Chapter 11 The Eleventh Chapter: Bogu's Aspirations at the Beginning of Youth

From March 25 to April 14, 1931, the Eleventh Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was held in Moscow.Manuisky, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, declared to the International sections that the right deviation has always been the main danger, past, present and future.Because of the tone set by the Communist International Conference, the anti-rightist opportunism was modeled, which provided strong support for Wang Ming's "leftist" line. Due to the impact of the international situation, the Central Soviet Area made the "Decision on Accepting the Summary of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International" in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in August 1931. It believed that the main danger within the party was still right opportunism. failure emotion.

After Wang Ming took over the transformation of the central leadership, he sent representatives of the central government to various parts of the country to carry out the "anti-rightist" struggle of the International Communist Organization, reform all levels of government agencies, and eliminate dissidents. After the "September 18th" Incident in 1931, that is, on September 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Emergency Tasks of the Party due to the Breakthrough of the Third "Encirclement and Suppression" by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Gradual Maturity of the Revolutionary Crisis."According to this instruction, from November 1st to 5th, the first congress of the Central Soviet Area was held in Ruijin.The central delegation presided over this meeting. Under the premise of anti-rightist deviation, Mao Zedong's "peasant war theory" in the land revolution and "guerrillaism" in military work were criticized at the same time. This is the Wang Ming line playing the leading role in the Central Soviet Area. It is also the first step in starting to seize the leadership of Mao Zedong.

During the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, in order to avoid the continuation of serious differences within the party and cause the party to split, Qu Qiubai took responsibility for the conciliatory mistakes made at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee and asked to withdraw from the Politburo.The issue of Zhou Enlai's resignation also caused some controversy. Later, Miff, the representative of the international organization, proposed the policy of "stay Zhou Enlai and go to Qu". On January 9, 1932, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Resolution on Striving for the First Victory of the Revolution in One Province and Several Provinces", requiring the Red Army to strive to secure the control of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi, Northeast Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, and Hunan and Hubei in the Central Soviet Area. The soviet areas in the border areas were connected to form an entire soviet area, and the occupation of central cities such as Nanchang, Fuzhou, and Ji'an was taken as a strategic goal.

The Provisional Central Committee first called Zhou Enlai and ordered Zhou to prepare for action. In early January, Zhou Enlai took into account the situation of the enemy and us at that time, and called back the Provisional Central Committee, explaining that the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area was currently having difficulties in attacking the central city.After analyzing Zhou Enlai's proposal, the interim Central Committee took another step back and replied to Zhou: Ask him to choose at least one city among Fuzhou, Ji'an, and Ganzhou to attack. According to this instruction, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area held an emergency meeting in Ruijin, and decided to attack Ganzhou, which was surrounded by the Soviet Area, in order to unite the Central Soviet Area with the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area and relieve the worries about the development to the north.The Central Revolutionary Committee issued an order to capture Ganzhou and appointed Peng Dehuai as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy.

On January 28, 1932, the famous Songhu Defense War broke out in Shanghai. On February 4, 1932, according to the deployment of the Central Revolutionary Committee, the 3rd Army of the Red Army took the opportunity of the Kuomintang's Songhu War of Resistance to besiege Ganzhou. Due to the hasty response to the battle and the backwardness of the Red Army's equipment, several days of fierce fighting failed, and the siege was withdrawn on March 7. In March 1932, after the 3rd Corps withdrew from the siege of Ganzhou, they assembled in the Jiangkou area of ​​Ganxian County. Zhou En came to Jiangkou to hold a meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to summarize the experience and lessons of the siege of Ganzhou and discuss the future course of action of the Red Army.The meeting decided that the main force of the Red Army should develop northward, and the Red 1st and 5th Army Corps formed the Central Route Army (later changed to the East Route Army), and the 3rd Army Corps and the Red 16th Army formed the West Route Army to fight separately.

