Chapter 5 Chapter Four: Deployment and Preparations of the People's Liberation Army Crossing the River

According to the established policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on marching south of the Yangtze River, the Central Military Commission decided in February that the Second and Third Field Army and the Advance Corps (Twelfth Corps) of the Fourth Field Army with Xiao Jinguang as the commander and political commissar and East China , Some local armed forces in the Central Plains Military Region have a total of about 1.2 million people. Under the unified leadership of the General Front Committee (with Deng Xiaoping as the secretary) composed of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin, they are preparing to launch a cross-river operation in March and April. Annihilate the Kuomintang army defending along the river, seize Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and the vast areas of southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, Zhejiang, northern Jiangxi, and northern Hubei, and be ready to crush possible armed intervention by imperialism at any time.

As early as December 12, 1948, when Huang Wei was encircled and wiped out, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the General Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign attended by Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi and with Deng Xiaoping as the secretary: After the Huangwei Corps was wiped out, a meeting of the General Front Committee was held to discuss the end of the campaign. The final rest plan, further battle plan and future battle plan for crossing the river. Mao Zedong submitted the preliminary opinions on the policy of crossing the river to the General Front Committee for discussion.The density of this telegraph machine was extremely high, and only Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping were sent, and Deng Xiaoping was instructed to read it to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin during the meeting, and burn it down after reading it.

The most prominent point in Mao Zedong's policy is: Huaye and Zhongye rest at the same time, and carry out cross-river operations at the same time. department". On December 15, the Huangwei Corps was wiped out. On the 17th, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the General Front Committee headed by Deng Xiaoping: "We plan to invite Comrades Bo Cheng and Chen Yi to come to the Central Business Unit together." That night, Liu, Chen, and Deng drove to the Huaye command post.The Huaihai General Front Committee held its first plenary meeting, and the topic was crossing the river. On the 19th, Liu and Chen went north and arrived at Xibaipo, the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, at the end of 1948. At this time, Mao Zedong published his 1949 New Year's message "Carrying the Revolution Through to the End".

After the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee from January 6 to 8, 1949, in order to implement the resolutions of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and implement the policies and tasks of the Central Committee, the Central Plains Bureau held an enlarged meeting in Shangqiu at the end of January. Two enlarged meetings were held in Jiawang, north of Xuzhou, in mid-June and at the end of February. Chen Yi returned from the Central Committee to the south, met with Su Yu near Xuzhou on January 22, and went to Jiawang to attend the enlarged meeting of the Huaye Front Committee.This is the first Jiawang meeting.The meeting was chaired by Chen Yi and held in mid-January. Chen Yi conveyed the content of the January meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and made a report on the spirit of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the 25th.The cadres who attended the Jia-Wang meeting discussed the instructions of the Party Central Committee on the current situation, the tasks of 1949 and Chen Yi's report.Through study and discussion, the meeting made the "Resolution on Supporting the Resolution of the Political Bureau Meeting of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949", and determined six tasks for 1949.

On January 26, 1949, Chen Yi rushed to Shangqiu to meet with Deng Xiaoping. Chen and Deng decided to immediately convene an enlarged meeting of the Central Plains Bureau, which was called the "Shangqiu meeting". The Shangqiu meeting was held on January 29 and lasted for 3 days.The meeting was chaired by Deng Xiaoping, the first secretary of the Central Plains Bureau. He conveyed the resolution of the Central Political Bureau meeting and made a report at the meeting. Deng Xiaoping focused on combining the work of the same party, government, and military organs in the Central Plains and certain ideological conditions among the cadres, mainly inspecting the phenomenon of right deviation in the implementation of policies in the newly liberated areas and cities, and criticized some cadres for their understanding of the situation. The right-leaning ideology, the numbness that began to appear, and the erroneous thinking of blindly underestimating the enemy helped the cadres to establish the confidence to dare to cross the river and march across the country, and the determination to not be afraid of any difficulties.

In the spring of 1949, according to the development of the war and the need to march across the country, all units of the army were reorganized in succession in accordance with the needs of the march.The original Northwest, Central Plains, East China, and Northeast four field armies were renamed the first, second, third, and fourth field armies respectively.Other units have also been reorganized successively. This is a reorganization meeting being held by a certain unit of our army Deng Xiaoping called on the commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army to conduct serious training and prepare ideologically, materially and militarily for the battle across the river. and build liberated areas, and do a good job of logistical support for crossing the Yangtze River.

After the Shangqiu meeting, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping held a meeting of the General Front Committee on February 8. All the people in charge of the Central Plains Bureau participated in the meeting. They studied in detail the issue of crossing the river and the deployment of crossing the river. The Corps has a total of 5 corps, adopting the tactics of deploying from Yangzhong in Jiangyin, Zhongxi in Nanjing, Dongxi in Wuhu, Guichi in Tongling, and Dongxi in Anqing, and crossing the river at the same time. The other two corps in the second field marched to the Huangmei, Susong, and Wangjiang sections with one army, and the five armies served as the general reserve team to follow the first breakthrough force to cross the river.

This deployment of crossing the river at the same time as the front line did not change much later, which laid the foundation for the "Outline for the Implementation of the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign" in the future.The time for crossing the river is initially set at the end of March. The meeting considered that the rainy season is coming and the spring floods have not yet occurred. On February 8th, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to the second field and the third field, that is, "turn the army into a work force." It turned out that on February 4, the General Front Committee, in the name of the Second and Third Field Commands, sent telegrams to the Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, and the Central Military Commission, reporting two major issues:

The army is stepping up to rest and reorganize, and the logistics work is being stepped up; After fully preparing, the two major field armies are preparing to advance the time for crossing the river from April to March. The Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, and the Central Military Commission responded to this report in a telegram: From now on, the method of first rural areas and then cities will be reversed in the past 20 years, and the method of first cities and then rural areas will be changed.The army is not only a fighting force, but primarily a working force.Army cadres should learn to take over and manage cities, know how to deal with imperialism and Kuomintang reactionaries in the cities, deal with the bourgeoisie, lead workers and organize trade unions, mobilize and organize youth, unite and train cadres in new areas, and Manage industry and commerce, be good at managing schools, newspapers, news agencies and radio stations, be good at handling foreign affairs, be good at dealing with the problems of various democratic parties and people's organizations, be good at adjusting the relationship between cities and villages, and solve food, coal and other necessary problems, Good at handling financial and fiscal issues.In short, all urban problems that the army, cadres and soldiers were not familiar with in the past should all be borne by themselves in the future.

