Chapter 15 2. Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai considered and fully prepared to resolve the North Korean issue fundamentally

Although the Washington authorities stated that they would never voluntarily withdraw from North Korea in order to preserve the face of their imperialist ally, they had to consider that once the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a new offensive, they would have the ability to withdraw from North Korea. The one that drove U.S. troops out of North Korea.At the same time, the Soviet Union may also seize the opportunity to capture the Japanese mainland.For the United States, Japan's strategic position is far more important than that of North Korea, and the only force that can be used to ensure Japan's security is the US 8th Army fighting in North Korea.In this way, once this threat appeared, the "United Nations Army" commanded by MacArthur had to be forced to withdraw from North Korea.However, how to judge the situation?How did MacArthur grasp the timing of the withdrawal?Can the Eighth Army safely withdraw to Japan?The Washington authorities have spent a lot of brains on this.Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, etc., have been discussing and negotiating for days since late December 1950, but they have not found the best plan.On December 29, before the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army launched the third campaign, with Truman's approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a pessimistic telegram to MacArthur.The telegram said:

All available estimates indicate that China is capable of driving the United Nations forces out of North Korea if it were to take action.one of the ways in which this capability might be prevented is by making the operation costly to the enemy, forcing them to forego it; the other is by committing large numbers of U.S. forces to the area, which would jeopardize our other commitments, including obligations to Japan's security.It is also unrealistic to ask other member states of the United Nations to provide a large number of reinforcements to North Korea.We don't think North Korea is the place to fight big battles.And, we believe that we should not send our remaining existing ground forces to North Korea to fight China while the threat of all-out war is growing.However, if we do not suffer serious losses, it will be of great significance to our national interests that we can successfully resist the CCP-North Korea’s attack in a certain area of ​​North Korea and attack the CCP’s military and political prestige.

Your primary mission is to provide necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea, repel the armed attack, and restore international peace and security to the region.However, in view of the current situation, it is necessary to adjust your mission. ... Developments may force us to withdraw from North Korea.Especially with the growing threat to Japan, it is very important for us to determine in advance the appropriate time for our eventual and orderly withdrawal.In our opinion, if you are forced to retreat to the positions near and to the east of Jinjiang, and the Chinese Communist Party gathers a large number of troops to attack your positions, and obviously has the ability to drive us out of North Korea, we will instruct you to start attacking Japan retreat.

You are asked to provide your views on the above situation.These circumstances will determine whether to withdraw troops, especially considering that your main task is still to defend Japan, and only the troops of the 8th Army can be used for this task. After receiving your opinion, we will clearly instruct you under what circumstances to start the withdrawal. After MacArthur received this telegram, he was very frustrated on the one hand, feeling that the Washington authorities still seemed hesitant and ambiguous about which route to follow. "This telegram seems to indicate that the 'will to win' in North Korea has been lost." On the other hand, he not only does not want to see a withdrawal from North Korea, but also advocates large-scale retaliation against China. On December 30, he replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposing: 1. Blockade of China's coast; 2. Destroy China's industrial capacity for war with naval and air force bombing; 3. The United Nations army received reinforcements from Taiwan's Kuomintang troops; 4. Let the Kuomintang army in Taiwan launch a diversionary attack on the mainland to reduce the pressure on the United Nations forces in North Korea.

Bradley once said that MacArthur's claim was "because his fabulous dignity was damaged. The red Chinese fooled this infallible 'military genius'. MacArthur wanted to restore lost face and military reputation, The only thing that can be done is to completely defeat the Red China generals who have fooled him. For this, at this time, he would like to prompt us to have a full-scale war with Red China, and maybe the Soviet Union, and start a third world war and a nuclear holocaust". When the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army launched the third battle and brought the "United Nations Army" close to the 37th parallel, the American authorities were even more afraid of the offensive of the Chinese and North Korean troops. They put their hearts in their throats, Li Qiwei With an average retreat of 60 miles, the US military lost "this important political base in Seoul ... together with the supply base in Incheon".Can Li Qiwei survive another attack from the Chinese army?The Washington authorities felt "a lot in their hearts."

