Chapter 46 In the second quarter, the old capital is getting smaller and smaller

At the end of 1946, the Kuomintang army captured Zhangjiakou. Chiang Kai-shek no longer cared about the opposition of the Communist Party and the Democratic League and the pressure from the United States, and refused to postpone the convening of the National Assembly. Peace was hopeless.At the beginning of the following year, Marshall left China and officially announced that the mediation had failed. The CCP's liaison teams in Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing all withdrew to Yan'an, and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party completely broke up. At the beginning of the breakup, Chiang Kai-shek was full of confidence. On the one hand, he arrested dissidents wantonly and eradicated them as the Communist Party or fellow travelers of the Communist Party.As early as at the military conference on October 18, 1946, he announced that the Communist Army would be defeated within five months. His chief of staff, Chen Cheng, even believed that it would only take three to five months. Months are the longest time frame.This kind of confidence and optimism is not entirely based on subjective conclusions, but based on wrong intelligence, which mistakenly believes that the CCP's call for peace shows that it is "vulnerable" militarily.After the capture of Zhangjiakou, it was judged that "the main force of the Communist Party has been defeated."Secret agent Zheng Jiemin even declared at the party and government group meeting on October 21: "The Communist Party's combat effectiveness is very poor, and its organizational strength is not as good as before. If the Hebei and Lu plains can be regained again, the Communist Party will have nothing to do." (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", page 652, see also pages 579 and 623) In fact, From June 1946 to February 1947, the Kuomintang recaptured no less than a hundred cities from the Communist Party during the talks and fights before the split, which seemed to prove that the Communist Army was indeed "vulnerable."Based on this, we can understand why Chiang Kai-shek is not afraid of breaking up, and even actively seeks war?

Under high optimism, Chiang Kai-shek increased the treatment of soldiers to boost morale. He really wanted to win a few big victories, so he adopted a comprehensive offensive strategy in December 1946, and captured more than 170,000 soldiers like a hungry tiger. It occupied more than 160 cities in an area of ​​square kilometers, but failed to capture the main force of the Communist Army. The burden and consumption of defense, Chiang Geng secretly ordered to build defensive fortifications after regaining the stronghold, and it must not be destroyed by the Communist army (see Chiang Kai-shek's "Bandit Suppression Order" revised on December 30, 1946), The burden and consumption have increased even more, and it is expected to open up the main railway lines from Northeast China, North China to East China, but it cannot be completed, and the loss of troops is huge.By March 1947, the all-out offensive was clearly unsustainable. Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to attack the CCP under the title of "Chairman of the State" and "President of the Executive Council". "Yeah.

Chiang Kai-shek's "key offensive" had two priorities: Shandong (military focus) and northern Shaanxi (political focus).In northern Shaanxi, Hu Zongnan was ordered to lead 140,000 troops to attack Yan'an in two ways on March 13, and they conquered it in less than a week.The Kuomintang claimed to have defeated 100,000 communist troops, but US intelligence showed that the communist troops had already withdrawn. (See Rea & Brewer ed., the Forgotten Ambassador, p. 179-180) Jiang Chi telegraphed Hu Zongnan to congratulate him, saying: "Brother Zongnan, the soldiers used their lives to conquer Yan'an in one fell swoop. Indignation is worthy of honor." But Mao Zedong and his central government had gone far away in the mountains of northern Shaanxi, and Hu Zongnan could not pursue them, nor could they capture the 20,000-odd Communist Army in northern Shaanxi. More than a year later, Mao Zedong regained Yan'an.Therefore, the greatest achievement of capturing Yan'an is only propaganda.Chiang Kai-shek led a large number of Chinese and foreign journalists to Yan'an, the red capital, to celebrate the victory, and the newspapers spread the news.The diorama of self-deception will eventually be dismantled, occupying land but unable to annihilate the main force of the enemy, and finally the land will have to change hands.In Shandong, Jiang sent Tang Enbo and other three corps of more than 250,000 people to attack strongly, intending to wipe out the enemy in Yimeng and Jiaodong, but failed.Under the command of Su Yu, the Communist Army dared to take the initiative to attack the reorganized 74th Division, which was fully equipped with American weapons, and wiped it out at Meng Lianggu on May 14. The division commander Zhang Lingfu was killed in battle.The reorganized Seventy-Fourth Division had the strength of an army and was one of the most elite Kuomintang main forces. It was destroyed at once. Chen Yixin, the commander of the East China Field Army, wrote a poem saying: "Meng Lianggu boarded the Ghost God, and the Seventy-Fourth Division has nowhere to escape? Selection" (See "Selected Poems of Chen Yi", page 128) It was enough to shock Chiang Kai-shek.

After being shocked, what lessons have you learned?On May 19, 1947, Chiang Kai-shek talked about the Battle of Meng Lianggu in the second session of "The Study of Bandit Army Tactics and the Essentials of Army Combat" to the Officer Training Corps.Chiang Kai-shek said: Speaking of this, I want to share the most recent lesson and tell everyone that this is what the 74th Division fought in Menglianggu.The Seventy-Fourth Division attacked Tanbu, the base of the bandit army in central Lu this time. After two days of attacking, they failed to capture it. When they found that the main force of the enemy had surrounded him, the whole division retreated to Menglianggu, a mountainous area 30 miles away from Mengyin. .At that time, the entire division had six regiments. If the division, brigade, and regimental commanders had profound tactical training, could choose the appropriate terrain, deploy troops, and form a well-planned fire net, no matter how strong the enemy's troops were, they would never be able to attack them in one day. fix us.But at that time, the division did not guard the mountain pass, but only the top of the mountain, and the top of the mountain was a rocky mountain, and there was no drinking water. Therefore, the enemy's artillery fire was more powerful, and our army suffered more casualties, resulting in a complete failure.This is the most painful and regrettable thing since our army suppressed the bandits.In addition, I heard that another reason for the division's failure this time is that last July, when the 74th Division fought in Huaiyin, it took 3,000 prisoners.Later, when Zhang Lingfu, the commander of the division, came to see me, I warned him face to face: "The prisoners of the bandit army must never be taken in, they must be sent to the rear for shelter." He said: "Many of the prisoners were captured by our army in the past, and It’s not used to supplement combat soldiers, it’s just a handyman, so it’s probably okay.” I said, “It’s not okay to be a handyman, it must be sent to the rear.” I thought he did so, but I didn’t know he didn’t This time, when the division was fighting against the bandit army, when it encountered heavy artillery fire, chaos broke out in the position. I heard that there were miscellaneous soldiers who took the opportunity to clamor and threaten the officers.It can be seen from this that the slightest negligence of our senior generals is enough to endanger the lives of the entire army.Commander Zhang is usually the most loyal, wise and courageous general, but because of a momentary negligence, he suffered such a disastrous defeat. This is something everyone should always remember as a lesson.

