Chapter 39 "The Invisible Front"

The Central Red Army's withdrawal from the Jiangxi Soviet Area did not notify the Red Fourth Front Army. This important news was obtained by the Red Fourth Front Army's radio station by monitoring the enemy's broadcast.In the organizational system of the Red Fourth Front Army, the radio station is the department with the smallest number of people but the most important function. The radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army was built in 1931 during the period of Hubei, Henan and Anhui.Dispatched by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in October 1931, Song Kanfu, Cai Wei, Wang Zigang and other radio staff arrived in the Hubei, Henan and Anhui bases one after another, and began to set up the Red Fourth Front Army radio station. In February 1932, the Battle of Shang (City) Huang (Chuan) wiped out a cavalry brigade of the enemy's Zhang Yu and seized a complete radio station. Song Kanfu, Cai Wei, Wang Zigang and Xu Yixin formed the first radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army. , Song Kanfu served as the director.

After the opening of the first radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army, it immediately communicated with the Central Soviet Area.The first telegram sent by the Red Fourth Front Army was to report to the Central Committee the unit organization of the Red Fourth Front Army.The second telegram reported the victory of the battles of Huang'an and Shanghuang.The first call back from the Central Committee to the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army was to congratulate the victory and to report some situations in the Soviet areas across the country. In the subsequent Sujiabu battle, several enemy radio stations and a large number of radio equipment were seized, and the Red Fourth Front Army radio station was expanded into one and two.One is directly under the General Headquarters and the Military Commission of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, and Song Kanfu and Wang Zigang are in charge.The second station moves with the combat troops, and Cai Wei is in charge.With few manpower and weak technical force, the radio work of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army began to serve as the eyes and ears for the leaders of the headquarters and the combat units.The leaders of the Red Fourth Front Army headquarters attached great importance to the work of the radio station. Zhou Chunquan, the security director of the headquarters, specially arranged a guard company to provide 24-hour security for the radio station, creating conditions for the smooth progress of the radio station.

After arriving in Sichuan, the headquarters of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army decided to expand the scale of the radio station. In Maoyu Town, Tongjiang, a radio training class was opened. The headquarters established an electrical affairs department. Song Kanfu was the director. The radio station was expanded to five stations, and each army was equipped with a department.The director of the first station is Wang Zigang, the director of the second station is Cai Wei, the director of the third station is Song Kanfu, the director of the fourth station is You Zhenggang, and the director of the fifth station is Xu Mingde.

After the establishment of the Red Fourth Army radio station, in addition to reporting the situation to the central government and the Soviet areas, it was also responsible for listening to enemy radio broadcasts, deciphering enemy telegrams, and providing enemy intelligence to leaders and other important tasks. The enemy has not used radio stations for a long time, and the work of keeping secrets is also very poor.By chance, Wang Zigang, the director of a station, heard the enemy's question and answer while listening on the radio, and thus knew the enemy's address, serial number and the name of the chief.The head of the headquarters attaches great importance to this situation and requires further strengthening of interception.From this time on, Song Kanfu, Cai Wei, and Wang Zigang all participated in listening to and deciphering the enemy's telegrams.After a period of groping and hard work, I basically grasped the law of the work of the enemy's radio station.

Song Kanfu was born in Pingxiang, Jiangxi. He joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1925 and transferred to the Communist Party of China the following year.During the Red Army period, he served as a radio operator, director, and bureau chief for a long time, and played an important role in the Red Army's communication, telecommunications construction, and detection of enemy military intelligence.After the liberation of the whole country, Song Kanfu successively served as Secretary of the Shashi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mayor and Secretary of the Municipal Committee of Wuhan City, Standing Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Committee and First Secretary of the Wuhan Municipal Committee, Vice Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and Secretary of the Secretariat.Song Kanfu recalled:

...The first one was called "Tongmi", which is the most common password, and its foundation is plain code.As long as the enemy radio station sends a message in "pass code", I can read the content of the telegram to the headquarters leader by picking up the phone. "Tongmi" is used by Tian Songyao.Liu Xiang uses one.Chiang Kai-shek used another.It's really like juggling, each with its own tricks.But as long as there is a password book as the basis, any changes can be guessed.During this period, every time we received an important secret message from the enemy, we called to report to Comrades Zhang Guotao and Xu Qianqian.Especially after Tongjiang tightened its position for the first time, we deciphered the telegram of the enemy's troop deployment and reported it to the general headquarters in time.Zhang Guotao was skeptical at first, but later he compared the situation of the on-site reconnaissance with the situation heard through the radio, and he was convinced that the two situations were exactly the same.

