Chapter 23 3. Still hugging the pipa and half covering the face

We cannot deny that the unified grain purchase and marketing policy has made an indelible contribution to stabilizing the market and ensuring people's livelihood during the extremely tight grain situation in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The capitalist industrialization system was established on a blank slate. However, we do not need to deny that the unified purchase and marketing policy was only a temporary measure adopted under the historical conditions at that time, a coercive means of behavioralization by the government, and its negative effects were also very obvious.As early as when this policy was formulated, Comrade Chen Yun was worried about it: "The name of requisition is appalling. You can consider what it is called, but the nature is of such a nature. ... The term "rationing" is a bit unpleasant. Thinking of the situation in the era of Japanese and puppet rule.... Requisition and allocation, rural procurement, urban rationing, rigid methods. I am a little worried about the implementation of this method, because it has something to do with everyone, and the problem is too big....Farmers Food can no longer be freely controlled, although we pay, but they cannot be sold for a price, which is likely to affect production sentiment."

For this reason, Comrade Chen Yun pointed out in the government work report of the first National People's Congress in the second year after the implementation of unified purchase and marketing: "Planned supply can only be a temporary measure. As long as industrial and agricultural production increases, the production of consumer goods will increase." If it is increased to the extent that it can fully supply market needs, the method of quantitative allocation should be abolished." However, the subsequent historical development led us to embark on a pure and pure road of planned economy. The temporary policy of unified purchase and marketing of grain not only continued for a long time, but also expanded to many agricultural products including eggs and Chinese cabbage. superior.

Whenever we do not seek truth from facts and follow the law of the development of things, we will take detours. This is a fact that history has proved thousands of times. Marked by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee held on December 18, 1978, China embarked on the road of reform and opening up.The forerunner of the reform is agriculture. In 1979, China began to reform and adjust the grain distribution system that had been implemented for 26 years.In addition to raising the unified purchase price of grain and reducing the purchase base of grain to increase the income of grain farmers, the most important reform is to change the monopoly distribution pattern of the grain department’s exclusive operation, restore trade in grain fairs, and allow farmers to complete the procurement and over-purchase tasks. Surplus grain Listed trade, negotiating purchase and selling.The traditional "rice market" for grain trading and distribution began to resume development, and a grain circulation management pattern with the state as the mainstay and collective and individual participation was gradually formed.By the end of 1984, there were 56,500 farmers' markets nationwide, including 50,000 in rural areas. The grain trade volume in the fairs increased from 2.5 billion kilograms in 1978 to 8.4 billion kilograms in 1984, an increase of 2.34 times.More than 20 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government have successively established professional grain purchase and sales companies. From 1979 to 1984, a total of 55.86 billion kilograms of grain was negotiated in six years. The number of kilograms increased to 17.5 billion kilograms, accounting for 34% of the purchase volume that year, and the amount of grain negotiated and sold reached 26.7 billion kilograms, accounting for 34% of the total sales.It meets the needs of farmers to sell surplus grain, stabilizes the price of grain in the market, and replenishes the stock of cheap grain.At the same time, the state has gradually reduced the varieties and quantities of unified purchases and sales, and expanded the scope of market regulation.

This reform was carried out without changing the unified purchase and marketing system, and it can only be regarded as a partial adjustment. It was not until 1985 that my country completely abandoned the 32-year unified purchase system. On January 1 of this year, the No. 1 document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stipulated that starting from 1985, the unified purchase of grain would be canceled and instead ordered by contract.The local government organizes the grain department to negotiate with the state-owned farms, agricultural collective production units and farmers according to the contract order plan issued by the state, and sign a grain order contract. In normal years, it must be completed, and in severe disasters, it can be appropriately reduced or exempted.The part that exceeds the contract order can be purchased and sold freely.

According to the assumption at the time of formulation, contract ordering is not only an economic contract, but also a national task, in an attempt to break the rigid system of planned purchases and gradually move closer to grain commercialization.For this reason, the state has also reduced planned purchases year by year and expanded the proportion of bargained purchases and sales.Purchases within the national plan were reduced from 102.35 billion kilograms in 1984 to 50 billion kilograms in 1989; while bargain purchases rose from 9.3 billion kilograms to 51.54 billion kilograms.This is the "dual-track system" of grain purchases and sales of "one piece of life, one piece of life".Its policy is to "gradually reduce contract orders and expand market acquisitions." The basic standpoint is to stabilize one area (contract order) and invigorate one area (market negotiation).

