Chapter 9 Chapter VIII Necessary Principles

Principles are rules of conduct, but not absolute rules. —George Kennan The first person in the history of war to use principles to fix the way of fighting should be Sun Tzu.The principles he put forward, such as "know yourself and the enemy, you will never be imperiled in a hundred battles", "attack those who are unprepared, and surprise them", "avoid the real and attack the false", etc., are still the creeds of contemporary military strategists.In the West, Napoleon revealed his heart to Saint-Cyr, whose name was later crowned on the lintel of a world-renowned military academy, after 2,000 to 400 years, "Write a book that accurately describes the principles of war." , provided to all soldiers".It's a pity that when he won the battle, he didn't have time; after he lost the battle, he didn't have the mood.For a commander who has created nearly a hundred victories in his life, this should be regarded as a small shortcoming.But as a great man, as long as you have outstanding success, there will be future generations to comment and sum up your winning method.One hundred years later, a British general named J. F. C. Fuller, from the war commanded by the old enemy who made the British feared before his death, summed up five principles guiding modern warfare[ 1].Since then, the entire western view of modern principles of warfare was born.Although the military regulations of many countries and some military theorists have put forward various principles of war, they are all similar to Fuller's initiative[2].This is because from the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars to the Gulf War, except for the continuous increase in lethality and damage, the form of war itself has not changed substantially.

[1] Fuller summed up Napoleon's principles of war as offense, maneuver, surprise attack, concentration, and protection.In addition, Fuller also summarized seven principles of warfare similar to Napoleonic Wars based on Clausewitz's views: keep the goal;These principles became the basis of modern military doctrine. (See "Guide to War", by Fuller, PLA Press, P38-60) [2] For example, the nine major military principles of the U.S. military: the principle of targeting; the principle of attack; the principle of concentration of forces; the principle of economy of forces;Very similar to the principles of combat during the Napoleonic Wars.

Things have changed now.All this happened during and after the Gulf War.The investment and use of precision-guided weapons, non-lethal weapons and non-military weapons has made war no longer desperately running along the track of increasing lethality and damage, but has begun its first change of direction in history. .This paved the way for the next century of warfare by other principles that were foreign to professional soldiers. No principle is groundless, especially the principle of war.No matter which military thinker's brain or military doctrine it came from, it must be the product of forging and forging in the furnace of war and on the anvil.Without the wars of the Spring and Autumn Period, there would be no Sun Tzu’s principles of war; without the Napoleonic Wars, there would be no Fuller’s principles of war; similarly, there would be no military, paramilitary or even non-military forces around the world before and after the Gulf War. War, there will be no new concepts of warfare such as the Americans' "full-dimensional warfare" and our "unlimited combined warfare", and of course there will be no mention of the advent of symbiotic combat principles.

While regretting the premature death of the "full-dimensional combat" theory, we are determined to make "unlimited combined warfare" not only stay at the level of theoretical speculation, but enter into a state of operational warfare.Although the idea of ​​"exceeding the limit" we advocate is intended to break all boundaries, there is one boundary that must be strictly adhered to, that is, to follow the necessary principles when conducting combat operations.Unless the principle itself needs to be broken in some special cases. When thinking about the laws of war condenses into a certain method of warfare, principles will follow.Although these tactics and principles have not been tested in a new round of actual combat, it is still difficult to say whether they can become a roadmap leading to the next victory.But the introduction of the principle of necessity is definitely an indispensable theoretical process for perfecting a method of warfare.Here is Tolos, dance here.Let us see what the following principles can bring to "over-limit combination warfare"——

omnidirectional Synchronicity limited target limited means unbalanced Minimum cost Multidimensional collaboration Full control Omni-directional - 360-degree observation, design and combined use of all relevant factors "Omnidirectional" is the starting point of the thought of "unrestricted warfare" and also the coverage of its thought.As an overarching principle of warfare, its basic requirement for implementers is to consider all factors related to "this" war in an all-round way, when observing battlefields and potential battlefields, designing plans and means of use, and combining all available When fighting for resources, there are no blind spots in the field of vision, no obstacles in the concept, and no dead ends in the orientation.

