Chapter 20 Instructions for the Movement of the New Fourth Army and Southern Anhui Troops

On December 9, Chiang Kai-shek personally issued an order: "All the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River are restricted to march to the area north of the Yangtze River on December 31 this year, and to the area north of the Yellow River to fight before January 31 next year. Now the Yellow River All the troops of the Eighteenth Group Army in the south are restricted to the area north of the Yellow River by December 31 of this year." In September 1939, the fourth detachment of the New Fourth Army marched into eastern Anhui.When Chiang Kai-shek got the news, he ordered the fourth detachment to withdraw, on the grounds that it could not move the garrison without authorization.The four detachments refused to listen, and Chiang Kai-shek secretly ordered Cheng Ruhuai's troops in eastern Anhui to "suppress the bandits" against the New Fourth Army entering eastern Anhui.However, by the beginning of 1940, the New Fourth Army in eastern Anhui was still developing considerably.

At this time, the strength of the New Fourth Army was mainly distributed in three areas: Ye Ting and Xiang Ying led the headquarters and the third detachment of the New Fourth Army to station in southern Anhui; After leading the fourth detachment of the New Fourth Army to open up the base area in eastern Anhui, Jiangbei headquarters was established. At that time, there were two different opinions on the strategic development direction of the New Fourth Army.Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the Central Plains Bureau of the CPC Central Committee who was in charge of guiding the work in Central China, advocated vigorously developing northern Jiangsu, and Xiang Ying, secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee who presided over the work of the New Fourth Army, advocated the development and strengthening of work in Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and other places.Mao Zedong, Luo Fu, and Wang Jiaxiang held a secretariat meeting, decided to support Liu Shaoqi's opinion, and telegraphed Xiang Ying and Ye Ting: "Your main way out lies in Jiangbei; although you have lost your good opportunity, you must still strive for Jiangbei." According to this request, the Jiangbei troops of the New Fourth Army Immediately develop to the enemy's rear in eastern Anhui, and by March, the number has grown from 5,000 to 15,000, opening the way for development to northern Jiangsu.

Seeing that the momentum was wrong, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the New Fourth Army in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and the western regions of the Huaihe River to withdraw to southern Anhui. On March 5, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telegraphed Liu Shaoqi: "Ignore Jiang's evacuation order at all." Seeing that the order failed, Chiang Kai-shek immediately ordered Gu Zhutong, commander of the third theater, Li Pinxian, deputy commander of the fifth theater, Tang Enbo, commander-in-chief of the 31st Army, and Han Deqin, deputy commander of the Sulu theater, to attack the Jiangbei New Fourth Army.

Facing the grim situation, Mao Zedong immediately issued a warning that "the center of friction will be moved to central China", and asked the Eighth Route Army to immediately deploy 40,000 to 50,000 troops to reach central China within three months to reinforce the New Fourth Army and create a new base behind the enemy. According to Mao Zedong's instructions, the Jiangbei troops of the New Fourth Army repelled Han Deqin's attack in northern Jiangsu, and temporarily stopped the eastward advance of other Kuomintang troops with an attitude of persuasion and struggle. In early April, Gu Zhutong invited Yuan Guoping, director of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army, to Shangrao to discuss the area of ​​activity of the New Fourth Army.At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek also invited Zhu De and Zhou Enlai to Chongqing to negotiate the Central China issue.

At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had already planned to shift the focus of military offensive from Jiangbei to Jiangnan.He said: "Ye and Xiang in southern Anhui are like turtles in a urn, and they can be caught at hand; Chen and Su are in southern Jiangsu, like fish on the seashore, fleeting." Therefore, Gu Zhutong repeatedly proposed during the negotiations that all the New Fourth Army in Jiangbei should be transferred southward. , The purpose is to cut off the possibility of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army meeting, and make them concentrate in a small area in southern Jiangsu before destroying them.

Mao Zedong was aware of Chiang Kai-shek's attempt in time.He called Xiang Ying on April 20: "Jiang and Gu's conspiracy is to strangle all the Jiangbei and Jiangnan troops of the New Fourth Army in the small area behind the enemy in southern Jiangsu, in order to isolate the connection between the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and to destroy the New Fourth Army at an appropriate time; Anhui, eastern Anhui...is an important area of ​​struggle to dispel the Kuomintang's conspiracy to destroy the New Fourth Army...Now and in the future, Jiangbei troops cannot be transferred southward. The southward transfer of these troops will not help the Jiangnan troops, but will only make the Jiangnan troops more isolated and more isolated. It is difficult, so we can use various methods to delay Gu Zhutong's delay."

What Mao Zedong was most worried about was the situation in southern Anhui, because the headquarters of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui faced the Yangtze River, which was tightly blocked by Japanese warships in the north, and there were heavy Kuomintang troops in the east, south, and west, and there was a possibility of being suddenly attacked at any time.He called Xiang Ying and asked: "When the military headquarters and southern Anhui troops are attacked by a certain party, is there a way to rush out of the encirclement to avoid heavy losses? Is it beneficial to fight guerrillas in the south, or to join Chen Yi in the east?" Is it absolutely impossible for Jiang to go north?" A few days later, he called Xiang Ying and clearly stated: "It is advisable for the southern Anhui army to quickly move to southern Jiangsu."

The situation is deteriorating day by day, but Xiang Ying hesitates. On May 4, Mao Zedong sharply criticized Xiang Ying. Subsequently, Chen Yi led his troops across the Yangtze River to the north and advanced into northern Jiangsu, breaking the Kuomintang's plot to destroy the New Fourth Army in southern Jiangsu.However, Xiang Ying still insisted on his own opinion and did not go east to southern Jiangsu to join Chen Yi's troops. He lost the opportunity to transfer, and was still unprepared for a possible surprise attack, which put the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui in an increasingly dangerous situation.