However, this reform is quite difficult in the implementation process.Contract ordering is both a contract and a task, which mixes the principle of commodity exchange with the principle of state administration, making it difficult to grasp in implementation.Secondly, due to the implementation of the "dual-track system" of "one piece of dead, one piece of living", there is a large gap in the price difference between the two parties. On the one hand, it makes farmers unwilling to complete or try to avoid ordering, and on the other hand, it gives opportunities for reselling grain.

Specifically, there are four main problems in the dual-track system of grain coexistence. One is that the relationship between grain prices has not been straightened out, the price comparison of agricultural products is unreasonable, grain prices are still low, and the problem of long-term inversion of grain purchase and sales prices has not yet been resolved. The fundamental solution; the second is that the grain purchase and sales system has not been straightened out, and the income and expenditure of cheap grain have been upside down for a long time, and there is a big gap; the third is that the grain circulation channels have not been straightened out, and the difficulty of selling grain has continued to occur for many years, and regional blockades and "grain wars" have alternated appear, the contradiction between production and sales areas is relatively prominent.When food is tight, they want to unify, and when food is loose, they want to release it; when there is too much food, there are few channels, and the circulation is not smooth; when there is less food, there are more channels, and the market is chaotic.As a result, they often fall into the vicious circle of "unification leads to death, and once release leads to chaos"; the fourth is that the grain management system has not been straightened out, policy-based management and normal commodity management have been mixed together for a long time, and grain business operations cannot obtain reasonable profits. It has affected the initiative and enthusiasm of grain enterprises to improve management and improve economic benefits.

Taken together, the biggest problem with the "dual-track system" of grain purchases and sales is that only the "unified purchase" has been canceled, but the "unified marketing" has not been touched. 100 million yuan increased to 40 billion yuan in 1991, more than doubled, accounting for 1/3 of the country's fiscal revenue.The tighter the finances, the less it is possible to increase the purchase price of grain, and the more unreasonable the grain price, the less willing farmers are to grow more grain.In addition, due to the reduction in the number of orders, the number of unified sales has increased year by year. As a result, the number of purchases and sales has been reversed, and tensions have repeatedly emerged. imports to compensate.Especially in 1989, when the supply and demand of grain became tense, the government had no choice but to close down almost all free trade markets for grain, restoring the monopoly of state-owned businesses.In order to ensure sufficient grain sources, the name of unified distribution purchase was canceled, but in fact, compulsory purchase measures were still adopted.In some areas, in order to urge farmers to pay grain, even the police and militiamen were used to dig in warehouses and pour them out of vats. The masses reported that the current contract order is actually better than "unified purchase is still unified purchase".If there is too much food, it is a contract system, and the food department does not accept it; if there is less food, it is an order system, and the government sends people to force it.Farmers have become rats in the bellows, suffering from both ends.

The double price of the dual-track system also violates the requirement of the law of value for price identity, and cannot transmit correct and reliable information to promote the rational allocation of factors.Double prices mean differences in interests, and the order base is distributed according to administrative regions, which is not conducive to the formation of a reasonable division of labor between regions.Moreover, under the dual-track system, there will inevitably be administrative intervention in grain production and distribution, which often violates objective laws, artificially divides the market, and engages in regional blockades. From 1985 to 1986, the vast majority of provinces in the country adopted compulsory measures to prohibit the flow of grain to other places, not only in food-deficient provinces, but also in some grain-producing provinces. The advantages.Secondly, in the “dual-track” sales system of the state-run commercial enterprises, on the one hand, they purchase grain at a contract price lower than the market price, and on the other hand, they sell grain at a price lower than the purchase price. The upside down part is subsidized by the government. The state-owned business operates in a monopoly position, so that the operating loss is covered by the policy loss, and the state-owned business loses its vitality; , to make huge profits.The double price in the purchase and sale of grain also provides the management units and individuals with the opportunity and possibility to profit from it, and encourages the unhealthy trend of using power for personal gain.Therefore, some people commented that the "dual-track system" is actually a "dual ghost system".

This is an incomplete reform. "Still holding the pipa and half covering the face", as a result, the country is carrying a heavier burden, and the grain market continues to fall into a cycle of "difficult to sell" and "difficult to buy". As the saying goes: a big family is hard to take care of.For China, which has a population of more than 1.2 billion, it seems to feel more deeply. We must protect the interests of farmers, so the purchase price of grain must be increased year by year until it basically matches the value. But we also have to consider the life of urban residents, so the sales price of grain has to remain stable, so that it has not changed for more than two decades.