Chiang Kai-shek said here that Zhang Lingfu was "a momentary negligence" and was tricked by some captured handymen, resulting in a disastrous defeat.Chen Zuohu, who was involved in the battle with Meng Lianggu, pointed out in a letter to Li Ao that Chiang Kai-shek's statement was mostly inconsistent with the facts.The 74th Division fought in Huaiyin not in the summer of July, but in the cool autumn season. Chen remembers that "when Zhang Lingfu led his staff on horseback to supervise the battle, he was wearing an egg-blue autumn coat."Chen also recalled that after the Seventy-Fourth Division entered the war from Nanjing to the north, until the entire army was wiped out, Zhang Lingfu did not leave the army, and Jiang also inspected it in the future.Chen suspects that "Mr. Jiang told a lie to show off his foresight, and it is obvious through observation."Regarding the captives, the Kuomintang did not have a unified regulation at that time, so it was left to the troops to handle.As for Jiang's "hearing" that during the Battle of Menglianggu, "some miscellaneous soldiers (referring to captured prisoners) took the opportunity to clamor and threaten officials." Chen knew nothing about it in the army. "Fight as usual" did not happen by accident.He suspected that it was "a nonsense fabricated by senior commanders such as Tang Enbo and the few commanders of the 74th Division who were lucky enough not to be captured", intending to shirk his responsibility for incompetent command and ineffective combat. (See Li Ao's "Three Collections of Research on Chiang Kai-shek", pp. 282-286) Apart from the effect of self-deception, this kind of fabrication cannot learn the lesson of the fiasco at all.

Thirteen days after the above-mentioned speech, Chiang Kai-shek gave another lecture on "The Shame and Reflexivity of the Generals of the National Army" to the third study class of the Officer Training Corps, and he also talked about the Battle of Meng Lianggu: As for why the seminar should be convened first, and not at the same time as the third period?This is because in view of the recent performance in the battlefields in central Lu and northern Henan, I believe that our generals in the front have not yet fully understood the military and political significance of suppressing bandits, and cannot establish the belief that they will win. Morality is low, and it is undeniable.Everyone develops the bad habit of self-preservation and self-sufficiency. They only see the interests of the part they lead, and they are almost indifferent to the dangers of friendly troops and the success or failure of the entire battle situation. The military virtues that are necessary for our soldiers' wisdom, trust, benevolence, courage, and strictness are completely lost.Our army is so lax in discipline and so low in spirit that there is absolutely no reason why we should not be spared from being wiped out if we are to fight against the fierce and cunning bandit army.This time Meng Lianggu's 74th Division failed and sacrificed as many as four or five people including the loyal and heroic Commander Zhang Lingfu. reason.

Chiang Kai-shek said here that the battle of Meng Lianggu was defeated because "the friendly army could not come to the rescue in time", and he oversimplified the reason for the disastrous defeat.He was unwilling and unable to realize that this battle was the outstanding performance of Su Yu, a young general of the Communist Army under the trust of Mao Zedong and Chen Yi, and it was also Su Yu's battle of fame.He commanded nine columns with Tanbu as the center, and faced the overwhelming momentum of the five reorganized divisions and one army of Chiang Kai-shek's general Gu Zhutong. The Seventy-Fourth Division of the 74th Division caught the enemy by surprise, won the effect of a surprise attack, and lured the 74th Division into the preset "iron fence", and then stretched its wings forward, gradually forming an encirclement trend.In order to separate the response of the 74th Division and the friendly forces, Su Yu used two columns to penetrate deeply, seize the commanding heights, and split the combination of the 74th Division, the 25th Division, and the 83rd Division respectively, showing the bravery of the generals here. , be brave enough to overcome dangers, and achieve the wonderful task of cutting off the enemy.When Zhang Lingfu, the commander of the 74th Division, found out that he was in danger of being imprisoned in the "iron fence", he was about to withdraw and retreat southward, but Su Yu had already pre-positioned a column in the southwestern area of ​​Tongkou behind the enemy, and within a day, he occupied the area first. Duozhuang, where the 74th Division retreated, blocked the enemy's retreat, and the 74th Division was forced to go to Menglianggu.It can be said that a master plays chess, the first move is to surprise the enemy.When the 74th Division of the U.S. Armed Forces was forced to go up the mountain, all heavy weapons were discarded at the foot of the mountain, which immediately deprived Jiang Jun of its artillery advantage.Chiang Kai-shek said: "Friendly troops cannot go to the aid in time", which should mean that it is impossible to go to the aid, because Su Yu only used five columns to besiege, and