For Unrestricted Warfare, there is no distinction between battlefields and non-battlefields.Natural spaces such as land, sea, air, and sky are battlefields, and social spaces such as military, political, economic, cultural, and psychological are also battlefields, and the technological space that connects these two spaces is a battlefield that all hostile parties strive for.[3 ].War can be military, paramilitary, or non-military; it can be violent or non-violent; it can be a confrontation between professional soldiers, or it can be a battle between civilians or experts. confrontation.These characteristics of Unrestricted Warfare are not only a watershed between it and traditional warfare, but also a starting line for a new type of warfare.

[3] The battlefield of Unrestricted Warfare is different from the past, it includes all natural spaces.Social spaces and expanding technological spaces, such as nanospaces, etc.Today, these several spaces are intertwined. For example, space can be regarded as a natural space or a technological space, because every step of its warlike process cannot be separated from technological breakthroughs.Similarly, the interaction between technology and society can be seen from time to time. The most typical example is the impact of information technology on society.From this point of view, the battlefield is indeed ubiquitous, and we can only look at it from an "omnidirectional" perspective.

As a principle with strong practicality, "omnidirectionality" applies to all levels of unrestricted combined warfare.At the strategic level, it refers to the combined use of national overall combat power to supranational combat power in intercontinental or global confrontations; at the strategic level, it refers to the combined use of national resources related to military purposes in war; at the war art level , refers to the army or the main body of the army scale, in order to achieve the goal of the campaign, the combination and use of various means on a specific battlefield; at the tactical level, it refers to an army or the main body of the scale of the army, in order to perform certain tasks. Combined use of different weapons and equipment and combat methods.At the same time, don't forget that all the above combinations should also include the cross combinations between their levels.

Finally, it must be clear that not every specific war has a wide range of operations in all spaces and fields, but "omnidirectional" thinking and grasping the battle situation are the first principles of unrestricted combined warfare. Synchronicity - actions in different spaces over the same time period The technical means possessed by modern warfare, especially the popularization of information technology, the emergence of long-distance combat technology and the enhancement of battlefield conversion capabilities, have integrated stretches of scattered battlefields with different natures into one, and also combined various military and non-military forces in parallel. The introduction of wars has greatly shortened the course of the war.Many goals that used to be accumulated through campaigns and battles, and completed in stages, may now be quickly achieved after the requirements of simultaneous arrival, simultaneous completion, and simultaneous completion are put forward.Therefore, the emphasis on "synchronicity" in combat is surpassing "phasedness" [4].

[4] In the past, the process of wars progressed from the edge to the depth in space, and had to be divided into stages in time.Unrestricted warfare reaches directly to the core in space, and is also "synchronous" in time, and usually no longer has the characteristics of stages. On the premise of careful planning, let the war elements distributed in different spaces and different fields, in a uniformly agreed time period, around the war goal, launch a patchwork and coordinated combined strike to achieve surprise, concealment and security. effectiveness.A full-depth simultaneous operation may be just a short unrestricted war, but it is enough to determine the fate of a war.The "simultaneity" mentioned here does not refer to "simultaneity" with exact minutes and seconds, but refers to "the same time period".In this sense, Unrestricted Warfare is a veritable "time-contracted war".