On March 30, 1932, Mao Zedong, who led the operation of the East Route Army, called Zhou Enlai, suggesting that the East Route Army go straight to Ganquan in order to mobilize the enemy to win the war and start the situation.He also told Zhangzhou that it was easy to defend but difficult to attack. On April 4, 1932, Struggle, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published a long article titled "The Wavering of Opportunism in the Chinese Communist Party in Striving for the First Victory of the Chinese Revolution in Several Provinces", which put the Comrades with correct thinking and who are skeptical and resistant to "Left" adventurism are all described as Right opportunism, so the whole party is called on to fight the most resolute and ruthless.

On April 10, the East Route Army of the Red Army captured Longyan. On the 11th, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang called Zhou Enlai to report the situation of the battle and the next move, saying that the reason for Longyan's victory was to unite the troops and attack the enemy unprepared. On April 14, the Provisional Central Committee issued the "Letter to the Party Headquarters in the Soviet Areas in order to Oppose the Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union and Carve up China", which pointed out that right opportunism is the main danger facing the parties in the Soviet Areas.

On April 20th, the East Route Army of the Red Army captured Zhangzhou, an important town in southern Fujian, wiped out 4 regiments defending the enemy's Zhangzhen Department, and captured more than 1,000 enemies. On the 22nd, Mao Zedong called Zhou Enlai and said: The great victory in Zhangzhou achieved the goal of cutting off a wing of the enemy in Guangdong, which had a great impact on the entire current situation. On May 11, 1932, the Central Committee of the Soviet Area received a letter from the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Soviet Areas on April 14. After discussion, it decided to accept the criticism from the Central Committee; Estimated that he has committed extremely serious and consistent right opportunism, he calls on all comrades in the party departments at all levels in the central Soviet area to immediately carry out a complete transformation in the work of the Red May, resolutely carry out a victorious offensive, strive for the expansion of the Soviet area, and win over Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei. The Soviet area unites as one and strives for the first victory in the central cities-Ganzhou, Ji'an, Fuzhou, Nanchang, Jiangxi and its adjacent provinces.

On May 20, the Provisional Central Committee once again issued an instruction to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area. It was still dissatisfied with Zhou Enlai's work after he came to the Soviet Area. The telegram said: "Wu Hao (Zhou Enlai) After comrades arrived in the Soviet area, some mistakes have been corrected, or partially corrected, and there have been considerable changes in some work. However, the danger of the anti-Soviet war has not been estimated, the leadership of the proletariat has not been consolidated, and the work of the trade unions has not been strengthened. All work has gone deep into the grassroots The complete transformation of the country has not yet started, or the necessary results have not been achieved... At present, we should adopt an active offensive strategy, capture one or two central cities, and develop a province or several provinces..."

Zhou Enlai was in a dilemma for a while. He knew that the decision of the provisional central government was wrong, but he had to implement it.Under the reprimand and urging of the interim Central Committee, he published "Support the Victory of the National Red Army and Resolutely Implement the Active Offensive Line" in the fifth issue of "The Truth", a publication of the Central Committee of the Soviet Area, on May 30. In late May 1932, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the 19th Route Army, which had been active and tenacious in the defense of Songhu, and stationed in Fuzhou. Three divisions of the Cantonese Army went to southern Jiangxi to sneak into Yudu.

