Chapter 25 2. Financial Suspended Accounts: The Lion Snowballs, Getting Bigger and Bigger

At the National Grain Circulation System Reform Work Conference held from April 27 to 29, 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji presented an unbelievable but unbelievable data to the participants: since April 1, 1992, my country's food system produces an average of 2.97 billion yuan of holes every month, an average of nearly 100 million per day! In this regard, Caijing magazine has a detailed disclosure: By the end of March 1998, the balance of grain loans across the country—that is, loans that have not yet been recovered—was as high as 543.1 billion yuan; The value adds up to only 329.1 billion yuan - between the two, a full deficit of 214 billion yuan!This means that a huge amount of 214 billion yuan has either been lost, or its whereabouts are unknown due to misappropriation, misappropriation, or even corruption!

"How much can we do if we don't lose or occupy the 200 billion yuan!" Zhu Rongji expressed his deep regret and heartache to the representatives attending the National Grain Distribution System Reform Work Conference. 214 billion yuan, accounting for 39.4% of the country's total grain purchase loans, half of my country's annual fiscal revenue, equivalent to the total amount of foreign investment invested in the central and western regions since the reform and opening up, and twice the loss of the catastrophic flood disaster in the Yangtze River Basin in 1998 ;With this money, one million Hope Primary Schools can be built, tens of thousands of factories can be built, and one more Three Gorges Project can be built; It can be divided into nearly 1,000 yuan...Who would dare to believe that 100 million yuan of funds was wiped out in just one day at sunrise and sunset, and more than 2,000 people were paid for the hard work of more than 4 million workers in the food system for 6 years. With the loss of more than 100 billion yuan, people can't help asking, where did the more than 200 billion yuan go?

In order to find out the exact whereabouts of the 214 billion, the State Council decided to use the sword of auditing.At the National Grain Circulation System Reform Work Conference and the Prime Minister's Office Meeting, Zhu Rongji pointed out three times that Li Jinhua, the chief auditor of the National Audit Office, should take the lead in auditing, with the cooperation of seven departments including finance, to check and audit the period from April 1, 1992 to May 31, 1998 Daily grain financial accounts and other unreasonable occupation of grain and oil purchase loans to find out the family background for the next step of grain reform.

Beginning in May, 50,000 auditors across the country are ready to go to battle. The Audit Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supervision, the People's Bank of China, the National Development Planning Commission, the State Grain Reserve Bureau, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China are composed of eight ministries and commissions. 16 inspection teams from the State Council went to various places to inspect the grain inventory and audit. "If you don't kill Loulan, you won't pay it back." Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, a huge audit operation with the largest number of participants, the largest audit scale, and the longest duration has begun!

How did such a huge hole come about?Speaking of this huge financial pending account, the financial department has a statement from the financial department, and the food system has the difficulties of the food system. It has become an unclear account of who is losing and who is losing. In fact, the food system is not born with a loss.From the information we consulted, we can find that, for a long period of time, the food system not only did not lose money, but also made a slight profit.What caused this embarrassing situation today?There is an evolution going on here. In the eight years from 1953 to 1960, according to accounting statistics, the average annual profit of the grain business was 189 million yuan, and the profit of the grain and oil industry was 88 million yuan, and the total profit was 277 million yuan.

In the past 8 years, grain enterprises have been able to turn over a certain amount of profits to the state. From our introduction to grain subsidies, we can see that this is mainly due to the fact that the sales price of grain and oil at that time was higher than the purchase price, and there was a reasonable price difference between purchase and sale. During the 18 years from 1961 to 1978, due to multiple increases in the unified purchase price of grain and oil, but no corresponding adjustment in the unified marketing price, the purchase and sales prices of grain gradually leveled off, and some varieties were inverted; the purchase and sales prices of edible oil were generally inverted, and business operations changed from profit to loss.During this period, although there are still certain regional price differences, raw grain and finished grain price differences, and quality differences in grain and oil commodities, they are far from making up for the commodity circulation costs incurred by enterprises and need to be subsidized by the state finance.Over the past 18 years, the state has provided an average annual subsidy of 2.406 billion yuan for grain commercial operations at affordable prices. After offsetting the profit of 255 million yuan realized by the grain and oil industry, transportation companies, and bargaining operations, the state's net subsidy is 2.151 billion yuan.

