognize those who act in the same way.The second passion is used to provide the nourishment and necessities that the body needs.

In the strength, exactness, and perfection of this guiding principle lies the fundamental virtue of prudence.Prudence, according to Plato, consists in impartial and clear perception, grounded in a comprehensive and scientific conception of the ends fit to be pursued and the means to be employed for their attainment. The first passion, the irritable part of the soul, constitutes the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity when, under the direction of reason, it becomes so strong that men despise all dangers in the pursuit of greatness and riches.According to Plato's moral system, this passion is more generous and noble than other natures.They are considered on many occasions to be the supplements of reason, used to check and restrain base and wild desires.You know how often we are angry with ourselves when the love of pleasure drives us to do things we disapprove of, and we are often the object of self-hatred and wrath; and this irascible part of human nature is thus called to help Reasoned passions triumph over passions caused by desire.

When all those three distinct parts of our nature are in complete harmony with one another, when neither the irascible passions nor the passions aroused by desire pursue any satisfaction which reason disapproves, This blissful calm, this perfect and absolutely harmonious soul, when nothing is ever ordered to be done outside of things, constitutes the virtue expressed by that word in Greek, which we usually translate as ego Restraint, however, could more properly be translated as good temper, or inner calm and temperance. According to Plato's moral system, when each of the three functions of the mind is confined to its proper function, and does not attempt to overtake that of any other; when reason predominates and the passions are subordinate; when each passion performs its own Justice arises when a just duty endeavors to achieve its just ends smoothly and freely, and with a degree of force and energy commensurate with the cost of the end it pursues. The last and most important of the virtues.That perfect virtue, the greatest propriety of conduct—which Plato calls justice, after some of the disciples of ancient Pythagoras—resides in this system.

Note that the Greek word for justice has several different meanings.As far as I know, the corresponding words in all other languages ​​​​have this situation.Therefore, there must be some natural similarities between these different meanings.In one sense, we say that our attitude toward another is just when we do not inflict any actual harm on him, directly injure his person, property, or reputation.Justice in this sense, which I have discussed above, may be compelled to be observed, and punished if violated. Another sense is that if the other person's character, position, and relationship to us make us properly and actually feel that he should be loved, respected, and respected, and we do not express this, and do not respond accordingly with the above feelings. To treat him is to say that our attitude towards him was unrighteous.Though we have done him no harm anywhere, if we do not endeavor to do him good, to put him where the impartial spectator would be pleased, in this first sense, say The attitude we take toward the person with whom we are of merit is also unrighteous.The first sense of the word corresponds to what Aristotle and the Scholastics called justice in the narrow sense, and what Grotius called justitia expletrix.It consists in not infringing on others, in doing voluntarily all that we are required to do by etiquette.The second sense of the word corresponds to what some have called justice in the broad sense, and what Grotius has called justitia attributrix.It consists in proper benevolence, in the proper employment of our own affections, in its application to those benevolent or philanthropic ends, to those ends which seem most expedient to us.In this sense justice encompasses all social virtues.However, the word justice is sometimes used in another sense, which is broader than the first two, though this sense is very similar to the second.As far as I know, this third meaning is also present in every language.When we do not seem to regard any particular object with that degree of respect, or with that degree of enthusiasm which, in the eyes of the impartial spectator, is due or certainly encouraged— — In pursuing it, we are said to be unrighteous in this third sense.Thus, when we do not admire a poem or a picture adequately, we are said to do them unjustly, and when we exaggerate their admiration, we are said to praise them too much.In the same way we are said to be unjust to ourselves when we seem not to be paying sufficient attention to any particular object of private interest.In this third sense, what is called justice is no different from the exact and perfect propriety of conduct and conduct, which includes not only the duties due to justice in the narrower and wider senses, but also all other virtues, Such as prudence, perseverance and self-restraint.It is evidently in this last sense that Plato understands the word he calls justice, and therefore, according to his understanding, it encompasses all the perfections of virtue.

