Chapter 52 Strategic decision miscalculation

The Nanchang Uprising succeeded quickly and failed soon after.Over the years, party and military historians have been exploring the reasons. When the leaders of the uprising had become the top leaders of the Republic, looking back on the past, they also sighed one after another. Zhou Enlai: This is also without experience. I only know how to apply the experience of the Soviet Union mechanically.We are gone, and the people are not happy.After the failure of the uprising, the Party Central Committee held a meeting at that time, but it was just a reprimand, and no experience was summed up. Looking back now, we have many lessons to learn.

Zhu De: At that time, I wanted to rush for success and wanted to win Guangdong. He Long: Our thinking and understanding at that time were weak. Chen Yi: The uprising was hasty and the preparations were insufficient, because the central government did not have a clear policy, so it was impossible to make good preparations.The uprising was able to succeed because the Kuomintang was not prepared, so the enemy in the city was quickly resolved. The history in the eyes of the old man is a solidified fossil with clear stripes.And when they rose up, there was no historical lesson; there was no foresight from the international community; even the party itself was still in its infancy.

Historical experience: There is no maturity without childishness. This corresponds to what Stalin said when he shook Mao Zedong's hand for the first time: the victor is not condemned. Failure - its poetic meaning is just like: I don't know the true face of Lushan Mountain, only because I am in this mountain. Mr. Zhang Xia, who has in-depth research on the Nanchang Uprising, once summarized three options at that time: one is to stay put and take Nanchang as the red center to form a three-legged situation of Ning, Han, and Nanchang. This is a possibility; It is also a possibility to go south to Guangdong, capture Haikou (called "Xiahai" at that time), and prepare for another northern expedition in the future. , relying on farmers, and establishing a base area (called "Shangshan" at the time), this is another possibility.In these three directions, the best strategy is to go up the mountain and establish a base in the countryside; the middle strategy is to stay where you are; the worst strategy is to go to the sea.

Nie Rongzhen also said later: "What are the particularly good conditions in Guangdong that you must go back to? Guangdong does not have particularly good conditions. The heroic workers and peasants in Guangdong have participated in various struggles against imperialism and warlords, and in creating Guangdong's revolutionary base. played a great role, but they, like the working people in other regions, have not been liberated from the feudal land ownership and feudal exploitation system of the landlord class, and the old roots of Guangdong's feudal forces still exist. Especially after April 15, Guangdong The worker-peasant movement was severely suppressed, and the revolutionary base in Guangdong has changed color. At that time, we wanted to return to Guangdong and open Haikou to seek foreign aid. factor."

An "old root" and a "discoloration" are doomed to mistakes.One up, one in, and one down.Grab that draw - no one wants to lose!Failure is always hidden behind a heavy curtain. The leaders of the Nanchang Uprising began to discuss the matter of withdrawing from Nanchang on the first night after the uprising. It was still in He Long's 20th Army headquarters.After a day and night of hard work, the uprising military generals hardly closed their eyes.Coupled with the hot weather, people after victory have a kind of exhaustion of athletes crossing the finish line.What's more, the general policy of fighting back to Guangdong was set as early as in Wuhan, and no one raised any objections before and after the uprising.The rest is the southward route—it’s a “go” anyway, and it doesn’t really matter how you go.Therefore, the discussion under the heat wave began to show irritability.

Liu Bocheng presided over the meeting.His eyes were bad, and the smoke in the room smoked him, making him cry in pain.Without saying anything, he quickly spread out the military map he had drawn on the table, and introduced to the people present: "Since the strategy of taking Dongjiang first and then Guangzhou has been determined, there are two marching routes to choose from." One end of the long pointer fell below Nanchang: "The first way is to enter Dongjiang via Ji'an and Ganzhou; the other is to enter Dongjiang via Linchuan and Huichang. The opinions of the members of the staff group are mostly in favor of the second way."

Liu Bocheng detailed the reasons according to his habit of one, two, three, four: 1. On the upper reaches of Ji'an, Ganzhou and other places, the number of enemy troops that can easily be united and concentrated will reach 40,000 (excluding Li Jishen's direct line on the Guangdong-Han Road), and our army's strength will only reach 20,000 (combat strength is still incomparable). It is difficult to win the attack, and there are concerns about Zhang Fakui's pursuit of more than 10,000 enemy troops in the lower reaches of Nanchang.On the Linchuan and Huichang roads, there are only Yang Ruxuan and Lai Shihuang with less than 3,000 weak enemy troops, which are easy to deal with. Even if the enemy sends troops from other places to attack us, it is equally difficult to travel by land, and I can defeat them one by one.

2. In terms of transportation, although the Ganjiang River is longer than the Fuzhou River, there are not many steamboats available for the same Shangshui. The Linchuan Huichang route is relatively straight and short, and it can quickly reach the Dongjiang River. 3. The peasant movement in Jiangxi is not good. The Linchuan and Huichang areas are more naive than the Ji'an and Ganzhou areas. If our army encounters a concentrated and powerful enemy, we will not be sure to disturb the enemy. Sichuan and Huichang are abundant, but during the autumn harvest, the road to Linchuan and Huichang is not difficult.