During this period, both the state budget and corporate finance treated the increased price increases for grain and oil purchases and the increased policy expenditures resulting from the increase in the unified purchase price of grain and oil as corporate losses, and did not separate them from normal operations and realized profits for separate reimbursement.The result of this is that, firstly, it encourages these enterprises not to pay attention to accounting, and spends extravagantly; secondly, some enterprises suffer losses even if they work hard subjectively and have good management. There is a misunderstanding of "only grabbing, selling, and adjusting, no matter how much you lose".This is the disadvantage of the separation of government and enterprise.In fact, apart from some policy-related losses that cannot be solved by the food system, a considerable part of the losses are caused by the internal operation of the enterprise. As long as management is strengthened and operations are improved, a considerable part of the losses can be completely reduced. In 1977, the food system carried out activities to strengthen management, increase revenue and reduce expenditure. As a result, by 1978, the annual loss had dropped to 3.2 billion yuan. In 1977 and 1978, the total deficit was 2 billion yuan, of which 1.3 billion yuan was completely improved. Loss reduction due to management and revenue reduction.But then we didn’t seriously sum up the experience, and we didn’t dare to touch the management model that doesn’t distinguish between government and enterprises. Not only did we not solve the phenomenon of inversion of purchase and sale prices, but the proportion of inversion became larger and larger, so that the state-owned food system suffered more and more losses and burdens. heavier.

During the six years from 1979 to 1984, the prices of grain and oil purchases and sales were completely inverted. In addition, the purchase and sales business continued to expand, and the proportion of over-purchasing increased accordingly. Losses are getting worse, grain and oil subsidies remain high. In 1992, the national state-owned grain system lost 23.017 billion yuan, in 1996 it lost 38 billion yuan, in 1997 it lost 48 billion yuan, and in 1998 it lost 27 billion yuan in the first quarter alone.Three years of bumper grain harvests and three years of losses for grain enterprises, and the more serious the problem of losses is in the grain-producing areas. In 1997, the loan balance of Hubei's grain system was 32 billion yuan, with a loss of 3.723 billion yuan that year, which became a heavy burden for state-owned grain enterprises and led to poor circulation of the entire grain system.

It is obviously unfair to record all losses on the food system, and it is also inconsistent with the facts to put all losses in the basket of policy losses.So which are the operating losses of the food system, and which are the policy losses of the country?Who loses more and who loses less?This has been an unresolved muddled account in the past.This is not to blame for the lack of accounting by the financial staff, nor the lack of strict financial supervision. The lack of distinction between government and enterprises in the grain distribution system is doomed to be a muddled account. So far, my country's state-owned grain system still integrates three kinds of behaviors: one is the macro-control function, the other is the welfare function, and the third is the management function.Among them, the macro-control function and the welfare function belong to the government's behavior, while the management function belongs to the enterprise's behavior.That is to say, the food system is both a government administration and a business unit.This kind of separation between government and enterprises was a common phenomenon in the planned economic system in the past, but with the implementation of the socialist market economic system, most state-owned enterprises have completed the reform of separating government from enterprises, but only the state-owned grain system It still maintains the identity of "officials are not officials, businessmen are not businessmen".Therefore, some people refer to the state-owned food system as the last bastion of China's planned economy in the past 20 years of reform.The purpose of corporate behavior is to make profits, while the government’s behavior requires the food sector to maintain an effective supply of food. When the two are mixed together, from an operational point of view, the high policy nature binds the hands and feet of the food system and cannot be independent. From a management point of view, profitability affects the implementation of government actions, and both aspects must be taken into account, and the result is that both aspects are often affected.

