Chapter 5 Zhang Guotao

Maoergai in August, the autumn wind brings coolness. Sending Zhang Guotao away, Mao Zedong had a lot of worries.At the Shawo meeting, Zhang Guotao once again expressed his agreement with the central government's policy of going north, but Mao Zedong was very worried that he would not actively cooperate with the central government as before in action.In fact, when carrying out the "Songpan Campaign", the Red Army had to abandon the "Songpan Campaign" and change it to the "Xiatao Campaign Plan" because of the loss of Zhang Guotao's lack of active cooperation.If Zhang Guotao continues to go his own way in the next step, the consequences will be very serious... Mao Zedong’s worries, we can find written proof in Zhang Guotao’s memoirs:

"Disagreement within the party quickly developed into a comprehensive one. Comrades from the Fourth Front Army and I accused the central leadership of being incorrect, while the majority of the central government insisted that the central policy was completely correct and would not make any concessions. The Maoergai meeting (note: refers to Shawo Conference) was an attempt to bridge differences, but it failed because the central majority was too insistent. This made the party's situation worse." It can be seen from this that at the Shawo meeting, Zhang Guotao's raise was just a raise of his hand.The political rift between Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong and other leaders of the central government did not heal with a gesture of hands; on the contrary, it deepened.

The "Xiatao Battle Plan" was the first strategic plan to change the campaign policy after the two armies joined forces. Its success or failure was related to whether the Red Army going north could find a foothold.Mao Zedong devoted a lot of energy to this.The gist of the new campaign plan is to take the main force of the Red Army out of Aba, march northward to the Xiahe area, assault the right side of the enemy's encirclement line, and strive to destroy the enemy's main force in the Tao River Basin, so as to create a Gannan base. For this plan, Zhang Guotao also agreed, and proposed an action plan for the implementation of the campaign goal: mix the first and fourth front armies into two left and right armies.

Taking Zhuo Keji and the 5th, 9th, 30th, 32nd, and 33rd armies in the south of the area as the left road, with Zhu De and Zhang Guotao in charge, marched towards Aba via Charlie, and then went north. Taking the 1st (1st Corps of the Central Red Army), 3rd (3rd Corps of the Central Red Army), 4th, and 30th Armies in the Maoergai area as the right route, led by the former enemy commander-in-chief Xu Xiangqian and political commissar Chen Changhao, they went north via Banyou.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Military Commission of the Central Revolutionary Army followed the right route army.

Everything is negotiated.Mao Zedong and others were also very happy. Everyone felt that the military operations of the Northward March had not stopped due to differences within the party.Thus, the vanguard of the Right Route Army set off... However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China never expected that shortly after Zhang Guotao returned to Zhuo Keji, another incident occurred. He sent a telegram to the central government, proposing that after leaving Aba in the west and entering Xiahe in the north, he would develop from the east (Shaanxi) to the west (Qinghai) in the Bianyuan campaign plan.There are two reasons: one is that it can avoid the main force of the Kuomintang army, and the other is that it can open up international routes. The dispute between "going north" and "going south" has evolved into a dispute between "going east" and "going west".

Holding the telegram, Mao Zedong's hands trembled slightly. The talented Zhang Wentian quickly described Zhang Guotao's move at this time with the most apt word "extraordinary problems". Bogu couldn't change his youthful vigor, and was used to the Moscow problem of going online, so he angrily threw the telegram on the table, "This is opportunism and escapism." Mao Zedong paced a few steps in the room and suggested that the three of them go together to listen to Zhou Enlai's opinion. At this time Zhou Enlai was suffering from hepatitis, which had turned into an amoebic liver abscess. He was ill and lived in a large lamasery. Two doctors, Wang Bin and Li Zhi, treated him all day long.

After listening to Bogu's briefing, Zhou Enlai was a little puzzled by Zhang Guotao's capriciousness: "Didn't the Politburo make a decision at the Shawo Conference on the matter of going north? Why did he change his mind again in just a few days?" Zhang Wentian interjected: "Guo Tao, just resolved the differences between 'going north' and 'going south', and he started a debate between 'going west' and 'going east', you don't know what he's thinking! " Mao Zedong said: "The root of Guotao's reluctance to go north to Shaanxi and Gansu, whether it goes south or west, is the starting point. But our Red Army not only wants to survive, but more importantly, it wants to develop."