Such is Plato's account of the nature of virtue, or of the disposition of mind which is the proper object of praise and approbation.According to him, the essence of virtue consists in the state of mind in which each function of the soul operates within its proper sphere, without encroaching on the sphere of action of the other functions, and in exactly the way it should. strength and intensity to perform their respective legitimate responsibilities.Clearly, his account corresponds in every respect to what we have said about propriety of conduct. II. Virtue, according to Aristotle, consists in the ordinary habits of right reason.In his view, every virtue lies in some kind of intermediate state between two opposite evils.One of these two opposite evils is displeasing by too much of one, and too little of the other, by the action of certain things.Fortitude or courage is then an intermediate state between the opposite vices of timidity and rashness.These two faults, under the influence of the thing that arouses the fear, are unpleasant by the excess of the former and by the deficiency of the latter.The virtue of thrift, then, is an intermediate state between the vices of avarice, miserliness, and profligacy.Of these two vices, the former cares more about the object of self-interest than it should, while the latter does not care enough.Nobleness, likewise, is an intermediate state between excessive arrogance, with a certain too strong feeling for our own identity and dignity, and a lack of guts, which is too weak.It is needless to say that this account of virtue is in perfect agreement with what we have said before of propriety and impropriety.

Virtue, according to Aristotle, consists not so much in those moderate and proper affections as in such moderate habits.In order to understand this, it is necessary to mention that virtue can be seen as the quality of an action, as well as the quality of a person.Taken as a quality of an action, it consists, even according to Aristotle, in the rational moderation, whether or not such control is to the man, of the emotion which produces it. a habit.Virtue, if it be regarded as a quality of a man, consists in the habit formed by this rational temperance, in the control which this practice has gradually become habitual and common to the mind.Thus, the act which springs from a generous emotion excited by chance is certainly an act of generosity, but the person who performs it is not necessarily a generous person, since it may be the only act of generosity ever performed by him.The motives and dispositions of the heart in performing the action may be very just and proper, but as this pleasant mood seems to be caused by occasional emotions rather than stable and persistent emotions of the character, it No glory will be brought to this actor.When we call a quality generosity, benevolence, or kindness, we mean that each of these names signifies a common and habitual disposition in that person.And any particular action, however expedient and proper it may be, seldom results in a habit.If an isolated act suffices to mark the character of the man who performs it as virtuous, the lowest quality of mankind may fancy himself possessed of all virtues, for in some cases every one prudently, Act fairly, temperately and fortitude.While individual actions, however laudable, seldom give credit to the person who perpetrates them, yet individual criminal actions by men who usually act with great regularity greatly affect, and sometimes completely destroy. The perception we form of his virtues.Such a single act is enough to show that his habits are imperfect; that he is a less trustworthy person than we tend to suppose from his usual series of behaviours. Aristotle presumably included this in his objections to Plato, when he argued that virtue consists in habits of conduct.Plato seems to have taken the view that merely just sentiments and sound judgments about what is fit to do or what to avoid are sufficient to constitute the most complete virtues.According