Using this as a measure, the US military's operational capability in the military field is closest to reaching this level.According to the existing equipment and technology of the U.S. military, an information campaign system can provide data on 4,000 targets for 1,200 aircraft within one minute, coupled with the extensive use of long-range strike weapon systems, this has led to the proposal of the "full-depth simultaneous attack" combat idea. Begin to get rid of the old war mode of gradually pushing from the periphery to the depth in space and launching operations sequentially in time.However, their ideas in this regard, judging from some public documents disclosed by the military, are still limited to the scope of military operations and have not been extended to battlefields outside the military field[5]. [5] The most typical ones are the four principles in the U.S. Army’s 2010 Joint Force Concept. “Mobile momentum, precision strikes, full-dimensional protection, and logistics focus” are all new principles for military warfare. Limited goal--the action guideline established within the reach of the means The goal is limited relative to the means.Therefore, the principle of establishing limited goals is that the goal is always smaller than the means. When determining the goal, fully consider its achievability, and do not pursue goals that are not limited in space and time.Only when there is limitation can there be clarity, reality, and operability.At the same time, after achieving the previous goal, you can keep yourself flexible in chasing the next goal [6].When setting goals, we must overcome the mentality of being overjoyed, consciously pursue limited goals, and exclude goals beyond our capabilities, even if they are correct.Because every goal that can be achieved is limited.Whatever the reason, pushing the ends beyond the means will only lead to disastrous results. [6] To achieve limited goals, it does not lie in whether there is restraint subjectively, but whether it exceeds the limitation of means.The means are the insurmountable "limits" when setting goals. MacArthur's mistakes in the Korean War are the most typical example of expanding limited goals.Later, the same mistakes made by the Americans in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan also proved that no matter who it is or what kind of action it is, as long as the goal is greater than the means, it will definitely fail. Not all contemporary politicians and military strategists understand this point. In the 1996 U.S. National Defense Report, President Clinton was quoted as saying, "As the most powerful nation in the world, we have an obligation to lead and take action when our interests and values ​​are seriously jeopardized."When saying the above, it is obvious that even Clinton failed to realize that national interests and values ​​are completely two different levels of strategic goals.If the former is a goal that Americans can maintain through actions, the latter is neither within their reach nor a goal they should pursue outside the United States.The idea of ​​"global first" corresponding to "isolationism" has made Americans tend to pursue unlimited goals when their national power is expanding.However, this is a tendency that will eventually lead to tragedy.A company with limited assets but keen to assume unlimited liabilities will have no other ending except bankruptcy. Unlimited means - Tends to use means unlimitedly, but limited to satisfying limited goals Unlimited means are aimed at limited goals [7].Infinity is a tendency to continuously expand the range of means selected and the way they are used, rather than the unrestrained use of means, let alone the absolute use of means or the use of absolute means.Infinite means to satisfy finite goals is the ultimate limit. [7] For details, see Bevan Alexander's "The Way of the Commander's Decisive Victory", P101-125. The means cannot be separated from the end.Unlimited means means that in order to achieve a specific goal, various means can be chosen without restriction, not that the means can get rid of the restriction of the goal and do whatever they want.As an atomic weapon that can destroy human beings, it was once regarded as an absolute means, but it was finally shelved precisely because it violated the principle that the means must serve the goal.The use of unlimited means can only be done as Confucius said, "do whatever you want without exceeding the rules", and this "moment" is the goal.Transcendence thinking expands the range of choice and application of means "at will", but it does not mean expanding the goal "at will", but only achieves limited goals with the use of means beyond limits and limits.Conversely, a smart commander will not limit his means because of limited goals, because this is very likely to lead to failure at a critical moment.That is to say, the "limited" must be pursued through the "infinite". In the American Civil War, Sherman's march on Savannah was not seeking to fight, but burning and plundering all the way. By means of destroying the rear economy of the Southern Army, the Southern people and the army lost their resistance, thus realizing the war in the North. Target.This is a successful example of using infinite means to achieve a limited goal.On the contrary, in the Fourth Middle East War, the war goal set by the Egyptian High Command for its front-line generals was to occupy the Sinai Peninsula, and the corresponding combat plan was to stick to Sinai after breaking through the Barev Line of Defense.Attempting to use limited means to achieve limited goals, as a result, as we all know, the Egyptians lost the victory they had already achieved [8]. [8] Before the Fourth Middle East War, the "Baird Plan" formulated by Egypt was divided into two steps. The first step was to forcibly cross the Suez Canal, break through the "Balev Line of Defense", and control the area 15-20 kilometers east of the river; The second step is to capture the front lines of Mitra Pass, Jidi