Chapter 106 Shanxi Coal Integration, When Preventing "Rounding"

Shanxi Province has encountered a new bottleneck in the centralized "incorporation" of small coal mines. It should be emphasized that here, we quote the word "incorporation", and we have considered using the words "recruitment" or "integration" before, but after careful weighing, we still think that under the impact of such an event and the context of the text, In the background, it seems more appropriate to use "incorporation". The "bottleneck" mentioned above refers to "the difference between the compensation standard and the coal boss's psychological price is too large", which affects the rectification work.

So, what is the "big price difference" mentioned above? Let's take a look at a ready-made case: a coal mine in Luliang, Shanxi Province, which the government valued at 100 million yuan, but the coal owner's asking price was as high as 700 million yuan.There are many unreliable negotiation periods between the two parties, so it is naturally difficult to form a "negotiation basis". This also reminds us at the same time: the final effect of the "one-size-fits-all" "incorporation" of small coal mines has to face a "Shanxi-style" reality test, and this is more worthy of our calm thinking.

There is no doubt that the long-term predatory mining of many small coal mines in Shanxi has brought endless financial resources to the coal bosses.Coal bosses get rich from "coal", but at the same time, they also cause "systematic damage" to the local environment. In stark contrast to this, most Shanxi people cannot enjoy the same "welfare" as coal bosses who "get rich because of coal" On the other hand, from the analysis of the deep-seated reasons of Shanxi’s coal government system, the coal bosses adopted the “fishing in the dry” style of excessive mining and private digging when operating coal mines. due to deterministic expectations.

Under the joint promotion of various "unfavorable factors", this kind of fluke mentality of "making a fortune is a fortune" has always been accompanied by the life of the coal boss. For example, there is one of the most typical real examples: According to some media reports, many coal bosses in Shanxi, after getting rich, will stay away from Shanxi, a "land of right and wrong", choose to buy houses and properties in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Hong Kong, and transfer their children's household registration Move out of province or abroad. That is to say, in the process of getting rich by digging coal, coal bosses have never regarded their hometown as their destination in life, and they have not regarded coal mining as a sustainable career to continue their incense.

If the private coal mines owned by the coal bosses can be held in an upright and stable manner through legal and reasonable channels and channels, then they will naturally tend to operate in a down-to-earth manner, instead of impetuously taking advantage of the rich and deceiving the world, and devote themselves to making The resources under its control are allocated as optimally as possible and "long-term governance". Such a market result is obviously not in line with the original intention of the relevant departments. All the above signs show that it is indeed difficult to determine and judge the market accurately through administrative power. For example, the "yin-yang contract" that appeared during the merger and reorganization of Shanxi Coal is an example.

In short, we believe that the "rectification" of small and medium-sized coal mines is certainly worth encouraging, but the lack of "modeling and design" of the implementation measures may greatly reduce the "hardness" of the policy. That is to say, how to obtain a "dynamic balance" between "administrative supervision" and "market competition" is a subject before us.