another four columns were arranged to block the aid, which prevented Jiang's army from cooperating internally and externally, turning defeat into victory.Su Jun showed tenacious perseverance in blocking the aid.Gu Zhutong's 65th Division, 11th Army, 7th Army, and 48th Division were effectively restrained and could not go to the rescue.In addition, although the 83rd and 25th divisions of the Kuomintang are approaching the encirclement and Meng Lianggu is in sight, they will never be able to surpass the strong defense line that blocks the rescue.The 74th Division was completely isolated, the encirclement gradually narrowed, and there was no way to break through. In the end, food and ammunition were exhausted. Su Yu ordered a general attack, concentrated artillery fire, and all officers and soldiers of the 74th Division surrendered that afternoon.These four days (May 13th to 16th) of the fierce battle fully proved Su Yu's courage as a general, brave and resourceful, and took the lead.Chiang Kai-shek couldn't see this, and actually said that he was defeated by the mob (see Chiang Kai-shek's "Notice to the National Army Officers and Soldiers in Memory of Master Zhang Lingfu's Suppression of Bandit Xianren").There was a lot of hype about Zhang Lingfu's suicide and martyrdom, a memorial meeting, and so on.In fact, the general of the defeated army, why should he be so honored?According to Yang Zhanchun, the staff officer who accompanied Master Zhang, after he was captured, Zhang Lingfu telegraphed to Chiang, saying that he committed mass suicide, but he was actually shot to death. (See Xin Ziling's "The Complete Biography of Mao Zedong", Volume 2, page 99)

Chiang Kai-shek's key offensive in Shandong lost troops and lost generals. Although the Jiaodong offensive was launched again in June and July, there was still little progress. Tubalu, who was not aware of the "millet plus rifles", defeated his elite division with American equipment. mean what?Instead, on June 25, he ordered the High Court to issue a warrant for Mao Zedong's arrest, in order to build up his momentum, a bit like whistling at night.After Chiang Kai-shek's key offensive failed, he was compressed in railway strongholds and big cities, while Mao Zedong shifted from inside to outside. In particular, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping's army took the opportunity to leap thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains.The Dabie Mountains are located between Henan, Anhui, and Hubei provinces, directly threatening Nanjing and Wuhan.During July and August 1947, Mao Zedong had gradually turned from defense to offense, showing the situation of encircling the city with the countryside.Chiang Kai-shek's "Decree to Suppress the Communist Party and Suppress Chaos" on July 5 of the same year was even more stern.In fact, in the second half of 1947, Mao Zedong shouted the slogan "Down with Chiang Kai-shek and liberate the whole of China." So far, it was not the Kuomintang "suppressing the Communist Party" but the Communist Party "suppressing the country."Chiang Kai-shek blamed it on tactical mistakes such as "the friendly army could not come to the rescue in time". Kick over.When Mao Zedong wrote a long article "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War" in December 1936, he quoted the example of Lin Chong (see "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Volume 1, p. 187).But Chiang Kai-shek didn't take this into consideration, who can be blamed?

In January 1948, Chiang Kai-shek "read the map showing the color of the expansion of the Communist bandits, which is horrifying" (see Chiang Kai-shek's diary on January 7, 1948, "Secret Records of President Chiang", page 307 Six), it is a key defensive strategy of withdrawing mining, dividing the war zone into 20 appeasement areas, setting up a commander-in-chief, holding military and political power, and organizing and training the people to enrich the source of troops.At the same time, concentrate our forces on the main point and the main line.In fact, this total concentration is not beneficial to Jiang, because these key points of defense are bound to be cut into isolated islands, waiting for a passive decisive battle. That is the upcoming so-called three major battles of Liaoshen, Huaihai (Xu Bang), and Pingjin, which will make Jiang The elite main force of the family is completely lost?

Chiang Kai-shek claimed to be familiar with "Vour Kriege" by the famous German strategist Cad von Clausewitz. (See Chiang Kai-shek's "Reflections on Clausewitz's Works", published in May 1956) Clausewitz made it very clear: "What is defeating the enemy? It must be the elimination of its force, no matter what method is used to kill or injure the enemy. We must regard the annihilation of all or part of the enemy as the sole goal of all operations." (See Clausewitz On War, p. Expenditure of troops has violated the so-called taboo of military strategists.In order to preserve 20,000 to 30,000 troops, Mao Zedong, who read Sun Tzu's Art of War, did not hesitate to abandon Yan'an and moved to northern Shaanxi. After defeating the enemy, Mao Zedong then regained Yan'an.