The reply also pointed out that after the Second Field Army and the Third Field Army crossed the Yangtze River and marched south of the Yangtze River, they would occupy many cities and vast villages.The central government places special emphasis on researching the countryside and studying rural policies.The rural areas in the south are fundamentally different from those in the old areas in the north.In the first year, the policy of reducing rent and interest cannot be implemented, and the rent and interest can only be paid as usual.Working in a new area, you will encounter many problems and need to relearn.

The reply telegram paid special attention to the emphasis on learning about urban work, pointing out that if the city cannot be learned to manage quickly, great difficulties will occur after the vast cities in the south of the Yangtze River are liberated in the future. The Third Field Army has jurisdiction over 15 armies, and Chen Yi is the commander and political commissar. This is the eve of the Battle of Huaihai, and Commander Chen Yi drove to participate in the first Jiawang meeting to study and deploy operational issues. Therefore, the reply request requested the second field and the third field not to relax the preparations for crossing the river, and on the other hand, to intensify rest and study policies within two months of February and March, and because the Kuomintang was launching a peaceful offensive at this time, we The party had to seriously engage in peace negotiations with the Kuomintang government.In this way, the plan of the General Front Committee to cross the river ahead of schedule was postponed. This telegram from the Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, and the Central Military Commission is an extremely important telegram.This telegram was sent not only to the second and third fields, but also to the field armies and the central bureaus.The question raised by this telegram is the direction and focus of the national party, government, and military work, that is, a major issue that is about to undergo a turning point in the work of the whole party.A month later, at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, a historic turning point occurred in the Party's work, and it was made a resolution of the whole Party. After this important telegram was sent to the second field, the second field carried out a joint implementation on the basis of the spirit of the Shangqiu meeting.According to the instructions of the Central Telegram, the Sanye Front Committee held a second temporary enlarged meeting in Jiawang, that is, the second Jiawang meeting. On February 11, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong decided that Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Jichun, and Chen Geng would join the East China Bureau as members.At this time, Liu Bocheng went from Shijiazhuang to Shangqiu. After Liu, Chen, and Deng discussed, Chen Yi went to Xuzhou on the 13th to hold the second Jiawang meeting of the three fields.Then, according to the instructions of the Central Committee, the East China Bureau and the East China Military Region also moved to Xuzhou, and together with the General Front Committee and the Sanye Front Committee, they arranged for the southward crossing of the river.Liu, Deng, Rao, Su, Tan and others also came to Xuzhou. The second Jawang meeting started on February 18. On the 19th, Chen Yi made a report on the party's new area policy.That night, he and Tan Zhenlin convened a meeting of cadres above the army level, and formulated the preparation order for the Third Field Army to cross the river. From March 5th to 13th, 1949, the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Xibaipo (Xibaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province). Attending the meeting were 34 members of the Central Committee, 19 alternate members of the Central Committee, 11 important staff members who attended the meeting, and a total of 20 members of the Central Committee and alternate members of the Central Committee who were absent due to traffic conditions and other reasons.This is an extremely important decision-making meeting to formulate various policies for winning the national victory and after the victory.Mao Zedong made a report and summary at the meeting. Mao Zedong said that after the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin battles, the main force of the Kuomintang army has been wiped out.In the future, we must deal with the remaining more than 1 million combat troops of the Kuomintang that are distributed from Xinjiang to Taiwan.He pointed out: "In various places in the south, the People's Liberation Army will first occupy the cities and then the countryside." The People's Liberation Army will always be not only a combat team, but also a work team.We must be prepared to convert all of the 2.1 million field troops into working forces for work in the newly liberated vast areas. Mao Zedong raised the issue of shifting the focus of the party's work from the countryside to the cities.He said that from 1927 to the present, our work has focused on the countryside, gathering strength in the countryside, encircling the cities with the countryside, and then taking over the cities.The time for such a method of work is over. "From now on, the period begins from the city to the country and the city leads the country."Of course, both urban and rural areas must be considered, and the rural areas must not be abandoned and only the cities should be considered.But the focus of the work of the party and the army must be on the city, and great efforts must be made to learn how to manage and build cities... The next day, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi and others were discussing, and Mao Zedong walked in.Everyone stood up one after another and gave up their seats to Mao Zedong. After sitting down, Mao Zedong said: "We are about to achieve national victory. What do you think of the future military situation?" "Chairman, you pointed out in your report that there are only