On June 9, Chiang Kai-shek convened a "meeting and suppression" meeting in five provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangxi in Lushan, preparing to launch a new "encirclement and suppression" plan for the Soviet area nationwide, first "encircle and suppress" Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan Western Hubei Soviet Area, then moved to the Central Soviet Area. In late June, the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Soviet Area decided to restore the headquarters of the First Red Army, governing the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Army Corps, and cancel the designations of the East Route Army and West Route Army. On June 25, 1932, Zhou Enlai held a meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area in Ruijin, and decided to organize a Labor and War Committee under the People's Committee. On July 7, the Executive Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic decided that Zhou Enlai should be the chairman of the Labor and War Committee, responsible for "planning and guiding all military, economic, financial, and labor mobilization matters related to the revolutionary war." In early July 1932, the Red Army on the one hand defeated 15 regiments of the Austrian Army in southern Jiangxi and Chijiang and Shuikouwei in northern Guangdong, and the southern part of the Central Soviet Area was stabilized.Zhou Enlai went to the front as a representative of the Central Bureau, and Ren Bishi acted as the secretary of the Central Bureau in the rear.On July 21, Zhou Enlai called the Central Committee of the Soviet Area in Xinfeng and transferred Xiangying to report the situation of the army on the one hand. He would cross the Ganjiang River and march northward before the end of the month, preparing to fight the enemy. On the same day, the Provisional Central Committee issued a letter of instruction to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the Provincial Party Committees of Jiangxi and Fujian. The Central Bureau of the Central Soviet Area (at this time, Ren Bishi was the acting secretary) proposed that Zhou Enlai be the general political commissar of the Red Front Army. Zhou Enlai disagreed, and on July 25, he called the Central Bureau in the name of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang. In the telegram, he said: We believe that for the convenience of commanding operations ahead, it is appropriate to abolish the first level of the political commissar and replace it with the general political commissar. That is to say, with Mao Zedong as the chief political commissar, the combat command authority belongs to the commander-in-chief and the chief political commissar, and the central military commission has the authority to make operational plans and decisions. Regarding the course of action, the representatives of the Central Bureau have the right to decide. On July 29, 1932, Zhou Enlai, considering that the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area still insisted that he concurrently serve as the General Political Commissar of the Red Front Army, stated in his letter of statement: ... This will lead to multi-management and leave the chairman of the government with nothing to do. Mao Zedong We must try our best to make use of his experience and strengths and urge him to correct his mistakes... With Mao Zedong's command, there is no difference in practice or principle. Please consider... At the beginning of August 1932, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area in Xingguo. It was decided that the Red Front Army would continue to be reorganized. The Supreme Military Council was composed of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, with Zhou Enlai as the chairman, and followed the army. In early September, Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang in the front had increasingly serious differences with the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area in the rear. Because the rear had the sword of the temporary central government, it ignored the actual difficulties in the front and blindly urged the front to attack. . In addition, at this time, Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang received a telegram from the Provisional Central Committee on September 14 that the Red Army in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui had failed in their counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and that they had withdrawn from the Soviet area. At present, the Red Fourth Front Army should adopt the method of luring the enemy to go deep into places where there is a basis for mass work and the terrain is convenient for us, cover our main targets, strictly implement the masses' fortified walls and clear the fields, and use the vast guerrilla forces to carry out harassing, intercepting and attacking the enemy in all directions. It is not advisable to stick to a certain point so as to facilitate the enemy's division and joint attack. In this way, during the movement, select the enemy's weak part, strike violently and destroy the enemy's point, and then quickly turn to the other side to quickly and efficiently. Resoluteness, secrets and maneuvers are all needed to defeat the enemy to completely