Chiang Kai-shek lost the Northeast, not because the Russians tore up the Sino-Russian treaty. If it was torn up, why didn't Stalin hand over the Northeast to Mao Zedong?In fact, most of the weapons and equipment of the 1.2 million Japanese troops in China were handed over to the Central Army of the Kuomintang.In the Northeast, the Soviet army was originally scheduled to withdraw in November 1945, but Chiang had no time to accept it and asked the Soviet army to postpone it to prevent the CCP from taking the lead.The Soviet army was delayed and delayed until it withdrew after the plunder in May 1949. (See Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Pt. 2, P. 727-728) After Chiang Kai-shek sent elite troops to take over from the Russians, he was defeated by the Tuba Road.Both the New First Army and the New Sixth Army with American equipment lost their divisions in the Northeast, and after the divisions were lost, they were lost in the Northeast. Just as Kirsten said, the only goal of combat is to wipe out the enemy. Jiang attaches great importance to the Northeast, but he does not know and dare not play a trump card in his hand, that is Zhang Xueliang.The Young Marshal is not only a "native son" (native son), but also a legendary figure in the Northeast. The shame of "September 18" is no more obvious than him. Once he returns to his hometown, his appeal will be unparalleled, and the momentum of the CCP will inevitably be covered by him.However, Jiang's narrow mind is still focused on revenge and personal grievances. How can he have the courage to "take the head of a general among a million people"?So he can only send third- and fourth-rate guys like Xiong Shihui, Chen Cheng, Wei Lihuang, etc. They have neither "competitiveness" nor "stability".In the end, he had to rely on the army to "open up" Northeast China. Even if he relied on the army, he would rather rely on Du Yuming, a Whampoa graduate with only a few months of rough military training, than Sun Liren, a graduate of the top American military academy with complete civil and military qualifications.After Sun criticized Du as "cowardly as a mouse", he was transferred to Fengshan, Taiwan to train recruits.So Jiang's elite "hardware" and "software" idiots were distributed at various points along the Northeast Railway, from Jinzhou, Shenyang to Changchun, all alone, unaware that they were surrounded by a vast "face".In September 1948, Mao Zedong took the initiative to fire at Jinzhou. Even if Jiang wanted to withdraw the elite from outside the pass to protect the pass, it was too late.When a "point" in Jinzhou was besieged, Jiang wanted to send reinforcements to relieve the siege, but Mao did not know that Mao had already planned to "siege the point and fight for aid".On October 3, Jinzhou was in an emergency. The nine divisions of the Northeast Corps of the Kuomintang stationed in Huludao could not be ordered to rush to the rescue. However, they were blocked in the Tashan area and fought endlessly without any progress.On the evening of October 15th, Jinzhou was lost. Jinzhou was lost, the back door to the Northeast was closed, and the public was tense.Three days later, Zheng Dongguo surrendered to the Communist Party in Changchun, and lost another "point", and Shenyang suddenly became an "isolated island".Desperate to counterattack Jinzhou, Chiang Kai-shek opened the back door and withdrew the Northeast elite to the south. He temporarily ordered Du Yuming, the favorite general of Huangpu, to serve as the deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Suppression General, assisting Wei Lihuang.Du flew to Shenyang on October 20, and immediately ordered Liao Yaoxiang's New Sixth Army of the United States to attack Jinzhou in the south, and ordered the 52nd Army to capture Yingkou in order to retreat.However, the advance of Liao's army was blocked, and they were unable to break through after fierce fighting for several days, so they had to withdraw from Yingkou. On October 28, it was wiped out in the east of Dahu Mountain, and Liao Yaoxiang was captured.At about the same time, the Kuomintang Corps in Huludao was also trapped in the Tashan area.On October 30, Du Yuming flew back to Shenyang from Huludao, but the airport was already occupied, so he could not land and turned back to Huludao.Three days later, the communist army occupied Shenyang, and Wei Lihuang escaped.Another week later, both Jinxi and Huludao were lost, the Liaoshen Campaign ended, and the entire Northeast changed hands. Chiang Kai-shek's army was wiped out with more than 470,000 people, of which more than 300,000 were modern elite troops.In this defeat, besides missing the opportunity early in strategy and becoming a trapped beast, Jiang also violated a taboo in tactics. maneuver.In contrast, Mao Zedong only mentioned strategic principles, and how to fight was completely decided by Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan of the Northeast Field Army. Is it accidental that success or failure is blunt? The Northeast has been lost, the Communist Army has surpassed the national army in number, and has obtained an unprecedented large number of American-made heavy weapons from the surrendered elite troops of the Chiang family. The strength and weakness have changed.What's more, Chen Yi and Su Yu have formed a huge East China Field Army, occupying