One day, at two o'clock in the middle of the night, Zhang Guotao walked four or five miles with his guards and came to our radio station quietly. He saw that we were working nervously, some of us were receiving reports, some were translating reports, and some were sending reports. It was only then that his doubts were dispelled, and he said: "You have worked hard!" After that, Zhang Guotao became more polite when he saw the comrades in our radio station. The situation of the struggle against the enemy is constantly developing, and our "battle" is becoming more and more tense.The enemy's passwords are changed very frequently, almost once a week. The more they are changed, the more chaotic they become. We call them "bad codes", and it is more troublesome to decipher. That's it.

... The battle against Liu Cunhou in the Xuan (Han) Da (county) battle was to decipher the enemy's troop deployment telegram. The Red Army occupied Pujiachang and Xuanhan one step ahead of the enemy, went straight to Suiding (Daxian) city, and wiped out six enemy regiments... During the siege by the Anti-Six Routes, Bijia Mountain, south of Wanyuan and west of Xuanhan, was a very dangerous mountain.The base of the enemy's Fifth Route King's Mausoleum attempted to attack by force. We learned the information from the enemy's radio station and immediately reported it to the general headquarters.Our army surrounded the enemy in a roundabout way, so that the enemy who stormed Bijia Mountain was flanked by our main force from the left and right.The enemy called for help on the radio: "The Red Army on Beacon Mountain has strong firepower...the Red Army is found on the left and the Red Army is found on the right. Send people to rescue quickly!" The enemy used English signals to communicate directly. We listened to the translation in time and reported to the leadership of the headquarters.The leadership of the headquarters is clear and determined.Comrade Xu Xiangqian came to the front line to command and fought a battle of annihilation.The comrades said happily: "The victory of this battle is also due to the credit of the radio station!"

Cai Wei was another well-known telecommunications expert in the Fourth Red Army.Cai Wei, a native of Ningde, Fujian Province, joined the Communist Party of China in 1924.Cai Wei studied radio technology at Tongji University, and was later absorbed into the Special Branch Radio Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Cai Wei can not only install and repair radio stations by himself, but also listen to and decipher enemy radio codes. Against the "three-way siege" in early 1933, Cai Wei successfully deciphered Tian Songyao's secret message, allowing Xu Xiangqian to understand Tian Songyao's deployment and actions. In the Battle of Kongshanba, he wiped out 13 enemy regiments in one fell swoop.After the war, Cai Wei received a special award from the headquarters. In 1934, in the battle to smash Liu Xiang's "six-way siege", Cai Wei not only deciphered the secret telegrams sent by the Sichuan warlords, but also intercepted and deciphered the telegrams sent by Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops by using the Jiang Jun code provided by Wu Zhiping, an underground party member. He made a great contribution to the victory of the Da Battle. In January 1933, Cai Wei served as the director of the second station of the Red Fourth Front Army Headquarters Radio Station, and began to conduct technical reconnaissance work on the enemy's radio station. In just one month, he successfully deciphered the enemy's code. In 1935, the Central Red Army arrived in Guizhou on the Long March. In order to report the intercepted and deciphered enemy intelligence to the Party Central Committee in a timely manner, Cai Wei stood by the radio station every evening and began to contact the Central Red Army.On the "invisible front", Cai Wei has repeatedly made extraordinary achievements and made special contributions.

Cai Wei loves the machine like his life, and spends all day thinking about it.Once, when enemy planes attacked Wangcang, the guard company notified all the personnel of the radio station to leave the house to avoid the air attack.Cai Wei didn't care, and hurriedly brought a quilt to cover the machine.The guard company commander was eager to pull him, but he pushed him aside.The company commander asked him anxiously: "Aren't you afraid of bombs?" Unexpectedly, Cai Wei really sat down next to the machine: "You guys go, I won't go." He didn't leave, and the guard company commander didn't leave to protect him. Although there was a rumbling explosion outside, he and the guard company commander He stayed by the machine and refused to move.Fortunately, none of the enemy plane's bombs hit the radio station.