smash the four "encirclement and suppression" campaigns... On September 23, Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and transferred it to the Provisional Central Committee. They reported the next course of action and said: the correct strategy is to win with certainty and destroy one part of the enemy so as to defeat the enemy one by one. Otherwise, if you are eager to fight, you will be disadvantaged instead, which will cause more serious mistakes. On September 25, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area called Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang, and put forward different opinions on their course of action. Gain favorable conditions to destroy the enemy.And explain that this is the specific arrangement and spirit of the active offensive strategy. This will actually delay the combat time for more than a month, and it cannot be combined to echo Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan and Hubei, and it can become a serious mistake. Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang immediately called the Central Bureau to refute and insisted on the original battle plan. Mao Zedong did persuasion time and time again, and Zhou, Zhu, and Wang also actively supported Mao Zedong's proposition at that time. In the process of this contradiction, Zhou Enlai strongly felt the leadership art used by Mao Zedong when he was supporting the situation in the Central Soviet Area alone and implementing many instructions from the Central Committee that did not conform to the actual situation.Mao Zedong required that the main person in charge should have extraordinary character, be good at handling various affairs, have a keen and careful observation ability of the huge complex that constitutes political power, war, and social life, and feel the overall situation. However, the Central Soviet Area did not fully understand Mao Zedong's correct proposition. On September 26, they immediately replied and rejected Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang's suggestions, and still advocated the established goal of capturing one or several provinces. Faced with such instructions on the front line, Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang were really unable to follow orders, so they had no choice but to stand still and resist the orders of the Central Bureau with silence. On September 29th, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area called Zhou, Mao, Zhu, and Wang again: We received the order of governance in September, and we think this is a very dangerous arrangement that deviates from principles.The Central Bureau decided to temporarily suspend operations and immediately hold a plenary meeting of the Central Bureau ahead. Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to recognize it. At this time, it was already dark clouds, and the sound of rolling thunder could be heard in the distance. Zhou Enlai certainly understood what all this meant. He knew that if he and Mao Zedong were in danger of being dismissed at the same time, it would be the best result if one of them could be retained.He tried his best to protect Mao Zedong, so he said at the meeting: Mao Zedong is beneficial to the war at the front. He understands the Red Army and the terrain, which is beneficial to military command. In order to ensure the implementation of the international line, there are two ways: One, I will take full responsibility for the war, and Mao Zedong will remain as an assistant at the front.The second is that Comrade Mao Tse-tung has full command and I am responsible for the implementation of the plan. This emergency meeting was aimed at Mao Zedong. Zhou Enlai's formulation obviously did not meet the wishes of the Central Bureau. As soon as he finished speaking, he immediately encountered strong opposition. At this time, Mao Zedong was more sober than anyone else. He knew that this meeting was aimed at him. Since there was no hope of changing the reality, it was better to let nature take its course.While others were speaking, he didn't say a word, just sat in a corner smoking one cigarette after another, and the smoke filled all around him.After making up his mind, he pinched out half of the cigarette, stood up slowly and said: Since the Central Bureau does not trust me, it is not appropriate for me to stay in the front.Speaking of this, he glanced at the people in the Central Bureau from the corner of his eye, smiled slightly and said: I am not in good health now. If this is the case, I would like to ask the Central Bureau for a period of sick leave. As for whether you agree or not, Let the organization decide. After Mao Zedong finished speaking, he suddenly felt an unprecedented helplessness.It may not be a bad thing to retreat bravely in the current situation, otherwise, the consequences may not be too good.Speaking of this, he glanced at Zhou Enlai who was in a daze. When he and Zhou Enlai looked at each other, he also felt Zhou Enlai's helplessness, but that helplessness was another kind of patience. Mao Zedong did not sit down after speaking, he pushed the chair behind him, and said coldly: Maybe you have a lot of things to say in front of me, so I will withdraw now... Without waiting for any reaction