Shandong; Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping have also formed a huge Central Plains Field Army based on the Dabie Mountains, and they are eyeing.If Chiang Kai-shek knew how to advance and retreat, he should actually concentrate his forces in the south of the Huaihe River, echoing Bai Chongxi in central China and Hu Zongnan in northwest China, so as to protect the Yangtze River.However, after Jiang's big defeat, he was extremely unwilling, and still wanted to gather and annihilate the main force of the communist army in order to save the situation.At first, due to the situation, they were ready to withdraw Xuzhou's army, but because Mao Zedong pretended to attack southern Henan, he felt that Xuzhou had time to defend and was reluctant to give up this famous city, so he ordered Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Huang Botao and Li Yannian's corps to attack Assembled in Xuzhou, there was Sun Yuanliang's corps in Suxian County to the south of Xuzhou, and Liu Ruming's corps in Bengbu.This battle is obviously going to be a decisive battle with the two field armies of East China and Central Plains between Xubang and on both sides of the Jinpu Railway.Du Yuming returned to serve as Xuzhou's deputy chief suppressor, and was actually in charge of the campaign. When Du Fu took office, Huang Botao's corps had been besieged. Jiang then ordered Du to lead the Qiu and Li corps to break the siege of the Huang corps.However, just like the Northeast Campaign, the Communist Army encircled and fought for reinforcements. When they bit the Yellow Corps, they stubbornly blocked the reinforcements, which made Qiu and Li's reinforcements slow down. Nearly 80,000 soldiers in the Yellow Corps died on November 20, 1948. He was wiped out on the second day, and Huang Botao was defeated and killed. Seeing the fall of the Huang Corps, Chiang Kai-shek, like a gambler who lost a lot of money, was eager to win it back. He did not hesitate to give his money to a fight. He ordered Du Yuming to lead his troops to attack the south, and ordered the Huang Wei Corps and Liu Ruming Corps to attack the North respectively, intending to meet in three ways. Suppress and open up the railway line between Xu and Bang.Unexpectedly, the advance of the Three Corps was still difficult, and sometimes it was even difficult to move an inch. Huang Wei's mechanized heavy weapon corps marched in areas with many rivers, which was even more difficult. Because Chiang Kai-shek did not know the enemy's situation and came up with random ideas, the enemy's generals in front were hesitant and lacked flexibility. Finally, after crossing the river on November 24th, they entered the pocket, had no way to move, and fell into a heavy siege in the Nanpingji and Shuangduiji areas.The next day, Jiang sent a telegram to Liu Zhi and Du Yuming, revealing that the national army consumed more than 120,000 rounds of various artillery shells, and the progress was less than one kilometer per day, which was cited as "a great shame" (the telegram is stored in the second archive of Nanjing). So far, Jiang Zhixu There is no hope of opening the railway line between Peng and Xu, so Yundu abandoned Xuzhou and retreated to the south of the Huaihe River.When Ran Du withdrew south on November 30, he was trapped near Yongcheng within a few days.Jiang actually wanted Du Nan to rescue the Huangwei Corps.This is another big taboo of military strategists that "if you withdraw, you can't fight, and if you fight, you can't withdraw".Du's Sun Yuanliang corps failed to break through and was wiped out.On December 15th, the long-besieged Huangwei Corps were destroyed one after another.Liu Ruming and Li Yannian's corps escaped south in time.After all parties were defeated, the Qiu and Li corps led by Du Yuming became more isolated in the northeast of Yongcheng, and they became isolated and helpless, waiting to die. Of course, Du Yuming hoped that the Central China Suppression Command and the Northwest Suppression Command would lend a helping hand. Chiang Kai-shek regarded Du as his confidant, and his subordinates were the foundation of his old base, and he hoped to have reinforcements.However, Hu Zongnan's Northwest Corps could not save the near fire from far water.Many historians pointed out that Bai Chongxi refused to save him in Central China because Jiang and Gui had always had a bad relationship, and there was a reason for this.In his self-report, Song Xilian even pointed out that the Bai family had an attempt to overthrow Chiang, and blocked the aid of the Song Dynasty. General" Vol. 2, p. 392) In all fairness, it should be true, and if we send more troops to be wiped out, it is better to concentrate our forces in Wuhan to protect central and southwestern China. This should be the best policy.Sacrificing Jiang's old roots is definitely not good for Jiang, and for the Kuomintang, it can be said to be "abandoning the handsome and protecting the car."Besides, Jiang Bieli set up Xuzhou to suppress the general. He had selfish intentions to divide Bai Chongxi's military power.Liu Bocheng of the CCP once said that the People's Liberation Army is the two ends of the dumbbell in East China and Northwest China, and the field army is the handle of the dumbbell, which is integrated