three ways to deal with the more than one million Kuomintang troops in the future: Tianjin, Beiping, and Suiyuan. However, if we succeed in peace talks with the Kuomintang, how will we deal with the Kuomintang army?" Mao Zedong said in a calm tone: "We hope that the comprehensive peace talks will be successful, but ah, we should not have too high hopes for the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek is unwilling to fail, and he is unwilling to put down his gun. However, we should also see that the Kuomintang There are already many people in China who are unwilling to fight another civil war, so let me say that comprehensive peace will not succeed in the future, but partial peace will still exist. You must be flexible in handling various issues, and try to use the method of Peiping to solve the enemy more.” Deng Xiaoping said: "Chairman, you pointed out in your report that the People's Liberation Army will always be a combat team and a work team, especially when problems in the south are solved using the Beiping method or the Suiyuan method. Your words It is very helpful for us to guide us in the battle of crossing the river." Mao Zedong smiled, pointed at Chen Yi and said: "Chen Yi forced him out. Last time he came to ask us for cadres, how could we have so many cadres. Now we have only prepared more than 53,000 cadres for you to go south for several months. One cadre is far from enough.” Chen Yi also smiled and said: "This is enough, our two field armies, plus local armed forces, have more than 1 million people." Mao Zedong said to Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi: "As the fighting gradually decreases, you must slowly implement this transformation of tasks. We used to encircle the cities with the countryside. From now on, we must start from the cities to the countryside, and from the cities. Lead the villages. When you go to the south to fight, you must first occupy the cities and then the villages." In order to meet the needs of marching across the country, our army implemented a unified organization in the spring of 1949 according to the instructions of the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong on November 1, 1948 on unifying the organization and troop numbers of the whole army: The Northwest Field Army was organized into the First Field Army (the first and second corps were formed in June of that year.), with jurisdiction over 7 armies; Peng Dehuai, vice chairman of the Military Commission and deputy commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, was also the commander and political commissar. The Central Plains Field Army was organized into the Second Field Army, which had jurisdiction over the third, fourth, and fifth corps, a total of 9 armies; Liu Bocheng was the commander, and Deng Xiaoping was the political commissar. The East China Field Army was organized into the Third Field Army, which had jurisdiction over the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth corps, a total of 15 armies; Chen Yi served as commander and political commissar, and Rao Shushi served as political commissar. The Northeast Field Army was organized into the Fourth Field Army, which had jurisdiction over the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th corps, a total of 12 armies.Lin Biao served as commander and Luo Ronghuan served as political commissar. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps in North China were successively organized into the 18th, 19th, and 20th Corps, a total of 9 armies; Nie Rongzhen served as the commander of the North China Military Region, and Bo Yibo served as the political commissar.The three corps of the North China Military Region are directly under the Central Military Commission. Adding the 5 armies under the jurisdiction of each military region, the army now has 16 corps and 57 armies. After this meeting, that is, on March 23, Mao Zedong led the Central Committee and the Military Commission to move to Peiping. In late March 1949, the General Front Committee entered Sunjiaweizi in the southern suburb of Bengbu.The meeting for crossing the river was held in this village, which was mostly huts with earthen walls, and some corps commanders also attended the meeting. Deng Xiaoping presided over the meeting. He first said: "Boss Chen, Comrade Tan Zhenlin and I went to Xibaipo to attend the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. The chairman and the leaders of the Military Commission were particularly concerned about the issue of crossing the river and talked with us for a long time. Starting today , we will use a few days to study some specific issues in the battle across the river. Everyone can speak freely." "The Yangtze River is different from the Yellow River. The Yangtze River has many ports. Especially in the east of Jingpu in front of our Sanye, from Taizhou to Haimen, there are many inland rivers near both banks that can directly lead to the Yangtze River. Therefore, there are many outlets into the river. Blockage is implemented, but there are still many ports that can be used. However, because there are many water networks on both sides of the Yangtze River, it is difficult for troops to pass through without erecting and repairing bridges, which hinders the movement of troops. Therefore, crossing the river, moving to the river and landing operations , Reconnaissance must be organized in detail to facilitate troop operations." "Because of the impact of natural water flow and man-made increase in land area, the condition of the banks of the Yangtze River has changed a lot, and the banks of the Yangtze River have often moved. Some areas of the river bank on the 1/50,000th map have actually moved a lot. For example, Langshan Mountain in Nantong used to be several miles away from the river bank, but now it is washed by the river to the foot of the mountain." "There are many sandbars in the Yangtze River, with different sizes. The larger ones have many residents, houses, and trees. These sandbars are mostly sandy. The sandbars can be used as