In the Battle of Huangqiao, Han Deqin was seriously injured and retreated to Xinghua, Caodian and other water network areas. He did not dare to act rashly and was quite annoyed. The most irritating figure, however, was Chiang Kai-shek. On the ninth day after the Battle of Huangqiao, that is, on October 9, 1940, according to Chiang Kai-shek's face-to-face order, Bai Chongxi and He Yingqin issued a "hao telegram" in the name of the chief and deputy chief of staff, ordering the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to "limit the telegrams to within one month. All of them will be deployed within the combat areas stipulated in the sixth question of the Central Prompt, that is, to the area north of the Yellow River.

The central government had a timely insight into the KMT's intentions, so Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang issued instructions on the direction of movement of the New Fourth Army and southern Anhui troops: "...After the publication of Haodian, the anti-communist upsurge rose. In the military, we had to move the main force of the New Fourth Army to Jiangbei in the name of moving first, so that our army could gather for the battle. "Xi Yi (that is, Ye Ting) and some of the staff must cross the river to command the large troops in the north of the river. You and the troops in southern Anhui may either move to the south of Jiangsu and cross the river to the north, or stay in the whole of southern Anhui, preparing to break out to the south when the Kuomintang attacks. Those who choose should choose one. If they stay in southern Anhui, they must be prepared to fight a civil war and suffer political disadvantages. Please consider it.”

Before the Battle of Huangqiao, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang sent a telegram saying: "Han Deqin's department is the only direct descendant of Gu Zhutong. After being attacked by me, Gu may take oppressive measures against our troops in southern Anhui and Jiangnan. Wangxiang is ready to deal with it." After the Battle of Huangqiao, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang jointly called Ye and Xiang: "The whole south has the possibility of turning into a dark world. But because Chiang Kai-shek is taking an anti-Japanese stand, we cannot conduct any guerrilla warfare in the Kuomintang areas in the south. Therefore, The military should take advantage of this time to cross the river quickly, and there must be no further delay." On November 21, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying to tell them to seriously prepare for moving north.After three days, I called Ye and Xiang again: "You must prepare to start all operations by the end of December; Ye led some to leave immediately; all problems must be resolved within 20 days." A few hours later, they called Ye and Xiang again: "Immediately start moving in batches, otherwise if a battle breaks out, the non-combatants and materials will be scattered." Such urgent and slow reminders can be seen that Mao Zedong had expected that Chiang Kai-shek would definitely kill southern Anhui. On the 27th, Xiang Ying telegraphed Mao Zedong and Zhu De in the names of him and Ye Ting, saying that they had decided to move to northern Anhui instead of southern Jiangsu after various studies and considerations, and asked him and Ye Ting who would go first and who would go later. On the 29th, Mao Zedong and Zhu De agreed with Xiang Ying's idea, but clearly pointed out that Ye Ting crossed the river with several batches in the middle, and Xiang Ying's actions will be notified by telegram. On December 18, Mao Zedong felt that the situation was grim, so he called Ye Ting and Xiang Ying: "All your confidential documents and telegrams must be burned. Don't keep a piece of paper or a word, so as not to fall into the hands of the enemy when passing through the blockade. Your password must be given by The person in charge took it with me." Two days later, Ye and Xiang were called again: "It is better for Ye Ting to cross the river quickly, and he should not ask Jiang's consent. If Jiang objects, it will be difficult to cross the river. There must be careful arrangements on the riverside, and Hu will be able to cross the river quickly. Fu (Liu Shaoqi) and Yun Yi contacted and prepared on the other side." On December 26, Mao Zedong wrote a telegram to Xiang Ying, Yuan Guoping, and Zhou Zikun: In the face of difficulties, you have repeatedly called to ask for instructions, but the central government gave you the guidelines a year ago, that is, to develop northward and behind enemy lines, but you have always excused yourself from implementing them.Recently it has been decided to move all the places to the north. As for how to move to the north and how to overcome the difficulties in moving, you have to figure out your own way and be determined.Although you are now protesting to the Kuomintang and asking for an extension of the deadline and the payment of salary, you must not have any illusions about the Kuomintang, and do not rely on the Kuomintang to help you with anything, and regard what may be helped as an accident.You must be determined and have a way to break through the darkest and most unfavorable environment and achieve the goal of moving north.If you have this kind of determination and method, even if you suffer losses, the basic backbone can still be preserved, and the future of development is still bright; if you waver and hesitate, and you have no way or no determination, you will be very dangerous under the enemy's stubborn attack.There is no place in the whole country where you are so hesitant, hesitant, helpless and determined.If the Kuomintang attacks you while on the move, you must be prepared and determined to defend yourself. This policy has already been instructed to you.We don't know what policy you want us to instruct. Do you have any policy yourself?The question of raising or delaying or going away now, what exactly are you advocating?Procrastinate or go?It seems that there is no fixed point and no direction, and you will suffer a lot in the future. As a veteran member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Xiang Ying had performed well and made important contributions in the three-year guerrilla war in the south, but now he has become so indecisive and undecided, it is incredible!Mao Zedong's telegram reveals both grief and indignation, as well as anxiety. On January 1, 1941, Mao Zedong finally received a telegram from Xiang Ying after making his final decision: "We have decided to move all to southern Jiangsu." A day later, Mao Zedong and Zhu De replied: "It is absolutely correct that you all resolutely drive south of Jiangsu and start immediately." On the evening of January 4th, more than 9,000 people from the headquarters of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui, its directly subordinate troops, and six regiments of the main force, with a total of more than 9,000 people, set off from Yunling to move northward in the rain amid the tragic singing of "Farewell, Three Years in Southern Anhui".How could they have imagined that what awaited them would be a bloody storm.