This kind of system that requires both management and operation will inevitably lead to unclear responsibilities and unclear rights and interests. Losses are the most direct consequence.Since the state-owned grain system is responsible for collecting, selling, storing, and adjusting grain for the country, part of the losses will inevitably occur due to policy factors. This is the so-called "policy loss"; and the grain system is also an operating entity. There is bound to be a phenomenon of profit and loss in the operation, which is the so-called "operating loss".Although there are two names, the financial system also requires separate management and independent accounting of policy business and operational business, but in fact they are mixed together, you have me, and I have you.If there is a loss in operation, it will be thrown into the basket of policy-related losses, and the national and local finances will be burdened, thus creating a phenomenon that some grain companies eat from the same pot; Losses were written off, which seriously affected the business enthusiasm of grain enterprises, and finally embarked on the road of "no loss, no loss".This kind of system is not conducive to improving the operation and enhancing the vitality of the state-owned grain system. What is more serious is that it artificially creates many loopholes, allowing some units and individuals to make a big fuss by taking advantage of policy-related business and policy-related losses.Some resell the grain purchased at protective prices, or even the grain reserves in the national grain reserve, to individual grain merchants at low prices. Misappropriating the state's grain and oil purchase funds for non-grain and oil operations, making profits into their own pockets, and the state "paying for losses."From this point of view, in the 200 billion yuan financial hole, there are not only losses caused by policy factors, but also losses caused by the commercial operation of the food system itself.The two mixed together intentionally or unintentionally, resulting in the current confusing account of "a layman can't understand it, and an insider can't explain it clearly".

But we can't help but figure it out.After more than six and a half months of special audit by 50,000 audit cadres, we finally have a clearer understanding of this huge loss hole. On December 3, at a press conference held by the Information Office of the State Council, Li Jinhua, Auditor-General of the National Audit Office, released the final audit results: After auditing 308.5 million grain enterprises, 2,499 branches of the Agricultural Development Bank and 2,594 financial departments Conducting special audits and investigations, it was preliminarily determined that from April 1, 1992 to May 31, 1998, among the newly added financial accounts of more than 200 billion yuan, more than 140 billion yuan belonged to normal accounts, and 600 billion yuan were abnormal accounts. More than 100 million yuan.The most important problems in the abnormal pending accounts are: first, false financial reporting and handling of accounts in violation of the accounting system; second, there are many loopholes in the management of grain funds, resulting in a huge gap in funds; third, poor management, chaotic management, and serious violations of discipline and regulations .The audit found and investigated 1,181 cases of violations of financial laws and regulations, such as serious misappropriation of acquisition funds, chaotic management, causing heavy losses to the country, defrauding state funds, and personal embezzlement and embezzlement of public funds. 27 people were held criminally responsible. In 6 years, more than 60 billion yuan of abnormal losses have been posted, and 10 billion yuan a year, which is a shockingly large amount.The more than 60 billion yuan is all the money of the state, the money of Chinese taxpayers, and the money of the masses in the bank. How could it be said that it is gone all of a sudden?People can't help asking, where did the more than 60 billion yuan go? According to the audit of 50,000 auditors, the 60 billion yuan is an abnormal loss.Where is the abnormality?The audit conclusion is: chaotic management, poor management, violation of discipline and law, embezzlement and embezzlement... Among them, what we hate the most is the "grain rat" who depends on food for food.From the batches of illegal cases that have been investigated and dealt with, involving tens of millions or hundreds of millions of yuan, we can see that the rampant rats are an important reason for the large increase in abnormal losses today.According to the audit by the auditors, among the "rats" that devour food and dig money, there are three kinds of "rats" that stand out: the first is the "hamsters" within the food system, and the second is the "hamsters" of local governments and various power departments. "Official rats", the third type is "ermines" in the banking system.Together they drilled holes into the country's granary, stole the country's food, ate the country's food money, and dug out the country's subsidies... Let's look at the "hamsters" from inside the food system: July 10, Fujin City, Heilongjiang Province, Facing the arrival