springboards for crossing the river, but there are also disadvantages in doing so. On the one hand, it is necessary to cross the river twice. In addition, the soil on both sides of the Yangtze River is relatively soft, which is not convenient for setting up artillery positions. ), it is necessary to study overcoming solutions in pre-battle training in order to improve combat skills.” "In the past, both the second field and the third field carried out battles over the Yellow River, but the Yellow River is 'faced with evil and kind', while the Yangtze River is 'faced with kindness and heart is evil'. To the east of Nanjing, the flow rate of the river is high, and at the same time, due to the attraction of the moon to the earth, the river water It rises and falls twice a day. The first and fifteenth day of the lunar calendar are high tides, and the eighth and 23rd are low tides. The ebb and flow of the tide directly affects ships entering the river and landing on the shore." The Second Field Army has jurisdiction over 9 armies, commander Liu Bocheng, and political commissar Deng Xiaoping.This was the headquarters of the Second Field Army when it marched into the Great Southwest in 1949. From left: Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping, Deputy Political Commissar Zhang Jichun, Commander Liu Bocheng "The boat people on the Yangtze River have many weird customs and habits. For example, the sail of the boat should not be called the sail, but the boat canopy; after eating, the chopsticks should not be placed flat on the rice bowl, but on another table; Talking nonsense should not be disturbed in the slightest, so as not to affect people's hearts; there are "jiang pigs" in the Yangtze River, and the big ones can knock over the boats. The boat people are prohibited from shooting and not causing trouble; The helmsman should be called the boss or the treasurer." After some research, Deng Xiaoping said: "The Yangtze River has the characteristics of the Yangtze River. We have encountered many new problems this time." Su Yu took up the conversation and said: "It seems that crossing the river is not very simple. I have crossed the river several times in the past, but they were all small-scale smuggling under the concern of the enemy, which is different from this large-scale forced crossing. The enemy is on the south bank of the Yangtze River. Many fortifications have been built, and some fortresses are still quite strong, such as Wusong, Jiangyin, Madang, Jiangning and other fortresses from the east of Jingpu to Haimen, and these fortresses are not easy to break through." Deng Xiaoping said: "The key point of crossing the river is whether you can get to the other side. First of all, you don't need to attack these fortified fortresses. In the history of crossing the river, the attack on Nanjing generally chooses the point of crossing the river in the southwest of Nanjing or beyond. In the eastern region, and there are many people crossing the river on the side, and few people crossing the river on the front, it is usually suitable to go from Caishiji to Dangtujian in the southwest of Nanjing." Chen Yi said: "I very much agree with what Comrade Xiaoping said just now. The key to crossing the river is to first break through the defense line of the Yangtze River. Chiang Kai-shek set up a 'long snake formation' on the Yangtze River, which is called a 'three-dimensional defense'. But his troops are basically Not enough, 700,000 people have to guard the front of 1400 kilometers, he can't hold it. In order to cross the river successfully, we can avoid the fortress of the Kuomintang, where we can cross the river, we will cross there. Just move the troops to the south bank , things will be easy." Deng Xiaoping said: "In 1947, when our army went south, Bo Cheng conducted some research on the tactics of crossing the river in front of the enemy before forcibly crossing the Yellow River. Organized the troops to advance to the north bank of the river, and did not attend this meeting. But he has a research on the battle of crossing the Yangtze River, and I will read it here for everyone to listen to." "Boss Liu has studied at the Frunze Military Academy, and he has a lot of research on military theory. I'm here to explain the text, you have to listen carefully!" Deng Xiaoping said humorously. Liu Bocheng wrote in the article: "According to our understanding, pontoon bridges cannot be built on the Yangtze River, only water crossings are possible. The main means of crossing the river are wooden boats and awnings; secondly, the enemy has already prepared for our crossing operation, so it is not easy to surprise and smuggle people. ; Third, the Yangtze River is very wide, and our artillery on the shore is not easy to receive the effect of suppressing the enemy's firepower, and it is difficult to support the first echelon; fourth, the enemy has the cooperation of the sea and air force, which is a greater threat to our crossing the river. How do you think about it? These questions?" Liu Bocheng threw out a lot of questions at the beginning of the article, like a hook to catch the hearts of the commanders present.Liu Bocheng said in the article: "(1) The enemy will estimate that we will go all the way from Xi'an to Chongqing, all the way to take Wuhan along the Pinghan Road, all the way to attack Nanjing along the Jinpu Road, and all the way to seize the Beijing-Shanghai line along the canal. Therefore, they must defend from Sichuan to Shanghai, counting The defense of a thousand miles of rivers is bound to be difficult, so we can only defend key points and main lines. If this is the case, there will be a large gap, which will help us to make false crossings in the main direction and attract the enemy. This method is often used to smuggle across the Yangtze River. Our basic tactics are to cross across the wide front, hundreds of kilometers, at the same time, and at night. This can disrupt the enemy's defensive deployment. In this case, some troops may There are obstacles, but for the most