to Plato, virtue can be regarded as a kind of science.Moreover, he believes that no one person can clearly and well-founded what is right and what is wrong, and act accordingly.Passion may divert our action from ambiguous and uncertain perceptions, but not from simple, definite and obvious assertions.On the contrary, Aristotle's point is: no convincing understanding can form good ingrained habits, and good morality does not come from knowledge but from action. III. According to Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, nature commands each animal to care for itself, and endows it with a sense of self-love.This feeling not only endeavors to maintain its existence, but endeavors to keep the various constituent elements of nature as perfect as they can be. Man's selfish affections, if I may say so, take hold of his body and its various parts, its heart and its various faculties and faculties, and demand the preservation of them all. and maintained in its best and most perfect condition.Nature, therefore, will point out to man that whatever helps to maintain this existing state is suitable to be chosen, and whatever tends to destroy it is suitable to be discarded.Thus, the health, strength, mobility, and comfort of the body, and the external conveniences which promote them; property, power, honor, the respect and respect of those with whom we live, are all taken naturally as things of choice. Recommended to us, and it's better to have these than lack them.On the other hand, physical disease, infirmity, indexterity, and pain, and the inconveniences of external circumstances which tend to attract and cause them; poverty, powerlessness, contempt and hatred of those with whom we live, all the same Suggested to us naturally as something to duck and avoid.In each of these two classes of opposites, there are some things which seem more amenable to selection or rejection than others of the same kind.In the first category, for example, health is clearly preferable to strength, which is preferable to flexibility; fame is preferable to power, which is preferable to wealth.In the second category, physical disease is more to be avoided than dexterity, disgrace to poverty, and poverty to loss of power.Nature presents to us, more or less, various things and circumstances as suitable objects of selection or rejection.The propriety of virtue and conduct consists in choosing and rejecting it; in choosing from among the various alternatives which are always presented to us, when we do not have all available to us; To choose the least of those evils which are always before us, when we cannot avoid them all.According to the Stoics, because we use this correct and precise discernment to choose and reject each thing according to its place in the universe of things, and thereby give each thing its due. Valuing, therefore, we maintain the exactness of the conduct which constitutes the substance of virtue.This is what the Stoics mean by living consistently, that is, living according to nature, according to those laws and directives that nature or the Creator has given us to do. In these respects, the Stoics' ideas of propriety and virtue were not far from those of Aristotle and the ancient Scholars. Among those elementary objects which nature recommends for our proper concern are the happiness of our family, of our relations, of our friends, of our country, of mankind, and of the whole universe.Nature also teaches us that, as the happiness of two is more desirable than that of one, the happiness of many, or of all, must be of infinite importance.We ourselves are only one, so that wherever our own happiness does not coincide with that of the whole, or of a significant part of the whole, we should—even if we choose to do so—make the individual Happiness is subordinate to the happiness of the whole that is so widely valued.Since everything in this world is directed by the providence of a wise, powerful, benevolent God, we may trust that everything that happens contributes to the