Therefore, on January 9, 1951, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff formally rejected MacArthur's claim of retaliation, and again instructed MacArthur: "Organize echelon positions to implement defense, and give priority to the safety of your troops and the basic tasks of defending Japan. Destroy the enemy troops in North Korea to the greatest extent. Once you determine that you must retreat to avoid serious losses in personnel and supplies, withdraw from North Korea to Japan." On January 12, Truman also expressed contradictions in his letter to MacArthur On the one hand, it allowed him to insist on fighting in Korea; on the other hand, it allowed him to ensure the safety of the Eighth Army for the defense of Japan.Where do we go from here?Truman also had countless thoughts.In order to grasp first-hand information on the Korean battlefield, Truman approved the dispatch of Army Chief of Staff Lawton?Collins and Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt?Vandenberg went to North Korea.

At this time, on the part of the Chinese People's Volunteers, because of their victory in three consecutive battles, the "United Nations Army" led by the United States was beaten from the Yalu River back to the 38th parallel, and from the 38th parallel to the 37th parallel. area.Among the troops, and even among the senior commanders, not only did the worries about whether they could fight or not disappear when they first entered the DPRK, but they also generally developed a mentality of underestimating the enemy and winning quickly, thinking that the Americans would not fight, and the Korean War would soon be over. It can end victoriously, "from north to south, one push and it will be over", and you can return home victoriously after using up a tube of toothpaste.At the same time, the Soviet military advisers in North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea also had this sentiment, thinking that the Americans could be driven into the sea in one go.The Soviet military adviser in North Korea even accused Peng Dehuai face-to-face: Why didn't you pursue after you won the battle?How can there be such a style of play in the world?

However, Peng Dehuai was clear-headed. As early as mid-December 1950, when Mao Zedong decided to cross the 38th parallel to fight the third battle, he pointed out the budding idea of ​​quick victory: "As far as I can see, the Korean War is still quite long-term. The enemy has shifted from offense to defense. The front line is shortened, the forces are concentrated, and the front is narrow, which naturally increases the depth, which is beneficial to the combined arms operations. Politically, the enemy immediately abandons North Korea, which is very unfavorable to the imperialist camp. Nor does it require the United States to do so. If it loses one or two more battles, it may retreat to Pusan, Incheon, Gunsan and other bridgehead positions, and it will not immediately withdraw from North Korea." Mao Zedong expressed his approval of this, and he gave Peng Dehuai a letter on the 21st The reply stated: "Your estimate of the enemy's situation is correct. You must make long-term plans." In the telegram to Peng Dehuai and Park Il-yu on the 26th, he further pointed out: "War still requires long-term planning, and it is necessary to estimate the many difficulties in the future. The situation. We must understand that without a serious struggle, without annihilating all or at least most of the puppet troops, and not annihilating at least 40,000 to 50,000 U.S. and British troops, the Korean problem cannot be solved, and the idea of ​​quick victory is harmful.” The telegram to Peng Dehuai on the 29th also informed that "Comrade Filipov believes that the leadership of the Volunteer Army is correct. He criticized many wrong comments. He understands the difficulties in the Korean war. He automatically proposed to add 2,000 vehicles to solve the your difficult problems".

When the third battle liberated Seoul, Peng Dehuai expressed his dissatisfaction with Beijing's setting off firecrackers and celebrating enthusiastically.He said, what if we evacuate Seoul again due to war needs? "People's Daily" published an editorial "I wish the recovery of Seoul": "Forward! Forward to Daejeon! Forward to Daegu! Forward to Busan! Drive the American aggressors who refuse to withdraw from North Korea to the sea!" Peng Dehuai held this opinion reserve.He believes that although the first three battles were fought relatively smoothly, the heavy military group of the US military was not eliminated. The enemy still has a huge advantage in weapons and equipment. Moreover, the casualties of the Volunteer Army have reached 100,000, and logistics transportation is extremely difficult. Only by fighting can we win.