In 1936, when the Fourth Red Army was stranded on the Xikang Plateau, Cai Wei unfortunately contracted typhoid fever.During his serious illness, Zhu De, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao and other leaders were by his side.Fu Lianjun and Su Jingguan, the two most famous doctors in the Red Army, tried their best to save his life, but there was no medicine, and finally he was killed by typhoid fever.Cai Wei was only twenty-nine years old when he died. Wang Zigang, a native of Dingzhou, Hebei, joined the Communist Party of China in 1929.After being dispatched by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to enter the Hubei, Henan and Anhui base areas, he successively served as the Secretary-General of the Telecommunications Department of the Staff Department and a telecommunications teacher.Later, he served as the director of the first radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army and the radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army Headquarters.After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he successively served as the Deputy Minister and Minister of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and made important contributions to the construction of the radio station of the Red Fourth Front Army and the post and telecommunications construction of New China. With the joint efforts of a large number of Red Army telegraphers including Song Kanfu, Cai Wei, Wang Zigang, You Zhenggang, Xu Mingde, etc., the radio station of the Fourth Red Army gave full play to its "eyes" and "ears".The main leaders of the Fourth Red Army rely on these "eyes" and "ears" to understand the enemy's deployment and movements, and then report them to the Central Red Army. Chen Changhao is mainly responsible for this work.Song Kanfu, the director of the Red Fourth Army Radio Station, and Cai Wei, the second station director, are both masters in radio interception and code-breaking.They took out several radio stations from the Fourth Front Army, and using the codes in their hands, they organized special personnel to listen to the enemy's radio communications 24 hours a day. After deciphering, they were confirmed by Zhang Guotao, Chen Changhao, Xu Xiangqian and others before sending them to the Central Committee. Red Army.Xiao Quanfu, a veteran of the Red Fourth Front Army and former commander of the Qinghai Navy District, wrote in the article "Recalling the Unsung Hero Comrade Cai Wei": After the Central Red Army, that is, the Red Front Army, began its Long March in October 1934, the work of our radio station became even more arduous. It was necessary to get in touch with the Central Red Army in time and provide them with information about the enemy. Due to the urgent and ever-changing military situation, especially after the Central Red Army entered Guizhou, it was always necessary to know the enemy's deployment and movements. During that time, Chen Changhao sometimes waited in front of the radio all night, afraid to close his eyes, for fear of missing important information.Song Kanfu recalled: At the end of 1934, the Central Red Army was intercepted and pursued by the enemy in Guizhou. The march was very tense every day, and we had no time to listen to the enemy’s radio station. We tracked the enemy’s radio station and gradually found out the enemy’s situation around the Central Red Army. After sorting it out, we sent it to the headquarters. The leader read it, and then sent it to the Central Red Army radio station.After joining forces, I saw the comrades of the Central Red Army Radio Station. They said: The information provided by the Fourth Red Army Radio Station was very fast and accurate, which played a certain role in helping the Front Army get rid of the enemy's siege and interception. On January 4, 1935, the radio station intercepted the enemy's deployment around the Central Red Army. After Cai Wei deciphered it, Zhang Guotao, Chen Changhao, and Xu Xiangqian checked the confirmation, and immediately decided to send a report to the Central Committee: Liao Zezhi assisted Guizhou with the so-called Model Division 3rd Brigade and Mu Yingzhou Brigade, a total of six regiments, which were originally concentrated in Luzhou and planned to enter Guizhou via Nanchuan and Zheng'an.Liu Xiangyue's five divisions, Chen Mingqian's department and Tian Zhongyi's brigade, a total of about nine regiments, were in southern Sichuan, Chen Zhida was in Shizhu and Qianjiang, Yuan brigade was in Fuling and Pengshui, Tian brigade was in Youyang and Xiushan. Chongqing regiment, Laifeng is Pan's brigade, and the ancient Song, Xuyong, and Chishui areas are invincible.Xiao and He have already occupied Cili, and Xu Yuanquan's team is going to suppress Xiao and He.The 25th Red Army led by Comrade Wu Huanxian has about 3,000 troops and has now arrived in the Shangnan area.The 60th Regiment of Liu Xiang was in Sui, Xuan, and Chengkou. About 30 regiments of Li, Luo, and Yang Sen were distributed in Shuanghechang, Yingshan, from the front of Yilong to the Xinzheng Dam Line, and the 30th Regiment of Tiandi Songyao was in Lang, Cang, and On both sides of the South Jialing River.Deng Xihou's 15th Enemy Regiment was on the front lines of Zhaohua, Guangyuan, and Jiange; Ding Brigade of Hu Zongnan's division went to Guangyuan;The enemy in southern Shaanxi has about seventeen regiments, concentrated on the sixth regiment of Nanzheng, about nine regiments of Xiao Zhichu's Chu tribe from Baihe to Yunxi, Rong Jingfang's division is in Zhushan and Zhuxi, and Shangguan Yunxiang's forty-six and seventy-six liang The teacher said that he opened Ankang and entered Wanyuan, and the enemy was rushing to build a blockhouse.The eastern part of the city has large mountains, poverty, and a small population. In the west, there are dangers of the Jialing River, Jiange, and Bikou. It is not a good strategy to adopt a decisive battle defense. How to ask for instructions. This telegram reported the distribution of enemy troops around the Central Red Army in more detail at that time. At this time, after the Central Liping Conference and before the Zunyi Conference, the Central Red Army was in the most difficult time for the enemy to chase and intercept. It should be said that this telegram It is too valuable for the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army who are struggling to fight.Song Kanfu once recalled: "After the Long March, Mao Zedong once told me in Yan'an that you comrades in the Red Fourth Front Army Radio Station have worked hard and deserve credit! When we were in trouble, especially during the Long March in Guizhou, it was you who provided information to make the We overcame the difficulties relatively smoothly.”