4. It is easy to communicate with the Hunan peasant movement through Ji'an and Ganzhou, but it is our goal to quickly reach Dongjiang, where the peasant movement is better. The most worrying thing about this route is that our Hunan soldiers occupy Most of them, including many without political knowledge, may defect from time to time. After Liu Bocheng finished speaking, the room was silent for a long time.He was too well prepared, and it was difficult to express the thoughts that flashed through the minds of the participants. Ye Ting, who was still prepared, said: "I have thought about the route back to Guangdong. The best route is to go south to Guangdong from eastern Jiangxi and western Fujian to obtain Haikou."

During the silence, Zhou Enlai seized the time to take a nap, and his spirit immediately improved.He urged Ye Ting to continue talking. Ye Ting went on to say: "We have roughly understood the deployment of the enemy's troops. Zhu Peide's 4 divisions are in the Ji'an area, together with Li Jishen's Qian Dajun and Huang Shaohong's troops. There are about 13 regiments in total. Of course, from the convenience of transportation From Ji'an and Ganzhou, it is better to enter Shaoguan and go directly to Guangzhou." He Long preferred Ye Ting's latter approach, and immediately took over and said: "I advocate going to Ji'an and Ganzhou. This is the main road, and it is easy to go. What's wrong with us first destroying Zhu Peide's troops, and then advancing to the east of Hunan? It's so hot My God, there are so many people crowded on a small road, why do you want to look far away?"

Ye Ting still said according to his own ideas: "The road is easy to go. But there are heavy guards along the way. Even if we can wipe them all out, once we reach Shaoguan, Li Jishen can use the railway to gather more than 5 divisions to fight us. We will Fight and go, weary divisions will go on an expedition, and it won't take advantage of the fight. Besides, there are two divisions under Zhang Fakui behind our army, and we are powerless to deal with them." Tan Pingshan is not good at military affairs, but he is very familiar with the situation of the route proposed by Ye Ting.He objected: "The route you mentioned is close to deep mountains and dense forests, sparsely populated, and marching is very difficult. We may not wait until we are exhausted to fight the enemy. If we encounter the enemy's interception, it will be a double danger." "That's what I mean." While Ye Ting and He Long were expressing their opinions, a person who spoke Russian-style Chinese stood up.He was the only Russian adviser Kumanin who participated in the uprising.His opinion was the same as Ye Ting's. He said: "I am in favor of marching along areas with few people, many mountains, and difficult passage. Due to natural conditions, this marching route is very difficult for marching. Consideration should be given to a large number of weapons. There is nothing to carry and ammunition, and there is a shortage of civilians. But if you follow this route, the insurgents can hope that there will be no major battles before they reach Guangdong, that is to say, they will avoid the real situation." Mo V Kumanin, Chinese name Ji Gong.He is also a veteran member of the Soviet Communist Party. He joined the Red Army in 1918 and served successively as artillery battalion commander and infantry brigade commander during the civil war.During the Great Patriotic War, he held leadership positions in the Navy. He came to China in 1926 and served as an advisor to the Whampoa Military Academy and the He Long Twentieth Army.Participated in the Northern Expedition and marched into Nanchang with He Long's team.On the eve of the uprising, there were two Soviet advisers in the troops stationed in Nanchang. In addition to Kumanin, there was also Teslenko stationed in the 24th Division of Yeting.In view of the complicated political situation, Commander Brucher of the Soviet Consulate General in Wuhan sent a coded telegram to recall them, ordering them to return home immediately.Teslenko received the telegram in De'an five days before the uprising.Kumanin, who was stationed in the suburbs of Nanchang, did not receive the telegram, so he became the only foreigner who participated in the August 1st Uprising.Although Ji Gong is only one person, people regard him as a front army.Originally, what He Long was most worried about was the problem of luggage and being attacked by enemies, but now Ji Gong has explained it all.He originally wanted to propose to concentrate his forces to attack Zhangshu and Ji'an, wipe out Zhu Peide's army, and then advance to the east of Hunan, join Mao Zedong and Yu Sadu (the leader of the Hunan Workers' and Peasants' Armed Forces), and occupy Hunan as a base.While he was hiding from the smoke and panting for air, the others were echoing Ji Gong's opinion.He paid special attention to Zhou Enlai's speech. Zhou Enlai did not want this to drag on any longer.His words are never extreme, and he generally agrees with one point of view, while explaining the other: "I think it's better to take the small road. Our main task at present is to reach Dongjiang quickly and avoid entanglement with the enemy. The big road is difficult. Avoid the enemy." Liu Bocheng, who presided over the meeting, announced that he would take a small path based on Zhou Enlai's opinion.And put forward specific reasons: Ji'an, Ganzhou and other places have 40,000 enemies that directly pose a threat to the rebel army, while the rebel army has only 20,000 troops, and it is difficult to win a confrontation; there are only nearly 3,000 weak enemies on the Linchuan and Huichang roads, and it is easy to Deal with it, even if the enemy transfers troops from other places and it is difficult to march in the mountains, you can defeat him one by one. Zhou Enlai raised his wrist and looked at his watch: "Comrades, it's getting late, go back and get ready, and take the time to rest for a while." He Long frowned.