into one.When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are at war, the opportunity for victory and defeat can be seen again. After Du Yuming was under heavy siege, on the night of December 19th, there was a heavy snowstorm. Until December 28th, there was no sunny day for ten days, making airdrops difficult.When the army was starving, Chiang Kai-shek actually sent an airplane to drop the martyr memorial book, intending to ask Du Yuming to die, which is really wonderful.Before Du was sent to the front line, Chiang Kai-shek summoned him and declared with a sad expression: This battle is a battle of life and death, "You put down the gun, I will take off the uniform? Choose the future of teachers and students, and this is the battle."So Du Yuming accepted the order in the face of danger, without hesitation.On the day when he was trapped, he refused the CCP's surrender because of the pain, the secret warning and exhortation of the teacher, "You put down the gun, and I will take off the military uniform? Choose."However, Chiang Kai-shek is a traitor after all. On the one hand, he clearly wanted Du Yuming to die;Therefore, the act of sending a plane to pick up Du Yuming in form has been performed again and again.But the truth is that although the plane was dispatched twice, the pilot did not bring Chiang Kai-shek's warrant.Without a warrant, Du Yuming dared not board the plane.It turned out that the master and apprentice had a "password" (secret expression). If the "password" does not match, all forms of care are invalid.It's all for others to see, you can't take it seriously? Since December 19, 1948, due to heavy rain and snow on the battlefield, airdrops of supplies have become more difficult. Du Yuming's troops have already eaten grass roots, bark and horse meat. How can this situation last?On January 9 of the following year, Du Yuming couldn't hold on any longer, and made a final attempt to break through. That night, he sent Chiang Kai-shek a final telegram: "All the troops are in chaos and cannot last until tomorrow. We have to split up to break through that night." This kind of breakout is actually Each flees for his life.Du Yuming changed into a soldier's uniform and mingled among them, but was still identified and captured.As a result of this great battle, the Kuomintang troops wiped out 600,000 people, including 57 entire divisions, and their vitality was severely injured. This unprecedented Huaihai or Xubeng battle lasted for 66 days, and almost the entire Kuomintang army was wiped out (except for some troops led by Li Mi), and Chiang Kai-shek lost his money.It is Chiang Kai-shek himself who should be held accountable.He didn't understand the principles of combat at all, and self-destructed the Great Wall.Du Yuming later wrote an article "The Beginning and End of the Battle of Huaihai", pointing out that at the beginning of the battle, Chiang Kai-shek's army was in a considerable advantage, "The People's Liberation Army is smaller than Jiang's army in Xuzhou, and its equipment is also inferior to Jiang's army, especially less artillery fire. , tanks do not."Ordinarily, with such an advantage, Chiang’s army is of course ready for a fight, but Chiang Kai-shek’s military judgment and command ability are too poor, and his subordinates are also mediocre. A surprising plan”: “Hundreds of thousands of troops were placed on both sides of the more than 200-kilometer railway from Xuzhou to Bengbu. They abandoned Xuzhou and set up permanent fortifications but did not defend it (fortifications as large and deep as Xuzhou, only one Two armies, almost equal to not defending), and placed all the corps in a long strip with no established positions on both sides of the railway, forming a situation where rats headed and snakes tailed, and they were beaten everywhere. As far as I know, in the history of warfare in ancient and modern China and foreign There is no strategic precedent for such a concentrated battle.” (Du Yuming, "The Beginning and End of the Huaihai Campaign") Fighting is like a competition, and the skills are not as good as others. If you lose the battle, you have nothing to say.But Chiang Kai-shek always believed that his failure was due to his subordinates not being loyal and not dying for him.Du Yuming was a "disciple of the emperor", and he failed to meet the standard of the emperor's dying day. He was not forgiven by the emperor.This kind of inhumane mentality is actually a disease.Why is it sick?Because according to modern standards, a general, as long as he has tried his best to fight, and when he has tried his best and still cannot avoid defeat, he can surrender for his safety.After this kind of general returns to the country, he is still a hero, and he is still welcomed as a hero, so this is because everyone really believes that people can not make unnecessary sacrifices.Mencius said: "You can die, you can have no death, and death hurts your courage." This is the truth.Of course, this does not mean that the person concerned is wrong to die, but that whether to die or not is a matter of his personal choice, a matter of his personal free will, rather than being chosen or coerced by others or the ruler.It is not a reasonable request, nor is it a humane request, to rigidly set a