Chapter 37 Yongxin Joint Conference and Mao Zedong's "Letter"

The Jinggangshan base is being consolidated day by day, the Red Army is getting stronger day by day, and the situation is getting better and better! Mao Zedong and the Hunan-Jiangxi Boundary Special Committee therefore put forward the "plan to create a political power in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains with Ninggang as the base camp".The purpose of this plan is very clear, that is, to make great efforts to establish a solid Jinggangshan revolutionary base, and to truly form an armed separatist regime on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi. This is a plan based on China's current situation and the reality of the Chinese revolution.

The Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, which led the Hunan-Jiangxi Boundary Special Committee, initially expressed its agreement with the Hunan-Jiangxi Boundary Special Committee's plan. In May and June of 1928, the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China sent two instruction letters to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee stating: "The provincial party committee fully agrees with the plan to use the Luoxiao Mountains as the base." However, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee quickly changed its position. Not only did it send a new instruction letter to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee on June 26, but it also sent Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming to the border as representatives to instruct the Red Fourth The army left the base camp and "immediately developed to southern Hunan", "leaving 200 guns behind", the main force "blazed a bloody road and developed to the areas of Zixing, Leiyang, Yongxing, and Chenzhou in Hunan", "to form the villages of the four counties separatist regime, encircling Hengyang", and must "immediately implement it without hesitation", claiming that this is an "absolutely correct" policy.In the instruction letter, the Provincial Party Committee also requested that "Zedong must set out with the army", and specially "send Comrade Du Xiujing to be the inspector of the Provincial Party Committee" and "send Comrade Yang Kaiming as the Secretary of the Special Committee" in order to change the Hunan-Jiangxi border special committee. Leaders, urging the implementation of the instructions of the provincial party committee.

The Hunan Provincial Party Committee's sudden change of its views was obviously the result of the gradual spread of "Left" putschism within the party at that time.They were not satisfied with establishing an armed separatist regime in such a remote place as the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, and established a red regime. They hoped to draw the Red Army to the areas around the city and launch workers' and peasants' riots, which would have a greater impact. Mao Zedong, the Border Special Committee, and the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army were quite embarrassed by this, especially the hard-line instructions of the Hunan Provincial Committee that seemed unquestionable.Mao Zedong once clarified in "The Struggle at Jinggang Mountains": "The Hunan Provincial Party Committee changed its position three times in a few weeks between June and July. The first time Yuan Desheng came, he agreed with the power plan in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains. The second time Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming came, advocating that the Red Army should not hesitate to develop towards southern Hunan, leaving only 200 guns to guard the border with the Red Guards, saying that this is an "absolutely correct" policy. The third time Yuan Desheng came again , but only ten days later, this letter not only scolded us for a long time, but advocated that the Red Army go to the east of Hunan, and said that it was an "absolutely correct" policy, and asked us to "do not hesitate." We accepted. Such a rigid instruction, if you do not follow it, you will be close to disobedience, and if you follow it, you will know that you have failed, which is really not good."

Should we stay in the base camp to establish a solid revolutionary base, or should we follow the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and march into southern Hunan?When the Hunan Provincial Party Committee's second instruction letter was sent to the border, the Border Special Committee, the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army and the representatives of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee engaged in a fierce and subtle struggle. This happened at the joint meeting of the Special Committee of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border, the Military Committee of the Fourth Red Army, and the Yongxin County Committee.

The meeting was held in Yongxin County on June 30. Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang Erzhuo, Hu Shaohai, head of the 29th regiment, Gong Chu, representative of the regiment party, and Zhu Yun, head of the 31st regiment, attended the meeting. Qing, He Tingying, representative of the Youth League; Wan Xixian and Tan Zhenlin, members of the Special Committee; Liu Zhen, Wang Huai, Liu Zuoshu, He Minxue, He Zizhen, etc. of the Yongxin County Party Committee.Yuan Desheng and Du Xiujing, representatives of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee who arrived in Yongxin at the same time, also attended the meeting.

The meeting place, Yongxin County Chamber of Commerce, is a small two-story building. It is located at the southern end of the city, next to the clear Heshui River, and has a quiet environment.But at the meeting place in the atrium on the second floor, more than 20 people sat around the room, all of them looked serious.In addition, it is midsummer and the climate is hot, which makes people feel dull. Du Xiujing was the representative of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, so he was the first to convey the instruction letter of the Provincial Party Committee on June 26.At the end, the "imperial envoy" also explained the reasons why the provincial party committee decided to develop in southern Hunan: the central government has made the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi the center of the national revolution, and Hunan is the center of the four provinces. As long as the situation in Hunan Rapid development can promote the general outbreak of the revolution in the whole country; if the revolution in Hunan is to be developed, the center will not be on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, but in southern Hunan.

Where the center of the revolution should be, many people present at the meeting could not give more reasons to justify the decisions of the central and provincial committees.But when they learned that the main force of the Fourth Red Army should leave the Jinggangshan base area and go to develop in southern Hunan, some people expressed different opinions. Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang Erzhuo, etc. all believed that the 200 guns left behind by the main force of the Fourth Army going to southern Hunan would not be able to defend the Jinggangshan base in any way. imagine.Therefore, their attitude was very clear: instead of going to southern Hunan, the main force of the Fourth Red Army should continue to create a workers' and peasants' revolutionary regime in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains centered on Ninggang on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi.