happiness and perfection of the whole.If, therefore, we ourselves fall into poverty, disease, or any other misfortune, we should first do our best to remove ourselves from this unpleasant situation, as justice and duty to others will permit. rescued.But if, after doing all that we can, we find that there is no way of doing this, we should be content with the fact that the order and perfection of the whole universe require us to remain in this position during this period.And since the happiness of the whole, even to us, is obviously much more important than a paltry piece of our own happiness, if we are to preserve the perfect propriety of our affections and actions in which the perfection of our nature resides, and correctness, then our own situation, whatever it may be, should thereby become the one we like.If any opportunity for our liberation does arise, it becomes our own responsibility to seize it.Obviously, the order of the universe no longer requires us to stay in this situation, and the great master of the world has clearly called us to leave this situation and clearly pointed out the way we should go.The same is true of the misfortunes of one's relatives, friends, and country.If it is within our power, without violating our own sacred duty, to prevent or end their misfortune, there can be no doubt that it is our duty to do so.Properness of conduct—the laws Jupiter provides to guide our conduct—clearly requires us to do so.If, however, it is entirely beyond our power to do so, we should regard this unfortunate event as the most fortunate event which could reasonably have occurred, since we should believe that it contributes most to the good of the whole. Happiness and order, and this is the most important of all things we should (if we are wise and just) desire.Precisely because our own fundamental interests are seen as part of the general interest, the happiness of the whole should not only be a principle, but the only goal we should pursue. Epictetta says: "In what sense are certain things said to be in accord with our nature and others contrary? In the sense in which we see ourselves as In the sense that everything else is disconnected and separate from each other. In this sense, it can be said that the nature of the foot is always to be kept clean. But if you think of it as a foot, don't think of it as a What has to do with the whole body, it should sometimes be trodden on the mire, sometimes on the briers, sometimes sawed off for the benefit of the whole body. If it will not do so, it will no longer is a foot. We should think of ourselves that way. What are you? A human being. If you see yourself as something detached and separate, then living to a long life, wealth and good health is That which pleases your nature. But if you regard yourself as a man, as a part of the whole, you should sometimes be ill for the sake of the whole, sometimes suffer trouble while sailing, and sometimes live in In poverty and want, at last, perhaps, should die before the end of life. Why do you complain then? Don't you know that by doing so you are no more a man than one foot is another foot?" A wise man never complains about fate, nor does he think that fate's arrangements are unfair when he is in trouble.He does not see himself as the whole world, as something unconnected and separate from all parts of nature, as something concerned by himself and for himself.He saw himself in the light he imagined human nature and the great Patronus of the world had seen him.He felt, if I may say so, the divine emotion, and saw himself as an atom, a particle, in the vast system of the universe, who must and should be placed at the mercy of the system as a whole.He is sure of that wisdom which directs all the events of human life, and accepts with pleasure and peace of mind whatever fate befell him.This is the fate he would have wished for himself had he known all the interrelationships and dependencies between the various parts of the universe.If fate calls him to live, he lives contentedly; if