Nevertheless, at that time, from the headquarters of the Volunteer Army to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the estimation of the development situation of the Korean War had changed.Indeed, after the Volunteers entered the DPRK, the combat progressed so smoothly and the battlefield situation developed so quickly, which was not expected by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China when it decided to send troops.According to changes in the battlefield situation, as well as the defeat sentiment of the imperialist camp and the indecision of the US authorities, if the war continues like this, it seems possible to fundamentally resolve the North Korean issue.Therefore, both Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai imagined that after full preparations and a few more battles, the North Korean issue would be fundamentally resolved.That is, it is envisaged to realize the first outcome of the war originally estimated.This is not only a consideration at the top and a slogan raised in the troops, but also a clear definition of the goals to be achieved for the deployment and preparation of the troops.

Long before the third battle was decided, on December 8, 1950, Peng Dehuai considered making full preparations in all aspects after the second battle was over, "so that the decisive battle offensive could start in early March (1951)." .Mao Zedong's telegram to Peng Dehuai on December 26 stated: After the third "end, the main force of the entire army... should withdraw to an appropriate area conducive to rest and recuperation, rest for one to two months, replenish recruits, restore physical strength, and summarize experience, preparing food and ammunition, repairing roads, repairing clothes, quilts, shoes and socks, rectifying discipline, improving the relationship between Chinese comrades and North Korean comrades... improving the relationship between the army and the people (strictly implementing the three major disciplines and eight points of attention), and doing Work well for the residents and masses (including helping the North Korean people solve some material difficulties), and strengthen political mobilization in the army (do not return to the country until the enemy in North Korea is wiped out), and make full preparations for the spring battle.”Before the start of the third battle, on December 29, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai to point out again that after this battle, "then rest for two months and prepare for the spring offensive." On January 8, 1951, when the Volunteer Army ended its third campaign, deployed to rest and prepare for the spring offensive, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army pointed out in a telegram instruction to various ministries: "The central issue in the future is that the whole party and the army should work hard to overcome difficulties and be fully prepared. Combat strength (physical strength, material resources, tactics, technology, etc.), sum up the experience of previous battles, especially the experience of the third battle, improve tactics and technology, and strive to fight continuously after the start of the next battle, complete annihilation in one go The enemy, liberate North Korea. This is the goal of the next campaign, and it is also the standard for specific preparations during the rest period." Du Ping, director of the Political Department of the Volunteer Army, said in his memoirs that "the 'struggle goal' and the rest'standard' The requirements are too high, which reflects that our headquarters did not know enough about the enemy's situation at that time." On January 14, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai regarding preparations for the spring offensive and transferred it to Kim Il Sung. On January 15, he notified the contents of the telegram to Stalin. The telegram stated: "The approximately 100,000 Korean recruits trained in the Northeast should be added to the regiments of the People's Army during the two- to three-month rest and training period that has begun so far, so that the companies of the divisions of the People's Army will be filled. And the Soviet Union To equip these units with advanced weapons, so as to effectively cooperate with the Chinese Volunteers to fundamentally resolve the Korean issue in the spring (April and May). In the two to three months starting now, both the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army have many serious problems There is work to be done, mainly to add new recruits to the army, to enable new recruits to learn combat methods from veterans, to strengthen the army's equipment, to repair railways, to stockpile grain and ammunition, to improve the transportation system and rear service work. Only when these tasks are completed can we Guarantee the final victory. There are two possibilities for the policy of the enemy high command in the future. "(1) With a little resistance under the pressure of the two major armies of China and North Korea, that is, to withdraw from South Korea. If this is the case, it is the result of our adequate preparations, because the enemy knows that we have made adequate preparations and our military strength The stronger the enemy, the more difficult it is to retreat. "(2) The enemy resisted tenaciously in the Pusan ​​area of ​​Daegu, and they would not withdraw from South Korea until we fought until they could no longer fight. If this is the case, we must make full preparations before we can fight again...There is a possibility that the objective The situation forces us to fight a battle in February, rest after the fight, and then complete the preparations for the final battle. This must also be taken into account. However, if this situation does not happen, it will take two