from others, Mao Zedong swung his wide sleeves and walked outside.Looking at Mao Zedong's thin back, Zhou Enlai felt indescribable emotions surging in his heart. The Ningdu emergency meeting held by the Central Bureau finally achieved its intended purpose: Mao Zedong was dismissed from the military and left the Red Army he founded. At that moment, Mao Zedong pushed his chair away and walked towards the door. He was calm on the surface, but in fact he was conflicted and painful inside. The sense of loss that made him leave the Red Army was indescribable and indescribable. Mao Zedong walked towards the door step by step. He felt that his legs were so heavy and the time was so long, as if it took a century for him to complete those few steps. According to historical records: After the Ningdu meeting, on October 26, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China appointed Zhou Enlai as the general political commissar of the Red Front Army. Xiang Ying and Gu Zuolin once talked to Zhou Enlai, criticizing him for conciliating in the struggle with Mao and blurring the battle lines that had already begun. Zhou Enlai made it clear that he could not agree with such criticism. On November 12, Zhou Enlai and members of the Central Bureau in the rear called the Provisional Central Committee separately to report the progress of the Ningdu meeting and the debate. Members of the Rear Central Bureau believe that: This meeting launched a two-front struggle that had never been seen within the Central Bureau, breaking the peaceful state of accommodation.Comrade Zhou Enlai’s opinions before the meeting were not significantly different from those of other comrades in the front. In the report, he did not mention active offensive. He interpreted the instructions of the Central Committee with the spirit of preparation as the center. Moreover, he did not give Mao Zedong’s mistakes a clear criticism. Some questions explain the cover for him, and it can't be said that it's just a matter of moderation.We believe that Comrade Zhou Enlai's lack of determination in the struggle is his greatest personal weakness, and he should have a deep understanding of this weakness and overcome it. Zhou Enlai said in the telegram: I admit that my criticism of Comrade Mao Zedong in the meeting was moderate, and I did not criticize enough of his organizational concept mistakes. In addition, I corrected the excessive criticism of comrades in the rear.I don't agree with those who think that the situation of this struggle has not been unfolded, which is to reconcile and blur the front of the struggle.Comrades in the rear advocated the recall of Mao Zedong, but there was no discussion beforehand. After it was brought up at the meeting, it was quite difficult to solve it. Temporary Central Recovery: Affirming that Zhou Enlai is correct, accusing Zhou of being a conciliator is incorrect, and emphasizing that unity of leadership is the most important thing at present. In this way, Mao Zedong was dismissed from the military on the eve of the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". From then on, Mao Zedong began to think about it, which was both tense and painful for him. The social surveys that Yudu conducted several times actually found a circumstantial evidence for the problem he was thinking about.This kind of thinking made him more mature, so there was the Zunyi Conference that decided the fate of the Red Army after the Western Expedition. When Mao Zedong was frustrated, the only person who cared for him and comforted him was He Zizhen.When Mao Zedong was busy in the past, he always observed the rule that he only met He Zizhen on Saturdays. Many Red Army leaders respected this unwritten discipline in the Soviet area at that time.Although Mao Zedong was frustrated at that time, his love with He Zizhen was beautiful. He Zizhen has a handsome appearance and a bit of a temper. She is a passionate revolutionary. When the Long March began, she was 24 years old. She was only 17 or 18 years old when she met Mao Zedong in Jinggangshan. He Zizhen was not Mao Zedong's original wife. Mao's father had forced him to marry a daughter-in-law four or five years older than him when he was 15 years old.He obediently attended church, but refused to have access to the young woman, whose name was not revealed (because it was an unconsummated marriage). He Zizhen was not Mao Zedong's first lover either, his first lover and first real wife was his teacher's daughter.This teacher was Professor Yang Changji, and Mao Zedong followed him to Beijing.In Beijing, Mao Zedong began to believe in Marxism and fell in love with Yang Kaihui passionately.Yang Kaihui is a slender, talented woman who is 8 years younger than Mao Zedong. She is determined to dedicate herself to the cause of building a new China. Mao Zedong and Yang Kaihui's resistance to traditional marriage was a "romantic union" and they lived together for many years. Born in 1922, Kishiyo was a young man with both talent and appearance. He was killed by an American bomb on the Korean battlefield in 1950. Mao Anqing, born in 1923, has been living in Beijing and married a lady named Shao Hua. In 1927, when Mao Zedong held the Autumn Harvest Uprising, he left Yang Kaihui