Du Xiujing and Yuan Desheng knew that it was difficult to persuade everyone, so they repeatedly emphasized: lower levels obey their superiors, and the decisions of the provincial party committee must be resolutely implemented. The meeting was at a stalemate for a while. Mao Zedong also disagreed with pulling the main force of the Fourth Red Army to southern Hunan. However, he was a caring person. He cited several reasons and pointed out that at this time, the main force of the Fourth Army was going to southern Hunan, which would do more harm than good.He suggested reporting to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in the name of the Military Commission of the Fourth Army and the Border Special Committee, clarifying the reasons for not being able to implement the instructions of the Provincial Party Committee, and asking the Provincial Party Committee to reconsider.

Mao Zedong's opinions and suggestions won the support of the vast majority of the participants.The joint meeting made a decision: the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee will not be implemented, and the Fourth Army will continue to stay on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi to establish a solid base. After the meeting, Mao Zedong drafted the "Report to the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China's Hunan-Jiangxi Frontier Special Committee and the Fourth Red Army Military Commission on July 4." This is a report resisting the instructions of the superiors, which can be said to be a blunt letter.

With sufficient facts and incisive analysis, Mao Zedong rationally stated the significance of establishing a separatist regime in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains and the main reasons why the Fourth Army did not go to southern Hunan.His heart is open and his words are sincere. Mao Zedong listed the following six reasons: (1) In the Fourth Army itself, many people are accustomed to the life of bandits, and they do not like to live in a place where they do hard work of mass struggle, which is full of the legacy of the Red Army's adventures.In the past month, they have been cleaned up in many ways, and at the same time the people in Yongxin and Ningkang counties have become popular, so they gradually gave up and realized that the policy of the central and provincial party committees last time advocating the construction of Ningkang base camp was correct.If it is changed immediately now, and the Fourth Army is re-entering the road of migration and wandering, the transformation of the Fourth Army will be even more difficult.The previous letter from the Provincial Party Committee pointed out that the Fourth Army had fought for thousands of miles and was close to bandits, so they had to choose places to rest in order to reform.This meaning is very correct, and it is being followed and implemented, and it is not appropriate to change it rashly.

(2) In terms of the enemy's situation, the enemy in Hunan Province is very tough, thick and powerful, not as easy to break as the enemy in Jiangxi.The Jiangxi enemy was defeated by me four times in a row, their courage was broken, and affected by my release of prisoners, the morale of the army was shaken.Only Wang Jun's 7th Division is considered capable of fighting. The first division and the first regiment are stationed in Pingxiang, and the second regiment is stationed in Jiujiang and Nanchang.This is not the case with the enemy in Hunan. They fought against me more than five or six times, and they were only able to repel a small part of them, while the enemy suffered no damage and remained stubborn.Therefore, in order to avoid a tough battle plan, it is not appropriate to attack Hunan Province at this time, and the reversal will deepen the enemy's siege, which may lead to the destruction of the entire army.Now the enemy army in southern Hunan consists of two Guangxi divisions, the 21st army, Xiang Chengjie's army (3,000 guns), Xu Kexiang's division, and Wu Shang's army. The enemy's strength is seven or eight times greater than that in western Jiangxi.Our army can win Xiang and Xu, but it will never win Wu and Gui.As soon as our army left, we were immediately surrounded by Wu, Gui, Xiang, and Xu, and there was a danger that Li would be wiped out. The Provincial Party Committee did not seem to have considered this point. (3) Ningkang can become the military headquarters, that is, the mountain is large and dangerous, the road leads to two provinces, the victory can be defended, the defeat can be run away, and the enemy can never surround us. With the base of the masses, we can really fight the enemy for a long time.If you leave Ninggang easily at this moment, "the tiger falls in Pingyang and is bullied by dogs", the Fourth Army will be very dangerous. (4) This proposition is by no means a conservative concept.In the past, there were riots all over the country, and various places were prosperous for a while. Once the enemy counterattacked, it would be like washing a river with water, and it would be completely defeated.All of this does not seek to consolidate the foundation, but only seeks the cause of great momentum.We are trying our best to rectify this disease at the moment, building a strong base camp for the military and at the same time laying a solid foundation for the future of the uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces.Now we are working hard in Yongxin and Ningkang, making progress day by day, and advancing to Lianhua, Anfu and the southwestern tip of Ji'an, deepening the agrarian revolution and creating local armed forces. (5) From an economic point of view, with such a large number of troops in the Fourth Army, it is necessary to save 700 yuan in cash every day.In addition to being burned and killed in various counties in southern Hunan, the economy was bankrupt and the local tyrants were wiped out.Since Zhu Bu arrived in Leiyang in February, he has not been able to raise a single penny, and has only relied on selling tobacco for a living.It is absolutely impossible to go to southern Shonen to solve economic problems at this moment.The only way to truly solve the current economic problems is in the border areas of Hunan and Jiangxi. (6) If the number of wounded soldiers increases to 500, the morale of the army will collapse if they want to rush to southern Hunan, and it is impossible not to go. This is also one of the most difficult problems. These six reasons are both real and sharp. Mao Zedong's "signature" is indeed extraordinary. Finally, Mao Zedong explained the decision of the Yongxin joint meeting to the Provincial Party Committee: "According to the above six practical reasons, before the outbreak of the new warlord war, we cannot leave Ning, Yong, and Lian to go to southern Hunan. Once the foundation here is slightly solid, outside Taking advantage of the opportunity, the four armies can send out tea, you, wine, and Liu to participate in the general riot in Hunan Province. At this time, we should try our best to communicate with southern Hunan, so that we can echo each other and serve as horns for each other.” Although the joint meeting made a decision not to go to southern Hunan, Mao Zedong also stated the reasons to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee.However, none of these could prevent a tragedy from happening.