to two months It is necessary and correct to fully complete the above-mentioned preparations within three months, and then hold the final spring operations, and comrades in China and North Korea should make up their minds to do these indispensable tasks.” On January 19, Mao Zedong added a paragraph in his review of Peng Dehuai’s report prepared for the joint meeting of senior cadres of the Chinese and North Korean armies: “In the next battle, the subjective and objective conditions of both the enemy and ourselves have changed, so our army We must make various preparations and adopt new tactics in accordance with the new situation in order to liberate all of Korea. This is a decisive battle, and we must prepare well and fight well.” The preparations for the spring offensive are strategic preparations that consider the fundamental solution to the North Korean issue.According to the above-mentioned guiding ideology and deployment, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army began preparations for the spring offensive after the end of the third campaign. On the day when the third battle ended on January 8, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army called the Central Military Commission and Gao Gang, asking for instructions, "The third battle is over. In order to sum up experience, unify thinking, and prepare for the spring offensive, it is planned to be held from January 20 to 25. A meeting of military-level cadres will be held on Japan, and we hope that comrades from the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau will attend. For comrades in the rear, the meeting place can be held in Junzili, southwest of Chengchuan. .In order to make up for the downsizing in the front, "we plan to invite the veterans from the major administrative regions to be recruited half a month to 20 days in advance. The first batch of 40,000 will be concentrated at the end of January, and the stadium, Turtle City, and Dingzhou will be transported by train in early February. Replenish the troops in the second half of the year. If this is feasible, the offensive can continue in early or mid-March." "After the spring offensive begins, it is necessary to fight continuously without giving the enemy a chance to breathe, and a strong corps must be detoured along the east coast to the east of the Nakdong River , to cut off the connection between Busan and Daegu. This way of fighting requires a strong and absolutely superior force. At the same time, in order to prevent the enemy from landing from the side, the 19th Corps should be transferred to the Yalu River to the stadium area as a reserve team, and the camera is used. 19th Each army of the Corps will send one person to attend the meeting, and they will arrive at Zhisi on the 20th and ask the Military Commission to notify them.” On January 12, Gao Gang wrote to Mao Zedong, the Central Military Commission, and Peng Dehuai, reporting the Northeast Military Region Party Committee's plan for spring offensive preparations.The report stated: “At present, all work in the military region is aimed at preparing for the spring offensive and eliminating all U.S. troops in South Korea. All departments must complete their assigned tasks by the end of March.” These tasks include: Special Forces Training Artillery completed all training tasks before the end of March, including 3 anti-aircraft artillery divisions and 22 battalions with 364 artillery pieces, 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions with 120 artillery pieces, 9 rocket artillery regiments with 210 artillery pieces, and 3 howitzer regiments with 108 artillery pieces. , the lack of cadres, drivers, and cars will be completed and the training will be completed before the end of March; the Air Force will complete the training of 4 divisions before the end of March. In addition to the existing airports, 5 new airports will be built in the Northeast before the end of April; The armored force has 5 tank regiments, 1 motorized artillery regiment, and 1 motorized infantry regiment. Before the end of March, cadres and drivers will be fully equipped, training will be completed, and people will be sent to the front to scout the road. The training of supplementary infantry has gathered 120,000 new recruits, who have completed training in the training regiment or the divisions of the Northeast Military Region and the provincial guard regiments, and replenished the front troops on time. Combined Arms Combat Education Infantry, Artillery, Air Force, and Tank Corps. It is the first time in the history of our army that the various arms and arms cooperate in combat. In order to achieve mutual cooperation in combat, it is recommended that each division and regiment in the front choose a full-time or deputy military commander. They will hold short-term training courses in Northeast China to conduct joint combat education of joint arms. The time is from one month to 40 days. Soviet consultants will serve as instructors. The 19th Corps who is preparing to enter the DPRK will draw a corps or a division to cooperate with them. The air force, artillery, and tanks conduct joint-arms combat exercises, and at the same time conduct joint-arms communication and liaison education for communication cadres. The logistics work is to effectively ensure the supply during the rest period, restore the physical strength of the troops, and strive to store a batch of materials ahead before thawing, and deliver them before March 15; the second is to plan and organize the supply of combat materials for the joint arms. Mass forwarding.Due to the extremely serious transportation problem, the Military Commission is requested to add 4 more car regiments on the basis of the already increased 5 car regiments, and to solve the 