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Chapter 74 Mao Zedong and Chen Yi "meet each other late, and comfort each other for the rest of their lives"

Red Base Camp·Jinggangshan 文辉抗 3414Words 2018-03-14
In January 1972, Chen Yi, the founding marshal of the Republic, passed away unfortunately. Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, who was seriously ill at the time, decided to attend the memorial service for Chen Yi in Babaoshan Cemetery in person despite the dissuasion of the staff around him.After receiving the notice, Zhou Enlai was very excited, and hurried to the lounge of the Babaoshan funeral parlor, and told Chen Yi's wife, Zhang Qian, that Mao Zedong was coming to attend the memorial service. Zhang Qian heard the tears, sobbed and asked: "Why did Chairman Mao come here?" Zhou Enlai said with emotion: "He must come, they are comrades-in-arms in Jinggangshan!"

After a while, Mao Zedong arrived.In the hall, Mao Zedong held Zhang Qian's hand and said: "Comrade Chen Yi is a good man and a good comrade. Comrade Chen Yi has made contributions. He has made contributions to the Chinese revolution and the world revolution." Mao Zedong also said: " Comrade Chen Yi can unite people." Indeed, Chen Yi is not only wise and courageous, both civil and military, but also magnanimous, forthright, and good at uniting people.This point was very prominent in the Jinggangshan period. Chen Yi, courtesy name Zhonghong, was born in Lezhi County, Sichuan Province. Born in 1901, he went to France for a work-study program in 1919. He joined the Chinese Socialist Youth League in 1922 and the Communist Party of China in 1923. In 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising led by the party and served as the instructor of the 73rd Regiment of the 25th Division of the 11th Army.

At that time, Zhou Enlai, who assigned him a job, once said apologetically: "The job assigned to you is too small. Don't think it is too small!" Chen Yi has a sincere face: "What a small thing! You ask me to be an instructor, and I will do it. As long as I have a weapon, I will do it!" After the rebel army went south to Guangdong and the main force was defeated in the Chaoshan area, Chen Yi assisted Zhu De to collect the rest of his troops in Raoping and moved to the border of Guangdong, Jiangxi and Hunan.At that time, some people were pessimistic and disappointed, depressed, lax in discipline, and even left without saying goodbye. When they arrived at Tianxinwei in Anyuan County, there were 700 or 800 troops left, and only Chen Yi was left as a division-level political cadre.At the critical moment when the army was facing disintegration, Chen Yi actively assisted Zhu De in the ideological and political work of the army and boosted morale.He sincerely enlightened everyone: to stand the test of failure and to be a hero in failure.Difficulties are temporary, but the future is bright.Chen Yi's words and deeds won the respect and support of the majority of the troops. Zhu De solemnly announced: "From today, this team will be led by Chen Yi and I." Under the leadership of Zhu De and Chen Yi, the remaining troops of the Nanchang Uprising, Finally overcame the difficulties, launched the Shonan Uprising in January 1928, moved to Jinggangshan in late April, and achieved a great meeting with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong.

Su Yu later commented: "If it weren't for the leadership of Comrade Zhu De and the assistance of Comrade Chen Yi, this army would definitely collapse." On April 28, 1928, Chen Yi met Mao Zedong for the first time at Longjiang Academy at the foot of Jinggang Mountain.Mao Zedong was tall and tall, with piercing eyes, bold and unrestrained demeanor, and humorous conversation.Chen Yi deeply felt that this is a remarkable character. At this time, Mao Zedong urgently needed to unite those who supported his political views around him.And Chen Yi is the best candidate. After the two armies joined forces, there was a phenomenon of disunity among the troops for a while.The Nanchang Uprising troops looked down on the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops, while the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops believed that the Nanchang Uprising troops had poor discipline and serious old army habits.