part, well-organized and well-prepared, you can force your way to success. "(2) In order to save troops, the enemy will inevitably strengthen auxiliary defenses. They may lay mines in weak places and areas estimated to cross the river, and strengthen the blockade of the river bank. Using the practice of the Japanese and puppet troops, they will build bamboo fences along the river. Building bunkers, high dams, reducing traffic ports, blocking news, cutting off north-south traffic, laying mines on the shore, and driving all ships close to the south bank. To this end, we must learn how to break barriers. "(3) About the tools for crossing the river. Most of the leading troops must use motorcycles in order to land quickly. It is estimated that the enemy may remove the equipment for crossing the river by motorcycles in the towns and ports on the north bank. Several of our corps are crossing the river at the same time. This tool Inevitably not enough, so in addition to actively repairing and organizing technical personnel training, the second kind of preparation must be made, that is, attention must be paid to seizure and collection control. Even merchant trading ships are not allowed to go away, or dismantled and buried. Register as much as possible and wait for call. At the same time, prepare a batch of equipment accessories, and dismantle some cars and other available engines for backup when necessary. A large number of tools mainly rely on tributaries, lakes, and ports on the north bank, and strengthen the requisition of ferries, business boats, fishing boats, etc. , secondly, after the first echelon landed successfully, the ships on the south bank were released. This tool issue became the main work in the preparations for the forced crossing. It was necessary to immediately start investigation and statistics in an organized and planned way and make ideological preparations for use. "(4) The enemy will definitely use the remaining aircraft to be active over the Yangtze River. This problem cannot be ignored. But the enemy's contradiction cannot be overcome because there are too few aircraft and the Yangtze River is too long. Which section will we focus on? Therefore, we still have many conditions available: one is to cross the river at night, which reduces the effectiveness of the aircraft; one is that we control the entire north bank, and many tributary harbors can gather tools and concealed troops, and take all negative means to reduce damage. The method is to fire all anti-aircraft weapons and light and heavy machine guns in an organized manner to force enemy planes not to fly low. There are many, and outdated, the original three brigades in Xuzhou only had 18 planes, and now they have gone to Nanchang). The troops can conduct special exercises during the preparation process. "(5) How to deal with the enemy's ships? The enemy may use merchant ships for combat and patrol purposes, plus naval warships, so the number is not small, but the lack of combat equipment on merchant ships has little effect on me. Therefore , we must do a good job of investigating, identifying, and educating the troops. The enemy's line of defense is too long, and his forces will inevitably be dispersed. If we do not disperse, we will take advantage of loopholes. Most of these weapons are ineffective, and vision at night is difficult. After our river crossing tools are launched into the water, they float like water gulls, so it is difficult for artillery fire to hit them. In addition, I have several methods to deal with them. Put them on a one- or two-day itinerary, guard on one or both of our wings, measure the distance, and shoot as soon as the enemy fleet is found no matter day or night. Use the threat of containment as the first line of cover." Deng Xiaoping read a lot in one breath, and the commanders of the corps below were all fascinated by it. Some of these things were questions they had been struggling to find answers to in recent days. However, Deng Xiaoping stopped suddenly when the book was at a wonderful point. He smiled and waved his hands and said, "No more! No more! After I ask Mr. Liu for his opinion, I will print a copy of the material for you so that you will not have to remember it in a hurry. Forgetful." Then everyone smiled and closed their notebooks, moving their fingers. The enlarged meeting of the General Front Committee was held for four or five days, and the staff office compiled the minutes of the meeting into the "Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Operation Outline", which was reviewed by Deng and Chen, and finally revised and finalized by Deng Xiaoping. During the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao Zedong specifically asked Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, etc. to study the issue of crossing the river, and initially set April 10 as the time for launching the crossing. The basic contents of the cross-river meeting in late March were initially determined as follows: The second and third field armies all began to cross the river on April 15.The 3rd, 4th, and 5th corps of the Second Field, a total of 9 armies with 350,000 people, were the West Assault Group, commanded by Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da, and crossed the river between Hukou and Zongyang; The Seventh and Ninth Corps of Sanye are the Central Assault Group, commanded by Tan Zhenlin, crossing the river from the east of Zongyang to the mouth of Jinhe; The eighth and tenth corps of the three fields are the East Assault Group, commanded by Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, crossing the river between Jinhekou and Jiangyin. There are 15 armies with a total of 650,000 people in the 4 corps of Sanye (plus the 12th Corps of Siye, I have more than 1.2 million troops in the battle of crossing the river). After successfully crossing the river, the central and eastern roads were under the command of Su Yu. A member of the General Front Committee responsible for leading and commanding the Battle of Crossing the River.From