"The low price of grain hurts the peasants" and "the expensive grain hurts the people", embarrassing the Chinese government: the back of the hand and the palm of the hand are full of flesh, neither side can be hurt! A double-edged sword that is difficult to grasp. A seesaw that is difficult to balance. This makes the reform of China's grain circulation system unavoidable and cautious. In 1985, a reform was carried out on the unified distribution of grain, but the effect was not obvious because the reform was not thorough and the measures were not matched.It has become the consensus of the whole society that the unified marketing must be dealt with.The state has used a large amount of financial subsidies to maintain the "consistent" unified marketing price for 25 years. Although the "ultra-stable" food supply has been maintained, the state has paid a heavy price for this.It also artificially distorts the price relationship between production and consumption.According to statistics, the country spends 11 times more money on food consumption than on food production. In 1991, the State Council decided to appropriately adjust the unified marketing price of grain and oil from May 1.This is the first comprehensive price adjustment since 1966. Although this is a small adjustment, one kilogram of rice still only costs 0.294 yuan, an increase of only 0.18 yuan (marked one meter); one kilogram of flour only costs 20 cents more.And after the price hike in 1988, our daily consumer goods had a relatively large price increase. This time, the grain and oil adjustment gave each employee a monthly subsidy of 6 yuan. It is said that there is no major difficulty in bearing it.However, due to people's special sensitivity to food prices, it still caused a big wave in the whole country.Since the "declassification order" was issued on April 23, there has been a large-scale panic buying wave across the country. In Beijing, there are 1,828 grain stores, 90% of which have hundreds of people buying grain. Bicycles, trolleys, and tricycles are full of grain stores. Residents line up in front of the grain stores in Ping’anli, Xicheng District, and Gulou Street, Dongcheng District. , causing traffic jams. For three consecutive days in Chongqing, all the grain stores had long queues of people buying grain, buying sack by sack and mopping by cart by cart. In Leiyang City, Hunan Province, 4.23 million kilograms of the 6 million kilograms of surplus grain saved by the residents were purchased before May Day, which is equivalent to the city’s grain purchasing power for four months. Kilogram. Fortunately, the grain and oil materials were well prepared this time, so although there was a rush to buy, it did not cause any major disturbances. The new price was officially implemented on May 1. When people looked at it in detail, the price increase was only a few cents, and it soon stabilized. With this experience, on April 1, 1992, the government once again increased the parity rations for urban residents, and implemented the same price for purchase and sale.Western reporters immediately telegraphed the world: "China is breaking through the last restricted area of ​​price reform." Grain price increase is inevitable, so it is expected by many people, so that the price increase this time is so calm that it is unbelievable, and there is no phenomenon of queuing up for price adjustment last year. The unified grain purchase and marketing system began to falter.Coastal areas such as Guangdong and Fujian have taken the lead in fully liberalizing grain prices and operations.Since 1988, Zhuozi County in Inner Mongolia, Guanghan City in Sichuan Province, Zhuhai City in Guangdong Province, Shenzhen City, and Hainan Province have all liberalized their markets. On November 1, 1992, the whole country officially announced that the price and management of grain purchase and sale would be liberalized, and the 40-year-old unified purchase and marketing system came to an end. This is the core reform of China's transition from a planned economic system to a market economic system, and it is also the reform that involves the most extensive and most influential areas.The grain produced by farmers can be marketed for free trade, while urban residents no longer have the protection of purchasing grain that symbolizes privileges. By the beginning of the second year, almost all counties and cities across the country had fully liberalized grain prices and operations.The grain purchases were withdrawn from circulation, and the food stamps known as the "second RMB" were declared invalid. However, because the relevant departments and some local leaders did not have a clear understanding of the ideology, the direction of action was unclear, and the preparations were not sufficient, and the measures were not matched, the result not only failed to achieve the expected results, but triggered a nationwide food price hikes.The most prominent manifestation is the one-sided understanding of the market economy.Some people think that a market economy means that everything should be liberalized and the market should be regulated without the state intervening.The pigs were released, and we had no problems. The eggs were released, and they were running better. The vegetables were released, and the volume increased and the price was stable.Can't the food be let