of the Audit Office's special audit team in Harbin, relevant leaders of the Fujin City Grain Bureau, Grain Depot, and the municipal government all said, "We will have no problem with this pimple." Fujin City is located in the Sanjiang Plain and is a grain-producing area in Heilongjiang Province. The Fujin City Grain Depot is one of the 21 national grain depots in Heilongjiang Province, with a conventional storage capacity of about 60,000 tons.During the investigation, the audit team found that the inventory reports of this grain depot in March, July, and October 1997 showed that the inventory suddenly increased from 34,000 tons to 106,000 tons. Further investigation also found that on May 25, 1998, more than 2,800 tons of grain were shipped out of the warehouse a day, and they were transported to Dalian by car. If each car loaded 8 tons, more than 3,500 vehicles would be needed. Normally, it would take more than 3 months. However, the account of the grain depot on June 25 reflected that the sales money had already entered the account, and the time of the two did not match at all. From January to March 1998, the grain depot in Fujin City cheated collectively in 4 times, forged more than 3,000 fake certificates, created the illusion of purchasing 5.7 million tons of national grain reserves, obtained a loan of 39.67 million yuan from the Agricultural Development Bank, and defrauded the national policy The subsidy is 3.39 million yuan. In order to play this "karate", more than a dozen professionals from the grain depot gathered in the dark room, and "flow operation" forged bills.In order to make the false accounts more realistic, the invoicing personnel copied the names and villages on the stubs of the previous farmers’ grain delivery, fabricated the quantity and amount of grain received, filled in the grain receipts, and then stamped the name stamps of the handlers in each link to complete the receipt of grain. More than 3000 sheets.It can be described as painstaking.Using this method, they falsely purchased more than 40,000 tons of grain for four times, and defrauded the state of more than 43 million yuan in loan subsidies.Among them, 12.55 million yuan was deposited in more than 30 accounts of savings banks and credit unions of various banks in the name of individuals. The Fujin Grain Bureau, as the competent department, is not ignorant of the tampering with the grain depot. In May 1998, the Grain Bureau organized an internal investigation of the unit and found that there was a problem of false purchases of grain stocks. On July 21, 1998, the deputy mayor of the city, Mr. Guo, was dismissed and pending review; other relevant personnel involved in the case were given party and political discipline sanctions. What happened in Fujin City shows that in the country's granary, there is still such a nest of morons who use their power to squeeze out food funds, regardless of the pain and resentment of farmers holding IOUs, and they will also cut back on spending and pay huge amounts of money. Capitalist governments are set aside.But with the deepening of the audit, people found that the Fujin incident was just the tip of the iceberg, and there were still a surprising number of "big rats" hidden underneath! Zhang Jingui, the former legal representative of the Nanhewan National Oil Reserve in Shanxi Province, caused economic losses of nearly 25 million yuan to the country during his tenure.During Zhang Jingui's 11 years in office, he arranged nine relatives including his wife, daughter, and son-in-law in key departments such as finance, distribution, and inspection of the treasury, wantonly eroding state property. From February 1993 to 1995, Zhang approved the allocation of more than 10 million yuan to the warehouse's distribution department in Guangzhou, whose son-in-law was in charge and his daughter was the accountant.The financial revenue and expenditure of this distribution department has been out of the supervision of the warehouse. So far, not only has it not paid a penny of profit, but it has also caused bad debts of 1 million yuan and a loss of principal and interest of more than 1.5 million yuan. In April 1994, Zhang Jingui signed a soybean oil order contract with Pang Rongxiang (whose son is one of the investors of Huajin Company) of the private enterprise Huajin Company (the investor is Zhang Jingui's son-in-law, etc.), and paid Pang more than 15 million yuan for the contract .After the contract was partially fulfilled, the negotiations between Zhang Jingui and Pang were terminated, and more than 11 million yuan is still lost. At this point, people can't help but ask, is there no system to control the movement of such a large amount of funds?Yes, but some of the rules and regulations of the bank are purely fictional; although the system exists, tens of thousands of resources can often be used based on Zhang Jingui's verbal "instructions". The case was spread to Beijing and shocked the top management.It is understood that Zhang Jingui and others have been detained according to law. The National Grain Reserve Bank in Kunming, Yunnan is also courageous.How dare they embezzle huge amounts of special loans for grain and oil purchases to engage in non-grain and oil