left: Su Yu (member), Deng Xiaoping (secretary), Liu Bocheng (member of the Standing Committee), Chen Yi (member of the Standing Committee), Tan Zhenlin (member of the Standing Committee) The key to such a deployment is that after crossing the river, the middle and eastern roads quickly move east and west, and encircle a large number of defending enemies in Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Wuhu in a pincer shape. The meeting also emphasized that we must also consider the possibility that the enemy will stick to the defense of the river, or shrink and gather troops to attack us all the way across the river, so we must be prepared for serious battles. On April 1, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi led the newly formed elite headquarters to Yaogang Village in the southeast of Hefei.The headquarters of each assault group also went to Tongcheng, Wuwei, and Taizhou. However, the date of crossing the river and the attitude towards the Nanjing government took a lot of consideration. Chen Yi, who was in the command center, had the responsibility to give more consideration to these issues. Soon after, due to the progress of the peace negotiations held in Peiping, the Kuomintang may sign the agreement. If it can be signed, the crossing of the river in battle can become a peaceful crossing of the river, which is of great significance.However, Mao Zedong estimated that the time for crossing the river would be postponed by half a month to a month, and planned to postpone the April 15 date proposed by the General Front Committee composed of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi and others to the end of April to the beginning of May.For this reason, Mao Zedong called the General Front Committee: What is the disadvantage of such a delay? The timing of crossing the river is one of the main links that Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi have mastered.They immediately collected opinions from all sides and conducted their own investigations.The opinions are pretty grim: Erye: The water potential of the Yangtze River will accelerate at the end of April and the beginning of May, with strong southerly winds, heavy rain and strong waves.And food has become difficult at present. Sanye: The rainy season began in late April, and the river was rising day by day. Two-thirds of the existing ships were riverboats, and it was difficult to navigate in the river. During the rainy season, the rice fields were flooded, making it difficult to deploy troops.Food and grass have also been difficult. The results of the General Front Committee's own investigation are: the water in May is greater than that in July and August, and the lakes on both sides of the river are flooded. The water surface of the Yangtze River is extremely wide, and it will be extremely difficult to cross the river.Now that millions of troops are crowding the riverside, if it is delayed for too long, they will have to retreat to get food and grass.As for the signing, it should also be assumed that the enemy will turn his face. Therefore, the General Front Committee with Deng Xiaoping as the secretary suggested to Mao Zedong to fight across the river first, and then strive for peaceful acceptance. The Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong, insisting on the necessity of political struggle and fully considering the objective situation of crossing the river, sent a telegram to the General Front Committee on April 15: "According to the negotiation situation, our army must decide to postpone the crossing of the river by one week, that is, from the 15th The crossing of the river will be postponed on the 22nd. Assuming that it is politically necessary, we must be prepared to postpone it for another 7 days.” Mao Zedong also specifically instructed Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi in the telegram: "When you issue an order to delay crossing the river, don't say it is for negotiation, but say it is because the friendly army has not yet completed the preparations for crossing the river, so as not to relax morale." Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi had different views.In the name of the General Front Committee, they gave instructions to the two field armies and the party committees of the corps.He did not avoid "for the sake of negotiation" at all, but made a positive statement about the relationship between crossing the river and negotiation.This is a good article that fully believes in the cadres and strives to raise awareness.It is indeed the style of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi. This time our army postponed the crossing of the river for a week, which was absolutely necessary politically and militarily.But it is also prone to the danger of lax fighting will and disorientation.Therefore, you must explain the following points to cadres above the division level: (1) The peace negotiations have made considerable progress, and an agreement may be signed in the near future.This kind of agreement is actually the surrender of the Kuomintang, so it is beneficial to the overall situation and the people. (2) When we cross the river, we should cross the river on the basis of the most favorable position in politics. That is to say, if the negotiation breaks down, the other party is responsible; .It is justifiable for us to cross the river after the negotiation is over (broken or an agreement is established), and when we achieve this step politically, the enemy will be more disintegrated and the militants will be more isolated and chaotic. faction, and may also divide a part of the main combat faction.The people of the whole country will support us even more. In the future, it will be more beneficial to cross the river peacefully or in battle. (3) It must be estimated that most of the Kuomintang troops are still in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's best friends. Even if the agreement is signed, they may still continue to resist. Therefore, we should start from fighting across the river.And