go?Our country has already implemented the socialist market economic system, and of course we cannot allow the existence of the unified purchase and marketing of grain, which is the most characteristic of the planned economy. The idea seems reasonable, but they overlooked an important issue, that is, food is by no means an ordinary commodity, but an important strategic material related to the national economy and the people's livelihood.The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and other countries with relatively developed and perfect market economic systems in the world have not completely released grain. The reason is that if a country gives up the management and control of the grain market, it will be difficult to effectively adjust the supply and demand of grain. balance and maintain social stability.What's more, we are still an underdeveloped country with a lot of people and little land, and the contradiction between food supply and demand will exist for a long time?The ambiguity in understanding will inevitably lead to deviations in action.For a time, grain production was squeezed out, grain planting area declined rapidly, grain purchase and sales were not taken seriously, and the grain sources controlled by the state were seriously insufficient... So, in 1993, when the grain harvest was bumper, our grain had problems.We don't know if it's misfortune or luck.It is unfortunate that grain fluctuations have occurred in the context of a bumper harvest and sufficient stocks, which shows how fragile my country's grain market is; if it is lucky, if it is not in a year of good harvest but in a year of disaster, if it is not in the year of national grain stock More often, this turmoil occurs when the country's food reserves are insufficient. We don't know what the ending will be like. Presumably we will not have such an easy time. In fact, as early as Guangdong's grain management was liberalized, some bad signs had already appeared, but we did not pay attention to it.At that time, after Guangdong's grain management was liberalized, first, grain production continued to decline. Compared with 1991, the province's grain sown area decreased by 8.03 million mu in 1993, a decrease of 14.2%, and the total grain output decreased by 2.44 billion kilograms, a decrease of 13%. .Second, there is a lack of effective means to control grain sources. All parties have weakened the concept of grain ordering tasks. Purchase contracts are not binding. Public grain collection policies are not implemented. In 1992, Guangdong Province purchased only 1.6 billion kilograms of grain, a decrease of 61% compared to 1991. After efforts were made in 1993, only 2.3 billion kilograms of grain was purchased, which was still 44% lower than in 1991.Third, market management is disorderly, basically in a state of laissez-faire.Unlicensed operations abound, there are many grain wholesalers, there are few standardized grain wholesale markets, and there is no complete grain market management law, which has led some private grain traders to deliberately drive up grain prices.Fourth, the status of state-owned grain enterprises as the main channel has been weakened. Before the liberalization of operations, the market share of the state-owned grain sector in the province reached 80%. Without seriously summarizing the experience and lessons of Guangdong and other places that took the first step, they hastily launched this "three liberalization" reform of grain purchase, operation and supply. The starting point is good, but the result has not been achieved. success.It was originally envisaged that after the price is liberalized, the purchase and sale of grain is basically the same as other agricultural and sideline products that have been liberalized. The price is mainly determined by the market, and the government can provide guidance and management. Severe inflation with rising prices across the board.It was originally envisaged that the financial subsidies for grain management could be canceled quickly, and the historical debts could be slowly digested. However, due to the problems in sales price limit, capital operation and storage, the financial subsidies and bank debts are still high. From the grain turmoil in 1993, we can clearly see that the huge fluctuations in China's grain market were largely caused not by grain production, but by the circulation system.It is obviously not feasible to continue to follow the traditional grain purchase and marketing system, and it is unrealistic to let it go in the name of going to the market. The big grain fluctuations since 1993 are not due to "less" grain prices rising, but "more" grain prices also rising.The essence of grain price changes is the adjustment of the interest structure of the state, operators, and consumers. The reason for further liberalization of purchase and sale prices is that the state is too burdened to protect both producers and consumers.At that time, the special grain storage stock was 40 billion kilograms, and the turnover grain stock was 100-120 billion kilograms, almost monopolizing the entire grain market.Originally, there was grain in hand, so there was no need to worry about grain price fluctuations, but the rise in grain prices happened precisely from the panic buying of the early indica rice with the largest inventory.State-owned grain