fate calls him to die, since there is certainly no need in nature for him to continue to exist in this world, he will willingly go to the other place where he is appointed. world.A cynical philosopher—whose teachings in this respect are similar to the Stoics— said, “I accept with equal joy and contentment any fate that may befall me: rich or poor, happy or Pain, health, or disease. All are the same. Nor do I desire the gods to change my destiny in any way. If I ask the gods to give me anything in addition to the favors they have already bestowed on me, then That is, they will inform me in advance what they will be pleased with, so that I may act according to my situation, and show that I am happy to accept their assignment." "If I am going to sail," Love said. Pictet said: "I choose the best ship and the best helmsman, and I wait for the best weather that my situation and duties have to take into account. Prudence and propriety--these gods to guide my actions Principles given to me--ask me to do so. But these principles require nothing more. If a storm breaks out at sea, though it cannot be resisted by the strength of the ship or the skill of the helmsman, neither will I Worry about the consequences. Everything I had to do has been done. The directors of my actions never commanded me to suffer pain, anxiety, depression or fear. We drown, or arrive safely, is Qiu Butt's business, not mine. I left it entirely to Qiu Bichi to decide, not restlessly considering what methods Jupiter might use to decide the matter, but with the same indifference A sense of security and a sense of security to bear with whatever consequences come your way.” The Stoics, from their confidence in the benevolent sages who govern the universe, and from their complete deference to whatever order these sages deem fit to establish, must necessarily be indifferent to all the events of human life.His whole happiness consists first of all in contemplating the happiness and perfection of this great system of the universe; in contemplating the good administration of this great republic of gods and men; In the thinking of conscious beings.In the second place, in doing his duty; in the proper doing of any little part of the business of the great republic which the above-mentioned sages have appointed him to do.The propriety or inappropriateness of his endeavors may matter to him.And the success or failure of these endeavors may not matter to him at all, it does not give him great pleasure or sorrow, nor does it arouse in him strong desires or aversions.If he prefers some things to others, if some situations are the objects of his choice and others the objects of his rejection, it is not because he considers the former to be in itself in every way preferable to the latter. Things are well, not because he thinks his happiness will be more perfect in what is called fortune than in what is called misfortune, but because of the propriety of actions which the gods have given to guide his actions. The laws he stipulated—required him to make such a trade-off.All his affections were merged and involved in two great affections, that of thinking how to do his duty; and that of thinking of the greatest possible happiness of all rational and conscious beings.With the utmost security he trusts in the wisdom and power of the great Master of the universe to satisfy his latter sentiment.His only anxiety was how to satisfy the former affection, not about the outcome, but about the propriety of his various endeavors.No matter what the ending will be, he believes that the huge power and wisdom are using this ending to promote the overall situation of the universe, and the latter is the ending he himself is most willing to promote. The propriety of this choice, though already pointed out to us, and apprehended by us as it is presented to us by the things themselves, we choose for their own sake.But once we have fully understood this propriety, the normal order, the grace, the goodness which we recognize in this propriety, the