business activities.After investigation and verification, from December 1993 to May 1998, this reserve bank misappropriated 109.95 million yuan of policy grain and oil loan funds.Among them, 237.265 billion yuan was approved by Wang Jiaren, director of the Provincial Grain Bureau, who presided over the meeting and personally signed and approved; 8,146.98 yuan was embezzled by Yang Heqing, the former director of the Kunming National Grain Reserve; 4.7519 million yuan was embezzled by Li Guoxian, the current director of the reserve. .Among the embezzled funds, only 3.37 million yuan of principal has been lost for the sugar project. In addition, in November 1997, when the State Council made clear regulations on grain sales, the Kunming National Grain Transit Depository made many requests to the Provincial Grain Bureau to sell old grain at lower prices for the benefit of the department. However, the main leaders of the Provincial Grain Bureau agreed without permission to sell 100 million catties of grain at a reduced price for the depot, resulting in a loss of 32.08 million yuan for the depot. Such daring and deceitful actions will empty out even the richest treasury. Digging the treasury for personal gain is the most common and serious problem found in the audit.They frequently misappropriated and occupied tens of millions of yuan of grain and oil special purchase funds to build high-rise buildings, repair hotels, buy cars and even eat, drink and have fun. How could the country not lose a big hole?Why don't farmers scold their mothers with "white strips"?In Sichuan, the grain system of a county has misappropriated 157 million yuan of grain money since 1992, which was used to build restaurants, foreign investment, and other auxiliary businesses; in Jilin, a grain enterprise in a small city used 160 million yuan of grain money , purchased a large number of non-productive fixed assets and assets that could not be used up for decades; in Anhui, a county’s food system misappropriated purchase funds to set up various profit-making economic entities such as hotels, guest houses, bathhouses, and gas stations. , and also set up the "office" of the Grain Bureau in the Huangshan Scenic Area; in Zhejiang, the grain departments of many counties and cities have their own hotels and restaurants, ranging from two-star to four-star; The purchase funds are lent to cadres and workers, and some places have implemented "grain saving and diversion". The Special Office of the National Audit Office in Jinan conducted a comprehensive audit of the assets, liabilities, gains and losses of 16 grain depots and transportation companies in Beijing and Shandong since 1992, and found that these 16 units generally had violations of regulations and disciplines.Some violated the state’s grain and oil purchase and sales policy, falsely claimed financial subsidies, and withheld state special revenue; some operating income was not recorded to facilitate bad behavior of enterprises;In this audit, a total of 200 million yuan was found in violation of discipline, accounting for 12% of the total assets of these enterprises, and more than 30% of individual grain depots. From April 1992 to the end of 1997, these enterprises took up nearly 100 million yuan in loans from the Agricultural Development Bank, and by the end of May 1998, it had reached 122 million yuan, an increase of 23.6 million yuan over 1997.Among these unreasonably occupied loans from the Agricultural Development Bank, some have caused huge financial losses due to poor management, some have been suspended due to unpaid financial subsidies, some have embezzled a large amount of loans due to other departments, and some have lost grain and oil. Funds are used to purchase and construct fixed assets. The "fat meat" of grain payments is also the "official rats" of the local government and various power departments: In Liaoning, a county's industry and commerce, foreign economics, and public security departments have long borrowed 1.13 million yuan from the Agricultural Development Bank of the grain depot , the longest is 6 years, and the shortest is 4 years; in February 1995, in Inner Mongolia, a county government in Inner Mongolia, in order to solve the difficulty of having no rice for the county winery, "Lalangpei" assigned the winery to the Grain Bureau , Consuming more than 31 million yuan of funds from grain enterprises; in Jilin, some government offices in other places regard the grain department as a cash machine, and can "borrow" millions of dollars...The grain purchase process should have been closed. , but it is unbelievable that there are also "ermines" stealing grain money in banks that implement closed responsibilities and national policies: since 1996, the Agricultural Development Bank, which has been approved to establish a branch, has established a branch within one year. More than 2,000 branches were stolen, 32 billion yuan was embezzled, and a loss of 19.7 billion yuan was incurred.By 1997, this situation continued unabated. Some provincial branches took 17.5 million yuan in loans to build hotels first, and some regional branches lent 179 million yuan in grain special funds to non-grain purchase enterprises. By the end of May 