Regarding Zhang Guotao’s back-and-forth, Zhu De also has a saying: “At that time, the reason he was willing to go north, but he didn’t want to go north, was to fight for an official position... After arriving in Maoergai, he was pessimistic and disappointed. He felt that the revolution had no future, and desperately wanted to go West, to Tibet and Qinghai, to escape the war far away.” The analysis of Mao Zedong and Zhu De can be described as knowing the enemy and knowing yourself. Because of this, there is no room for compromise in the differences between the central government and Zhang Guotao, unless Zhang Guotao abandons his views and obeys the central government.Otherwise, Mao Zedong would never look at the Chinese revolution being led to a dead end by Zhang Guotao and not think of a way, no tricks.

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu made an emergency consultation decision: first send a telegram to Zhang Guotao in the name of the central government, and resolutely stop him from going west to Qinghai and Xinjiang. Disagreements became public again. On August 14, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao received an instruction telegram from Zhang Guotao in the name of Zhu De, the general headquarters of the Red Army: "The first column of the Left Route Army is now advancing northward one after another, and can attack Aba on the 19th."The right-hand army should quickly "move to the left bank of the Tao River via Banyou".

On August 15, Zhang Guotao and Zhu De also received an instruction telegram from Mao Zedong and others in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "Regardless of the enemy's situation, terrain, climate, and food, we must immediately advance from Banyou to Xiahe with the main force." "The main force of the first and fourth fronts should go to the right, and only a detachment should be dispatched from Aba on the left to cover the rear and advance." The two telegrams were tit for tat, Zhang Guotao asked the right army to leave the left bank of the Tao River, approach the left army, and then go west to Qingjiang.Mao Zedong asked the left army to go out of Xiahe, follow the northward route of the right army, and then go east to Shaanxi and Gansu.