standard for selection and to make people feel confused.However, Chiang Kai-shek, who survived his defeat in the capital Nanjing, did not think so in his outdated brain.He always wants others to be Wen Tianxiang for him, so that he will be happy, so he always asks others to come to death. On May 8, 1933, he gave a lecture on "The Way to Command the Army to Win in Warfare", and he once had a thorough way to deal with those who did not commit suicide and "shamelessly ran back with joy."He said: "The captured officers and soldiers who return will be treated as enemy spies and shot immediately. Anyone who indulges in concealment or shelters and covers is the same crime." However, three years after he said this, Chiang Kai-shek himself became the tester of his theory. He claimed to be captured during the Xi'an Incident. If he said: "You take Yu as a prisoner", "Yu was captured by your rebellion", but he was born secretly and released, but he continued to "suppress the bandits". Not afraid of "destruction of the military atmosphere."On April 15, 1947, Chiang Kai-shek felt that the "bandit suppression" campaign was unfavorable, so he gathered senior generals from the front and came to Nanjing for two weeks of training. At the opening ceremony, he said very bluntly that he would be The captured soldiers "only need to commit suicide" to solve this "the most shameful thing in life".Three years after this speech, on April 16, 1950, he gathered his defeated soldiers who had fled to Taiwan, and gave a speech at "Yangming Mountain Villa" on "Soldier Soul - The Essentials of a Revolutionary Soldier's Success and Success" , divided into two categories: one is "fleeing in battle" and the other is "captured or surrendered".His hatred for this kind of "unscrupulous and shameless" is beyond words.Obviously, in Chiang Kai-shek's mind, first, revolutionary soldiers should not be captured; second, even if they are captured, "only suicide" can redeem themselves, and everything else is unforgivable. We must point out that Chiang Kai-shek's basic ideology is very complicated.It contains the half-baked feudal ideology of the upper class in China, the semi-transparent ignorance of the lower class in China, and the half-baked Western and Japanese modern thoughts. ...it is a platter of these ideas, both half-baked and half-new.Take the idea of ​​"unfortunately being a prisoner" and "only suicide" as an example. Judging from Qu Tutong's story, it is not purely a traditional Chinese thought.Qu Tutong was a good official in the Sui Dynasty. When Tang Gaozu raised his troops, Qu Tutong was guarding Yongji in Shanxi for the Sui Dynasty.He led his troops to rescue the capital Chang'an, but was trapped by Tang Gaozu's troops.Tang Jun sent his family boy to persuade him to surrender, but he refused, so he killed the family boy; he also sent his son to persuade him to surrender, but he refused. Enemy? Xuan" immediately ordered to shoot his son with an arrow.Later, when the capital fell, Tang Gaozu's troops sent people to fight in the heart, and Qu Tutong's troops mutinied. He got off his horse and kowtowed to the southeast, crying loudly, saying: "I have tried my best, but I am still defeated. I am worthy of your emperor?" He was sent to Tang Gaozu by his subordinates.Tang Gaozu said: "Why is it too late to meet you?" To persuade him to surrender, Qu Tutong said: "I can't do what a minister should do, and I can't die, so it's embarrassing to be caught by you." Tang Gaozu said: "You are a loyal minister." Immediately appointed him as chief of staff of Tang Taizong.After the world was settled, Emperor Taizong of Tang painted twenty-four portraits of heroes in Lingyan Pavilion, including Qu Tutong.Qu Tutong was interpreted as a loyal minister of the Sui Dynasty and Tang Dynasty. The reason was that he was a loyal minister even though he was with the two monarchs.Therefore, after Qu Tutong's death, Wei Zheng proposed that Qu Tutong was "a person who is innocent and unchanged in death today", and his loyalty and reliability were admired by the whole Tang Dynasty.After Qu Tutong surrendered, he ran to recruit his subordinate Yao Junsu. When everyone saw him, they both cried.Qu Tutong said: "My army was defeated, but I joined the volunteer army. Wherever the volunteer army came, the world would not respond. If this is the case, you should surrender?" It's time to surrender.Qu Tutong argued: "Hey, Junsu, I have done my best? Choose." Yao Junsu said: "I haven't done it yet? Choose me and still have the strength to do it? Choose." So Yao Junsu stuck to it Do not drop.In the end, the soldiers in the city were exhausted and killed by their subordinates. In history, Yao Jun was included in the "Sui Shu", but Qu Tutong was included in the "Tang Shu". The contemporaries compiled the history of different eras respectively. Why?The reason is that Yao Junsu died for the Sui Dynasty, he was from the Sui Dynasty; Qu Tutong did not die for the Sui Dynasty, so he is not from the Sui Dynasty.But in terms of reason, Qu Tutong tried his best to record, but it didn't hinder him from being a loyal minister. How can this make sense?The reasonable explanation is: after Qu Tutong tried his best, the object of his allegiance no longer exists—"the Sui Dynasty is dead"—and