happiness which we feel in its consequences, must be before us Show greater value, that is, greater value than is actually gained by choosing all other objects, or greater than the value that is actually avoided by abandoning all other objects.The happiness and glory of human nature come from attention to this propriety, and the misery and disgrace of human nature come from the neglect of this propriety. But to a man of reason, to a man whose passions are perfectly placed under the absolute control of the ruling virtues of his nature, the exact observation of this propriety in every case , are equally easy.If in good times he thanked Jupiter for imposing on himself a circumstance to which he had no trouble adapting, and in which there were few temptations to lead him to evil. on the way.In the face of adversity, he also thanked the director of this scene of human life for placing such a strong competitor by his side.Although the competition may be fiercer, the honor that comes with victory is greater, and victory is equally certain.Is there any shame in such a misfortune that befell us when we were through no fault of our own, and what we had done was perfectly proper?Therefore, there can be no evil in this case, but only the noblest and best.A brave man rejoices at dangers into which it was not his rashness that had brought him, but fate had brought him into it.These dangers provide an opportunity to exercise heroic strength and fearlessness.His efforts brought him great joy.This joy comes from a sense of greater propriety and deserved praise.A man who can successfully withstand various exercises does not abhor the most severe tests of his strength and agency.In the same way a man who is in control of all his passions is not afraid of whatever circumstances the Lord of the Universe thinks fit to place upon him.The grace of God has endowed him with virtues which enable him to control every circumstance.If he encounters pleasure, he restrains it with restraint; if he encounters pain, he endures it with firm will; if he encounters danger or death, he despises it with noble courage and perseverance. .In the events of human life, he is not found at a loss, or at a loss as to how to maintain the propriety of his sentiments and actions.The propriety of such sentiments and actions directly constitutes, in his mind, his honor and happiness. The Stoics seem to have viewed life as a game of great skill.In this game, however, there is a certain chance mixed in, or what is crudely understood as luck. In this game, the stakes are usually negligible, and all the fun comes from playing well, fairly, and skillfully.However, in spite of all skill, if, under the influence of chance, an intelligent player happens to lose, this should be considered a matter of joy rather than grief.He didn't make a wrong move; he didn't do anything he should be ashamed of, and he enjoyed all the fun the game had to offer.If, on the other hand, a clumsy player, in spite of all the wrong moves, happens to win under the influence of chance, his success will give him but little satisfaction.He was ashamed to think of all the mistakes he had made.Even during the game he can't enjoy some of the fun he can get out of it.Unpleasant emotions of worry, doubt, and hesitation arose in him almost before every move because of his failure to grasp the rules of the game.Regret when he discovers that he has made a terribly wrong move usually makes him extremely unhappy.To the Stoics, life, with all the good that may come with it, should be regarded as a mere two-pence stake--something too small to be worth aspiring to care about.Our only concern is not the twopence stake, but the proper manner of playing. If we place our happiness on winning the stake, we place it on chance factors beyond our reach and beyond our control.We necessarily expose ourselves to endless worries and insecurities, and often to sad and humiliating disappointments.If we place our happiness in playing well, in playing justly, in playing wisely and skillfully, in the propriety of our conduct, in short, in the proper training, education,和专注、自己完全有能力去控制、完全受自己支配的东西之上，我们的幸福就完全有保证，并且不受命运的影响。