in Changsha, and the two never saw each other again. In October 1930, Kaihui was arrested by the Kuomintang when she was living in the eastern suburbs of Changsha.She was imprisoned together with her eldest son, Mao Anying.The Kuomintang tried to make her turn her back on Mao Zedong.She refused and was tortured.She was executed by criminal police on November 14, 1930, outside Liuyangmen, Changsha. A nurse named Chen Yuting took Mao Anying home.Mao Zedong's younger sister Mao Zejian (actually a cousin) was an underground worker. She was arrested earlier than Kaihui and was killed in Hengshan on August 20, 1929.The deaths of the two of them are not related to each other, but both of them have a relationship with Mao Zedong.Mao Zedong rarely saw her in the years before parting with Kaihui.They often hold jobs in different places.After parting, as the years went by, he missed Yang Kaihui more and more deeply. In 1957, he published a poem titled "Butterfly Love Flower" in memory of Kaihui: "I lost my pride..." In 1927, Mao Zedong and He Zizhen met in Jinggangshan.She was a top student fresh out of an evangelical high school, slender and full of life.She had fought in the local peasants' Autumn Harvest Uprising before joining the ranks of the Red Army in Jinggangshan. ... He Zizhen was born on the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival on August 15, so her parents gave her a delicate and poetic name "Longan".In southern China, Gui means August, and longan means longan, a fruit similar to litchi.When she grew up, she felt that the name Longan was "too soft", so she changed it to Zizhen, which means precious child.She is very beautiful, she can be regarded as a beauty in Yongxin City, with fair skin, bright eyes, lively and enthusiastic, and proficient in poetry and calligraphy.She was one of the first women in the school to engage in the revolutionary cause. She led her classmates to cut off their long braids and overthrew the Bodhisattvas in the shrines of temples.She was one of the first people wanted by the Kuomintang in Yongxin County. On January 27, 1927, she took part in leading the uprising in three counties, saving 28 Communist Party members who were imprisoned awaiting execution.He Zizhen and the others had only a few old-fashioned rifles when they revolted, but they made a lot of trouble in the city and finally won. Not long after He Zizhen went up the mountain with Mao Zedong, he was engaged in dangerous work behind the enemy lines.Once she had to pretend to be a dying sick woman to avoid arrest.Another time, when she was performing a reconnaissance mission, she rescued Mao Zedong and Zhu De who were ambushed.She jumped on a horse, held a pistol in each hand, and galloped for more than ten miles at a stretch, diverting the attention of the enemy and allowing Mao Zedong and Zhu De to escape. Deeds like these quickly made He Zizhen famous among the guerrillas, and He Zizhen fought alongside those men in the early struggle in Jinggangshan. Mao Zedong and He Zizhen lived together in Jinggangshan shortly after they met in 1927, but they were not officially married until 1930 after Yang Kaihui died.Their first child, a daughter, was born in the border area of ​​Fujian. From July to October 1929, Mao Zedong suffered from malaria and recuperated on a mountain at the junction of Fujian and Jiangxi. Since then, He Zizhen has been working by Mao Zedong's side, and she acts as his female secretary. He Zizhen knew where Mao Zedong suffered after being frustrated. At this time, it was useless to say more. She just wanted to take good care of Mao Zedong in life. She tried every means to cook Mao Zedong's favorite Hunan cuisine, but Mao Zedong's appetite was not good, and every time he ate, he just praised He Zizhen's cooking skills. He Zizhen looked at Mao Zedong who was getting thinner and thinner day by day, and only then did he really understand the old saying "heart disease is hard to heal". Although He Zizhen knew that she could not cure Mao Zedong's "disease", as a woman, she knew how to care for and take care of a man. Mao Zedong loved to eat fried soybeans, and she always tried to find ways to buy soybeans from her fellow villagers. Every night when Mao Zedong suffered from insomnia, she always stuffed a small bag of fried soybeans into it. Mao Zedong grabbed the fried soybeans and chewed them vividly.He Zizhen lay beside Mao Zedong, listening to Mao Zedong's contented chewing, let out a long breath secretly.She knew that Mao Zedong would soon fall asleep while chewing.Stir-fried soybeans became Mao Zedong's hypnotic agent. During those days of waiting and hesitation, He Zizhen's heart never felt relaxed. She believed that Mao Zedong was right, and that the disaster of the Red Army was temporary. In those days, only when Mao Zedong walked into the house and saw He Zizhen's warm smile did he relax a little.He often stared at He Zizhen's face for a long time until He Zizhen lowered her head shyly.At this time Mao Zedong said like a child: Zizhen, you are still so young. When Mao Zedong said this, He Zizhen's tears almost fell, and she understood that it was Mao Zedong who was easing her heart.Every time at this time, she always looked at Mao Zedong affectionately.