since the enemy will certainly use this time to strengthen his military preparations along the river, we should also use this time to make more adequate military preparations.It is not only wrong but dangerous to relax one's combat readiness. (4) If politically necessary, it may be postponed again for a few days.Therefore, in the army, on the one hand, we must prevent acute diseases, and on the other hand, we must prevent the slackening of the will to fight. (5) Everyone is most worried about seasons and river water issues. The central government also attaches great importance to this and calculates the time.Before the end of this (April), there will be no major changes in the river water. (6) Another major problem of time delay is food, firewood, oil, and salt. Each regiment must calculate it in detail and work out a solution. I hope we can solve it by telling us. (7) During the extended time for crossing the river, the central task should still be to strengthen combat preparations, but this time can also be used to convey the resolution of the Second Plenary Session.Party committees are asked to make their own decisions on this point. Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi issued this telegram on April 12 and reported it to the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong fully respected the opinions of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi, and on April 14 he reiterated: "The instruction of the General Front Committee on April 12 is very good. Please follow this instruction and explain to the cadres above the division that the time for delaying the crossing of the river will be emphatically explained. Reasons, strengthen combat preparations, and raise more food, grass, oil and salt." Afterwards, after repeated discussions on the time of crossing the river, the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong finally made a decision at 9 o'clock on April 18: "I fully agree with the entire deployment of the General Front Committee, that is, the corps of the Second Field and the Third Field will be dispatched in April. The attack will start on the 20th, and the general offensive will be carried out on the 22nd to fight to the end." The Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, and the Central Military Commission assigned the People's Liberation Army the general task of crossing the Yangtze River. If the Nanjing government is unwilling to reach a domestic peace agreement, the People's Liberation Army should fight across the Yangtze River and destroy the old nest of the Kuomintang—liberate Nanjing, liberate Shanghai, and Hangzhou. , Wuhan and other big cities and the vast areas of southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, and Zhejiang, and then take advantage of the victory to march to the southeastern provinces, and then liberate the whole of China. In order to ensure the completion of this task, Mao Zedong ordered the General Front Committee with Deng Xiaoping as the secretary to continue to organize and command the main force of the second field and the third field, as well as the advance corps of the fourth field, namely the 12th Corps, Jianghan Military Region, Tongbai Military Region, Hubei-Henan Military Region, etc. A military region fights.The above-mentioned troops are required to cooperate in operations in accordance with the unified deployment of the General Front Committee. The General Front Committee, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary, sits at the headquarters in Hefei. According to the instructions of the Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong, and the Central Military Commission, combined with the characteristics of the enemy's Jiang defense and the deployment of troops, the "Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign Implementation Outline" was drawn up.as follows: The "Outline for the Implementation of the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign" drafted by Deng Xiaoping, secretary of the General Front Committee A. The Jiang army has gathered troops from Shanghai to Anqing. There are 24 armies and 72 divisions, with a total of about 440,000 people.Among them, 18 armies and 49 divisions were directly responsible for the defense of the river; 6 armies and 23 divisions were in control of the Hangzhou, Jin, Qu, and Hui areas on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line.It can be used as a mobile user, and there are about 4 to 5 armies. B. The entire second and third field armies of ours aim at annihilating all or most of the above-mentioned Chiang forces, occupying southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, and the entire province of Zhejiang, seizing Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, and completely destroying the political and economic center of the reactionary Kuomintang government , decided at 18:00 on April 15th, to start the battle with the whole line crossing the river. C. Judging that after we successfully cross the river, the possible changes in the enemy army are: (1) Shrink our forces in the Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou triangle area and the Nanjing and Wuhu areas, control the key points in Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhu, Zhenjiang, and Wuxi, and plan to gather our forces and We rushed to the Eastern Front Corps on the Beijing-Shanghai Line to conduct a decisive battle, and retreated to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Line with the troops west of Wuhu to protect their retreat. (2) Withdraw backwards, deploy defensive lines in Wuxi, Nanjing, Wuhu and the areas south of them, use the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway to quickly transfer troops to control along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, ensure the two key points of Nanjing and Wuhu, and seek to cut off our eastern and western armies Then, depending on the situation, or fight me decisively in the Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou triangle area.Either retreat to a decisive battle with us on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, or make a strategic retreat along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line. (3) Voluntarily abandon the areas of Wujin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhu, and all enemy lines along the Yangtze River retreat southward to gather on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line and the coastal areas of Wuxi, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, so as to use the railways and Haikou for stubborn resistance, or for an orderly campaign.