the emerging ruling power belongs to the will of God and the will of the people.The object of his allegiance is no more progressive than the emerging ruling power.No matter how hard he struggles, "the merits are not preserved in the country, and the strength is powerless to save the country from danger."Therefore, he became a loyal minister of the two dynasties.The comparison between Qu Tutong and Yao Junsu is mainly to explain that there is not only one kind of concept of "loyalty" in Chinese thought. Chiang Kai-shek only accepted one kind of dying day, but he didn't know that the concept of "surviving death" Festival, there are many times, can also be established.Take Wen Tianxiang and Shi Kefa as examples.Shi Kefa died in the rebellion, which is a special case; but Wen Tianxiang is a clear example of "captured and unyielding".Wen Tianxiang didn't have to be a martyr, but if the people of the Yuan Dynasty forced him to go to sea, he would definitely be a martyr.正因为个人定有这种下限，我们才可以了解：为什么王莽篡汉后十四年，龚胜才一死；为什么宋亡元兴后十四年，谢枋得才一死。这些志士仁人，他们都是“无求生以害仁”的，但是不害仁的求生，他们也都去求。蒋介石要求人人做文天祥、史可法，悬格不可谓不对，但他忘了：宋朝养士三百多年，只出了一个文天祥；明朝敦励近三百年，只出来一个史可法，其他多是大难临头、望风跪倒的投降汉?选何况，蒋介石自己何德何能，要别人为他死节？他自己若适用同一标准，在“西安事变”被俘时，为何不“只有自杀”？他为何对在衡阳抗敌被俘归来的将军们，大颁青天白日勋章？他在兵败山倒时，为什么不“国君死社稷”式的死在南京？ 蒋介石所谓的军人要被俘不屈、“只有自杀”，连自己都做不到，却以最高标准要求杜聿明。杜为他卖命、受苦、家破人亡，他仍然要为已甚，不准别人亲人团圆?选杜太太曹秀清由蒋介石手谕送往台湾，当作人质，过着惨淡的岁月。长子杜致仁在气愤之下，就吃安眠药死了。直到大女儿杜致礼的丈夫杨振宁得了诺贝尔物理奖，蒋介石和宋美龄才另眼看待，大献殷勤，希望杜夫人影响杨振宁回台湾，“帮助蒋校长反攻大陆”?选 杜聿明戎马半生，又坐牢半生，还不够?选手下被敌人惩罚后，还要被自己人惩罚，这就是蒋介石的新三纲五常标准——强制别人做烈士。 最具讽刺性的是，他虽强制别人做烈士用心甚苦，但降将仍然是一大堆（详阅李敖《蒋介石与自己降将——为活先烈开清单》，《蒋介石研究五集》，页二五七至二七六），也许烈士太少了，蒋介石有意无意制造“活先烈”过干瘾，最彰明昭著的例子是康泽。 一九四八年七月二十二日，国民党国防部政工局长邓文仪在记者招待会上，做了一个重要宣布，据第二天《大公报》内容如下： 襄阳之战中康泽殉难 邓文仪在记者招待会宣布 这位政工局长口中的康泽，在襄阳之战中真的“业已殉难”了吗？这根本是一厢情愿，一九四八年七月下旬的《新闻天地》的报道，证明康泽并没有殉难，康泽是被俘的，中共的新华社也在十七日晚上宣布他被俘了?选康泽是蒋介石最欣赏的一个心腹、一个心中内定的烈士样板。曾任军委会别动总队总队长。在蒋记特务系统中，重要一支是“复兴社”。“复兴社”又分三支，一支是贺衷寒系的“政训”系统，一支是康泽系的“别动队”系统，一支是戴笠系的“特务处”系统。康泽的“别动队”系统起源在南昌开办“中央陆军军官学校驻赣暑期研究班”，这班召集军官再加训练后，编入“庐山训练团第四营”（团长蒋中正、副团长陈诚、第四营营长韩文焕）。一九三三年十月，在庐山成立“军委会南昌行营别动队”。别动队实际上是一支突击队兼负责军事特工训练的队伍。队员或三两组成——小组或个别单独一组，有时以正式军官身份公开出现，有时则化装改扮，暗佩手枪，进行秘密活动。他们在地方上任意搜查、逮捕，以至秘密刑讯和枪毙人。其为人也，到处生杀予夺，自然炙手可热。康泽的炙手可热，延续到抗战开始，更是风光。他在抗战中的职务是一九三七年兼军委会政治部第二厅厅长、复兴社总社书记。一九三八年任三民主义青年团中央团部组织处处长、武汉支团部主任、战时青年服务总队总队长。一九四五年奉派出团考察第二次大战各同盟国家战后复员工作。一九四七年返国。翌年一月膺选为行宪后第一届立法委员、国民党中央执行委员会委员。蒋介石要他做热河省主席，他没做，改到襄阳去做第十五绥靖区司令官，正好赶上襄阳之战。 一九四八年七月一日开始的襄阳之战，蒋介石方面说，“文武双全的康泽将军戍守”，由于“共匪畏之如虎”，“相信此次战役定卜全胜”。可是言犹在耳，短短六天以后，康便以被俘闻了。最令我们注意的，是康泽副手郭勋棋被俘归来“伪装聋子”的事。这位将军为什么要装聋子？因为装了聋子，才可以做哑巴；做了哑巴，一切真相才可以按下不表，真相显然是不能说的?选在襄阳失守时候，蒋介石为了人造奶油式的赶造先烈，在一九四八年七月二十二日，特由国防部政工局长邓文仪宣布：“第十五绥靖区司令官康泽于襄阳作战中业已殉难。”蒋介石在聚餐时，表示“他所了解的康泽，是不会被俘的”，在蒋介石眼中，康泽是“壮烈成仁”的料子，不料，老康却放水了?选——康泽并没有死。所谓康泽“殉难”襄阳之说，既是纯属子虚，为什么蒋介石却要硬说康泽殉难了呢？我们已分析了他复杂的意识形态，他是枪杆子出政权的人，他的天下从打斗中得来，得到后，为了保有天下，必然借助于一些“忠”的观念。不幸的是：在时代的巨变下，还没建构好这种观念，他在大陆就面临了考验。“忠”在国民党的要求中，是临难死节。临难不死，是谓苟且偷生，不死被俘，是不妥当的。一九四九年，蒋介石在阳明山庄讲《军人魂——一名革命军人成功成仁之要义》，很沉痛地告诉了我们，在“大陆沉陷的大失败之中”，真正临难死节的，只有“二人”。（参阅国防研究院出版《蒋总统集》，页一六七二）蒋介石对这种“寡廉鲜耻”的痛恨，情见乎辞。所以，他对“临阵逃亡”的或“被俘或投降”的，就一概不感兴趣了。他感兴趣的，显然只在谁谁谁死了、谁谁谁临难死节了。这种兴趣过分膨胀的结果，就会在情况不明时，先一厢情愿给他死了再说，甚至先给他进了忠烈祠再说。其中最有代表性的，就是“罗列入祠”事件。蒋介石在逃到台湾后，痛感于临难死节的烈士缺货（参阅《李敖千秋评论丛书》第二十期），所以，对临难死节的谣言，也不无从宽录取之处。在台湾做过“陆军总司令”的罗列将军，在没逃到台湾前，就被从宽录取，进过圆山忠烈祠?选不料罗列入祀忠烈祠后，忽然在一九五一年四月，以一名“死鬼”，逃到台湾，大窘之下，只好把他在忠烈祠的牌位撤除，派他去做“陆军总司令”。这种令人哭笑不得的妙事，很像明朝末年的洪承畴降清。洪承畴降清后，明朝的皇帝还不知道，并断定洪承畴一定临难死节。于是皇帝大为震悼，为之辍朝三日、赐祭十六坛，又为洪承畴立专祠，并把所部官兵并列祠内。皇帝又御制祭文，要亲自哭丧。不料最后消息传来，洪承畴竟在前线投降了。于是大窘之下，丧事也风光不起来了。 和“罗列入祠”事件相似的，康泽没死，幸亏证实得早，否则小笑话之后一定会闹大笑话，因为康泽比起罗列来，分量重得太多太多了。这种分量，使蒋介石在康泽未能殉难以后，仍旧不肯死心，而要强调康泽“抗节不屈”的事迹。康泽如“被俘不屈”，纵然没死，也是虽败犹荣?选一九六四年七月，蒋介石在第九次党务工作会议上，讲康泽“十几年来抗节不屈的情形”，说他“身体早已衰谢不堪，据说他的牙齿都脱落得快没有了，这十多年，真不知道他是怎么熬过的”、说他“见死不更其守，凛然的节概，实在使人怀念和感叹”。另外再请看一副挽联： 襄阳当南北要冲，弹尽而莫之济；粮竭而莫之援。 十七日阁部扬州，羸卒孤城，已分百死。 忠烈昭党国史乘，劳改而终不变；酷刑而终不屈。 廿五载文山土室，丹心正气，独有千秋。 这一挽联所显示的心态，就是一个显例。挽联上“十七日阁部扬州”，是用史可法的典，“廿五载文山土室”，是用文天祥的典。但是，这种典岂可用得？史可法死守扬州，最后是殉难了的；文天祥土室坐牢，最后是死节了的，而康泽被共产党关是一九四八到一九六三年，前后十五年。他在一九六三年被共产党释放后，还在到处参观、留影纪念、游山玩水、好整以暇，又何来“廿五载文山土室”呢？至于说康泽“卒为中共所俘，备受折磨而死”，似乎也同样引起对康泽死难的错觉。文笔也好，史笔也罢，措辞总不能这样瞒天过海吧？康泽既是一九六三年释放的第四批，比后面的第七批要早十多年，足见他行为“良好”，不在话下，他要是“不屈”，共产党是不会那么痛快放他的。蒋介石说康泽在牢里“破衣一袭，寒彻骨髓”过的“隆冬天气”，一个人能不能这样一过十五年，姑且不论，但是中共放了康泽以后，康泽在特赦战争罪犯大会上，当场穿上共产党发给他的“新衣一袭”时，却全无“不屈”之色。“康泽同志”会“抗节不屈”、“被俘不屈”的希望，也在共产党多年的“恶作剧”中，终于证明老康放水无误?选 在邓文仪发表康泽殉难后三十五年，同一位邓文仪先生又发表了大手笔，他在《黄埔学生六十年（中）》（《中国人杂志》第一卷第二期，一九八三年七月十五日）里，有这么一段： 杜聿明在被俘之后誓不屈服，脚镣手铐，囚首垢面，种种非人的折磨，在炼狱度过数十年的悲惨生活，终至于死节，至于各级被俘的十数万军官与三万政工人员，其中十分之八均为黄埔学生，大部分均遭共匪集体屠杀，或监禁在集中营里做劳工，受尽非人的折磨迫害。襄阳之康泽、成都之曾扩情、太原之梁敦厚等，都是民族正气之显扬，万千黄埔学生随着大陆沦陷而壮烈牺牲的战绩，更缔造了中国无名英雄威武不屈的战史。 请看这又是何等荒唐之错啊?选杜聿明早在一九五九年就被共产党释放了，照《传记文学》第三十九卷第一期（一九八一年七月一日）的扼要小传，他被释放后， ……稍后任“政协”全国专员，补任“政协”全国委员。五十二年，妻曹秀清由美返平，与之重聚。五十三年十二月，任三届“人大”代表、四届“政协”全国委员。六十一年二月，美国总统尼克松访问中共，应邀出席“国宴”；九月，日本首相田中角荣访问北平，二度在“国宴”上露面。六十四年一月，任四届“人大”代表。六十七年二月，任五届“政协”常务委员、五届“人大”代表。六十九年十一月，因肾病复发住院。七十年五月七日晨七时二十七分，因并发心脏等病在北平去世，年七十七岁。 试问这是“在炼狱度过数十年的悲惨生活，终至于死节”吗？邓文仪的“脂粉作业”、“涂金作业”，目的就是要给人死节的错觉。 一九四八年十二月下旬，当杜聿明及其二个兵团被围于陈官庄之时，傅作义正坐困北平。华北“剿总”傅作义原有五十余万大军，实力不容藐视。毛泽东又洞烛先机，棋快一着，急命林彪在东北新胜之师，迅速入关，切断了傅作义大军西退或东进之路。而蒋介石顾此失彼，为徐蚌战役已弄得焦头烂额，竟无暇正视平津局势，傅作义于十一月三日亲自飞抵南京求见，蒋不知故意还是真无时间相见，只命国防部长何应钦接见，转达几点意见，未必切实可行，更无积极支援的保证。当十二月十四日，共军攻陷天津，剩下北平孤城，傅作义乃决定与中共和平谈判，达成协议。十二月三十一日，解放军入城，和平解放。傅作义不战而降，免除千万中国人的死亡、文化古都的摧毁，实有功于中华民族，所以他的命运与战而后降的国民党将军完全不同，不但没有劳改，而且当上新中国的水利部长。当然蒋介石视为不忠，但是蒋要求傅对他个人效忠，他还不配，因为他从来就没有视傅为自己人。 到一九四九年之初，蒋介石的老本愈打愈小，在两年多的时间里，损失了百万以上的军队。长江以北，除了胡宗南孤悬西北的兵团外，尽是解放军的天下，南京的蒋政权已摇摇欲坠矣。