如果我们行为的结果，超出了我们的控制能力，同样也超出我们关心的范围，我们就不会对行为的结果感到担心或焦虑，也不会感到任何悲伤甚或严重的失望。 斯多葛学派的学者们说，人类生活本身，以及可能随之而来的种种便利或不便利，可以根据不同的情况而分别成为我们取舍的合宜对象。如果在我们的实际处境中，使天性感到愉快的情况多于使它感到不快的情况，也就是说，作为选择对象的情况多于作为抛弃对象的情况，在这种场合，从整体上说，生活是合宜的选择对象，而且行为的合宜性需要我们继续生活下去。另一方面，如果在我们的实际处境中，由于不可能有任何改善的希望，使天性感到不快的情况多于使它感到愉快的情况，也就是说，作为抛弃对象的情况多于作为选择对象的情况，在这种场合，对智者来说，生活本身成为抛弃的对象，他不仅有权摆脱这种生活，而且，行为的合宜性，即神为了指导他的行动而给他规定的法则，也需要他这样做。 爱比克泰德说：我被吩咐不得住在尼科波利斯，我就不住在那里。我被吩咐不得住在雅典，我就不住在雅典。我被吩咐不得住在罗马，我就不住在罗马。我被吩咐得住在狭小而岩石多的杰尔岛，我就住在那儿。但是杰尔岛的房子受到烟薰火燎，如果烟小一些我就会忍受着住下去。如果烟太大，我就会去另一所房子，到了那儿，再也没有什么威力可以叫我离开。我总是惦记着把门开着，在我高兴时就可以走出来，还可以到另一所适宜的房子里去隐居。这所房子在一切时候都向世人敞开。因为在那儿，除贴身的衣服之外，除自己的躯体之外，没有一个活着的人有任何可以凌驾于我的权力。斯多葛学派的这个学者说，如果你的处境大体上是令人不快的；如果你的房子烟薰火燎得太厉害，你务必得走出来，但是走出来时不要发牢骚、不要嘟哝或抱怨。平静地、满意地、高高兴兴地走出来，并且答谢神祇们。这些神出于她们极大的恩惠，敞开了死亡这个安全和平静的避风港， 随时可以在人类生活充满风暴的海洋上接待我们。这些神准备了这个神圣的、不受侵犯的、巨大的避难所。它总是敞开着，随时可以走进去，完全把人类生活中的狂暴和不义排除在外，并且大得足以容纳一切愿意和不愿意到这儿来隐居的人。这个避难所剥夺了一切人一切抱怨的借口，甚至消除了这样一种幻想，即： 人类生活中除了诸如人由于愚蠢和软弱而遭受的不幸之外还会有什么不幸。 斯多葛学派的学者们，在他们的一些流传给我们的哲学片断中，有时谈到愉快甚至轻松地抛弃生命。我们认为，这些哲学家可能用这些段落来引诱我们相信他们的想象：无论什么时候，由于微小的厌恶和不适，人们可以带着嬉闹和任性的心情合宜地抛弃生命。爱比克泰德说：“当你同这样的人一起吃晚饭时，你为他告诉你有关他在迈西恩战争中的冗长的故事发牢骚。他说：'我的朋友，在告诉了你我在这样的地方如何占领高地之后，我现在还要告诉你在另一个地方我是如何陷入包围之中的'。但是，如果你决意不再忍受他那冗冗的故事的折磨，就不去领受他的晚餐。如果领受了他的晚餐，你就找不到起码的借口来抱怨他讲那冗长的故事。这种情况和你所说人类生活中的邪恶是同一回事。不要埋怨不论什么时候你都有力量去摆脱的东西。”尽管表述的口气带有愉快甚至轻松的味道， 然而，在斯多葛学派的学者们看来，在抛弃生命或继续生活下去之间的抉择，是一件需要极其严肃和慎重地去考虑的事情。在我们得到早先把我们放到人类生活中来的主宰力量明确无误地要我们抛弃生命的召唤之前，我们决不应该这样做。 但是我们不仅仅在到了人生指定的和无法再延长的期限时，才认为自己受到这样的召唤。无论什么时候，主宰力量的天意已经把我们的生活条件从整体上变成合宜的抛弃对象而不是选择对象时，这个主宰力量为了指导我们的行为而给我们规定的伟大法则，就要求我们抛弃生命。那时，可以说我们听到了神明确无误地号召我们去这样做的庄严而又仁慈的声音。 在斯多葛学派的学者看来，正是因为上述理由，离开生活，对一个智者来说， 虽然是十分幸福的，但是这可能是他的本分；相反，继续生活下去，对一个意志薄弱者来说，虽然必定是不幸的，但是这可能是他的本分。如果在智者的处境中， 天然是抛弃对象的情况多于天然是选择对象的情况，那么，他的整个处境就成为抛弃的对象。神为了指导他的行为而给他规定的准则，要求他像在特定的情况下所能做到的那样，迅速地离开生活。然而，甚至在他可能认为继续生活下去是合适的时候，他那样做也会感到非常幸福。他没有把自己的幸福寄托于获得自己所选择的对象或是回避自己所抛弃的对象，而总是把它寄托于十分合宜地作出取舍。他不把幸福寄托于成功，而把它寄托于他所作出的各种努力的合宜性。相反， 如果在意志薄弱者的处境中，天然是选择对象的情况多于天然是抛弃对象的情况，那么，他的整个处境就成为合宜的选择对象，而继续生活下去就是他的本分。 然而，他是不幸的，因为他不知道如何去利用那些情况。假使他手中的牌非常好， 他也不知道如何去玩这些牌。而且，在游戏过程中或终结时，不管其结果以什么方式出现，他都不能得到任何真正的满足。 虽然斯多葛学派的学者或许比古代任何其他学派的哲学家更坚定地认为，在某些场合，心甘情愿地去死具有某种合宜性，然而，这种合宜性却是古代各派哲学家们共同的说教，甚至也是只求太平不求进取的伊壁鸠鲁学派的说教。在古代各主要哲学派别的创始人享有盛名的时期；在伯罗奔尼撒战争期间和战争结束后的许多年中，希腊的各个城邦国家内部几乎总是被极其激烈的派别斗争搞得一片混乱，在国外，它们又卷入了极其残酷的战争。在这些战争中，各国不仅想占领或统治、而且想完全消灭一切敌国，或者，同样残酷地想把敌人驱入最坏的境地， 即把他们贬为国内的奴隶，把他们（男人、妇女和儿童）像牲口一样出售给市场上出价最高的人。这些国家大都很小，这也很可能使它们往往陷入下述种种灾难之中。这种灾难，或许是它们实际上已经遭受的，或者起码是意欲加到自己的一些邻国头上去的。在这种风云变幻的处境中，最清白无辜而地位最高并担任最重要公职的人，也不能保障任何人的安全，即使他家里的人，他的亲戚和同胞，也总有一天会因为某种怀有敌意的激烈的派别斗争的广泛开展而被判处最残酷和最可耻的刑罚。如果他在战争中被俘，如果他所在的那个城市被占领，他就会受到更大的伤害和侮辱。但是，每个人自然而然地，更确切地说，必然地在自己的想象中熟悉了这种他预见到在他的处境中经常会遇到的灾难。一个海员不可能不常常想到：风暴、船只损坏、沉没海中，以及他自己在这种情况下所能有的感受和行动。同样，希腊的爱国者或英雄也不可能不在自己的想象中熟悉各种各样的灾难。他意识到自己的处境常常会，更确切地说，一定会使他遇到这些灾难。像一个美洲野蛮人准备好他的丧歌，并想好他落到敌人的手中，在他们无休无止的折磨以及所有旁观者的侮辱和嘲笑中死去时，如何行动那样，一个希腊的爱国者或英雄不可避免经常地用心考虑：当他被流放、被监禁、沦为奴隶、受到折磨、 送上刑场时，他会受到些什么痛苦和应当如何行动。但是，各派的哲学家们，不但非常正确地把美德，即智慧、正直、坚定和克制行为，表述成很有可能去获得幸福甚至是这一生幸福的手段，而且把美德表述成必然和肯定获得这种幸福的手段。然而，这种行为不一定使这样做的人免除各种灾难，有时甚至使他们经受这些灾难——这些灾难是伴随国家事务的风云变幻而来的。因此，他们努力表明这种幸福同命运完全无关，或者起码在很大程度上同命运无关；斯多葛学派的学者们认为它们是同命运完全无关的，学院派和消遥学派的哲学家们认为它们在很大程度上是和命运无关的。智慧、谨慎和高尚的行为，首先是最有可能保障人们在各项事业中获得成功的行为；其次，虽然行为会遭到失败，但内心并不是没有得到什么安慰。具有美德的人仍然可能自我赞赏，自得其乐，并且不管事情是否如此糟糕，他可能还会感到一切都很平静、安宁和和谐。他也常常自信获得了每个有理智和公正的旁观者——他们肯定会对他的行为表示钦佩，对他的不幸表示遗憾——的热爱和尊敬，并以此来安慰自己。 同时，这些哲学家努力表明，人生易于遭受到的最大的不幸比通常所设想的更容易忍受。他们努力指出那种安慰，即一个人在陷入贫困、被流放、遭到不公正的舆论指责、以及在年老体衰和临近死亡时双目失明或失去听觉的情况下劳动时，他还能得到的那种安慰。他们还指出了那种需要考虑到的事情，即在极度的痛苦甚至折磨中、在疾病中、在失去孩子以及朋友和亲人等死亡时所感到的悲伤中，可能有助于保持一个人的坚定意志的那些需要考虑到的事情。古代哲学家们就这些课题撰写的著作中流传到现在的几个片断，或许是最有教益和最有吸引力的古代文化遗产。他们学说中的那种气魄和英雄气概，和当代一些理论体系中的失望、悲观、哀怨的调子形成了极好的对照。 但是，当古代的这些哲学家努力用这种方法提出各种需要考虑的事情—— 它们能以持久的耐心，如同弥尔顿所说的能以三倍的顽强，来充实冥顽不灵的心胸——的时候，他们同时也以极大的努力使他们的追随者们确信：死没有什么也不可能有什么罪恶；如果他们的处境在某些时候过于艰难，以致他们不能恒久地忍受，那么，办法就在身边，大门敞开着，他们可以愉快地毫无畏惧地离开。他们说，如果在这个世界之外没有另一个世界，人一死就不存在什么罪恶；如果在这个世界之外另有一个世界，神必然也在那个世界，一个正直的人不会担心在神的保护下生活是一种罪恶。总之，这些哲学家准备好了一首丧歌——如果我可以这样说的话——希腊的爱国者和英雄们在适当的场合会使用这首歌；我想必须承认，斯多葛学派各个不同的派别已经准备好更为激越和振奋人心的歌。