Pass, and Hatemia Pass to ensure the safety of the east bank of the canal, and then develop in depth according to the situation.In actual combat, the Egyptian army turned to defense as soon as it crossed the canal, and did not attack until 5 days later, giving the Israeli army a chance to breathe. Non-equilibrium -- looking for action nodes in the opposite direction of equilibrium symmetry As a principle, "non-equilibrium" is the main fulcrum of the partial positive law in the theory of unrestricted warfare, and its essence is to carry out combat operations along the counter-ideology of equilibrium and symmetry.From the distribution and use of forces, the selection of the direction of the main battle and the center of attack to the configuration of weapons, it is necessary to consider the influence of unbalanced factors and the problem of using unbalanced as a means to achieve goals. Whether as a way of thinking or as a guiding principle in combat, disequilibrium manifests itself in all aspects of warfare.As long as the principle of non-equilibrium is correctly grasped and used, the enemy's weakness can always be found and seized.Some poor countries, weak countries, and non-state war subjects have no way to challenge forces that are much stronger than them, such as Chechnya against Russia, Somalia against the United States, Northern Ireland guerrillas against Britain, and Islamic jihadists against the entire West. With one exception, they adopted the unbalanced and asymmetric warfare method of "mouse and cat" style, and wisely insisted that they would never face-to-face with the army of a big country, but used guerrilla warfare (mainly urban guerrilla warfare)[9], terrorist warfare, religious warfare, etc. It deals with combat styles such as warfare, protracted warfare, and cyber warfare; its main combat direction is mostly in areas and fronts that the opponent does not expect, and the focus of strikes is always chosen to cause a huge psychological shock to the opponent.This method of using unbalanced means to build momentum for oneself and let the situation develop according to one's own wishes is often very effective, making those opponents who use regular troops and regular means as their main combat power often like elephants fleeing into a porcelain shop, helpless. Nothing works. [9] Braudel, who is famous for his research on the development of capitalist society, paid special attention to the "organizing role" of big cities in the capitalist world.In such a huge world, the key points are just a few central cities, such as New York, London, Tokyo, Brussels, and perhaps Hong Kong. Once they are attacked at the same time or a guerrilla war breaks out, the world will be in chaos. (The Dynamics of Capitalism, by Braudel, Oxford Press) In addition to the effectiveness shown in use, non-equilibrium itself is the law of motion of things implied by the golden rule.This is the only law among all laws that encourages people to use the law in a way that breaks the law, and it is also a good cure for the chronic disease of stable thinking. Minimum cost - use war resources at a lower limit that is sufficient to achieve the goal The principles of the "minimum cost principle" are: first, rationality is more important than economy [10]; second, the combat style determines the size of war costs [11]; third, seek "less" (low consumption) with "more" (multiple means) ). [10] There has always been "saving" in military principles, which mainly refers to the need to pay attention to the control of manpower and material consumption in war.In unrestricted warfare, "reasonable use" is the correct economy. [11] Unrestricted Warfare allows great leeway in the choice of war styles, and the cost of conventional military war styles and financial-led war styles is naturally very different.Therefore, in future wars, the cost will mainly depend on what kind of combat style to choose. Rationality includes two aspects: rational formulation of goals and rational use of resources.Reasonable setting of goals, in addition to establishing goals within the radius of the means, also needs to compress the load of the goals to make them as simple and concise as possible; rational use of resources obviously refers to the most appropriate way to achieve goals, rather than one-sided requirements saving.Conservation -- the minimum use of resources -- is meaningful only if it meets the needs to achieve the goals. More important than knowing the principles is how to use them.Whether or not the minimum use of war resources can be used to achieve the goal depends on the choice of combat style.The reason why the Battle of Verdun is called a meat grinder by war historians is because both sides used meaningless wars of attrition; and the reason why the Germans were able to sweep the British and French forces after crossing the Maginot Line was because It uses the blitzkrieg that combines the shortest time, the best route and the most powerful weapon.It can be seen that finding a combat style that rationally uses war resources is indeed the key to achieving "minimum cost". Today, when goals and means to achieve goals have become unprecedentedly diverse and complex, a single field and a single means have clearly shown that they are powerless in the face of complex goals.The result of different means and goals is bound to be high consumption and low efficiency.The idea of ​​getting out of the predicament is to achieve "less" through "more".That is to combine the advantages of various war resources in various fields to form a new combat style, and to achieve the minimum cost while achieving the goal. Multi-dimensional cooperation--coordination among all available forces in the military and non-military fields covered by a goal "Multidimensional" here is another name for multiple fields and multiple forces, and has nothing to do with dimensions in mathematics and physics. "Multidimensional cooperation" refers to the coordination and cooperation between different fields and different