Although the team is united, the morale of the army is difficult to unite. Mao Zedong and Zhu De are very troubled by this. Unexpectedly, Chen Yi proposed a good solution to the problem-breaking the boundaries between the two troops and communicating with the cadres. Commander Zhu De applauded, and Mao Zedong praised him even more. On May 6, Mao Zedong specially wrote to Chen Yi to exchange opinions, and said sincerely: "It's late to see each other, and we will comfort each other for the rest of our lives. I hope we can discuss things." In this way, Chen Yi became a representative of Zhu De (military) and Mao Zedong (political).

On May 20, 1928, Mao Zedong was elected as the secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Chen Yi succeeded Mao Zedong as the secretary of the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army.From then on, Chen Yi concentrated all his efforts on the work of the Fourth Red Army and became the right-hand man of Mao Zedong and Zhu De.Thanks to his efforts, the Fourth Red Army "work in the army has improved, especially the regiment committees have gradually played a role."The discipline of the troops has been strengthened, the combat effectiveness has been improved, and a series of victories in military struggles have been achieved, making the development of the Jinggangshan base area enter its heyday.

Chen Yi was an active supporter of Mao Zedong's correct line.When the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China repeatedly asked the Fourth Red Army to develop in southern Hunan, he stood by Mao Zedong, patted his chest and said: "No matter what happens, the Jinggangshan base must not be lost." In mid-July 1928, according to the decision of the Yongxin Joint Committee, Zhu De and Chen Yi led the military headquarters and the 28th and 29th regiments to attack Lingxian and Chaling, forcing the Hunan enemy to return to help and relieve the siege of Jinggangshan.After conquering Ling County, homesickness spread rapidly among the officers and soldiers of the Red 29th Regiment, clamoring to return to southern Hunan.Gong Chu, a member of the Military Commission of the Fourth Army and a party representative of the 29th Regiment, not only did not stop it, but instead encouraged it, creating a momentum among the troops that "we must return to southern Hunan."After Chen Yi learned about it, he immediately convened an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission to persuade the officers and soldiers of the 29th Regiment to obey the overall situation of the revolution, overcome their homesickness, and not return to southern Hunan.He also held a soldier representative meeting and an officer-soldier meeting, where he and Zhu De spoke to persuasion and education.However, because Gong Chu and others acted on their own accord, the speeches of Zhu De and Chen Yi failed to reverse the intention of the officers and soldiers in southern Hunan.

After that, the 29th Regiment went straight to southern Hunan. Zhu De and Chen Yi worried that the 29th Regiment would fail if they acted alone, so they had to lead the 28th Regiment to follow up.The result was the "defeat in August" they didn't want to see. The 29th Regiment was wiped out, and the 28th Regiment also suffered losses. In late August, Mao Zedong led the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment from Yongxin to Guidong to welcome Zhu and Chen back.At the enlarged meeting of the former committee held in the Tang Family Mansion in eastern Guizhou, Chen Yi truthfully reported the out-of-control situation of the troops during the trip to southern Hunan, and made a sincere self-criticism.He said: As the secretary of the Military Commission, I failed to stop the wrong tendency and caused this failure, so I should bear the responsibility.

After the main force of the Red Army returned to Jinggangshan, Chen Yi assisted Mao Zedong and Zhu De to actively do a good job in the ideological and political work of the army. Within a month, the Fourth Red Army won three battles and three victories, regained most of the lost ground, and made the Jinggangshan base rise from the "August failure". grow up. In January 1929, Chen Yi, along with Zhu De and Mao Zedong, led the main force of the Fourth Red Army to leave Jinggangshan, fought in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, carried out guerrilla warfare, developed agrarian revolution, and established revolutionary bases.

In this year, Chen Yi made a mistake called "Chen Yiism". It was at the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army Party held in June 1929, and Chen Yi was the host of the meeting. Because the Red Army was in a war environment and fought in the countryside for a long time, the majority of party members were peasants and people of petty bourgeois origin, so they were influenced by various non-proletarian ideas, such as purely military views, rogue ideas, remnants of warlordism, Extreme democracy, absolute egalitarianism, etc., also caused some major differences in principles within the Red Fourth Army.Due to Chen Yi's lack of struggle experience and his limited level of ideological understanding, he adopted a compromise and conciliatory attitude based on his subjective desire to maintain unity within the party.At the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army Party, while affirming Mao Zedong's correct views on the assessment of the revolutionary situation, the policy of building the army, and overcoming some erroneous ideas in the party, he also sharply criticized Zhu De and Mao Zedong.

