Chapter 35 Yu Xu

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War.The Hundred Regiments Campaign that took place 65 years ago played an extremely important role in the entire War of Resistance Against Japan.However, over the past 65 years, there are still many differences in people's evaluation and views on the Hundred Regiments War.How to view and evaluate Hundred Regiments War?Obviously we cannot draw conclusions simply and easily.We must put it into the historical environment at that time to investigate.On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, we compiled this book in order to reproduce the days and nights of the three and a half months of the Hundred Regiments War.

In fact, the evaluation of the Hundred Regiments War has changed several times.During the period of the Hundred Regiments War and just after its conclusion, both the party and the army gave high praise. For example, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai saying: "The Hundred Regiments War is really exciting. Can such a battle be organized once or twice?" time?" But the ensuing deterioration of the situation in the North China War made senior leaders begin to re-evaluate the Hundred Regiments Campaign. From 1941 to 1942, the Japanese army carried out five consecutive "security strengthening campaigns" with the nature of "total force warfare" in North China.The total strength of the enemy forces fought by the Eighth Route Army (as well as the New Fourth Army and South China guerrillas) rose from 58% in 1940 to 75% in 1941 and 63% in 1942, while the strength of the Eighth Route Army decreased from 400,000 in 1940 to 305,000 in 1941.

The base area has also been greatly reduced.All of these have caused changes in the evaluation of the Hundred Regiments War. In January 1943, Deng Xiaoping had taken a critical attitude towards the Hundred Regiments War in his report at the meeting of the Taihang Branch Bureau: The Hundred Regiments War had exposed the military power of the region too much, causing heavy casualties and difficult recovery of vitality. However, the ups and downs and even qualitative changes in the evaluation of this campaign were due to the vicissitudes of the political situation.With the political ups and downs of Peng Dehuai, the main initiator and commander of this battle, the evaluation of the Hundred Regiments War has been mixed.

For the War of Resistance behind enemy lines in North China, Mao Zedong fully affirmed it in his early years.For example, in the spring of 1945, when Peng Dehuai reported to Mao Zedong, he said that the War of Resistance in North China basically implemented the correct line of the Central Committee.Mao Zedong said: It is the implementation of the correct line, not the basics.During the Lushan Conference, the Hundred Regiments War became one of Peng's important crimes. For example, fighting the Hundred Regiments War was unorganized and undisciplined, and it was an opposition to Chairman Mao on the strategic policy of the War of Resistance.In the few years after the Lushan Conference, some party history books were designated as "poisonous weeds" because they did not avoid Peng Dehuai's name, let alone objectively evaluate the Hundred Regiments War.During the "Cultural Revolution", there were more absurd vicious attacks on "class capitulationism", "in order to maintain Chiang Kai-shek's rule", "causing Chiang Kai-shek to launch the Southern Anhui Incident", etc.

After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party, the evaluation of the Hundred Regiments War has re-entered a normal discussion period.As a party involved, Peng Dehuai admitted that there were problems in the command of the Hundred Regiments War in previous intra-party struggles, but he insisted on affirming the Hundred Regiments War in general. After the "Cultural Revolution", more and more people in the party history circle held positive views on the Hundred Regiments War. So, what is the significance of Hundred Regiments War and its shortcomings?

First of all, when the Hundred Regiments War broke out, it was the time when Japan and Chiang negotiated the conclusion of the memorandum on July 23. The summit-level talks between Chiang Kai-shek and Seishiro Itagaki were planned to be held in Changsha in August (July 16, the Minei cabinet collapsed, and Jiang made excuses. Negotiations have been postponed).Although the CCP did not know the specific situation of the negotiations between Japan and Chiang at that time, it felt that Jiang was increasingly compromising with Japan.Amid the anti-Japanese upsurge and anti-Japanese voices agitated by the Hundred Regiments War, Chiang Kai-shek had to stop his compromise with Japan. In late August, when Japanese Prime Minister Konoe wrote another personal letter suggesting to continue the talks, Jiang refused.This is one of the historical significance of the Hundred Regiments War.

Secondly, the Hundred Regiments Campaign hit the Japanese army's "cage policy."Our army broke through the enemy's front lines in seven key positions, tore up the enemy's "cage" in North China, dispersed the enemy's military system, and forced the enemy back in nearly 50 counties.The enemy had to spend a lot of effort to straighten the front and fill in the gaps. In February 1941, the General Headquarters of the enemy's China Expedition Army dispatched a division from the Eleventh Army (Wuhan) and the Thirteenth Army (Ninghu-Hangzhou) to reinforce North China, but the battle situation still did not turn around. As of July 1941, The enemy has been taking a strategic defensive position in North China.

Until the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, the Japanese warlords began to take the offensive in North China under the temptation of the Southward (Pacific) strategy.This is another historical significance of the Hundred Regiments War. However, there are also some problems in the Hundred Regiments War, and it is these problems that caused the differences in its evaluation later. First of all, the Hundred Regiments War was wrong in judging the enemy's situation.From the orders issued by "Jizong" (Peng Dehuai presided over the work, and Zhu De had returned to Yan'an to participate in the work of the Military Commission), it can be seen that the judgment was that the Japanese army would launch an attack on Xi'an, Chongqing, and Kunming.But in fact, after the Battle of Yichang, the Japanese army had temporarily taken a strategic defensive position.For example, in the "Mainland Order No. 439" on July 23, it was required to ensure that the "Yellow River, Yellow River Flooding Area, Luzhou, Wuhu, and areas east of the Hangzhou line" and the combat area in Wuhan "are roughly in Anqing , Xinyang, Yichang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang".Although it is impossible to obtain completely accurate enemy intelligence in wartime, it is a relatively big mistake to judge the enemy's main strategic actions incorrectly and draw conclusions too rashly.