enterprises rushed to buy early indica rice in order to make up for the inventory deficit after the liberalization of operations.It is understood that during the period from 1992 to 1993, due to the cancellation of grain purchase tasks in some places, the original grain purchase funds were misappropriated, and the state-owned grain enterprises that rely on grain management for a living had to use the grain in stock to maintain operations. Grain storage has also been embezzled and caused "deficient treasury".On the other hand, food price fluctuations are closely related to the financial situation. Whether "more food" or "less food" often depends on "less money" or "more money". When the "difficulty in selling grain" occurs, it is usually when the government has no money to collect grain and the price of grain falls again and again; The price rises faster.Therefore, financial reform is also part of the reform of the grain distribution system. The establishment and improvement of the grain market economic system, which is the largest agricultural product, is by no means an easy task, nor is it simply let go as most people imagine. On the contrary, strengthening the management and regulation of the grain market is an important task under the conditions of the establishment of a socialist market economy. A basic content of China's grain circulation system.This is not only a general requirement of a market economy, but also a special feature of grain as a special commodity.Of course, this kind of management and regulation is by no means the compulsive management and administrative regulation like the unified purchase and marketing in the past.According to Comrade Zhu Rongji's conception, it is mainly to follow the law of value and the principle of market economy. On the one hand, it is necessary to establish a reasonable grain price that not only takes care of the interests of farmers but also allows urban residents to bear it. Ensure balanced regulation and market supply. Due to the unsuccessful reform of the grain circulation system, the state had to take strict control measures to stabilize the market and stabilize grain prices, and many aspects have returned to the original situation.One is from canceling an order to resuming an order. At the beginning of 1993, it was announced to change the state order to contract order, which was regarded by some as the third emancipation of farmers. In May 1994, the document of the State Council on deepening the reform of the grain purchase and sales system clearly defined grain order as a national task and an obligation of farmers. All levels of government must be done.The second is to re-implement the "dual-track system" from the abolition of the "dual-track system" of prices. In 1993, one price was implemented for both grain purchase and sales, which is called price unification, and parity and bargaining disappeared. Dual-track prices, ordering tasks are purchased according to national pricing, and other purchases are made on the market. The state uses administrative means to control a part (70-80%) of social commodity grain.The third is from the abolition of food stamps to the restoration of food books, and the supply of vouchers is limited. After the grain turmoil in 1994, the State Council began to deploy the reform of China's grain distribution system. The general policy is three aspects of policy: First, the purchase policy.Continue to retain the state's task of ordering grain, purchase grain from farmers at a uniform order price that basically reflects the value of the commodity, and ensure that the state holds 70-80% of the commodity grain.The second is the supply policy.The state-owned grain sector must ensure the basic food rations of urban residents, troops and rural population with sufficient food supply, while maintaining relatively stable market prices.The third is the market policy. It is necessary to strictly strengthen the market management of grain circulation. During the period of ordering grain purchases, non-state-owned grain management units and individuals are not allowed to purchase grain directly in the countryside.Unlicensed operations must be resolutely banned, and behaviors that disrupt the grain market, such as hoarding, bullying, and driving up grain prices, must be severely punished.The goal of the reform of the grain distribution system is to gradually establish a unified, open, competitive, and orderly grain purchase and sales system that is compatible with the socialist market economic system, to implement market regulation under the macro-control of the state, and to give full play to the role of the market mechanism in resource allocation. Basic status, and standardize market behavior and rule of law. In reforming the grain circulation system, in addition to fully considering China's special national conditions of a large population and little land, it is also necessary to seriously consider the special grain situation of tight supply and demand.Specifically, the first is the long-term shortage of my country's total grain.Due to our country's large population and little arable land, food production cannot meet social needs for a long period of time, and it is a long-term shortage of commodities.Second, the grain production is small and scattered, self-sufficient.This feature is completely different from