Lost and hard to return, Zhang Guotao insisted on going to Aba. As a result, the central authorities had to stop again, and held a meeting of the Politburo on August 20.This is the "Maoergai Conference" in history. Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Chen Changhao, Kai Feng, and Deng Fa attended the meeting, and Li Fuchun, Xu Xiangqian, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, and Li Xiannian attended the meeting.Zhou Enlai was ill, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, and Liu Bocheng were in the left army, Ye Jianying led the vanguard of the right army, and Peng Dehuai led the three armies in the back. None of them attended the meeting. Mao Zedong put on the table the differences between "Westward Advance" and "Eastward Advancement" and expressed his own idea of ​​"Eastward Advancement". Unexpectedly, everyone's opinions were unprecedentedly unanimous, and even Chen Changhao was very positive. Mao Zedong was very happy to see that everyone's thinking was unified, and he also praised Chen Changhao's speech. He said: Whether to go east or west is the key to the overall situation.Going east is a positive policy, which we must adopt. Based on Mao Zedong's speech, the Mao Ergai Conference adopted the "Supplementary Decision of the Central Committee on the Current Strategic Policy". While affirming the policy of advancing eastward, the "Decision" pointed out that advancing westward is a dangerous retreat policy. "The political source of this policy is right opportunism that fears the enemy's exaggeration of the enemy's strength and loses confidence in one's own strength and victory." Due to changes in the situation, the Maoergai Conference, on the basis of adhering to the principle of going north, made three adjustments to the specific deployment of the Xiatao Campaign formulated in advance: first, the deployment of troops was adjusted from split (two routes) to combined; First, the marching route was adjusted from the left and right marching northwards to the one-way column marching northward along the same route; the third is the main force of the Red Army's northward marching, which was adjusted from relying mainly on the left army to mainly relying on the right army. If you can't be a husband and wife, let them go if they want to go, and they will come back by themselves in the future. In July and August, the central government devoted its main energy to resolving differences and unifying understanding, so military operations did not lose time.On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek used these two months to fully understand the intention of the Red Army to go north.He mobilized Wan Dajun, arranged three blockade lines, and blocked almost all the main roads in the northwest direction of Mao Ergai. Chiang Kai-shek thought that his plan was perfect this time, and the Red Army could hardly fly.Unexpectedly, the vast grassland helped the Red Army a lot. The Northwest Sichuan Grassland, also known as the Songpan Grassland, is 600 miles in length and width, covering an area of ​​about 1.52 million square kilometers. It is actually a large swamp.The climate in the grassland is extremely harsh, the annual average temperature is below zero, and the wind, hail, rain and snow are unpredictable within a day.It was already August when the Red Army crossed the grass. The flowers on the meadow in August are in full bloom, but the water and grass under the flowers are dangerous everywhere. They are as terrifying as a banshee. If you accidentally fall into the swamp, you can swallow people in just a few minutes.Throughout the ages, not only are people inaccessible, but even birds are rare. Xue Yue said in "The Documentary of Suppressing "Bandits"" that if the Red Army wanted to go this way, "there was no way."Therefore, when the enemy predicted the course of action of the Red Army, the grassland was excluded. Therefore, Mao Zedong had an opportunity to take advantage of it. Mao Zedong, who loved to trek across mountains and rivers since he was a child, fought against nature, did not believe that his troops could not conquer nature. With one hand on his hip and one finger pointing at the map, he assigned a task to Yang Chengwu, the political commissar of the Red Fourth Regiment of the First Army Corps: "The route to the north to resist the Japanese is the correct route. Going out of Sichuan in the east, we dare not take the risk of crossing the grassland and going out of Shanxi and Gansu in the north. However, the enemy will never know our bottom line, and we will take the road that the enemy thinks he dare not take." Knowing that the grassland is a swampy country filled with mist, overgrown with water and grass, and indistinguishable in direction, you must find a marching route northward from the vast grassland.” For Yang Chengwu, it was the first time in his life to accept the task from Mao Zedong face to face. The most fundamental way to overcome difficulties is to explain clearly to comrades all the difficulties that may be encountered.Yang Chengwu kept Mao Zedong's words firmly in his heart. Xiao Jinguang said in his memoirs that the biggest threat to grassland is not the harsh natural conditions, but hunger.When the troops prepared the grassland, although they harvested some food such as highland barley and radish from the Tibetans' fields, it was just a drop in the bucket. Later, Mao Zedong never forgot this "foreign debt".When he was in Yan'an, he once talked to Snow, "This is our only foreign debt. In the future, we must repay the Tibetans for the provisions we have to take from them." At that time, there were countless stories about eating wild vegetables, bark, and leather shoes in the Red Army.The security guard of Huang Kecheng, chief of the Operations Division of the Political Department of the Red Army, woke up after a nap, and found that a large piece of meat had been gouged out from the buttocks of the chief's mule. He was so anxious that tears came out. This reminded Huang Kecheng, He ordered the mules to be killed and the meat distributed to the soldiers.This experience spread like wildfire, and when the Red Army walked out of the grass, there was not a single animal left. In the grassland where the danger of death is hidden everywhere, Red Army soldiers not only have to challenge the harsh natural conditions, but also challenge the limit of human life.This is a rare tragic song in the history of human existence. Even in this difficult environment, the debate between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Zhang Guotao on "going south" and "going north" is still going on...Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao, etc. kept sending telegrams to Zhang Guotao, asking him to report to the right army. Get closer and go north together.And prepare to send a regiment with horses, yaks, and food to meet them and help them walk across the grass. However, one telegram after another, like disappearing into the sea. On September 3, Zhang Guotao finally heard back.But the content of the telegram made Mao Zedong a thunderbolt.Zhang Guotao used the rise of the Gequ River as an excuse not to follow the central government's "northward march" plan to command the troops to march northward, but decided that the left army would return to Aba. . Over the next few days, telegrams from both sides continued.The contradiction developed to a white-hot level.One ordered the left army to go north in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the other ordered the right army to go south in the name of the Red Army General Headquarters. Zhang Guotao saw that the CPC Central Committee's policy of going north was unshakable, so he ordered Chen Changhao to lead the right-hand army to go south behind the back of the Central Committee's telegram. This is the "99 secret codes" that people are still researching until now. Coincidentally, September 9 seems to have some connection with Mao Zedong. The Autumn Harvest Uprising, Zhang Guotao's split (Mao said it was the darkest moment in his life), and his death all happened on this day. The "Secret Telegram 99" was first learned of by Ye Jianying, then chief of staff of the former enemy general headquarters. Because of his vigilance, Mao Zedong knew the contents of the telegram before Chen Changhao. Mao Zedong kept his composure and had done Chen Changhao and Xu Xiangqian's fight for it. But at the critical moment, Chen Changhao decided to listen to Zhang Guotao, and Xu Xiangqian didn't want to see the Red Fourth Army split and decided to go south temporarily. Mao Zedong knew that things had reached a very dangerous point. He neither wanted to see the Red Army kill each other, nor did he want to see everything he had fought for lost.The only way is to get rid of the golden cicada's shell. For the time being, you go your way and I go mine. As for who is right and who is wrong, we will talk about it later. Mao Zedong rushed to the base of the Three Army Corps and made an urgent decision with the Standing Committee members: the First and Third Army Corps set off at 2 am.As for the name, Mao Zedong sent Ye Jianying to tell Chen Changhao: The troops will go back to the south and then cross the grassland, and they need to prepare more food, so the troops will go out to "grass" at dawn.Chen Changhao did not object.In this way, Mao Zedong took advantage of the dead of night and led the first and third armies to set off.By the time Chen Changhao found out, Mao's men had already left Chen's "sphere of influence".Chen Changhao carried out Zhang Guotao's order.In this way, the right army was divided into two, those who were willing to go north continued to go north, and those who did not want to go north went south and returned to Banyou. Regarding this temporary "split", Mao Zedong said very coolly, "If you can't be married, if they want to leave, let them go! They will come back by themselves in the future." Later history confirmed Mao Zedong's foresight. Not only Chen Changhao came back, but Zhang Guotao also came back. "If we want to resist Japan, we must first go to northern Shaanxi."Mao Zedong's plan to go north had a specific destination. After Mao Zedong escaped from the golden cicada, Zhang Guotao quickly put the hats of "rightist escapeism", "opportunism" and "split the Red Army" on Mao Zedong and the front army led by him. What followed was mutual criticism.In order to occupy a "reasonable" word, the responsibility for the split is shifted to the other party.Both sides were quite moved. Careful historians have noticed that after September 10, the telegrams sent by Mao Zedong and others to Zhang Guotao have made important changes in the title. First of all, Zhang Guotao was no longer called "brother", but changed to "General Political Commissar Zhang".Secondly, the signature of the telegram no longer used the words "Enlai, Luofu, Bogu, Zedong, Jiaxiang" and so on, but changed it to "Central".Thirdly, the deliberative words such as "hope" and "hope" in the telegram were replaced with command words such as "instruction". At that time, Mao Zedong certainly knew that these changes in words could not have any effect, but he no longer called brothers and sisters, but instead, he was upright and upright. In order to shift the responsibility for this "split" to Mao Zedong, Zhang Guotao also made an article on the word "reasoning", but his article was so bad that it was self-defeating, and he drove himself to a dead end. In order to take advantage of the "reason", Zhang Guotao, in addition to holding a criticism conference in Aba in mid-September with the theme of "opposing Mao Zhou and Zhang Bo's escape to the north", even held a meeting of senior cadres above the military level in Zhuomudiao on October 5 to establish a separate "Party Central Committee". ", proclaimed himself "Secretary", formed a resolution, and issued a declaration that the Central Committee had "lost the qualifications to lead the entire party", "Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bogu, and Luo Fu should rescind their jobs, expel members of the Central Committee and the party, and order arrests. Yang Shangkun, Ye Jianying should be dismissed and investigated." On December 5, Zhang Guotao called the central government again, declaring