Secondly, the strategic policy of the Eighth Route Army during the Anti-Japanese War has long been determined as "independent mountain guerrilla warfare" and "basically guerrilla warfare, but mobile warfare under favorable conditions."The launch of the Hundred Regiments War was actually a strategic large-scale offensive campaign launched by concentrating the main force of the Eighth Route Army, which obviously did not conform to the above-mentioned strategic policy. The goal of this campaign stipulated by the "Jizong", such as "cutting off" the Zhengtai Line for a long time, "basically aims to cut off the traffic on this line" (Order on July 23); "completely destroy" the Zhengtai Line and Tongpu The section from Xinxian County to Shuoxian County completely "united" the rear areas of Southeast Shanxi, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Northwest Shanxi, and the Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (ordered on August 31), completely out of the balance of strength between the enemy and us. It surpassed the capabilities of the Eighth Route Army at that time.This requirement exceeding actual capabilities has actually resulted in: 1. The originally planned combat strength was only more than 20 regiments, but the actual combat strength exceeded 100 regiments. The momentum was too large and the military strength was too exposed; Stations, passes, county towns, strongholds, and bunkers to be guarded are not only beyond the scope of guerrilla warfare, but also beyond the scope of mobile warfare, and have become positional battles.And in order to block the enemy's reinforcements, we had to fight some tough defensive battles.

After the Hundred Regiments Campaign entered the anti-"sweeping" stage, Peng Dehuai had some strategic and tactical considerations (for example, he hoped to seize the opportunity and wipe out more than one battalion of the enemy, so that the enemy would not dare to "sweep" in the future with a brigade "battalion") As a result, the "sweeping" time interval is lengthened and the gaps are increased), regardless of the fatigue of the troops, it is somewhat "reckless" (Peng Dehuai's language), the battle of Guanjianao is an example.Of course, Peng’s considerations are justified, and the fighters have also seized the opportunity well (the enemy’s three-way "mopping up" troops have lost tactical contact and are isolated from each other. It is very difficult for the three enemy forces to join forces and support each other, but there are not enough "confidantes", that is, insufficient consideration of the fatigue and equipment of one's own side.Such mistakes are sometimes unavoidable.

Third, there is an opinion that in the Hundred Regiments War, our army sacrificed a lot to attack the enemy's positions. Although some places were captured, they could not be consolidated, so it was of little significance.This is of course a superficial and one-sided understanding.This is a struggle in enemy-occupied territory, where every inch of land is taken from the enemy.In this special mode of warfare, it is impossible to imagine that only we gain and no enemy fights, nor can we imagine that only the enemy wins but not ourselves; gains are lost, and losses are regained.The final consolidation is the final victory.If the conditions for final consolidation are met, then what should be done before that?Therefore, the theory of one gain and one loss does not conform to the logic of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear.Similarly, the "concentrated" order thought it would be able to cut off the Zhengtai line "for a longer period of time" and "unite" the base areas, which also violated the logic of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear (especially when the enemy is strong and we are weak), and it is also an argument. of. It is undeniable that the Hundred Regiments War was an important turning point in the Japanese army's understanding of the CCP's power in North China.The Japanese invaders, who were severely hit by the Hundred Regiments War, strengthened their understanding of the power of the CCP, and adjusted their anti-communist policies in North China in all aspects: at one time, they strengthened their troops in North China; formulated the "Three-Year Plan for the Restructuring and Construction"; strengthened their support for the CCP. Intelligence work; strengthening the puppet regime and armed forces; creating blockades, walls, and no-man’s land; using the puppet Xinmin Association to propagate anti-communism; carrying out five "security strengthening campaigns" and unprecedented brutal "sweeps" of the anti-Japanese base areas in North China. As the Japanese army's pressure on China's frontal battlefields eased, the anti-communist activities of the Kuomintang authorities became increasingly active.From a national perspective, the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party intensified rapidly from the autumn of 1940 to the beginning of 1941.The Kuomintang authorities forced the New Fourth Army to withdraw to the north of the Yellow River. When the headquarters of the New Fourth Army withdrew from southern Anhui, the Kuomintang created the Southern Anhui Incident in January 1941. After the Hundred Regiments War, the Eighth Route Army's struggle strategy against the Japanese and puppets underwent some changes.Although the Hundred Regiments War dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese army, the Eighth Route Army suffered considerable casualties and losses of weapons and ammunition.In the middle and late stages of the Hundred Regiments War, due to the retaliatory "mopping up" of the anti-Japanese base areas in North China by the Japanese army, the base areas were severely damaged and it took quite some time to recover.From the end of 1940, the Eighth Route Army had to prepare for the sudden anti-communist situation from the Kuomintang. The Hundred Regiments War that shocked China and abroad has a history of more than 60 years.Comments on the merits and demerits of this battle, which is right and which is wrong, are now basically conclusive, but the controversy and research on this period of history will continue. In the process of writing this book, I have read many documents and absorbed the research results of many scholars. I will not list them here, and express my heartfelt thanks.Due to the limited level of the author, coupled with tight time and heavy tasks, it is inevitable that there will be many deficiencies and mistakes. I hope everyone can criticize and correct me, and give more valuable opinions.