Chapter 27 Japan's Imperial Council Approves "Outline for Handling Incidents in China"

After Konoe, Tojo and others came to power, the first thing they did was to determine the southward expansion as Japan's basic national policy and the policy program of the new cabinet. Due to the strategic needs of preparing for the southward advance and transferring the war of aggression against China to the so-called "long-term combat system", the entire deployment and combat focus of the Japanese troops in China at that time had begun to shift to the "security war" in North and Central China.Since the Eighth Route Army's Hundred Regiments War shook the Japanese base camp, the Japanese army's "security war" focused on the CCP, and its purpose was to eliminate the anti-Japanese armed forces led by the CCP and destroy its anti-Japanese base areas.

The "Basic National Policy Outline" decided by the second Konoe Cabinet on July 26, 1940 stated: "At the time of the world's historic transformation, create a new political, Economy and culture are indeed the major tests that the empire has faced in history." Based on the "good opportunity" of Germany's expansion in Europe, Japan's basic national policy has changed from the original "establishment of a new order in East Asia" to "building a new order in Greater East Asia." " as its fundamental policy.In order to implement this policy, the consideration of the Japanese ruling group is: to carry out a "protracted war" in China with the smallest burden as much as possible, and gradually reduce the number of troops in China.

This basic national policy is based on actively preparing for the southward advance. It has changed its position of taking the solution of the Chinese problem as a prerequisite for the southward advance.Matsuoka and Tojo believed that "resolving the South is actually promoting the resolution of the incident in China".The new cabinet also determined: in terms of diplomacy, it is necessary to strengthen the axis of Japan, Germany, and Italy, eliminate the obstruction of Britain and the United States in Japan's construction of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", and adjust the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union; System, "establish a strong new political system to seek the centralization and unification of all state affairs", that is, to strengthen the fascist dictatorship.

Under the guidance of this idea, on November 13, 1940, the Japanese Imperial Council passed the "Outline for Handling Incidents in China".Its policy consists of three points: one is to continue to use force to attack China; the other is to block sea, land and air routes, and strictly prevent the US and Britain from aiding China in the war of resistance; the third is to adjust the diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, using all political and military means to Weaken the Chongqing regime's will to resist the war and make it submit quickly.In the outline, the policy towards China and the policy towards the United States and the United Kingdom should be considered in a unified way. Before the end of 1940, the two strategies of politics and war should be used to "weaken the Chongqing regime's will to resist the war and make it submit quickly." The strategic shift is aimed at the surrender of the Chongqing regime."

Japan's China Expeditionary Force expressed strong dissatisfaction with the "Outline for Handling Incidents in China", and believed that it should continue to send necessary troops to the Chinese side, "trying to compress and weaken the hostile regime and its domain behind the enemy's rear, and destroy the camera when the situation permits." On November 28, 1940, Senior Staff Officer Joichiro Sanada of the Chinese Expeditionary Army was sent back to Tokyo to report his dissatisfaction with the "Outline for Handling Incidents in China" to the General Staff Headquarters.Colonel Sanada pointed out in his report: "Arranging and shrinking troops has brought serious obstacles to operations." "Currently, my troops in China are 250,000 in North China, 296,000 in Central China, and 166,000 in South China. Thousands, a total of 728,000, with a total of 20 squadrons in the air force (among them, 8 squadrons in North China, 6 squadrons in Central China, and 6 squadrons in South China. The Chinese Expeditionary Army advocates: including the South China Front Army, maintain 728,000 squadrons in 1941 The current situation of thousands of people is 680,000 in 1942, 680,000 in 1943, and 600,000 in 1944." He also pointed out: "The order of security in the main occupied areas is Mengjiang, the triangle area, Wuhan North China is the worst area.” The China Expeditionary Army planned, “In 1941, in order to consolidate North China, about two divisions were transferred from Central China to North China for a thorough ‘mopping up’; for Wuhan, the Jiangnan area should be sorted out and shrunk.” If the situation permits, the Beijing-Hanzhou line will be opened to connect Central China and North China, and it is estimated that it may be carried out after 1944."

On November 30, 1940, Takushiro Hattori, a senior member of the Second Section of the Japanese General Staff Headquarters, informed Sanada of the opinions of the central supervisors, to the effect that it was necessary to consider that the number of troops in China would gradually decrease.If the determination is directed south in 1941, it will inevitably delay the resolution of the China issue.If the situation improves, the pressure on China must be stepped up to end the war.In the case of no southern operations in 1941, it still tried its best to put pressure on China.Regarding this matter, Lieutenant Assistant Takushiro Hattori had the following recollection: "In short, the war against China is already in a dilemma, but since the number of troops in China must be reduced to an average of 650,000 within 1941, considering the world situation, there are still With a force of 720,000, first exert pressure to lay a good foundation. After the summer and autumn of 1941, when there is still no turning point, we have to shrink the force and turn to a persistent situation.”

It can be seen from this that the Japanese General Staff Headquarters has shown a tendency, that is, it believes that before the implementation of the reduction plan, it should go all out to fight on the Chinese battlefield and postpone the so-called "protracted war" strategy until 1941. After Xiaqiu, the military pressure on the Chinese battlefield focused on North China. In the process of gradually forming this guiding ideology for fighting against China, on December 26, 1940, Minister of the Army Tojo Hideki held talks with Chief of Staff Sugiyama Moto, and determined the following basic policy: "(1) The incident in China must be made To achieve a solution as soon as possible, for this reason, we must not only consider the south, but also establish a policy that focuses on China and the north." "(2) Recently, there has been a tendency to focus on political strategies in resolving the incident, but it has had little effect. It is necessary to concentrate on the political and operational strategies that will directly contribute to the resolution of the incident.” Tojo and Sugiyama also jointly decided: “The content of the current operational outline against China is to thoroughly restore the law and order in North China, conduct offensive operations by the air force, and concentrate operations on China. strategy, strengthen the blockade and support China's armed public security police forces."

Hideki Tojo and Moto Sugiyama also discussed how to trap the Chiang Kai-shek regime.The two reached a consensus that: the Japanese army and navy must strengthen their overall blockade of China.Cut off China from the ground, sea and air, cut off the French Indochina route, destroy the Burma Road, blockade the sea with the navy, blockade the seaport with the army, and strengthen economic oppression against China. Prior to this, on October 3, Japan's newly formed Indochina Expeditionary Force Command and Naval Air Force stationed in Hanoi, Vietnam, a French colony, cutting off the international route to China's Yunnan and Guangxi via Hanoi, and as the Japanese navy bombed the mainland of China aviation base.Four days after the Japanese "peacefully" entered Hanoi, naval air forces took off and bombed the city of Kunming, the "backyard" of the Chongqing government.