that "you should use the Party's Northern Bureau, the Shaanxi-Gansu Government and the North Route Army, and you should not use the name of the central government again." Zhang Guotao's reckless actions without a fighting strategy made things impossible to maneuver. If we say that Zhang Guotao’s earlier disputes with the Central Committee about “going north” and “advancing south” can be attributed to disputes over strategic differences and marching routes, then after Zhang Guotao established a separate “Central Committee”, the nature of his disagreement with the Central Committee became organizational question.For a political party and party members who put the organizational line above everything else, Zhang Guotao's behavior undoubtedly cut himself off from the party and the masses. In contrast, Mao Zedong was much smarter. At the Russian World Conference, someone proposed to expel Zhang Guotao from the party. Mao Zedong not only denied it, but also patiently explained it. He said: "If you expel him from the party, he will still Leading tens of thousands of troops, but also blinding tens of thousands of troops, it will be difficult to meet in the future." Because Mao Zedong knew that the struggle with Zhang Guotao was directly related to the issue of unity and winning over the entire Fourth Front Army. Peng Dehuai commented on Mao Zedong's move in his self-report: "If Zhang Guotao was expelled from the party at that time, it would be much more difficult to win the Fourth Front Army to cross the grassland in the future. There will be no future meeting of the Second and Fourth Front Armies in Ganzi, let alone There will be a meeting of the first, second, and fourth front armies in northern Shaanxi." In the name of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Mao Zedong announced the "Decision on Comrade Zhang Guotao's Mistakes" to the whole party on the one hand, and on the other hand retained Zhang Guotao's party membership.It not only accounts for "reason", but also leaves room for it.However, Zhang Guotao held a meeting of senior cadres in the army in the name of a general political commissar of the Red Army in order to take advantage of the "reason". Then he made the decision to reorganize the Party Central Committee and expel members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The living target of the "gun commanding the party" has lost "reason". After the meeting on the Russian border, in the bleak autumn wind, Mao Zedong led the troops to march north again.And from the perspective of propaganda, this unit was called the "Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Red Army's Anti-Japanese Advance Team". On a sunny day, the vanguard of the Red Army arrived at Hadapu. Hadapu is like their home, the people there look like them and speak the same language.Red Army soldiers climbed snow-capped mountains, crossed grasslands, and passed through unfamiliar Tibetan areas, and finally returned to Han areas and returned to the Han compatriots. So far, Mao Zedong has led these soldiers to travel 24,000 miles.Where to go next?He still doesn't have a definite idea.He only knew that he had to go north, to Gansu, Shaanxi, and even Ningxia, to fight Japan.But these are just general directions, not definite destinations.Since the Long March, this situation has often occurred. Mao Zedong himself only knew roughly where he was going, but lacked specific goals, and it was the same at this time. Mao Zedong loved reading books and newspapers all his life, and this good habit finally helped him solve the problem of the whereabouts of the Long March. On September 19, Mao Zedong finally read the following information from an August newspaper sent by Nie Rongzhen—“Jinyang Daily”: "Liu Zhidan's Red Bandit Division in northern Shaanxi has occupied six counties, with more than 50,000 regular Red Army troops, and more than 200,000 guerrillas, Red Guards, and Young Pioneers. Peeping into the northwest of Shanxi, there is a danger of crossing the Yellow River east at any time." Of course, the strength of the Northern Shaanxi Red Army was deliberately magnified by Yan Xishan.Yan Xishan had his own reasons for amplifying the power of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi.Due to the feud between Wang and Chiang, on August 8, Wang Jingwei submitted to Chiang Kai-shek his resignation from the positions of Premier and Foreign Minister. Chiang Kai-shek intended to transfer the tiger away from the mountain and let Yan Xishan be the head of the administration. Naturally, Yan, the local emperor, did not want to leave Shanxi. Therefore, he exaggerated the strength of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi in the newspaper, intending to explain why he could not leave Shanxi, otherwise Shanxi would fall into the trap of Liu Zhidan. hand hazard.In fact, at this time, the northern Shaanxi base area and Liu Zhidan were being put in jeopardy by the purge of counterrevolutionaries...but it is true that there is still the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi, and Liu Zhidan is active in northern Shaanxi. Finally, Mao Zedong's plan to go north had a specific destination. On September 22, Mao Zedong gathered cadres above the first and third armies and the column regiment of the Central Military Commission to hold a meeting in a temple of Guandi.This was the warmest and most relaxed meeting since the Long March. Mao Zedong's speech was full of enthusiasm: "We have traveled more than 20,000 miles and overcome countless hardships. Today, we can finally sit here and have a meeting comfortably. This is a great victory in itself. At present, the Japanese imperialists are invading China. , we are going north to fight against Japan. First of all, we must go to northern Shaanxi, where Liu Zhidan’s Red Army is located. Our route is correct.” Finally, Mao Zedong waved his fists and encouraged: "Comrades, let's advance victoriously. We are only 700 miles away from northern Shaanxi. That is our destination and our anti-Japanese advance position!" There was thunderous applause from the audience. The Red Army who ventured northward has a bright future!