the impact of modern production by farmers in the United States, Canada and other countries on grain circulation.It will be difficult for my country's grain production to change the state of hoes and rakes plus animal power, facing the loess and back to the sky for a long period of time in the future.Due to the low level of productivity, the amount of my country's total annual grain production depends on the enthusiasm of 250 million farmers to grow grain, and on the weather.If the harvest is good and the enthusiasm for growing grain is high, each household will produce 50 kilograms more, and the total amount of grain in the country will increase by 12.5 billion kilograms, otherwise it will decrease by 12.5 billion kilograms.One increase and one decrease, the difference is 25 billion kilograms.Similarly, because of price and other reasons, if each household sells more or less grain by 50 kilograms, the impact on the national grain procurement is also 25 billion kilograms. 50 kilograms is insignificant for a farmer, but 25 billion kilograms has a considerable impact on the circulation field.This is a very special situation in my country's grain circulation. If it is not resolved properly, it will easily cause large fluctuations in grain. From the above considerations, the reform of my country's grain circulation system should firstly establish a reasonable price for grain purchase and sale.It is necessary to follow the law of value and the principle of equivalent commodity exchange, and respect the mechanism of the market to form prices. It is also necessary to proceed from the basic national conditions of our country, consider the national financial resources and the bearing capacity of all aspects, actively and steadily carry out food reform and adjustment, and gradually understand Follow the price relationship, promote the development of grain production, and keep the market grain price basically stable. Secondly, in our country, the implementation of the "three liberalizations" of grain to allow free purchase and sale does not meet the conditions and does not conform to China's national conditions and grain conditions, as well as the special attributes of grain commodities. It has been proved by practice that it is not advisable.Some countries in Europe and the United States with a relatively developed market economy, although they advocate free trade, have been intervening in the production and distribution of food and strengthening management. Japan, South Korea and other countries that are relatively short of food have stricter management of food.Our country cannot let it go easily, and we will have a special discussion on this point later. According to the above ideas and principles, after 1994, my country's grain circulation system has carried out the following three aspects of exploration. First, the "rice bag" governor responsibility system. This was put forward by the State Council in the "Notice on Deepening the Reform of the Grain Purchase and Sales System" in 1994: "Implement the government leadership responsibility system of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, stabilize grain production, stabilize grain stocks, and flexibly use local grain reserves to adjust , to ensure the stability of grain supply and grain prices, and to be responsible for the balance of the total amount of grain in the region.” The basic requirements are: first, the governor should be responsible for stabilizing the planting area, developing grain production, and increasing effective supply; second, the governor should be responsible for purchasing , and strive to master more grain sources, insisting that the grain department must control 70-80% of the commodity grain sources.The plan ordered by the state should be the task of governments at all levels and the obligation of farmers, and should be implemented step by step to farmers to ensure completion; the third is that the governor is responsible for the food balance in the region, ensuring supply and stabilizing the food market; the fourth is to establish a local food reserve risk fund system.To sum it up, all governors, mayors, and chairmen of autonomous regions are responsible for the balance between supply and demand of grain in their provinces, cities, and districts.As much grain as the province needs, we must try our best to plant, produce, and purchase so that the purchase and sales balance out.If there is a shortage, go to the wholesale market in the production area to buy or import, and sell the excess to the sales area or the country, contributing to the realization of the national total balance.Therefore, the "rice bag" governor responsibility system is also called regional self-balance.In order to fulfill this responsibility, the provinces must stabilize the sown area of ​​grain, increase grain production, and establish local grain reserves.At the same time, the central government has strengthened macro-control. By understanding and mastering the food balance plate of each province, coordinating the main production areas and sales areas to establish a stable supply and demand relationship, and using the central grain reserves to solve catastrophic disasters and suppress grain price fluctuations, to help provinces achieve regional grain supply and demand. balance.The purpose of implementing this reform is to