Criticize Zhu De for his "old military officer" thinking; criticize Mao Zedong's "patriarchal" leadership style. Failure to support the correct proposition is actually tantamount to suppressing the correct proposition, and the adverse consequences are obvious.Chen Yi did not expect that his compromise and reconciliation method would further encourage the non-proletarian thinking that was already seriously existing in the party at that time.During the re-election of the former committee, Mao Zedong's former secretary was elected, and Chen Yi was elected as the former secretary. Mao Zedong was extremely dissatisfied with the results of the meeting. After the meeting, he left the Fourth Red Army and went to Jiaoyang in western Fujian to recuperate. Chen Yi knew that it was difficult to take on this important task, and he quickly realized that he was not as good as Mao Zedong in this position.Therefore, he made self-criticism sincerely and asked Mao Zedong to come back to preside over the work of the former committee. In late July, after receiving a letter from the central government asking the Fourth Red Army to send leading cadres to Shanghai to participate in the military meeting, Chen Yi decided to go to Shanghai to report the situation of the Fourth Red Army in person.He transferred from Hong Kong to Shanghai, where he reported in detail the situation of the Fourth Red Army to Zhou Enlai, Minister of Military Affairs of the Central Committee, and especially reported many correct propositions of Mao Zedong in a realistic manner.Later, according to the spirit of Zhou Enlai's many instructions, he drafted the famous "September Letter" on behalf of the Central Committee.The letter fully affirmed the correctness of Mao Zedong's line, criticized the mistakes of the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army, asked Zhu Mao to unite, instructed Mao Zedong to return to work in the front committee, and all commanders and fighters of the Fourth Red Army to maintain Zhu Mao's leadership. At the beginning of October, when Chen Yi rushed back to the Fourth Red Army from Shanghai, he heard that many branches of the "Eighth National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army proposed to invite Mao Zedong to come back to preside over the work of the former committee and wrote a letter, but Mao Zedong refused . When I asked why, I learned that Mao Zedong said in his reply that he opposed the perfunctory and conciliatory "Chen Yi Doctrine" and that he would not come back until "Chen Yi Doctrine" was overthrown. Chen Yi was ashamed when he heard this. He did not expect that the "Seventh National Congress" would hurt Mao Zedong so seriously.So, he said frankly and sincerely: "I came back this time to reinstate Mao Zedong and unite the Fourth Red Army. This time I will review Mao Zedong, and he will come back." He also said: "'Chen Yiism' is right and wrong. Proletarian things, I also want to work with my comrades to overthrow this 'Chen Yiism'." Since Chen Yi brought back the instructions from the Central Committee and Chen Yi’s sincere self-criticism, Mao Zedong returned to the Fourth Red Army headquarters from Jiaoyang immediately after receiving Chen Yi’s letter, and cooperated with Zhu De and Chen Yi when they met in Tingzhou. review. After this conflict, both Mao Zedong and Chen Yi further deepened their mutual understanding and established a deep personal friendship.From then on, Chen Yi became one of the few people with whom Mao Zedong could open his mind, and he was also one of the few people with the most freedom in front of Mao Zedong. After the main force of the Red Army's Long March in 1934, Chen Yi served as the director of the government office of the Chinese Soviet Republic, responsible for leading the remaining Red Army to carry out an arduous three-year guerrilla war; after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the commander of the first detachment of the New Fourth Army; After the accident, he was appointed as the acting commander of the New Fourth Army; during the War of Liberation, he successively served as the commander of the Shandong Military Region, the commander of the Shandong Field Army, the commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and the commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army; Served as secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, commander of the East China Military Region and the Third Field Army. In 1954, he served as Vice Premier of the State Council, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government, and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. In 1955, Chen Yi was awarded the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China.
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