1998, there were still More than 78 million yuan has not been recovered... Preliminary audit analysis shows that the misappropriation of food funds mainly involves embezzlement by individuals, embezzlement by enterprises and departments, and government intervention.So where did the money go?It has become hotels, office buildings, housing for employees, and high-end consumer goods such as cars and mobile phones, as well as stocks, futures, and real estate. When is the bill pending? Policy losses, business losses, and Shuoshu dug, all of which caused a hole of more than 200 billion yuan in the state-owned food system.If it is distributed to more than 4 million employees, each person will have to bear 50,000 yuan. If it is broken down to various grain enterprises, most of them will be insolvent. Obviously, such a heavy burden cannot be borne by the state-owned grain system alone. A considerable part of it is a policy loss, which should not be borne by the food system.But the finances have no money to make up for it, and enterprises have no ability to pay for it. Under such circumstances, the food system can only play football and put this burden on the banks. Many people may not understand that both the national and local finances subsidize the policy losses of the food system, so how can there be policy losses? This is where the state food system feels wronged.In the past, my country's food policy losses were all subsidized by the central government, and the deficit was generally compensated for as much as possible. During this period of time, the deficit and compensation were basically balanced, so there was very little phenomenon of hanging accounts.Later, a financial system was implemented in which the central and local governments ate food separately, and some subsidies such as grain enterprise losses and price increase subsidies were assigned to the local financial burden. The subsidized policy losses have not been subsidized in time, resulting in the phenomenon of hanging accounts.And the bank also implemented the reform of changing the appropriation to a loan, so the principal was not repaid, and the interest came again. The lion snowballed, and it got bigger and bigger, which finally led to today's embarrassing situation. In this regard, local governments also have difficulties with local governments.In terms of the financial system, the central government basically implements a large-scale contract system for the local governments. The base amount handed over by the local government to the central government must remain unchanged for several years, and the price increase of grain and oil cannot be adjusted to reduce the contract base.In recent years, grain purchase prices have been raised many times, freight rates have also been greatly increased, and loan interest rates have been rising again and again, which has brought great pressure to local finances.It is generally reported by local governments that the central government is only concerned with issuing policies, regardless of bills, and that it is unreasonable to shift the burden to local finance. Therefore, many local governments have not provided financial subsidies as required by the central government.According to statistics, about 90% of the current policy-related financial charges in the state-owned grain system belong to the financial subsidies that local governments should make up but have not made up.This part of the funds not only squeezed the funds of the state-owned food system, but also had to pay interest and penalty interest by the state-owned food system. It is conceivable that under such circumstances, the state-owned food system is indeed difficult to reflect its own business vitality. In addition to insufficient local financial subsidies, the current "big pot rice" grain circulation system has also caused state-owned grain management departments to have chaotic management, poor management, and even conduct policy and commercial operations in violation of the basic laws of market economy.Reverse operation is one of the more typical phenomena.According to the current policy, the funds needed by state-owned enterprises to buy grain from farmers are provided by the Agricultural Development Bank; When repaying the loan, the profit is used for personal expenses, and the interest is subsidized by the government.If this operation is followed, not only will the food system not suffer a large loss, but it will make a slight profit, which can cover part of the expenses.But in fact, many companies did not do this, but engaged in "reverse operation".For example, they buy grain at 0.6 yuan per catty in accordance with national regulations, and the conventional practice is to sell it at 0.7 yuan per catty in accordance with national policies. After returning the purchase loan, there is still 0.1 yuan to pay various expenses.But they refused to do so, and sold the grain at 0.5 yuan per catty. The money they got back was used to make up for their own losses and expenses, and the remaining 20 cents were returned to the bank. there. Why is this so?It turned out that from 1995 to 1997, grain harvested for three consecutive years, and the market price dropped. In order to protect the interests of