give full play to the enthusiasm of the central government and the local government, and work together to solve the problem of feeding our populous country. On February 27, 1995, at the Central Rural Work Conference, General Secretary Jiang Zemin explained the meaning and function of the "rice bag" governor responsibility system: "In a big country with a population of 1.2 billion, we must rely on self-sufficiency in food supply and demand. Basic balance. We must recognize the special importance of the food issue politically and strategically. In recent years, some developed coastal areas have experienced a large reduction in the area of ​​grain fields and a decrease in yield per unit area. They rely on purchasing large quantities of grain from other places to live. This situation must be reversed quickly .From a province's point of view, the basis for solving the food problem must be to increase local grain production...The main leaders of the party and government must implement a strict responsibility system. If there is a problem with the "rice bag" in any province, the secretary of that province will be responsible. , The governor is responsible." Putting the governor in charge of the people's "rice bags" is an important measure taken by the central government to maintain the balance between grain supply and demand and stabilize the grain market.In the past, the people's food problems were all on the shoulders of the central government. Where there was a shortage of food, they would ask the central government to ask for it. Now, the governors are not so relaxed.They must carefully consider the production and sales situation in the area. Grain-producing areas should consider exporting grain to increase farmers' income; grain-selling areas should consider controlling grain sources to ensure supply. Some people worry that this will lead to self-protection of provinces and regional blockades?Judging from the actual situation, food-deficient areas need to buy food, and he will not engage in blockades; if grain-producing areas want to take advantage of their resources, sell a variety of grains to outsiders, which is a basic trend at present.So it is unlikely to be blocked.Regional blockades are generally the product of a shortage of total food supply in the society. In the past, there have been local regional blockades many times without the implementation of the rice bag governor responsibility system. Therefore, regional blockades have no necessary connection with the governor responsibility system.Others worry that the implementation of food regional balance and governor responsibility system will cause food-deficit provinces to lose their resource advantages and become self-sufficient in food?The central government clearly pointed out from the very beginning that the implementation of regional balance is by no means a small but complete, or the old road of self-sufficiency.Zhu Rongji emphasized: The central government's policy of implementing regional balance in grain is to realize the responsibility system of grain governors and to enhance the enthusiasm and sense of responsibility of governments at all levels in agricultural investment and grain production.The implementation of regional self-balance in grain does not require each region to balance itself, let alone require regional self-sufficiency. It still needs to make full use of the advantages of their own crops and other economic crops according to the economic divisions that have been formed in the country, and give full play to the market. The basic role of resource allocation. Judging from the national situation, the "rice bag" governor responsibility system has achieved relatively satisfactory results.First, the basic position of agriculture has been strengthened, and grain production has developed rapidly; second, grain purchases have been implemented and effective supply has been increased; third, the grain market has been stabilized and grain supply has been guaranteed; fourth, local grain reserves have been strengthened.In view of this, the comprehensive grain reform in 1998 continued to maintain this effective measure. Second, the food sector implements "two-line operation" of policy-oriented business and commercial operation. On June 10, 1995, the State Council issued Document No. 15 on the implementation of "two-line operation" in the grain sector, and subsequently held a national reform work conference on "two-line operation" in the grain sector on July 18. Since the merger of the China Grain Corporation, the Grain Administration Bureau, and the State Public Grain Depot in 1952 to form the grain department, the grain department has not only undertaken national policy tasks, but also engaged in commercial business activities for a long time. "Officials", businessmen are not businessmen, the state's financial burden is heavy, and grain enterprises themselves lack vitality.Many disadvantages in the current field of grain circulation are caused by this. Therefore, the State Council decided to operate on two fronts, separate policy-related business from commercial business, and let managers focus on the management of the grain market, while operators do everything possible Invigorate grain circulation and other business projects, so as to increase its own benefits. The specific purpose of the two-line operation