forces to achieve a goal.There is nothing new in this definition literally, and similar expressions can be found in many outdated or latest versions of combat doctrine.The only and biggest difference between it and all such expressions is that it introduces non-military and non-war elements directly rather than indirectly into the field of war.In other words, when any field may become a battlefield and any force may be used for war, it is more inclined to understand multidimensional cooperation as the cooperation between the military dimension and other dimensions under the command of a specific goal, while Not every war must be dominated by military action.All dimensions are equal in the face of war, which will become a formula for solving future war issues[12]. [12] The equality of all dimensions is mainly to overcome the concept of "military supremacy".In future wars, military means are just an ordinary choice. The concept of multidimensional collaboration is only valid when covered by specific goals.Without goals, there can be no multi-dimensional collaboration.The size of the goal determines the breadth and depth of cooperation among various dimensions. For example, if the goal is set to win a war at the strategic level, the areas and forces that need to be coordinated may involve the entire country or even supranational.From this to any military or non-military action, regardless of the field involved and the depth or strength of the force, coordination among all dimensions is essential, but this does not mean that the more means used in each action, the more powerful it is. Well, but only as much as necessary.Overuse or underuse of each dimension will only make the action swing between puffiness and dryness, and ultimately endanger the target itself.Here, the oriental wisdom of "too much is too much" helps us understand and practice this principle. In addition, we urgently need to broaden our horizons in our understanding of usable forces, especially non-military forces.In addition to paying the usual attention to conventional and materialized forces, special attention should also be paid to the use of intangible "strategic resources", such as geographical factors, historical status, cultural traditions, national identity, and the domination and use of the influence of international organizations, etc.[ 13].But this is not enough, we also need to take an over-the-limit action in the application of this principle, and turn the most likely variable multi-dimensional cooperation into a mediocre operation of plane operations, leading to all levels from war strategy to tactics three-dimensional cross combination. [13] China is uniquely positioned in this regard.A long cultural tradition, peaceful ideology, no history of aggression, strong economic strength of the Chinese, and status as a permanent member of the United Nations are all important "strategic resources". Whole-process regulation--uninterrupted access to information, adjustment of actions and control of the situation in the whole process of the beginning, progress and end of the war War is a dynamic process full of randomness and creativity. Any attempt to fix a war into a set of preset plans is almost absurd or naive.Therefore, it is necessary to give feedback and corrections to the whole process of the war in the "present tense" of the war, so that the initiative is always in one's own hands.This is "full control". Due to the addition of the principle of synchronicity, the "whole process" of the whole process of regulation can no longer be understood as a long process.This process may only be an instant under the conditions of modern high-tech means.As we said earlier, one battle is enough time to complete a war.This will probably make the whole course of the war very short, and at the same time greatly increase the difficulty of regulation. Today, when information technology welds the entire world into a network, there are far more factors involved in wars than in previous wars.The occlusion of various factors and their influence on the war are so close that the loss of control of each link may lose the entire war like losing a horseshoe[14].Therefore, in the face of a balloon-like modern war that is about to be burst by new technologies, new methods, and new fields, full-scale control is increasingly an art rather than a technology.It requires you to use more intuition rather than mathematical deduction to grasp the ever-changing battlefield situation; it requires you to change far more than the adjustment of troops, the change of deployment, the update of weapons, and more importantly, the conversion of the battlefield to the non-military field Resulting in changes to the entire set of rules of war.The result is to send you to a strange battlefield, to start a strange war with a strange enemy.And you have to win a strange victory by controlling the whole process of this strange process. [14] In modern warfare, accidental factors will also affect the outcome of the war just like ancient warfare.A fuse on a command center computer was blown due to overheating at a critical moment (this is entirely possible. The cause of an F-16 misfire incident over the bay was due to the circuit of the "Black Hawk" helicopter "identifier friend or foe" It's often hot, and pilots occasionally turn it off to cool down), and it could spell disaster.This may be the modern version of the story of a war lost for the loss of a "horseshoe".For this reason, "whole process control" must be adhered to. Unlimited combination warfare is exactly such a kind of warfare that is carried out with unfamiliar but brand-new tactics. All of the above principles are suitable for any combination battle beyond the limit. Following these principles does not guarantee victory, but violating them is sure to lead to failure.Principles have always been necessary, not sufficient, conditions for victory in war. There is no principle of victory, only the principle of necessity.We should bear this in mind.