撤退。 （四）在情况不利于撤退的时候，分别固守京、沪、杭诸点，以图顽抗。 （五）只要我军渡江成功，无论敌人采取何种处置，战局的发展均将发生于我有利之变化，并有可能演成敌人全部混乱的局面。 丁、我军的作战纲领： （一）战役第一阶段，达成渡江任务，并依据下一阶段之要求，实行战役的展开；第二阶段，达成割裂和包围敌人之任务，并确实控制浙赣线一段，断敌退路；第三阶段，分别歼灭包围之敌，完成全战役。 （二）战役的准备，应以能够应付丙项第一、第二两种情况为出发点，要计算到我东线兵团渡江成功之后，可能遇到严重的战斗，故西线兵团应给以及时有力之支援。 （三）无论敌人采取何种处置，情况发生何种变化，西线之三野第七、第九两个兵团，除留必需兵力协同二野歼灭当面之敌外，主力应与东线三野之第八、第十两兵团实行东西对进，力求迅速会合。此着成功，既可使东线兵团不致孤立，使东线主力作战有必胜之把握，又可做到打乱敌人作战体系，达成割裂包围敌人之目的。故此着实为全战役之关键。 （四）如敌实行第一方案，则应集结三野4个兵团的主力甚至全力于京沪上的决战方面，而以二野之1个兵团进至衢州及其以北以西地区，截断浙赣线，二野主力应沿江东下担任攻占芜湖及准备攻取南京之任务；如敌实行第二方案，则可改以二野主力出浙赣线，余同第一方案。 （五）如敌实行第三方案，则以二野一部接替南京警备，主力解决浙赣线上之敌，三野全力负责解决沪、杭、无锡地带之敌。 （六）如敌实行第四方案，则以二野解决南京，三野解决沪、杭。在步骤上，宜将上海放在最后解决较为有利。 （七）如敌完全混乱，则依实际情况临机处置。 戊、战役第一阶段——渡江作战的部署： （一）由粟裕、张震两同志率三野统率机构，直接指挥三野第八、第十两兵团之主力，共6个军及3个独立旅，由张黄港至龙稍港段及由口岸、三江营、京口段实行渡江，另以第八兵团之三十四、三十五两个军，于战役发起同时，以积极佯攻的手段，吸引和钳制两浦之敌。渡江成功后，除留部队歼灭沿江当面之敌外，应以主力迅速向京沪线上挺进，控制铁路一段，力求首先立稳脚跟，调整态势，巩固阵地，巩固后方联络线，然后扩张战果，对敌人作有后方的、有秩序的进攻。如条件许可，则应派队向西发展，截断京杭公路，如敌进攻，则求得在野战中逐步地予以歼灭，如力量不足，则继续巩固阵地，以待第七、第九兵团赶到时协同歼灭之。 （二）由谭震林同志指挥三野第七、第九两兵团，由裕溪口至姚沟段及由姚沟至枞阳镇（不含）段实行渡江。渡江成功后，除留足够兵力歼灭沿江当面之敌，并监视芜湖之敌外，主力应迅速东进，与第八、第十两兵团会合，截断京杭公路，完成对京沪杭地区敌人之割裂，并协同第八、第十两兵团各个歼灭之。 以上两路（4个兵团），归粟、张（粟、张，即粟裕、张震）统一指挥。两路之具体作战部署，第七、第九两兵团之东进路线，均由三野首长另以详细命令规定之。 （三）二野由枞阳镇（含）至望江段实行渡江。渡江后除歼灭当面之敌外，应以1个兵团以最快速度迅速挺进至浙赣线衢州及其以西以北地区，确实控制浙赣铁路一段及屯溪南北公路，断敌退路。二野主力则应迅速东进，接替三野留置部队的任务，担任歼灭芜湖地区之敌，并准备攻取南京。二野各兵团之具体作战部署，由二野首长另以详细命令规定之。 （四）各部队于渡江成功后，应派队接引左右友邻兵团渡江，各部队应与友邻部队切取联络，互通情报，密切配合，并积极主动地支援友邻作战。 己、总前委使用华东局电台，与两个野战军及三野4个兵团联络。三野各兵团，凡有关作战事宜的电报，除发给粟、张外，应同时发给总前委。 庚、有关作战的战术、技术、通信联络、后勤工作诸事宜，由两野战军自行命令规定之。 辛、这是战役的基本纲要，所有规定执行事宜，及随着战役发展之各项处置，随时由总前委以单个命令规定之。 总前委 寅世 《纲要》对我军参战部队的具体作战任务，作了明确的规定。为了保证战役计划的实现，总前委决定将两大野战军划分为3个作战集团，即西集团、中集团和东集团。 西集团由二野3个兵团和四野第十二兵团组成，共35万余人；中集团由三野第七、第九两个兵团和榴弹炮兵第二、四团及第一团1个营，还有骑兵团组成，共30余万人；东集团由三野第八、第十两个兵团和榴弹炮兵第五、第六团以及苏北军区3个警卫旅、海防纵队、坦克团、炮兵预备队等组成，共35万人（这3个作战集团又称西路大军、中路大军、东路大军）。 3路大军的具体部署大致如下。 西集团由二野司令员刘伯承、政委邓小平指挥，在湖口和枞阳镇之间渡江。 第三兵团在枞阳镇至安庆以东地段渡江，第五兵团在安庆以西至望江段渡江，第四兵团在望江至湖口段渡江。 3个兵团渡江以后，要以勇猛果敢的行动，消灭沿江之敌。得手后，第三兵团首先消灭殷家汇的敌人，然后以最快的速度向歙县挺进，截断徽杭公路，并沿徽杭公路东进杭州。第五兵团渡江后快速沿景德镇、婺源前进，占领衢县江山段铁路。要求该兵团抢在第三兵团之前完成此任务，以保证截断敌人的退路。第四兵团渡江后，则迅速沿江东进，接替第九兵团的任务，监视芜湖的敌人，并准备进攻和占领南京。 东集团，由粟裕和张震率领三野司令部，直接指挥渡江作战。渡江地段为黄港至口岸之间和三江营至京口之间。在发起渡江作战的同时，命令一部兵力积极佯攻两浦敌人吸引南京之敌，以保证渡江作战成功。 渡江后，留一部分兵力歼灭沿江之敌，力求站稳脚根，调整态势，巩固阵地和后方联络线，然后扩大战果。主力则对敌人作有后方的迅速推进，控制宁沪铁路，会同中集团合围南京、镇江和芜湖的敌人。 中集团，由谭震林组织指挥，在裕溪口至姚沟段和姚沟至枞阳镇段实行渡江作战。同时，以一部分兵力在芜湖和和县地段上进行佯渡，牵制和迷惑芜湖的敌人。 渡江后，留一部分兵力配合西集团消灭当面之敌，主力则迅速东进截断宁杭公路，会同东集团完成对敌人主力的包围。 东集团和中集团从南京的两侧实行渡江。渡江以后，两个集团对敌人实行钳形包围态势，力求从东西两个方面，向中心压缩，把敌人包围在广德、长兴以北地区，并夺取南京。此着胜利以后，再向上海、浙江、福建进军，协同西集团消灭向纵深逃窜之敌。 四野的第十二兵团和江汉、桐柏、鄂豫军区部队约20余万人，一部分兵力进占浠水、薪春、黄梅等敌白崇禧集团的防区，钳制九江方面的敌人，保证西集团渡江作战的右翼安全；另一部分兵力进占武汉的外围据点花园、孝感、黄陂，造成进攻和夺取武汉的态势并准备在武汉至九江之间地段渡江南进。 以上从湖口至张黄港地段，敌我总兵力的对比为1∶2.2，在强渡地段八圩港（江阴）至口岸（扬中）地段，敌我兵力对比为1∶3。这样，我军在主要攻击方向上的兵力，相当于敌人的2至3倍。在整个渡江作战中，我军参战主力部队为120余万人。这个数字是出乎敌人意料的。 3月底的一天，安徽六安。 刘伯承一走进办公室，就坐下休息。警卫人员把他的行李搬进隔壁一间刚腾出来的教师宿舍，刘伯承和夫人汪荣华就住在这里。 长征结束后的刘伯承和夫人汪荣华 汪荣华是六安赫家集人，早在六合起义时期就参加了革命，这次又回到了自己的家乡，当然更加高兴。在六安停留的几天里，许多战友、亲属前来看她，忙得她不亦乐乎。 虽然没有去蚌埠参加总前委扩大会，可是刘伯承却一点也没有清闲，他是个闲不住的人。人住下，身体不动了，可脑子却又转开，思考起他的作战理论。 刘伯承不仅是一个非常善战的高级指挥员，而且是一位军事理论家。所以全国解放以后，毛泽东没让他当太长时间的南京市市长，而是命他出任中国人民解放军最高的一所高等院校——南京高等军事学院院长。 在六安休息几天，刘伯承还在继续研究渡江战术问题。他整天伏案工作，直到3月30日，刘伯承完成了由十点构成的渡江战术指示。他在这份指示里，对渡江作战的具体情况作了一些预想，并指出了解决的办法。 渡江战术注意事项： 《渡江作战之研究》与《敌前渡河战术指导》前已发作教材，兹据最近情况特提出以下战术注意事项： 其一，敌人在长江北岸以桥头堡、要塞及江心洲支点等构成的掩护阵地，其企图是及早察明我渡江部署，堵我渡江出口，配合其舰队、飞机迟阻我渡江行动，以掩护江南主阵地的防御实施。 其二，我们从事于渡江的战术训练，船筏及其他器材的搜集，特别是侦察实施等，首先要把敌人的江北掩护阵地扫除，直达江边，才能进一步作切实的准备。此时各部队应派出干部观察，以望远镜（夜间则听音响）察明江幅、流速、江洲，尤其是南岸地形、工事，敌人如何配置。对于所发现目标在何时何地如何动作，都应登记下来，作为判断、决心的基础。这种观察的侦察与战斗的侦察结合起来，作用更大。渡江的步、炮、工兵等协同动作的组织，也应由相关干部在实地侦察中实施之。 其三，在扫除敌人江北桥头堡支撑点时，特别对妨害我主要渡江点之敌，力求截断其退路，割裂其部署，予以速歼，不使其退守江南，增加以后的抵抗力。如敌人所守备的地点，不妨碍我主要的渡江作战，或其重兵固守难攻之时，则暂以一部兵力封锁之。 其四，在夺取与控制江北桥头堡后，即应开始组织我渡江的突击部队与掩护部队，并在实地侦察、训练。同时组织防空，并以炮兵射击敌舰，封锁江面。 其五，对敌人堵塞我船筏出口的障碍物，或直接排除之，或另辟水沟驶出船筏，或推船筏翻过坝头出江，均须依据具体情况而决定之。但船筏应排列于隐蔽的船坞，以便防空而又容易出航。 其六，因长江及其两岸地形经常变迁，故不能专靠地图，必须实地侦察，进行判断，而善于利用之。 （一）江幅狭窄部容易漕渡，且便于我岸火力掩护，但一般流速大。 （二）江幅过宽，则与上项相反。如江中有浅底，特别是有错综罗列的江洲，则敌人舰队受到一定航路的限制，易遭我炮击，故只能以小艇游击。这些江洲我应分别夺取之，而以火力互相掩护，逐步跃渡长江，或仅据江洲作为掩护渡江的阵地。 （三）江身弯曲部向我岸鼓出者，可以组织交叉火力，掩护渡江。 （四）南岸常有淤泥，特别在敌短兵火力下不易登岸，这要我们善于组织战斗，并铺上芦苇或木板通过之。 （五）南岸湖沼限制我登陆机动，我只能用之作为掩护阵地。我在登陆后，必须向无障碍地带机动。 （六）如登岸处急峻，则先头部队须带绳子、梯子攀登之，而后即修筑码头与通路。 其七，当我占领南岸掩护阵地时，我炮兵应先以一部转移到南岸阵地，支援部队向前进展，压制坦克活动，拦阻敌人逆袭；或炮击敌舰，掩护渡江。此时两岸的对空射击，应能确实掩护渡江。 其八，各路渡江军队应以宽正面而有重点地（对敌弱点）同时渡江。一达南岸，即控制要点，首先以足够的兵力横扫敌人，扩大突破地段，接应友邻登陆，其主力接着（即主要地）放胆向指定地点进入挺进，贯穿敌人纵深，截敌退路而兜歼之。不可为途中残敌（或掩护部队）所抑留。这些残敌，只能由后梯队派一部兵力肃清或封锁之。各部队在挺进攻击中，应有随伴炮兵并大量发扬飞雷（注：即以迫击炮或抛射筒发射炸药包，炸毁敌工事）与爆炸的威力。 其九，我军一达南岸，应向主要方向派出先遣支队，察明敌人纵深部署与我军前进道路之状况，最好以工兵带器材附于该支队，扫除地雷与修复道路。 其十，在渡江作战向江南进军中，对敌人的政治攻势必须与战斗密切配合实施，以达到从政治上瓦解敌人之目的。 刘伯承将这份战术指示交给参谋长李达，对他说：“将它印一些，下发到团一级指挥员。我们要让每一个指挥员打明白仗，要让他们在战斗之前就知道如何去战斗，这样可以避免许多无谓的牺牲。” 对邓小平亲拟的《京沪杭战役实施纲要》，中央军委于4月3日复电同意。此后，为便于指挥二野、三野渡江，主持全局，并便利与驻桐城的刘伯承、张际春、李达的联络和就近照顾第七、第九兵团，邓小平、饶漱石、陈毅率华东局、总前委和华东军区机关，于4月3日后由孙家圩子南移肥东县撮镇的瑶岗村；粟裕、张震则率三野指挥机关于4月4日东移泰州的白马庙，以便统一指挥东、中集团渡江。 三野、二野的部队有计划地向长江沿岸挺进！ 江北的条条公路上，滚动着川流不息的炮车、辎重车；战马嘶鸣，风一般疾驰在辽阔的原野上；战士们排成几路纵队，掮着枪，扛着炮，迈开矫健的步伐，唱着雄壮的战歌： 沿江地区的船户将隐蔽大水底的船只拉出来，支援我军渡江 成千上万的民工，推着小车，赶着牛车，抬着担架，浩浩荡荡地跟着大军向南前进！ 在宿营地，在行军的行列里，时时都可听到战士们的议论： “这回蒋介石算是叫咱们给打趴了，所以才打出和平旗号。” “吃人的狼，还能改掉本性？指导员说，蒋介石表面上下台了，换上个李宗仁，暗地里却在组织部队，想争取3到6个月的时间，编400个师，再来和咱们干！” “说干就干！马上打过长江去，干它个窝底朝天！ “可上级讲，到江边还要准备。” 渡江战役第一阶段：1949年4月20日至23日，我第二、第三野战军先后发起渡江战役。第三野战军第七、九兵团组成的中集团，在强大炮火掩护下，首先登上长江南岸；第三野战军八、十兵团组成的东集团和第二野战军三、四、五兵团组成的西集团与中集团同时渡江。百万雄师以木帆船为主要航渡工具，迅速突破敌人江防，占领贵池、铜陵、芜湖、无锡、镇江等城，解放了国民党反动统治中心——南京。这是渡江战役期间，华东军区、第三野战军领导同志合影：司令员兼政治委员陈毅（左二）、政委饶漱石（左一）、副司令员兼第二副政委粟裕（左五）、第一副政委谭震林（左三） “准备个啥？抗战时长江咱来来回回走了几趟？啥样不知道？蒋介石剩下的三等残废部队还禁得住打？我要是粟司令，下令大军南下！我们第一梯队，刘邓第二梯队，一直打广东，没人配