of the grain sector is to: strengthen the macro-control of the grain and oil market by the state and local governments, better organize and implement the total balance of grain and oil, adjust the throughput in a timely manner, and maintain the basic stability of grain prices; Financial subsidies for grain enterprises should give full play to the role of financial subsidies; manage bank purchase funds well, ensure that policy purchase funds are not occupied by commercial operations, and prohibit the use of bank loans to make up for corporate losses or advance unallocated financial subsidies funds; strengthen the operation and management of state-owned grain enterprises, reduce grain and oil circulation links, reduce circulation costs and operating costs, and enhance strength and vitality in competition. The two-line operation requires a clear division of central and local food powers, and a good two-level total balance.Grain work implements a system of unified central leadership and hierarchical responsibility. Under the principles of unified policy, unified market, and unified import and export management, the central and local governments are responsible at different levels.The grain and oil directly controlled by the central government is composed of the national reserve grain and oil and the central imported grain and oil. The state's right to order grain belongs to the central government and is used by provincial governments.For local food balance, the responsibility system of governors, autonomous region chairmen and municipal mayors is implemented.It is stipulated that grain production areas should establish local reserves of grain sales of more than 3 months, and sales areas should establish local reserves of grain sales of 6 months to ensure supply. Separating the policy business and commercial operation of the grain sector, establishing two operating mechanisms, and accounting separately, this is a profound change to the decades-old traditional grain circulation system and is an important part of the reform of the entire economic system.It touches on the thorny issue of grain finances.In the past, policy losses were mixed with operating losses, and operating losses were also included in the policy books. However, the part that should be provided with policy subsidies has not been implemented for a long time in some places, which has dragged down commercial operations.This time the State Council made up its mind, on the one hand to strictly separate the two, and to resolutely stop and digest historical bad debts.Prior to this, 54.5 billion yuan had been charged to the national food system. "Two-line operation" must digest historical debts, otherwise the relationship cannot be straightened out, obstacles cannot be removed, and the original intention cannot be achieved.However, to digest pending accounts and implement suspension of pending accounts, the two-line operation is a prerequisite.The central government's attitude is very firm, and the policy is very clear. As long as the outstanding debts are digested within five years, the central government will fully bear the interest.The central government has decided that the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions are responsible for digesting the unpaid accounts. The "two-line operation" is the beginning of further deepening the reform of the grain circulation system, and it plays a very important role in strengthening the country's macro-control, straightening out the relationship between grain, finance, and finance, and further implementing the governor's responsibility system. The new food reform program in 1998 was also based on this. Third, establish a vertical management system for national grain and oil reserves. 在“文革”时期，有不少省市在粮票上印有毛主席语录：“备战、备荒、为人民。”据考证，这句话并不是毛主席的原话。1964年，毛主席在杭州听取几位副总理关于经济计划工作的汇报后，说：“现在不错啊，咱们工业有个大庆，农业有个大寨。但计划工作时要考虑人民的生活。总之，一切从几亿人民出发。”后来，他又同周恩来总理说，要注意三句话，注意战争，注意灾荒，注意一切为人民。为了顺口，周总理将其概括为“备战、备荒、为人民。” 现在我们很少看到这条语录了，但这句话的意义，对我们现在的粮食流通改革仍有重要的启示作用。中国素有“积谷防饥”的传统，《管子·山权数》中说：“王者岁守十分之三，三年与少半成岁，三十三年与少半而藏十年。藏三之一不足以伤民，而农夫敬事力作。”意思是说，每年贮存粮食收成的十分之三，合三年又三分之一，就可以有一年的粮食储备，而合三十三年又三分之一，就可以有十年的粮食储备。这样，每年储藏三分之一，不至于伤害农民，反而可以使农民专心耕作。另外，《管子·山至数》中还主张国家在粮食贮备问题上建立专项的资金保证。他认为，国家以县为单位设立专项的粮食贮备金，春天，粮价高时，用这项款向农民发放贷款，秋天，粮食收获，价格下跌，则以时价回收贷款，农民以粮还贷。这样，国家运用这一款项，不仅可以贮存粮食，而且能调节余缺，避免丰年粮食卖不出去，连猪狗都吃人食，而碰到灾荒年成，满路上都是饥饿的灾民的情况发生。 现在，我们说，战争的阴影并没有完全消除，而灾害的侵扰则是经常发生的，1998年的特大洪灾，以后的岁月里还有可能发生。因此，现在重提“备战、备荒、为人民”不但不过时，相反还有重要的现实意义。这就给我国的粮食流通体制提供了一个改革的方向，那就是建立完备的粮食储备制度。 我们需要建立的粮食储备制度，应该包括国家储备和地方储备。国家的粮食储备则包括战略储备、专项储备、市场供应储备和基本消费储备。国家的粮食战略储备是维护国家根本利益和整个国家以及社会经济的根本之所在，因此，必须由国家进行收购、贮存、调拨和投放与更新；国家的专项储备是运用中央财政建立的储备，主要用于救济全国性的自然灾害，平抑大范围的市场粮价波动和应付各种突发性的大事故；市场粮食储备是以调控市场运行为目的粮食储备，对社会起蓄水池作用。地方储备则主要是保持地区平衡的储备。 国家有了充足的粮食储备，就能有效地对市场进行调节。在粮食供过于求，价格大幅度大跌的情况下，通过保护价收购，增加储备，保护农民的生产积极性；在粮食供求比较紧张，价格上涨幅度较大时，通过储备粮的抛售，缓解供求矛盾，抑制粮价上涨。 江泽民总书记在1995年的中央农村工作会议上指示，一定要把粮食库存搞实。 现在，全国有150多万粮食职工从事粮食储备工作，目前的问题是由于体制不顺、政企不分、盈亏统算，政策性亏损严重，占了全粮食系统财务挂账的大部分。国务院关于两线运行的文件，明确规定粮食仓储企业是政策性业务单位，享受政策性补贴，要服务和服从于宏观调控，为稳定市场、平抑粮价发挥主渠道作用。 为了更进一步地加强国家对粮源的掌握与对粮食市场的控制，国家粮食储备局正逐步做到直接管理若干大中型储备库、转运站。其根本任务是按照国家有关法规、政策和业务制度，对国家储备粮油进行购、销、调、存和轮换，为粮食的宏观调控服务。 从近几年实践的效果来看，以上三项改革是比较成功的，粮食市场趋于稳定，粮食秩序逐渐理顺，一些体制方面的深层次矛盾也在逐渐解决，这一切，都为1998年的全面粮改打下了良好的基础。 如何建立一个现代化的又与我国国情相适应的粮食市场流通体系，是摆在我们面前的一项艰巨的任务。这不是一天两天就能达到的目标，而需要我们进行认真地探索和逐步地完善。也许我们还会遇到坎坷，遇到曲折，但我们只要遵循实事求是的原则，遵循市场经济的发展规律，中国的粮食流通就一定能走在健康、有序、既促进生产又保证消费的康庄大道。