farmers, the central government issued a policy to require state-owned grain enterprises to buy surplus grain from farmers at a protective price, which was higher than the market price.If this policy can be fully implemented, grain sources will be concentrated in the hands of state-owned grain enterprises, and sales at a fair price will not be a problem in the future.However, some places and some enterprises are disobedient and do not strictly implement the policy. Farmers go to the bazaars to sell at low prices. Some private traders buy at low prices and sell at low prices. Sales, forming a vicious circle, the hole is getting bigger and bigger. Anyway, the bank will get the money if it loses.In addition, state-owned grain enterprises have a heavy burden of personnel and many operating links, resulting in high grain operating costs, and it is difficult to compete with individual and private grain vendors in the market, so they made this bad policy.As a result, the losses are getting bigger and bigger, and the accounts are getting more and more.However, the current big-pot rice system that does not separate government and enterprises has condoned the behavior of the food system, so that what should be paid and what should not be paid. ". The long-term and huge losses have had a negative impact on both the finance and the state-owned food system, manifested in: (1) the losses that have occurred in the year cannot be fully reflected in the final financial accounts, and the financial expenditures are untrue. Hidden fiscal deficit. (2) If the finance owes the enterprise, the enterprise owes the bank, the loan exceeds the plan, and the loan cannot be repaid when it expires, the bank will take measures such as raising interest rates, penalty interest, and restricting loans to the enterprise, which will not only cause difficulties in the capital turnover of the enterprise, but also affect normal business activities. Multi-angle debts are difficult to clean up, and the burden on enterprises is getting heavier due to interest rate hikes on debts.The old unresolved accounts are unresolved and new ones appear, forming a vicious circle. (3) In order to alleviate the contradiction of unpaid accounts, the local finance implements the practice of bundling the profits and losses of the enterprises, and uses all or most of the profits to offset the losses. The enterprises see that no matter how much profits they create, it is difficult to make up for the parity deficit, so they simply quit. , causing policy losses to eat up operating profits. (4) Accounting has become a cover for unreasonable expenditures of some enterprises. Operating losses and policy losses are listed together in the accounts, and policy losses are used to cover up operating losses. Financial suspension is a typical practice that violates the principles of the socialist market economy. To put it bluntly, its essence is a hidden fiscal deficit.It not only conceals the authenticity of the financial situation, precipitates a large amount of credit funds, affects the development of banking business, but also places a heavy burden on the localities and enterprises.If it continues to develop, there will be only one result, which is to drag down food, finance, and banks until it affects the normal operation of the entire economy.This is by no means sensational. In fact, the huge amount of financial debt has reached the point where the country's finances cannot bear it.Therefore, it is not only a food problem, but also a major economic issue to stop and digest grain financial historical debts and prevent new debts. Beginning in 1995, the central government carried out the "two-line operation" reform of the grain system, one of which was to digest financial liabilities.The measures adopted at that time were first to require local finance to provide sufficient normal policy subsidies. The State Council stipulated: "The subsidies of local governments at all levels to grain enterprises must be implemented, and the subsidies must be allocated in a timely manner to ensure that there is no delay or arrears, and the full amount is in place. Enterprises do not bear policy-related losses.” The second is to implement a suspension of outstanding accounts for grain enterprises after implementing the “two-line operation”, requiring all outstanding accounts to be digested within five years. The food reform in 1998 made it more difficult to digest historical bad debts and eliminate new bad debts as a hard task.In the grain reform policy of "splitting into four quarters and improving", it was stipulated that the end of March 1992 should be used as the boundary for separating new and old outstanding accounts, and the grain outstanding accounts should be completely resolved.For this reason, the State Council requires grain enterprises in all regions to absorb all losses from 1992 to the present within 5 to 10 years. deal with.At the same time, the State Council has stipulated that since June 1998, state-owned grain enterprises are not allowed to incur new losses. If there are new losses, they will even ask the governor of the province. The attitude is firm and non-negotiable. This is our determination to implement the grain reform policy!