3,000 cars requested by the Volunteer Army.The Northeast is preparing 2 transportation regiments, 8 transportation battalions, 15 stretcher regiments and rush to build carts and carts.In order to improve the logistics work, a logistics meeting was held in late January. Logistics personnel from the various armies in the front were sent to participate, and the Military Commission and the General Logistics Department were invited to send personnel to attend and guide. In addition, political work preparations were also planned and specific requirements were raised for the style of preparation.It was decided that Li Fuchun, deputy political commissar of the Northeast Military Region, would be responsible for logistics preparations, and He Jinnian, deputy commander of the military region, would be responsible for the training of various arms and the planning and preparation of joint combat education. After negotiations between Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, from January 25th to 29th, a joint meeting of senior cadres of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army was held in Junzili, Seongcheon County, where the headquarters of the Volunteer Army is located. Gao Gang, chairman of the Northeast People's Government, attended the meeting, and the General Staff of the Central Military Commission sent special personnel to work with the volunteers to prepare and guarantee the meeting.Peng Dehuai made a report at the meeting.Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong attached great importance to this meeting. After Peng Dehuai presided over the drafting of the report, he sent someone to Beijing to send it to Beijing. To be on the safe side, he sent it to Beijing in the form of a telegram.Mao Zedong personally reviewed and revised the report, and Peng Dehuai obtained the consent of Kim Il Sung. From the 16th to the 18th, Peng Dehuai went to Kim Il Sung's office and negotiated on the opening of the meeting. In his report, Peng Dehuai summarized the significance and reasons for the victories of the three battles. At the same time, he pointed out that although the three battles achieved great victories and laid the foundation for the complete liberation of North Korea, “the U.S. imperialists Not yet withdrew from North Korea, because the American invaders want to maintain their political position in the Far East and the world, because they want to protect the wealth they plundered in North Korea, and because they also believe that their superiority in equipment can help them hold their positions in South Korea , so they will not automatically withdraw from North Korea. We must make full preparations in all aspects and carry out several intense and large-scale battles in order to achieve the goal of completely liberating North Korea.”In view of the different understandings of the previous three campaigns, especially the different understandings of the lack of large-scale campaign pursuit, the report pointed out that: in the first battle, because "the main force of the enemy has not yet been defeated, the enemy has not yet correctly estimated the strength of our army." , the enemy is superstitious about the power of its air force, and has not given up its ambition to enter the Yalu River. These have created the possibility that our army will lure the enemy to go deep and wait for work. If our army pursues, we can only drive the enemy away, but cannot wipe out the enemy. The second The battle...Facts have proved that pursuing the enemy with modern equipment on foot cannot achieve great results. After the third battle, both the Volunteer Army and the People's Army made part of the pursuit, and no major results were achieved. In view of solving the problem of transportation supplies There is an urgent need to restore the fatigue of the troops, to consolidate the coastal defense and to consolidate the security of the rear, and the policy of not pursuing fierce pursuit and continuous attack is correct."Under the condition that the equipment of the enemy and the enemy is very different, according to the experience of the previous three battles, the way of fighting in the future should also strive to fight at night, strive to boldly outflank and divide, and bravely penetrate into the depths and rear of the enemy. At the same time, the organization should be elite and brave. The small units attacked the enemy's artillery positions and command posts, confused the enemy's deployment, and made a full-scale attack, making the enemy dizzy.For the next battle, it is proposed to make various preparations according to the new situation, and it is required to prepare well and fight well.And emphasized logistical preparations.The report conveyed Mao Zedong's instructions, requiring all comrades in the Chinese volunteer army in North Korea to learn from North Korean comrades seriously, wholeheartedly support the Workers' Party of Korea, and support Comrade Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Korean people. Unite like brothers, share weal and woe, depend on life and death, and fight to the end to defeat the common enemy. Chinese comrades must treat North Korea's affairs as their own, and educate commanders and fighters to love North Korea's mountains, rivers, grasses, and mountains. Mu, don't use the needles and threads of the North Korean people, just like our domestic views and practices, this is the political basis for victory. As long as we can do this, the final victory will definitely be won."The report also proposes policies for areas south of the 38th Parallel. Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang made speeches at the meeting.Jin Xiong, deputy commander of the China-North Korea Joint Command, Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and Han Xianchu, deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army, Jie Fang, chief of staff, and Du Ping, director of the Political Department, made speeches on certain aspects of preparations.Song Shilun, commander of the 9th Corps, and others introduced their combat experience. In order to prepare for the spring offensive, this meeting summarized and exchanged experience, unified thinking, clarified policies, and strengthened the unity of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army. From January 22 to 30, in order to solve the problem of lagging logistics work and ensure the completion of the logistics system's preparations for the spring offensive, the Volunteer Army Logistics Conference was held in Shenyang, chaired by Li Fuchun, deputy political commissar of the Northeast Military Region.Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhou Enlai, Acting Chief of the General Staff Nie Rongzhen, Director of the General Logistics Department Yang Lisan, Air Force Commander Liu Yalou, Artillery Commander Chen Xilian, Military Commission Transportation Commander Lu Zhengcao, and Northeast Military Region Logistics Minister Li Jukui attended the meeting and gave instructions.In addition to the leaders of the various branches on the front line and the leaders of the various armies doing logistics work, the leaders of the Northeast Bureau, the Northeast People's Government, and the Northeast Military Region in charge of rear support also participated in the meeting.The Central South, East China, and Northwest military regions where the 13th, 9th, and 19th Corps were originally located also sent representatives to attend the meeting. This meeting was carried out by means of group research on the summary of the conference.The meeting summarized the logistics work experience of the first three campaigns, and agreed that the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea pushed our army’s logistics work to a new stage. Even completely rely on the supply of the rear, the supply of the combined arms.This is a new situation.Logistics work must adapt to this new situation and realize new transformations.There were many difficulties in the logistics work of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and there were many practical problems to be solved. The meeting focused on the main contradiction of insufficient transportation and large front-line demand, and focused on transportation and supply issues.Emphasizing "thousands of lines, transportation first", decided to take all measures to establish transportation lines for military stations and change the passive situation of transportation.And to this end, some specific problems were solved: the establishment of three military depot lines in the east, the middle and the west, and the increase of air defense, emergency repair, and transportation forces.This meeting played a huge role in promoting the transformation of the logistics work of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to meet the requirements of modern warfare. At the same time, the training of the air force, artillery, and armored forces planned by the Northeast Military Region was carried out in an orderly manner. In late December 1950, the Air Force participated in actual combat exercises with a division led by the Soviet Air Force. Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, Liu Yalou negotiated with the Soviet General Adviser in China, and the Soviet Union agreed to dispatch two MiG-15 fighter divisions and 124 aircraft to cover the transportation of the two railway lines from Ji'an to Jiangjie and from Anton to Anzhou starting from January 10. (In fact, it was not dispatched at that time, and it was not dispatched until the second quarter).It is expected that by the end of March and early April, China will have 5 air divisions participating in the battle, including 2 destroyer (fighter) divisions, 2 bomber divisions, and 1 impact aircraft (now called attack aircraft) division, and 3 North Korean air divisions will participate in the battle.Command posts of the Volunteer Air Force, Volunteer Artillery, and Volunteer Armored Forces were established to organize training for each service.The military chiefs and chiefs of staff at all levels above the Volunteer Corps returned to the Northeast for short-term training to learn the coordinated command tactics of combined arms operations.The 19th Corps is also preparing to enter the DPRK, and the Central Military Commission also decided to transfer 3 troops from the Southwest Military Region to prepare for entering the DPRK. In November 1950, the light weapons of 36 infantry divisions ordered from the Soviet Union had arrived. It was decided to refit the 19th Corps and the 9th Corps in North Korea first, and then refit the 6 armies that entered North Korea during the first battle in batches (actually , In February and March, the equipment of these 36 divisions was first refitted to 27 divisions of the 19th, 9th, and 3rd Corps). Work has also begun to build additional airports in the country and in North Korea for the dispatch of the Air Force. The Air Force has sent a liaison team to North Korea for the construction of the airport. Beginning at the end of January, additional anti-aircraft artillery units and railway repair units were sent to North Korea. Except for the complex construction of the airport, all other preparations will be basically ready by the end of April.But just as Mao Zedong estimated in his telegram to Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung on January 14, "that is, the objective situation forces us to fight a war in February." The situation on the battlefield changed in late January, and the "United Nations Army" launched a counterattack across the board.